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Alan Rivaldo Public Utility Commission of Texas Regulators’ Role in Smart Grid Security What They Want to Know

Regulators’ Role in Smart Grid Security: What They Want to Know by Alan Rivaldo Public Utility Commission of Texas

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  • 1. Alan Rivaldo Public Utility Commission of Texas Regulators Role in Smart Grid Security What They Want to Know

2. BACKGROUND Utilities are typically monopolies and therefore are highly regulated. Unlike with most other stock investments, for the most part utility investors are guaranteed a certain rate of return on their investment. Any capital investments made by utilities are ultimately paid by ratepayers their customers. 2 3. CUSTOMERS AND REGULATORS Therefore, customers need to know what they are getting and how much theyre paying for it. Customers are typically disengaged from the process (at least beyond the bottom line on their utility bill). Regulators are the ones who are charged with knowing about the capital expenditures made by utilities. 3 4. RATE CASES Utilities recapture capital investments through rate cases Rate cases are conducted in open hearings This process is nothing new: ~100 years Any infrastructure: Water and Wastewater Electric service 4 5. WHAT IS NEW? In past few years, commissions became aware of cybersecurity as a pressing issue. Unfortunately, some awareness has come in the form of alarmist reports in the media: Mass outages Chaos Imminent take-overs by foreign governments 5 6. WHATS NOT SO NEW? Risk that legislatures may overreact Try to pass comprehensive bills that may: Cause unintended consequences Impede meaningful progress Interfere with commission direction Classic conflict: legislative vs. executive 6 7. THE CHALLENGE Utilities have difficulties finding qualified, knowledgeable staff for energy operations. Commissions are in the same position; engineers have to be recruited from an industry in which there traditionally hasnt been much turnover. 7 8. THE CHALLENGE (CONT.) States budgets are being cut Recruiting from industry and the private sector is a challenge PUC staff knowledge limited to conventional energy operations technologies Electromechanical devices Not advanced, data-intensive technologies 8 9. WHAT TO DO? Commissions train existing staff Hire new people to ask intelligent questions of: Utilities Vendors Staff within the agency Ponder implications of technology on policy Ponder implications of policy on technology 9 10. ASK UTILITIES QUESTIONS: STRATEGY What is your security strategy? Update your security plans? How often? Test your plans? Have you conducted vulnerability assessment of: Back Office information systems? Control Systems? 10 11. ASK UTILITIES QUESTIONS: RISK How do you manage risk? Use a Risk Management process? How was it derived? From DOE/NIST/NERC or some other authority? 11 12. QUESTIONS: UTILITY ENGAGEMENT Have you worked with Department of Homeland Security regarding cybersecurity? Aware of work with DHS National Cyber Security Division (NCSD)? US-CERT? ICS-CERT? etc. NESCO (National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization) Law Enforcement, i.e. Fusion centers Local chapter of InfraGard (FBI public private partnership)? DOE, SANS, others? 12 13. NERC CIP We may ask about NERC CIP Not necessarily the utilitys status NERC CIP is outside of a states jurisdiction No double reporting or double jeopardy NERC CIP compliance is only marginally interesting to state regulators. We care more about distribution: SAIDI and SAIFI Upstream cybersecurity issues may have an impact upon SAIDI and SAIFI 13 14. NERC CIP (CONT.) NERC CIP is compliance-based. Commissions are compliance-focused out of tradition, but Compliance doesnt ensure security. Cybersecurity isnt about checking boxes on a form. Hackers dont have checklists Folks at utilities: Trying to get their CIP compliance paperwork in order to satisfy some NERC auditor Hackers: Working diligently to upset the apple cart 14 15. LESSONS FROM NERC CIP PUCs are more interested in knowing how many resources a utility has tied up in doing NERC CIP compliance paperwork Is NERC CIP compliance a value-added activity? Compliance puts a utility only on the ground floor of security Compliance doesnt set a ceiling Compliance makes security people contemplate the roof 15 16. LESSONS FROM NERC CIP Utilities have to graduate beyond compliance Utilities should have compliance mastered by now, right? Utilities must find their way up the stairs to a higher floor in the building Compliance mindset vs. Security 16 17. PERSONNEL What kind of people do you have? Individuals specifically assigned cybersecurity responsibility? IT staff responsible for cybersecurity in energy operations? Does energy operations have its own security staff? What kind of training and experience does cybersecurity staff have? Engaged in cybersecurity standards activities of: NIST SGIP Cybersecurity Working Group? NESCOR, UCAIug, NERC, etc.? 17 18. PERSONNEL / VENDORS What background checking is performed for those with access to key cyber components? Vendors and other third-parties that have access to key cyber systems How are they vetted? How do you screen who has access to your systems? A lot of support comes from vendors and integrators. 18 19. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES Review: Commissions are tasked with approving surcharges in rate cases so that utilities can recoup the costs they have incurred by making capital expenditures on the infrastructure. Is the equipment a utility buys robust when it comes to security? Will it continue to be robust in the future? Traditional equipment lifetime is as long as 40 years. 19 20. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES Moving toward new paradigm May call for more regular replacements of infrastructure components Precedents: IT and mobile phone infrastructures Will no longer be in terms of multiple decades But anticipated replacement cycle wont be as brisk as mobile phone infrastructure 20 21. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES Prefer not to have to replace devices at all Hope/wish replacement wont be for reasons of security Smart Grid continues to evolve More palatable reasons for replacement: Expanded functionality Larger quantity of data Higher data rates 21 22. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES/VENDORS Regulators want assurance that: Proposed investments are prudent Solutions are cost effective Firms hired by utilities are: Capable Reliable Understand their ultimate responsibilities 22 23. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES/VENDORS Regulators want utilities to: Do their due diligence when securing their infrastructure Prove it Hold their vendors accountable for doing their part Everyone plays a role in security, and everyone should be accountable for holding up their end of the bargain. 23 24. VENDORS Regulators and therefore the utilities want: To know that products and processes are secure From concept to design to manufacture to deployment to support in the form of issuing of firmware updates, to the eventual decommissioning of these devices and systems. 24 25. VENDORS AND UTILITIES Concept/ Specification Design/ Development Integration Deployment Operation Product Suppliers System Integrators Realms of Security Assurance Utilities Maintenance S.I. V 25 26. VENDORS ROLE Third-party assessment of products - proof Installation of products - field testing of configured, deployed infrastructure Deliver what was promised Anything that touches or comes near a device is doing what its supposed to do Maintain integrity of the data Without latency 26 27. UTILITYS RESPONSIBILITIES Ensure the safe and secure delivery of energy and energy-related data Maintain the accuracy of the data being transmitted Ensure data is handled with care Secure Policies in place and followed Ensure customer privacy 27 28. REVIEW Commissions take a look at the numbers we want to see what the public is or will be paying for. If incorporating security costs a little bit more upfront, then that should be reflected in the numbers and filed in the rate case preferably itemized, if possible. At the same time, costs must be reasonable and reflect whatever level of risk is acceptable. 28 29. REVIEW AND CONCLUSION We must accept that risk is inevitable and cannot be completely eliminated only mitigated to an acceptable level. Risk is difficult to calculate, but commissions want to know how you made your determinations; make us a part of the process. We all play a role in security. 29