How Intentionality Derives from Consciousness

PIT The derived content view Nonconscious occurrent states Is derived intentionality intentionality?

How Intentionality Derives from Consciousness

David Bourget and Angela Mendelovici

July 19, 2012

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Phenomenal intentionality theory

The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) All intentionalitycomes from phenomenal consciousness, the “what it’slike” aspect of mental states

Intentionality The aboutness of mental statesContent What states are about, or what they represent

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The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) All intentionalitycomes from phenomenal consciousness, the “what it’slike” aspect of mental states

Intentionality The aboutness of mental statesContent What states are about, or what they represent

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• PIT is an alternative to tracking theories, functional roletheories, and other theories of intentionality

• One motivation is that it seems to capture how things seem tosubjects

• Represent blueness, not reflectance properties or similar• Avoids the disjunction problem• Avoids the depth problem

• PIT does not claim that there are no tracking relations orfunctional roles

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Phenomenal content

Phenomenal content Content directly obtained from phenomenalcharacter

• Basic idea: In at least some cases, when a state has a certainphenomenal character, it automatically has certain contents,e.g. blueness

• Different possible relations between phenomenal content andphenomenal character:

• Identity• Realization• Other kinds of determination

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Simple PIT

• All intentional content is phenomenal content• This appears to be the view of David Pitt

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Phenomenal content is not enough

1. Standing states

• Propositional attitudes (or non-occurrent variants)• Problem: Lack phenomenal character

2. Nonconscious occurrent states

• States in early visual processing, language processing,blindsight

• Problem: Lack phenomenal character

3. Occurrent thoughts

• Thoughts you’re currently entertaining• Problem: Insufficient or non-matching phenomenal character

• E.g. DEMOCRACY, H2O

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1. Standing states• Propositional attitudes (or non-occurrent variants)• Problem: Lack phenomenal character

2. Nonconscious occurrent states

• States in early visual processing, language processing,blindsight

• Problem: Lack phenomenal character




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2. Nonconscious occurrent states• States in early visual processing, language processing,

blindsight• Problem: Lack phenomenal character




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2. Nonconscious occurrent states• States in early visual processing, language processing,

blindsight• Problem: Lack phenomenal character

3. Occurrent thoughts• Thoughts you’re currently entertaining• Problem: Insufficient or non-matching phenomenal character


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Goal

• Overarching goal: Develop best version of PIT• Today’s goal: Address the three kinds of problematic states

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The derived content strategy

• There is some phenomenal content, but not much• Non-phenomenal states/contents can be derived fromphenomenal states/contents

• Searle, Loar, Horgan & Tienson, Kriegel

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Dispositionalism about standing states

• Standing states are dispositions to token phenomenal stateswith the same contents (and perhaps use them in certain ways)

• Searle

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Dispositionalism

• Dispositionalism only works if occurrent states have sufficientlyrich contents

• But:• H2O• DEMOCRACY

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Matching content

• Derive more content through something like thesense-reference relation

• Some phenomenal contents have a descriptive structure

• Descriptions,• Clusters of properties• etc.

• We have other contents that match these complex phenomenalcontents

• Call contents derived in this way matching contents

• Horgan & Tienson employ this kind of strategy

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Example

• Occurrent thoughts about water have phenomenal content likethe clear watery stuff around here

• H2O is the clear watery stuff around here• So, thoughts about water refer to H2O• We can say that thoughts about water are (derivatively) aboutH2O

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Problem

• I’m thinking that John is the tallest man in the country• Am I really thinking also about Bob, who happens to be thetallest man in the country?

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Solution

• For a thought about “the F” to be also a thought about α, thesubject has to be disposed to take α to be the object of theirthought upon learning that it is the F.

• Sometimes we care about the referent, sometimes we careabout the description

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Still..

• Are there always enough (descriptively accurate) phenomenalcontents to recover all the objects of thought we want torecover?

• When I think about water (H2O), typically I don’t have aphenomenal grasp of some other content in terms of which itcan be picked out (e.g. a description)

• Typically, almost all that runs through my head is perceptualand verbal phenomenology

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What we have so far

• A way to derive standing states from occurrent states toaddress the problem of standing states

• A possible way to address the problem with occurrent statesthrough matching

• But not enough phenomenal content to recover the occurrentstates and standing states we want to recover

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The conceptual role response

• One possible solution is to derive the missing descriptivecontent from conceptual roles

• My phenomenology is limited to hearing the word “water” anda mental image of the nearby beach

• Still, I count as thinking about H2O because this experience isappropriately related to a complex thought of the form thewatery stuff around here, and H2O satisfies this description

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Problem

• What is the relevant connection between the simple thoughtand the complex thought?

• Many causal connections between occurrent thoughts do notyield derived contents

• Why should connections between occurrent thoughts yieldderived contents?

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Cashing out

• We are disposed to accept some contents as what we meantby certain other contents, e.g. unmarried man for bachelor

Experiences of cashing out: Experiences of accepting one contentas a cashing out of another content

• The proposal: Occurrent states derivatively represent whatevercontents we’re disposed to experience as cashings out of theircontents (and whatever we’re disposed to experience ascashings out of those contents)

• Intuitively: We use our phenomenal contents to stand for morecumbersome definitions, characterizations, etc. (just as we uselinguistic expressions to stand for things)

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Cashing out





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Cashing out





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Example of cashing out content

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Summary

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Summary

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Summary

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Summary

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Summary

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Nonconscious occurrent states

• We suggest that nonconscious occurrent states do not reallyhave intentional content in the same sense in which consciousstates have intentional content

• We can all agree that nonconscious occurrent states• track things, have functional roles, and “represent” things if all

this boils down to is tracking and functional roles• don’t have phenomenal character

• The main disagreement is over whether conscious intentionalityalso boils down to something like tracking and functional role

• IOW, cognitive scientists are talking about something else

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Intended content

• We treat nonconscious occurrent states differently fromstanding states and thoughts

• Standing states and thoughts involve contents we are disposedto recognize as our own, contents we intend, or what we’regetting at

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Intended content

• We treat nonconscious occurrent states differently fromstanding states and thoughts

• Standing states and thoughts involve contents we are disposedto recognize as our own, contents we intend, or what we’regetting at

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Intended content

• In the case of thought and belief content, one motivation forrecovering them from phenomenal content is that they wereintended

• But the nonconscious content in question here is not intended,so this motivation for recovery does not apply

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• While many nonconscious occurrent states are plausibly notintentional at all, we can allow that some are

• No inconsistency in the idea of a phenomenal, nonconsciousoccurrent state

• David Pitt holds a similar view

• Agnoticism is best in most cases: either they have phenomenalcontent or they have no content at all

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Is derived intentionality really intentionality?

• Depends how you reference fix on intentionality• Phenomenal intentionality and derived intentionality aredifferent natural kinds

• But they have something in common that justifies theterminological similarity

• Satisfy our vague pretheoretic notion of aboutness• Intended contents

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• Depends how you reference fix on intentionality

• Phenomenal intentionality and derived intentionality aredifferent natural kinds



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Summary: Problematic states

1. Occurrent thoughts• Get their contents from cashing out and matching

2. Standing states• Get their contents from dispositions to have occurrent states

3. Nonconscious occurrent states• Represent in some other sense (tracking, functional role)

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Spiritual

How Intentionality Derives from Consciousness