Managing the Unimaginable 2010-05-24.ppt

Managing the Unimaginable:Lessons from Terrorism Security and

Disaster Response Planning

Henry H. WillisJune 2, 2010

International Disaster and Risk ConferenceDavos, Switzerland

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Terrorism Security and Disaster Response Involve Many Different Activities

Protecting Emergency Responders

Inspecting Containers

Countering MANPADs

Defending Infrastructure

Improving Public Health Preparedness

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Benefit-Cost Analysis Is a Standard Way of Assessing Whether Activities Are Justified

Risk Reduction > Cost

Benefit > Cost

Risk Before Effort – Risk After Effort > Cost

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Assessing Terrorism Risk and Risk Reduction Requires Answering Difficult Questions

• Where, when, and how will terrorists attack?

• Do countermeasures deter terrorists?

• Do terrorists shift to different targets or types of attacks?

• How long will terrorists be unable to circumvent security?

• How catastrophic will consequences be?

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Container Security Policy Provides Examples of How Analysis of These Issues Can Guide Security Policy

• How does container inspection contribute to national security?

– Used game theory to assess radiation detection?

• Are investments in inspection technologies justified?

– Used cost-benefit analysis to assess container scanning using radiography

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Containerized Shipping Helps to Drive the U.S. Economy

• 25% of U.S. exports and imports by value

• $500 billion worth of goods annually

• More than 12 million containers annually

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Container Shipping System Reaches Acrossthe Entire United States . . .

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… and the System Moves Quickly

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Port Security Uses Many Approaches toPrevent Nuclear Terrorism

• Deploying radiation portal monitors

• Using handheld detectors

• Developing advanced detector systems

• Considering role of retaliation in security posture

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Game Theory Provides Insights Into How Detection Technologies Contribute to Deterrence

• Analysis assumes that terrorist decisions based on terrorist perceptions of:

– Benefits of a nuclear attack (V)

– Consequences of retaliation (Sa and Fa)

– Cost of an attack (Ca) and number of weapons (M)

– Number of containers inspected (n)– Effectiveness of detection technologies (p)

• How do defender choices (n, p, Sa, and Fa ) influence a terrorist seeking to maximize their expected utility?

Source: Bier et al 2010

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Analysis Suggests That Detection Capability Alone Cannot Reliably Deter a Nuclear Terrorist

Assumes:• Terrorist group

strongly prefers intended target

• Defense policy specifies retaliation only following a successful attack

• Terrorists only have a single weapon


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However, Detection May Deter When Paired With A Strong Policy of Retaliation

Assumes:• Terrorist group

strongly prefers intended target

• Defense policy specifies retaliation following a successful or failed attack

• Cost of weapons is less than $1 billion

But Are These Investments Like This Worthwhile?


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Container Security Policy Provides Examples of How These Approaches Can Guide Security Policy

• How does container inspection contribute to national security?

– Used game theory to assess radiation detection?

• Are investments in inspection technologies justified?

– Used cost-benefit analysis to assess container scanning using radiography

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Containers Enter a Multi-step Scanning Process on Arrival at U.S. Ports

Most SearchesResult in

False Positives

~12 million

Number of Containers Unloaded

in U.S. Ports

~11.5 million

Not Selected forScanning

~500,000

Number of Containers Selected

for Scanning

~5%

~475,000

Not Selected forHand-Searching

~25,000

Number of Containers Selectedfor Hand-Searching

~5%

Note: This example is not radiation detection scanning

Source: Martonosi et al 2005

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Case Study: Under What Scenarios Is 100% Container Inspection Viable?

• What would 100% scanning do to costs and delays?

• What technological and operational improvements would help the most?

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We Assessed Viability of Decision to Switch to One of Three Alternative Policies

Baseline Policy

• Current X-ray technology

• 5% inspection

Policy 1: Increase Inspection

• Current X-ray technology

• 100% inspection

Policy 2: Improved Technology

• Current Gamma-Ray technology

• 100% inspection

Policy 3: Greatly Improved Technology

• Same as in Policy 2• But decrease in false

positive rate


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We Took a Cost/Benefit Approach to Evaluate Proposed Security Measure Policy Choice

• Compared costs/benefits of proposed policy to baseline

• Threshold probability for switching to proposed policy

Baseline) - (Proposed

Baseline) - (Proposed

Rate Detection in Change *Cost AttackCostsPolicy in Change

)Attack( =P

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Analysis Addressed Uncertainty in Several Model Parameters

• Volume of containers shipped– U.S. total, large port, and small ports considered

• Technology cost and performance– Capital, operations, and maintenance– Inspection, detection, and false positive rates

• Labor costs for inspections

• Costs of container delays

• Cost of terrorist attacks: from $1 billion to $1 trillion

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We Considered Both a National and an Individual Port Perspective

Delay Cost$0-$60 per cont., per hr.

Attack Cost$1 billion - $1 trillion

Attack sizes considered were:• Larger than ’93 WTC and ’95

OK City• On par with natural disasters• Range of estimates for 9/11 or

nuclear attack50 TEU/hr.

Small Port:

“Miami”

365 TEU/hr.Large Port:

“Los Angeles”

1474 TEU/hr., over 157 ports

U.S.

Arrival RateLocation


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We Compared Three Policies to the Base Case

5555Hand Inspectors per Team

4.8 cont./day4.8 cont./day1 cont./day1 cont./day

Hand Searching Rate

4444Operators per Scanner

$90,000$90,000$200,000$200,000Maintenance Costs

$1 million$1 million$4.5 million$4.5 million

Equipment Cost

1%5%5%5%False Positive Rate

30 TEU/hr.30 TEU/hr.20 TEU/hr.20 TEU/hr.

Scanning Rate

100% inspection, Greatly Improved Tech. (Policy 3)

100% inspection, Slightly Improved Tech. (Policy 2)

100% Inspection, Same Tech.

(Policy 1)

Base Policy 5%

Parameter

Based on X-ray technology

Based on gamma-ray technology


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100% Inspection Is Only Cost Effective for Large Attacks or with Improved Technology

1,000

100

10

1

Greatly Improved

TechnologyImproved

TechnologyCurrent

Technology

AttackCosts

($ Billion)


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Nationwide Implementation Depends onAttack Costs and Probability of Attack

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 6 60

Delay Cost ($/TEU-hr)

Annual Threshold Chance of Attack (%)

$1 Billion

$10 Billion

$100 Billion

$1 Trillion

AttackCost


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Improved Technology Increases Viability of 100% Inspection at Lower Threat Levels


0

20

40

60

80

100

0 6 60


0

20

40

60

80

100

0 6 60


$1 Billion

$10 Billion

$100 Billion

$1 Trillion

Attack Cost

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But by Other Parameters, Some Cases Are Infeasible

1,000

100

10

1

Greatly Improved

TechnologyImproved

TechnologyCurrent

Technology

AttackCosts

($ Billion)

!

!

!

!

!


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Personnel Requirements at Large Ports May BeInfeasible with Current/Improved Technology

0

100

200

300

400

500

Current Improved Greatly Improved

Hand Search Stations Required at Port of LAby Policy Alternative

Nu

mb

er o

f H

and

Sea

rch

Sta

tio

ns

Approximate Current Number of Hand Search Stations


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These Examples Suggest Ways AnalysisCan Improve Policy

• Terrorism security policy most confront deep uncertainty and extreme events

• In some cases, analysis can structure and help to focus decisions on critical assumptions

• Similar challenges are present for other disaster-related scenarios, for example,

– Managing risks of pandemic influenza– Adapting to consequences of climate change