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We have seen beyond any rational doubt that the global economy is "unbalanced". In fact, "balance" in the sense of a permanently fixed state of affairs has always been an illusion. The axis of global trade has performed a "complete 360" – in a world that we see as "new", the so-called "emerging" powers and economies are the same ones that initiated global trade centuries earlier.The Big Difference today is that we now have "instant globalisation". Processes and trends that used to take a thousand years can now happen in well under a thousand days.
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McKinsey & Company |
What lies ahead – why the next 30 years will be different from the last 30
Richard Dobbs, Director, McKinsey Global Institute
McKinsey & Company | 1
Long-term interest rates in developed economies, 1975-2009Yield to redemption on long-term government bondsPercent, GDP-weighted
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; McKinsey Global Institute
1 10-year government bonds where available. 2 Calculated as nominal yield on 10-year bonds in current year minus average realized inflation over next 10 years. We use OECD estimates of inflation
in 2009-19 to estimate real interest rates in 2000-09.
Capital has become increasingly cheap since the mid 1980s
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20102005200019951990198519801975
Ex-post real values
Nominal values
McKinsey & Company | 2
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
80
0
-48%
20001990198019701960195019401930192019101900
100
Average commodity prices have fallen substantially
World War I
Post-warDepression
Great Depression
World War II
1970soil shock
McKinsey Commodity Price Index (years 1999-2001 = 100)
1 Based on arithmetic average of 4 commodity sub-indices of food (coffee, cocoa, tea, rice, wheat, maize, sugar, beef, lamb, bananas and palm oil), agricultural raw materials (cotton, jute, wool, hides, tobacco, rubber and timber), metals (steel, aluminum, tin, copper, silver, lead and zinc), and energy (oil, coal, and gas) with each sub-index weighted by total world export volumes 1999-2001 at indexed prices over the same time period in real.
SOURCE: Grilli and Yang, 1988; Pfaffenzeller et al., 2007; World Bank; International Monetary Fund; OECD statistics; FAOStat; UN Food and Agriculture Organization; UN Comtrade; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
McKinsey & Company | 3
Now we are moving into a new economic era
“The great moderation”(1980-2000)
“Demographic dividend” driving economic growth
Progressively cheaper capital driving asset price growth (and leverage)
Cheaper resources
Cheaper labor
Governments privatizing, cutting taxes and promising more
Each generation “richer than their parents”
McKinsey & Company | 4
Now we are moving into a new economic era
“The great moderation”(1980-2000)
“Demographic dividend” driving economic growth
Progressively cheaper capital driving asset price growth (and leverage)
Cheaper resources
Cheaper labor
Governments privatizing, cutting taxes and promising more
Each generation “richer than their parents”
Trend break
Debt crisis
Urbanization
Aging
Disruptive technologies and interconnection
McKinsey & Company | 5
02200098
550
94921990
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
0Q2 2011
08060496
SOURCE: Haver Analytics; national central banks; McKinsey Global Institute
1 Includes all loans and fixed-income securities of households, corporations, financial institutions, and government.2 Defined as an increase of 25 percentage points or more.3 Or latest available.
The last decade saw a credit boom of immense proportionsTotal debt, 1990-Q2 2011, Percentage of GDP
Canada
Australia
Germany
United States
South Korea
Italy
France
Spain
United Kingdom
Japan
Change 2000-08Percentage points
75
39
7
37
177
89
145
68
91
77
McKinsey & Company | 6
*Including North America
1 AD
China 25%
Europe 21%
India 32%
Rest ofAsia
11%
Other* 11%
Note: artistic impression; not to be used for navigationSource: MGI analysis using data from Angus Maddison, Nasa and MGI Cityscope
McKinsey & Company | 7
1 AD
The action was in Asia
Note: artistic impression; not to be used for navigationSource: MGI analysis using data from Angus Maddison, Nasa and MGI Cityscope
McKinsey & Company | 8
*Including North America
1500
China 25%
Europe 25%
India 24%
Rest ofAsia
15%
Other* 11%
Note: artistic impression; not to be used for navigationSource: MGI analysis using data from Angus Maddison, Nasa and MGI Cityscope
McKinsey & Company | 9
McKinsey & Company | 10
2x richer
McKinsey & Company | 11
North American cities
20%
Non-urban GDP 30%
Other cities
13%
European cities
17%
OECDAsia-Pacific cities
9%
China and India(total)
11%
2000Note: artistic impression; not to be used for navigationSource: MGI analysis using data from Angus Maddison, Nasa and MGI Cityscope
McKinsey & Company | 12
McKinsey & Company | 13
3x richer
McKinsey & Company | 14
Typically, an increase in urbanization is paralleled by an increase in GDP per capita
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Per capita GDP1990 PPP USD (log scale)2
30,000
10,000
3,000
1,000
300
Urban populationPercent
1820
United States2005
1891
Japan2005
1920
China2005
1950
1950
South Korea2005
1930
Brazil2005
1950
1860
United Kingdom2005
1950India2005
Italy2005
Germany2005
SOURCE: Population Division of the United Nations, Angus Maddison via Timetrics, Global Insight, Census reports ofEngland and Wales, Honda in Steckel & Flouds, 1997, Barioch, 1975
1 Definition of urbanization varies by country; pre-1950 figures for the United Kingdom are estimated.2 Historical per capita GDP series expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, which reflect purchasing power parity.
