Americans’ Weakening Ties to Organized Religion, 1973-2012: Generations & Politics

Michael HoutNew York University

Claude S. FischerUniversity of California, Berkeley

Pew Research Centers Religion & Public Life Project

8 August 2013

1

We analyzed the trend 1973–2000

Politics:Political liberals and moderates — but not conservatives —increasingly declared no religion

Generations:Cohort replacement accounted for 40% of the trend

Why do generations differ?

American Sociological Review, April 2002

2

Today:Update the trend through 2012Discuss why cohorts differ

3

Updating the trend

4

Smoother, slower — but sustained — rise

0

5

10

15

20

0

5

10

15

20

No

relig

ious

pre

fere

nce

(%)

1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012Year

Notes: Dots are observed data, vertical lines show 95% confidence interval, and the trend line is estimated using locally estimated (loess) regression.

5

Smoother, slower — but sustained — rise

1991

Hout-Fischer model

0

5

10

15

20

0

5

10

15

20

No

relig

ious

pre

fere

nce

(%)

1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012Year

Notes: Dots are observed data, vertical lines show 95% confidence interval, and the trend line is estimated using locally estimated (loess) regression.

6

0

10

20

30

40

No

relig

ion

(%)

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Year

LiberalConservative

Political gap not only persisted… it got wider

7

Cohort replacement clear then

1900-19151916-19251926-19351936-1945

1946-19551956-1965

1966-1975

1976-1985

0

10

20

30

No

relig

ious

pre

fere

nce

(%)

1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012Year

8

Cohort replacement clear then

1900-19151916-19251926-19351936-1945

1946-19551956-1965

1966-1975

1976-1985

0

10

20

30

No

relig

ious

pre

fere

nce

(%)

1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012Year

Explained 40% of trend

9

1900-1915

1916-1925

1926-19351936-1945

1946-19551956-1965

1966-1975

1976-19851986-1995

0

10

20

30

No

relig

ious

pre

fere

nce

(%)

1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012Year

Cohort replacement clearer now

10

1900-1915

1916-1925

1926-19351936-1945

1946-19551956-1965

1966-1975

1976-19851986-1995

0

10

20

30

No

relig

ious

pre

fere

nce

(%)

1972 1980 1988 1996 2004 2012Year

Cohort replacement clearer now

Explains 60% of trend

11

What explains cohort differences?

12

Politics & cohort differences both rooted in:

Culture shock

… & two aftershocks

13

The shock

Sex

Drugs

Question authority

14

First aftershock

Moral majority

Traditional values

Church-based

15

Second aftershock

AIDS kills sons, brothers, uncles & cousins

Gay ➞ normal

16

Two more considerations

Many parents emphasize “think for yourself” over obedience

Undermines the authority in traditional authority

… including the teaching authority of religious leaders

Academic literature: Miller & Swanson, Lenski, Kohn, Alwin.17

… and secularization

Heaven

AfterlifeMiracles

Hell

Godno doubt

Bibleword-for-word

Atheist or Agnostic

0

25

50

75

100

Belie

f (%

)

1900 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990Year of Birth

Source: General Social Surveys, 1988-2010.

Boomers skeptical about BibleRecent cohorts have more doubts about God & more agnostic

18

Our statistical test

19

Random effects model of cohort differences

Null NewPersonal characteristicsPeriod: dummiesCohort: random effects

Personal characteristicsPeriod: dummiesCohort: random effects

Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex & drugsValues independent thinkingSecularization index

20

Random effects model of cohort differences

Null NewPersonal characteristicsPeriod: dummiesCohort: random effects

Personal characteristicsPeriod: dummiesCohort: random effects

Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex & drugsValues independent thinkingSecularization index

Cohort differences, not personal

21

Cohort differences explained by sex, drugs, and independent thinking (not disbelief)

Coefficients for Cohort Covariates and the Standard Deviations of Cohort Random EffectsCoefficients for Cohort Covariates and the Standard Deviations of Cohort Random EffectsCoefficients for Cohort Covariates and the Standard Deviations of Cohort Random Effects

Cohort variable Null NewCounter-cultural attitudes regarding sex and drugs

— 0.36Counter-cultural attitudes regarding sex and drugs (0.07)Values independent thinking — 0.24

(0.06)Secularization index — 0.04

(0.03)Cohort: random effects (σ) 0.41 0.08

(0.05) (0.03)Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold.Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold.Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients in bold.

22

Conclusions

Politics:Political liberals and moderates — but not conservatives —increasingly declared no religion

Generations:Cohort replacement accounted for 40% of the trend

American Sociological Review, April 2002

23

Conclusions

Politics:Political liberals and moderates — but not conservatives —increasingly declared no religion

Generations:Cohort replacement accounted for 60% of the trend

Baby boom and later generations developed values and attitudes that undermine traditional authorityNo sign of secularization

American Sociological Review, April 2002

Confirmed

Extended

24