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Realism Meets Nation Building
The US policy elite’s critique of US
foreign policy in Pakistan Alicia Mollaun 3rd year PhD student POGO
Research Project • Examina:on of US and Pakistan elite percep:ons of US foreign and aid policy in Pakistan in the post 9/11 era.
• 38 face-‐to-‐face interviews conducted in Washington D.C. and New York in March 2012.
• 40 face-‐to-‐face interviews conducted in Islamabad and Lahore between October 2011 and October 2013.
Research themes/chapters • 1. US elite views of US foreign policy in Pakistan • 2. US elite views of US aid to Pakistan • 3. Pakistan elite views of US foreign policy in Pakistan • 4. Pakistan elite views of US aid to Pakistan • 5. Comparison of US and Pakistani views
Research Questions – this chapter • Does the US elite think that the main challenges facing Pakistan are internal or external? • Does the US elite think that US policy in Pakistan is mainly guided by realist or by na:on building objec:ves? • How sa:sfied overall is the US elite with US foreign policy in Pakistan?
Literature • Proponents: US responsibility to na:on build (see Dobbins (2003) (2007); Lesser (1999)) • Argue that despite limited success – worthy policy. • Fukuyama (2004): threats come from weak states – in the US interest to teach people to be_er govern themselves.
• Realist Cri0cs: See Morrell et al (1999); Pei and Kasper (2003); Dempsey and Fontaine (2001); Dempsey (2002). • Not the job of the US to na:on build – par:cularly as a means to counter terrorism. • Dempsey argues that na:on building won’t combat terrorism – CT hinges on policy of ‘victory and credible deterrence’.
Literature • Large case study based literature of US na:on building: • Post 9/11, majority of literature focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, li_le on US na:on building in Pakistan.
• Afghanistan and Iraq: Fukuyama (2006) • Iraq: Dodge (2003), Diamond (2006) • Afghanistan: Goodson (2005), Rubin (2003) • Pakistan/Afghanistan/Central Asia: Rashid (2008)
• Li_le considera:on of Pakistan -‐ (Rashid (2008) a journalis:c excep:on), or on possible trade-‐offs/tensions between realist and na:on-‐building objec:ves.
• This research fills a gap on the literature on Pakistan and na:on building; and on US elite percep:ons of US policy more broadly.
Obama’s nation building strategy in Pakistan
Af-‐Pak Strategy 2009: “Today, it is clearer than ever before that we must expand our rela:onship with Pakistan beyond security issues, and lead the interna:onal community in helping the Pakistani people overcome poli:cal, economic, and security challenges that threaten Pakistan’s stability, and in turn undermine regional stability.”
But with a hint of realism Obama: “Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to roo:ng out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that ac:on be taken -‐-‐ one way or another -‐-‐ when we have intelligence about high-‐level terrorist targets.” (2009)
So what does the US policy elite think about US policy in Pakistan?
What is the major short-‐ to medium-‐term challenge facing Pakistan? • Wide range of challenges iden0fied:
• 34 different challenges named; 83 responses given. • Number of respondents = 36
• 14 of 36 elite respondents (39%) name at least one external challenge
• 30 of 36 elite respondents (83%) name at least one internal challenge
What is the major short-‐ to medium-‐term challenge facing Pakistan?
Most popular responses and number of respondents:
External (25% of total responses)
Internal (75% of total responses)
Afghanistan (5) Economy (10) India (5) Energy (6) Securing Nukes (3) Extremism (6)
What is the major short-‐ to medium-‐term challenge facing Pakistan?
“The domes:c situa:on in Pakistan will be cri:cal. It is going to be the economic problems that will be the driver, which will out of necessity force Pakistan into rethinking its regional rela:onships. The US obviously has a great interest in this because an unstable Pakistan is not going to help in crea:ng a stable Afghanistan or a stable South Asia.” Interview: Shuja Nawaz, The Atlan:c Council.
What does the US want most from Pakistan? • 18 different ‘wants’ iden:fied; 63 total responses (average of two per respondent) • Number of respondents = 32 Realist
63% (total responses)
Na0on Building 27%
Don’t know 10%
Afghanistan (17) Stability (7) US doesn’t know what it wants (4)
Counterterrorism (non-‐state actors) (6)
Extremism (social phenomenon) (5)
US has too many conflic:ng goals (2)
Nuclear Security (5) Governance (2)
Realist perspectives
“Why are we giving Pakistan this aid? It is Nigeria with nuclear weapons. That is, it is a poor country that cannot meet its budget, but it doesn’t have oil. So in a sense it is a form of blackmail…Pakistanis know that we regard their survival as important to us.” Interview: Stephen Cohen, Brookings Ins:tu:on 2013
Nation building perspectives “There are more extremists, a more religiously conserva:ve popula:on – that is what the trend is. Part of the problem is that there are always things to mul:ply that – a lack of educa:on, lack of jobs, lack of a stable economy. We don’t have programs to address it [extremism] at all … it is too much of a band-‐aid approach” Interview: Poli:cal Staffer, Washington D.C.