Per capita GDP and urbanization time series, 1891-20051
McKinsey & Company | 15
2025Note: artistic impression; not to be used for navigationSource: MGI analysis using data from Angus Maddison, Nasa and MGI Cityscope
North American cities
14%
Other cities
17%
European cities
13%
Chinese and Indian cities
25%
OECDAsia-Pacific cities
6%
Other GDP 25%
McKinsey & Company | 16
195019001850180017501700
Britain
Germany
US
Sweden
Japan
India
China
Korea
2000
The economic transformation is happening at a scale and rate faster than ever in history
SOURCE: MGI analysis using data from Angus Madision, University of Groningen
Years to double GDP per capita
1 Time to increase GDP per capita (in PPP terms) from 1,300 to 2,600 USD2 Population at start of growth period
PopulationMillions
37
4
9
10
28
47
1,020
820
Total years
10
37
155
53
64
33
14
17
McKinsey & Company |
Effect of changing age mix
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division
-0.5-0.3-0.10
0.4
Contribution of share of working-age population growth to yearly GDP per capita growth, percentage points
Germany
France
Spain
Italy
EU-15
U.K.
-0.4-0.3-0.3-0.2
0.6-0.4-0.3-0.1
0.30.6-0.4-0.5
-0.1-0.1
0.3 -0.9-0.2-0.3-0.1
0.5
-0.3-0.3
0.1
0
0.2
-0.4-0.3
0.10
-0.1
2000-2010 2010-20201980-1990 1990-2000 2020-2030
U.S.
-1.1-0.4
0.10.31.1
Korea
McKinsey & Company |
Commodities now show significant correlation with oil prices
Timber -0.52
Steel -0.01
Beef -0.11
Rice 0.32
Wheat -0.07
Maize -0.01
0.59
0.74
0.67
0.99
0.75
0.96
Correlation with oil prices
1980 to 1999 2000 to 2004 2005 to 2011
0.91
0.99
0.74
0.61
0.94
0.96
McKinsey & Company | 19
Debt crisis
Urbanization
Aging
Disruptive technologies and interconnection
Emerging markets will drive global growth and increases in wealth
More expensive capital
More expensive and volatile resource prices
Growing labor market mismatches and inequality
More government intervention, fiscal austerity
“The great uncertainty”(2010-2030)
The last 30 years saw rising global prosperity driven by strong fundamentals, but the next decade or more looks very different
“The great moderation”(1980-2000)
“Demographic dividend”driving economic growth in OECD
Progressively cheaper capital driving asset price growth (and leverage)
Cheaper resources and labor
Governments privatizing, cutting taxes and promising more
Each generation “richer than their parents”
1 Covered as part of the digital chapter
Trend break
McKinsey & Company | 20
3 billion people entering the Global Middle Class
SOURCE: OECD Development Center
Growth in emerging markets is based on the 3 billion people that will enter the middle class over the next decadeMillions
2009
2020
2030
333 338 342
North America
181 251 313
Central and South America
664 703 680
Europe
137 222 341
Middle Eastand Africa
525 1,740 3,228
Asia Pacific
1 Global middle class defined as daily expenditures between $10 and $100 per person in purchasing parity terms.
GLOBAL REBALANCING
McKinsey & Company | 2121
Nearly half of global growth by 2025 will be in “middleweight” cities in emerging markets
1 Megacities are defined as metropolitan areas with ten million or more inhabitants. Middleweights are cities with populations of between 150,000 and ten million inhabitants.
