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A lecture by Vlad Tarko at a CADI workshop, www.cadi.ro/workshop
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From informal tribal affairs to formal democratic institutions
Vlad Tarko
Center for Institutional Analysis and Development,Eleutheria Foundation, Bucharest
Exchanges
Two people: A and BTwo products or services: x and y
A[x] & B[y] A[y] & B[x]
Exchanges
Two people: A and BTwo products or services: x and y
A[x(t1)] & B[y(t
1)] A[y(t
2)] & B[x(t
2)]
Exchanges
Two people: A and BTwo products or services: x and y
A[x(t1)] & B[y(t
1)] A[y(t
2)] & B[x(t
2)]
Why does the exchange happen?
A[y(t1)] > A[x(t
1)]
B[x(t1)] > B[y(t
1)]
Exchanges
Two people: A and BTwo products or services: x and y
A[x(t1)] & B[y(t
1)] A[y(t
2)] & B[x(t
2)]
Why does the exchange happen?
A[y(t1)] > A[x(t
1)]
B[x(t1)] > B[y(t
1)]
The possibility of error:
A[y(t2)] < A[x(t
1)] < A[y(t
1)]
B[x(t2)] < B[y(t
1)] < B[x(t
1)]
A and B are total strangers
Example:
x = a service A does to By = payment A receives for service x
The exchange:
A[x] & B[y] A[y] & B[x]
A and B are total strangers
Example:
x = a service A does to By = payment A receives for service x
The exchange:
A[x] & B[y] A[y] & B[x]
The method of payment:1. after
2. in advance3. mixed
A and B are total strangers
Example:
x = a service A does to By = payment A receives for service x
What the two people would do rationaly:
1. A[x] & B[y] A[ ] & B[x, y]
2. A[x] & B[y] A[x, y] & B[ ]
3.i. A[x] & B[y] A[y0] & B[x, y – y
0]
3.ii. A[x] & B[y] A[x, y0] & B[y – y
0]
A and B are total strangers
The magic of aggression (believable threat):
1. A[x] & B[y] A[ ] & B[x, y] B gets beaten
2. A[x] & B[y] A[x, y] & B[ ] A gets beaten
A and B are total strangers
The magic of aggression (believable threat):
1. A[x] & B[y] A[ ] & B[x, y] B gets beaten
2. A[x] & B[y] A[x, y] & B[ ] A gets beaten
The exchange happens in both cases...
The other use of aggression
Forcing someone to accept something s/he doesn't really want:
A[x] & B[y] A[y] & B[x]
A benefits: A[y] > A[x]B does not: B[x] < B[y]
x = suckers' payoffrole = lowers the threat level A needs to
deliver
This is how governments work!
Forcing someone to accept something s/he doesn't really want:
A[x] & B[y] A[y] & B[x]
A benefits: A[y] > A[x]B does not: B[x] < B[y]
x = a public „service”y = tax money
More authoritarian the state, poorer the services.
Inside a small community
Primitive tribes:
groups of 100-200 hunter-gatherers
Exchange facilitators, besides aggression:
- family ties
- reciprocity
- indirect reciprocity (reputation)
The phenomenon of trust
Due to the exchange facilitators the default attitude is changed:
Mutual distrust Mutual trust
Defections are dealt with- gossip diminished reputation
- exile, in extreme cases
Social pressure to conform
Voluntary exchanges
The concept of „voluntary exchage” is a consequence of the phenomenon of trust!
Prior to that you cannot distinguish:
- aggression as an exchange facilitator
from
- aggression as raw power used to trumple over other people's wishes
Psychological adaptations to social life
Reciprocal altruism the idea of fairness
Reputation & gossip information asymmetries are useless
those who withhold information are anti-social
Repeated interactions the phenomenon of trust
Aggression-based interactions with people from other tribes xenophobia
Insidethetribe
Inside a small community
Internal exchange facilitators:
- family ties
- reciprocity
- indirect reciprocity (reputation)
Relation with the outsiders:
- aggression-based.
This is all there was for more than 90% of our history!
The spread of Homo Sapiens
Here comes agriculture!
Consequences of agriculture
Poorer quality of food, but in larger quantities.
Food surpluses specialized clases of non-farmers:
- ruling class, - armies, - priests,
- manufacturers etc.
Living with farm animals diseases
Recent history in a nutshell:
Agriculture-based societies wiped out hunter-gather societies.
- Better guns and technology- Nastier germs - Standing armies
- Centralized governments
The origin of the state
The chief has a number of aids (friends and family) who:
- collect taxes- settle internal disputes
- organize engagement with other tribes (trade/war)
- organize public works
As the community got bigger the divizion of labor whithin government
the first state institutions formized rules of conduct
(after a long time) free entry into government
Problems with large communities
Partially identified by Jarod Diamond:
1. Solving and preventing conflicts between individuals
2. Decision making about public issues (the tragedy of the commons)
3. The barter system is no longer workable money missunderstanding money: „asking for interest is evil” (fairness) „the middle men are evil” (information assymetry) „inflation can make you rich” (more is better)
4. Large population densities insufficient resources
How tribal mentality solves them:
The magic solution: Centralized Authoritarian Control everything is owned by a small ruling class the ruling class itself is similar to a primitive tribe
1. Imposing a single public morality / religion2. Individuals obey the ruler's orders3. Redistributive practices (charity work)4. Imperialism and mercantilism
Modern solution:
The magic concept:Private Property Rights
(owning something no longer means that you are personally capable of defending it)
1. Rule of law2. Representative democracy
3. Free markets4. Free trade
The rule of law
Social function:
Creating trust between strangers
The rule of law
Social function:
Creating trust between strangers
Dilemmas:
How far can/may formal law diverge from informal social practices?
How does formal law evolve?
French law VS. American law
French law: the law is a clearly defined, so it is easier to defend yourself in court
American law: the formal law is closer to informal practices
French law: social issues are too complex for utilitarian analyses
American law: muddleing the difference between morality and legality
Legal abuse
The over-use of legislation when informal solutions are possible
The problem of the commons:Autocratic solutions Democratic/Capitalist
solutions Are they really working?
What can we learn from this transition?
Modern solution: End of history?
The magic concept:Private Property Rights
(owning something no longer means that you are personally capable of defending it)
1. Rule of law
2. Representative democracy Corruption & Paternalism
3. Free markets Conflict with the felling of fairness
4. Free trade