What is the one key factor you would change in US policy towards Pakistan? • 74% of responses advocated for a complete overhaul of US policy
• 24 different policy changes advocated, total responses 34 • Number of respondents = 26 • Wide range of changes suggested, most popular
Complete Policy Overhaul (74%)
Discrete Reforms (26%)
Take a longer term approach (5)
Make aid pay as you go (2)
Reset rela:ons (3) Promote peace with India (2)
Improve US credibility (2) Reduce drone strikes (1)
What is the one key factor you would change in US policy towards Pakistan?
“The US has no long-‐term strategy for its rela:onship with Pakistan. They have a strategy based on the war in Afghanistan. If you read the strategic documents the Obama Administra:on puts out, the purpose of the rela:onship with Pakistan is to defeat and dismantle AQ, prevent safe havens and nuclear issues. It is all limited to that agenda. This is the problem.” Interview: Shamila Chaudhary, New America Founda:on
How satisDied overall is the US elite with US foreign policy in Pakistan? • Very dissa:sfied. • Dissa:sfac:on expressed in very general terms – “take a longer term approach”.
• Indicates dissa:sfac:on with US policy on the whole (both military and civilian).
• Lack of ‘discrete’ or specific policy ideas tells us that there are no easy fixes for the US in Pakistan.
Why the dissatisfaction? • It is difficult to achieve realist and na:on building goals in Pakistan: • Messaging gets lost – US asks too much of Pakistan – the elite think there are too many goals/unclear goals.
• Pakistan’s weak government and civil-‐military tension. • Over the past decade the US has go_en li_le bang for its buck in Pakistan – aid for na:on building has yielded poor results in terms of Pakistan assis:ng the US with security goals (realist goals) – so why keep pursuing this policy?
“I am not quite sure the US knows what it wants. American policy is in the midst of transi:on, from a near myopic focus…on the war on terror…the Obama Administra:on sustained many aspects of the Bush approach and tried to add civilian aid…but never really broke the narra:ve -‐ a principle objec:ve of the Obama Administra:on’s engagement was the outcome of its investments in Afghanistan.” Interview: Steve Coll, New America Founda:on
Why the dissatisfaction? • There is disconnect between US goals and Pakistan’s priori:es • Many elite believe there is li_le convergence of na:onal interests, especially regarding the Taliban and Pakistan’s strategic use of terrorist networks.
“We want things Pakistan does not want to do or cannot deliver on. There is a direct correla:on, the security apparatus knows, that if they extend their CT opera:ons beyond the Pakistan Taliban, they are invi:ng a world of hurt. So they can’t deliver or don’t want to deliver. I don’t see it changing. They are promising less and delivering li_le. Except for against those guys [terrorists] that are aiming at them.” Interview, Michael Krepon, S:mson Centre
Why the dissatisfaction? • The pursuit of realist objec:ves undermines na:on building goals: • The elite are cognisant that the US’s transac:onal approach to the
rela:onship and pursuing short-‐term policy is not in the US’s long-‐term interests in building a stable and secure Pakistan.
• The elite argue that the US rela:onship with Pakistan is viewed through the lens of Afghanistan – this damaged US-‐Pak rela:ons and has undermined na:on building goals given Pakistan thinks the US is helping Pakistan in exchange for security coopera:on.
“I would want to take a much longer approach…This idea of thinking about Pakistan in the long-‐term rather than the short-‐term should be front and centre. Think about the 10-‐20 year :me frame, not what you want out of Pakistan next year… The threat of another 9/11 hangs over every poli:cians head. That overwhelms every other policy decision. If doing something slightly increases the chance that we will have another a_ack – no one wants to touch it, even if it is just the percep:on.” Interview: Danny Cutherell, Centre for Global Development
Conclusion • Looking at elite responses across all three research ques:ons, some interes:ng pa_erns emerge with regards to elite percep:ons: • Pakistan needs help primarily with its internal challenges –the elite are more likely to nominate internal rather than external challenges when asked what Pakistan’s main problems are.
Conclusion
• US primary goals in Pakistan are realist ones – despite the Obama rhetoric, the elite think that when it comes to Pakistan, realist goals are more important than na:on building for the US.
Conclusion
• US policy in Pakistan needs to be overhauled – Most of the elite advocate a complete overhaul or reset rather than more specific reforms.
Conclusion • I argue that this dissa:sfac:on with US policy reflects: • the difficulty of achieving either realist or na:on building goals • the disconnect between Pakistani needs and US priori:es • the fact that the pursuit of realist objec:ves undermines the achievement of na:on building.
Concluding remarks • In context of this broader research project, US elite views are not too dissimilar to Pakistan elite views. • Pakistan elite also emphasise internal challenges – though there is greater agreement on what the internal challenges are.
• Both have a realist perspec:ve. Some of the elite argue that US aid to Pakistan should be scaled back; many elite in Pakistan advocate cancelling it altogether.
• The Pakistan elite, however, is less dissa:sfied with the way its government is conduc:ng policy vis-‐à-‐vis the US – and collec:vely blame the US for many of its country’s woes.
Concluding remarks
Important applica:ons of this research: • Ul:mately, the US will have a greater probability of success in Pakistan if its broad geopoli:cal interests dovetail with those of both the elite and the people in the target na:on – and if the US can be_er understand the perspec:ves of the elite.
• This research adds to the large body of literature on elite opinion and fills a gap with respect to Pakistan. There is li_le in-‐depth research on the foreign policy views of the elite in Pakistan, or the US elite concerning US policy in Pakistan.
Discussion and Q&A