2 Includes all 2,600+ cities from MGI Cityscope database.3 Real exchange rate (RER) for 2010 is the market exchange rate. RER for 2025 was predicted from differences in the per capita GDP growth rates of
countries relative to the US.Note: Numbers may not sum due to rounding
Contribution to global GDP growthPercent
GDP growth, 2010-25100% = USD 50.2 trillion USD RER
Emerging market megacities
Emerging market middleweight cities
Emerging market small cities and rural areas
Developed economies
SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute Cityscope 2.0
12
12
4
3
564
12
19
68Large
Midsized
Small
13
30
109
11
26
13
49
38
LargeMidsized
Small
GDP, 2010100% = =USD 62.7 trillion USD RER
McKinsey & Company | 22
19
14
9
9
9
4
United States
Western Europe
Japan
Other developed
China
Other emerging
2020F
391.5
24
22
17
19
2010
198.1
29
27
10
11
2000
113.1
35
34
5 3
By 2020, emerging markets’ share of financial assets is projected to double
SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute
Total financial assets, 2010-2020FPercent; USD trillion
Emerging markets’financial assetsUSD trillion1 Measured in 2010 exchange rates.2 Rapid growth in emerging markets but low growth through 2015 in mature economies.3 Emerging markets’ currencies appreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar.
8 41 141
McKinsey & Company | 23
3,207
66
1,755
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
US
China
0520009590851980 10
In 2008, China overtook the United States as the world’s largest saver
Japan 1,287
US 1,755
China 3,207
390
Korea 333
Italy 349
Brazil 361
Russia
France 449
India 566
Germany 757
SOURCE: CEIC; Haver Analytics; McKinsey Global Growth Model; International Monetary Fund; World Development Indicators of the World Bank; United Nations System of National Accounts; MGI
Gross national savingsUSD billion, nominal values
China and United States
569
2010
McKinsey & Company | 24
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Elderly dependency ratioPercentage of total population
Japan net household saving ratePercentage of disposable personal income
SOURCE: United Nations (Population Division); Bank of Japan; McKinsey Global Institute
In developed countries, aging populations are saving less
McKinsey & Company | 25
1 France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.2 Australia, Canada, Japan, and South Korea.3 Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey.
SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute
Incremental demand for equities by domestic investors vs. increase in corporate equity needs, 2010-20FUSD trillion; 2010 exchange rates
37.4
25.1
-12.3
Increase in corporate equity needs
Incremental demand for equities
2.8
4.7
3.5
4.3
9.8
10.5
7.9
3.9
5.9
9.2
Other emerging
China
Other developed
Western Europe
United States
Incremental demandfor equities
Increase in corporateequity needs
Lower investor demand for equities could fall short of corporate needs by US$12.3 trillion
McKinsey & Company | 26
0
50
100
150
200
250
36 383416 4018 2220 3224 26 3028148 4442
GDP per capitaReal USD 1,000, US PPP per person
12
Energy consumption per capita, 1970-2008Million BTU per person
60 42 10
SOURCE: IEA, Global Insight; McKinsey analysis
Historical range for energy consumption evolution
Thailand Australia
JapanSingapore
FranceChina
IndonesiaIndia
United States Germany
South KoreaUnited Kingdom
Resource consumption in emerging markets is likely to expand significantly with increased prosperity
India 2030 projected
China 2030 projected
McKinsey & Company | 27
Emerging markets could account for over 90 percent of growth in energy demand by 2030
204
205
214
China
India
Othernon-OECD
OECD
Global
2030
680
176
58
206
26
2020
591
150
39
174
22
2010
499
100
25
150
20
SOURCE: McKinsey analysis (Cost Curve v3.0)
Compound annual growth rate, 2010-30Percent
2.9
4.3
0.2
1.6
1.4
1 Includes cross-border energy use, e.g., sea, air travel.
Developing
Developed
Primary energy demandQBTU
McKinsey & Company | 28
Commodity prices have increased sharply since 2000, erasing all the declines of the 20th century …
McKinsey Commodity Price Index (years 1999-2001 = 100)
1 Based on arithmetic average of 4 commodity sub-indices of food, non-food agricultural items, metals, and energy. 2 2011 prices based on average of first eight months of 2011.
