A SESERV methodology for tussle analysis in Future Internet technologies - Introduction and motivation

© 2011 The SESERV Consortium 1

A SESERV methodology for tussle analysis in Future Internet technologies

Introduction and motivation

Costas Kalogiros, Costas Courcoubetis, George D. Stamoulis{ckalog, courcou, gstamoul}@aueb.grAthens University of Economics and Business

September 2011

Socio-Economic Services for European Research Projects (SESERV)

European Seventh Framework CSA FP7-2010-ICT-258138


Internet as a platform for stakeholders’ interactions

Internet Technology layer

InternetSocio-Economic layer

ISPsEnd-users ASPsRegulators

Socio-Economic layer is governed by laws of socio-economics, while technology layer by laws of physics

routerslinks switches

Internet protocols

Internet applications

Firewalls

middleboxes

3G towers

Real-world socio-economic transactions

Stakeholders with varying socio-economic interests

Technology choices(including investments, configurations)

Technology outputs (connectivity, QoS, mobility, security, etc.)

Technology components

…

servers


Basic socio-economic technology cycle

Stakeholders’ strategies / policies with respect to a specific technology (functionality)

Adopt technology

Dimension resources

Configure technology

Use technology

ISP

Longer

Shorter

Adap

tatio

n tim

esca

le

At each stage conflicting incentives may exist at the socio-economic layer. The combination of actors’ strategies lead to a tussle outcome, which is characterized by the benefit that stakeholders get.

Internet Socio-Economic layer

tussle outcome


Tussle evolution (1/2)

• If the tussle outcome is considered “unfair” by a subset of stakeholders, they can react by:• Leaving the system• Adopting another technology/ reconfiguring the selected one• Asking the regulator to intervene by restricting other

stakeholders’ policies• … hence making the outcome unstable

• Even though a tussle outcome can be considered “fair” by all stakeholders of that particular functionality, it can destabilize other functionalities (spillover effect to other tussles)

Analyzing the anticipated tussles can shorten unstable periods & help the long-term success of a technology


Unstable outcome

Stable outcome Evolves

Affects

Functionality A

Functionality C

Functionality B

…

Legend

Tussle A2

Tussle C2

Tussle B1 Tussle B2

Initial state

Functionality

…

Functionality A

Functionality C

Functionality A

Functionality C

Functionality B

Tussle A1

Tussle C1

Functionality B

T0 (initial tussle outcomes)

T1 T2

Transfers

TA Time A

…

Tussle evolution (2/2)


Purpose of Tussle Analysis• Defines a systematic approach for understanding the impact of

introducing new Internet technologies• Why a new technology is needed today?• What are the interests of existing stakeholders today?• What options do existing technologies offer to stakeholders?• What are the properties of existing outcome in terms of performance

& stability? • What would be the effect of a new technology to the ecosystem in

the future? • How would the interests of existing and new stakeholders be

affected?• How would the options of existing and new stakeholders be affected? • Can this technology help reaching a “fairer” outcome regarding this

functionality, or increase efficiency in case of an already stable outcome?


Tussle analysis case study: bandwidth sharing

Functionality: bandwidth sharing

ISPs throttle bandwidth of p2p applications by using DPI technology.

p2p applicationsconfigured to perform traffic obfuscation

What if ISPs deploy congestion exposure technologies & congestion pricing schemes?

Functionality: VoIP service delivery

Regulator announces fines due to VoIP providers’ complaints

p2p users get disproportionate bandwidth share

p2p users configureapplications to open multiple TCP connections for thesame session

?

ISPs use DPI technology to degrade quality of rival VoIP services

ISP’s telephony services get preferential treatment

?

no discrimination

peer-to-peer (p2p) users

interactive users

interactive users get

disproportionate bandwidth share

ISPs

ASPs

Regulator

ISP(neutral entity)

fairbandwidth

sharing

Tuss

le o

utco

me

Stak

ehol

ders

’ st

rate

gies

/pol

icie

sSt

akeh

olde

rs’

stra

tegi

es/p

olic

ies

Tuss

le o

utco

me

ASP’s VoIP services get preferential treatment

p2p applications motivate multiple TCP connections for the same session


Step 1: Identify all primary stakeholder roles and their characteristics for the functionality under investigation

Step 3: For each tussle assess the impact to each stakeholder and potential spillovers

Functionality I Functionality II

Step 2: Identify tussles among identified stakeholders

spillover new iteration

tussle tussle tussle tussle

A high-level view of the SESERV tussle analysis methodology


A guide to applying the SESERV tussle analysis methodology


More Information

Don’t hesitate to contact us if your research project is interested in performing a tussle analysis for understanding the existing (and/or future) socio-economic issues related to your proposed Future Internet technologies.

• http://www.seserv.org

• [email protected]

• http://www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&gid=3870856

• http://www.twitter.com/seserv

http://www.seserv.org/

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&gid=3870856

http://www.twitter.com/seserv


APPENDIX


Design For Tussle

• A tussle-aware Internet protocol should• lead to a stable outcome by allowing all involved

stakeholders to express their interests and affect the outcome (“Design for Choice” Principle)• It does not impose one particular outcome because no one

can guess it

• avoid spillovers to other functionalities (“Modularize along the tussle boundaries” Principle)

Clark, D. D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K. R., and Braden, R.: Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow’s Internet. IEEE/ ACM Trans. Networking 13, 3, pp. 462-475, June 2005


Towards achieving stable outcomes

• The “Design for choice” principle provides guidance in designing protocols that allow for variation in outcome. Useful properties are: • “Exposure of list of choices” suggesting that the stakeholders

involved must be given the opportunity to express multiple alternative choices and which the other party should also consider.

• “Exchange of valuation” suggesting that the stakeholders involved should communicate their preferences in regard to the available set of choices (for instance by ranking them in descending order).

• “Exposure of choice’s impact” suggesting that the stakeholders involved should appreciate what the effects of their choices are on others

• “Visibility of choices made” suggesting that both the agent and the principal of an action must allow the inference of which of the available choices has been selected. Clark, D. D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K. R., and Braden, R.: Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow’s Internet. IEEE/

ACM Trans. Networking 13, 3, pp. 462-475, June 2005


Towards avoiding tussle spillovers to other functionalities

• The “Modularize the design along tussle boundaries” principle helps in identifying whether tussle spillovers can appear.

• A protocol designer can check any of the following two conditions:• “Stakeholder separation”, or whether the choices of one

stakeholder group have significant side effects on stakeholders of another functionality (another tussle space), for example creates economic externalities between stakeholders of different tussle spaces.

• “Functional separation”, or whether different stakeholders use some functionality of the given technology in an unforeseen way to achieve a different goal in some other tussle space, i.e., the functionality of technology A interferes (and possibly cancels) with functionality of technology B.

Clark, D. D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K. R., and Braden, R.: Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow’s Internet. IEEE/ ACM Trans. Networking 13, 3, pp. 462-475, June 2005