SOURCE: Grilli and Yang, 1988; Pfaffenzeller et al., 2007; World Bank; International Monetary Fund; OECD statistics; FAOStat; UN Food and Agriculture Organization; UN Comtrade; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
0201120001900 19801970196019501940193019201910 1990
World War I
Post-warDepression
Great Depression
World War II
1970soil shock
McKinsey & Company | 29
These resource trends pose several risks to global growth and welfare
The IMF estimates that a 10 percent increase in the price of
crude reduces global GDP by 0.2-0.3 percent in one year
The World Bank estimates that recent food price increases
drove 44 million people into poverty
At least eight countries commit five percent or more of their
GDP to energy subsidies. In 2005, government subsidies were
estimated to account for 14 percent of India’s GDP
Just four countries – Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela –
hold almost 50 percent of known oil reserves
A recent study by the Economics of Climate Adaptation
Working Group suggests that some regions are at risk of
losing up to 12 percent of their annual GDP by 2030 as a
result of existing climate patterns
McKinsey & Company | 30
Labor force growth will likely slow worldwide and become flat across advanced economies by 2030
1 Includes 45 countries from the Young Middle-Income, China, India, Young Developing, and Russia & CEE clusters.2 Includes 25 countries from the Young Advanced, Aging Advanced and Southern Europe clusters.
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division (2010 revision); ILO; local statistics for China and India; McKinsey Global Institute analyses
2,1431,726
417
6.0%0.9%
24.8%
1.6%
21.6%
1.4%
Advanced economies
524494
Developing economies
2,940
2,355
Global aggregate
3,464
2,849
1990
2010
20301990–2010
2010–2030
Compound annualgrowth rate (percent)
Labor forceMillion workers
McKinsey & Company | 31
Labor’s share of income across advanced economies has fallen steadily for three decades
1 Employee compensation as a percent of gross national income using real 2000 US dollars, excludes government transfers and capital receipts.2 Includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Australia from the Young Advanced cluster; the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden and
Germany from the Aging Advanced cluster; and Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain from the Southern Europe cluster.
SOURCE: OECD; World Bank Development Indicators; EU KLEMS; Havers Analytics; McKinsey Global Institute analyses
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
64
65
63
62
61
60
59
0
58
-3.5 pp
-3.5 pp
-7.1pp
Labor share of income in advanced economiesPercentage of total
McKinsey & Company | 32
Wages for US workers with tertiary education have grown more than twice as fast as for others, creating a widening gap
0
0.40.5
1.1
Less than high school
High School graduate
Somecollege
Collegegraduate
SOURCE: CPS 2008; Daron Acemoglu and David Autor, Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings, 2010; McKinsey Global Institute analyses
2.8
1.7
+63%
20081963
1 Includes workers who have completed college or graduate school.
Growth in real weekly wages for full-time workers, 1963-2008Compound annual growth rate, percent
Ratio of weekly wages of college graduates to high school dropoutsMultiple
McKinsey & Company | 33
Across advanced economies, unemployment rates of low-skill workers are 2-3x the rates of high-skill workers
SOURCE: Eurostat; OECD Education at a Glance 2011; McKinsey Global Institute analyses
Unemployment rate, 25-64 years, by educational attainmentPercentage of labor force
Less than upper secondary
Secondary
Tertiary
UnitedKingdom
1999
2011
347
Denmark
1113
15
12
19
26
France Germany Sweden Spain
46
10
47
10
45
11
69
15
57
13
347
569
59
16
26
14
McKinsey & Company | 34
Debt crisis
Urbanization
Aging
Disruptive technologies and interconnection
Emerging markets will drive global growth and increases in wealth
More expensive capital
More expensive and volatile resource prices
Growing labor market mismatches and inequality
More government intervention, fiscal austerity
“The great uncertainty”(2010-2030)
The last 30 years saw rising global prosperity driven by strong fundamentals, but the next decade or more looks very different
“The great moderation”(1980-2000)
“Demographic dividend”driving economic growth in OECD
Progressively cheaper capital driving asset price growth (and leverage)
Cheaper resources and labor
Governments privatizing, cutting taxes and promising more
Each generation “richer than their parents”
1 Covered as part of the digital chapter
Trend break
McKinsey & Company | 35
Questions to consider …
Footprint Is your global footprint aligned to growth? Are you
allocating enough resources to high growth cities and areas? Do you
understand customer needs in these growth areas?
Capital and resources Are you prepared for larger and more
rapid changes in interest rates, resource inputs, and higher potential for
a liquidity crunch? Are you ready for increased correlation?
Business portfolio How does this need to be realigned? Are parts
of it exposed to changes in resources prices or shift in the cost of
capital? Are you ready for lower OECD growth?
Talent Are you ready to source talent from new sources as the
OECD demographic dividend comes to an end? Is there a way of
upskilling lower skill talent?
Competitive landscape How will changes in interest rates,
resource inputs and talent availability change the competitive
landscape? Can you compete with Chinese peers with their access to
cheaper capital and talent? How can you cope with volatility?
McKinsey & Company | 36
Thank you
Materials available: www.mckinsey.com/mgi
www.mckinsey.com/mgi