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0wning the Internet of Trash Darren Martyn Xiphos Research [email protected]

Steelcon 2015 - 0wning the internet of trash

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0wning the Internet of Trash

Darren Martyn

Xiphos Research

[email protected]

whoami

• Darren Martyn / infodox

• Penetration Tester & Researcher @ Xiphos Research Ltd

• Forensics & Chemistry Student @ GMIT

This talk…

• Hacking embedded devices – a gentle introduction.

• Both hardware and software explorations

• Examining exploitation ITW and post exploitation

wtf

Today we shall talk about…

• Obtaining firmware for embedded devices.• Basics of UART identification and use • Extraction of firmware/finding vulnz• Popping boxes (exploit development).• Boxes being popped (router malware case studies)• Post exploitation • Future ideas…

(I promise, no more walls of text after this!)

Firmware

Honest, this is what firmware looks like

Methods of getting firmware…

• Download from internet> Vendor website> random internauts

• Extract from device

• There are other methods, but not going to get into that here.

Methods of getting firmware… (D-Link FTP)

Methods of getting firmware… (netgear support)

Random Internauts…

Extracting from device…

• This is where we segue into the land of UART.

• Basically, get some kinda shell on the device

• And copy the rootfs (the bit we give a damn about for now).

• Two main ways this happens for todays purposes…

UART Basics…

• UART = “Universal Asynchonous Reciever/Transmitter”

• TL;DR basically serial

• Usually 4 pins, we only care about 3 really.

• RX, TX, VCC, GND. We usually can ignore VCC.

Identify UART

Bastards removed the pins!

Interfacing with UART.

• Buspirate - ~15£, interfaces with bloody everything.

• Has disadvantage of being a bit of a pain to use at times.

• Save money and cost!

• USB-TTL converter for 2£ from ebay

USB-TTL

Which pin goes where

• This is a hard one to explain. Best summary is below.

• http://www.devttys0.com/2012/11/reverse-engineering-serial-ports/

• Get a multimeter or oscilloscope…• GND pin, will positively continuity test with … a grounded bit• VCC is tied high at +3.3V or +5V usually• TX fluctuates between 3.3V and 0V as it… Transmits.• RX… Good fucking luck

Ok, all hooked up. Interaction time?

• Not yet. Gotta find the baudrate

• I usually just use this, or do it by hand.

• https://code.google.com/p/baudrate/

• Then just ‘screen /dev/ttyUSB0 <baudrate>’

Connected!

Here we have a “Billion” routersbootloader debug output coming over serial from it :D

Sometimes we get a rootshell…

Othertimes we get a “uBoot” shell.

GET /FIRMWARE

• If you have a uBoot shell, you can often dump out the image

• Xfer to yourself over tftp

• With a rootshell… xfer back to yourself over tftp the entire rootfs

A case study in firmware reversing && bug hunting…

• For this bit on extracting FW and finding bugs a case study is best.

• I presented the end result of this at Bsides Hannover.

• We start with Moovbox firmware, end up with rootshells!

Because of scale we scripted binwalk…

Next up, scripting uncramfs…

Trigger Warning: Filthy Code Ahead

find . –name “vuln”

• Took a fairly blind approach to finding vulns

• “Grep and gripe” kind of things

• First off, looked at the web interface of device. How does it work. Whats its config. Etc.

Anyone see why this prompted interest?

Scripting is Magic…

Scripting is Magic…

Some numbers

• All 108 were vulnerable to ShellShock

• All 108 had the same shitty CGI script

• 106 used thttpd rooting as root

• 2 ran lighttpd. Also as root

Remote Root Everywhere

Further firmware analysis

• Lets look for more fun stuff in this firmware

• First off, we analyse the passwd files

• 4 unique hashes

The Hashes

• I have yet to crack these. People have been trying and failing for about a month. Can you succeed?

root:$1$5jjAfVIS$dIG6AvGNwq8EENjTHnfpK/

root:$1$jb.3W.1D$8FeBW.T/x2wwJVB.lp.gv1

root:$1$bw7WuzHj$aU6V7omf9zBWA2sEaJv9p1

root:$6$W74jOIhT$QaYoDDN.N1SRgyG5ALymJHcYc9TmXKcITXyCstGDdK9cXOssLOTMQPl2uRm.wsNZ7oE5byOOrdNlvNxyguqVs/

SSH Keys

• Protip: Hardcoded SSH Keys Suck

• They all have /etc/ssh/ keys. RSA and DSA

• They also have the same /etc/ssh_key privkey, which is a bit unusual...

/etc/ssh_key

• Now, this is an odd one. It matches exactly two boxes in the wild – both hosts in Germany

• As to wtf these are, I have no idea

• If anyone can figure it out, it would be great ;)

• 89.110.151.186 & 89.110.148.26 (who is this?)

Using SSH keys to fingerprint

Look! Duplicate Keys! Everywhere!

Let’s go after SSL keys…

• OpenVPN Keys: find . -name "*.key" (108)

> All identical

• SSL Keys: find . -name "*.pem" (973)

> 2e465be3c06ea7db968347aaa3df7d37> Also all the same...

SSL Keys

• 6 of them on each image. All identical across images:

> 7135ad5b7fd5fb2eb23f8dfecf74919d> cb5199178e4649461928356c7cbdae74> de2c6949bd1bca55c20d9610510a08d1> 905a7590ee039a788a08d4dfd15d2582> a926c2beaa439f37bc62a5678a4e5906> 35a569e0e768495554c4cbddd787f9e4

Popping Boxes/xdev

• Most of the vulns you will find are remote root

• A lot of them will be command injection bugs.

• Most people just enable telnetd and leave it at that.

• More fun to be had…

Popping Boxes/xdev –Se0wned

Popping Boxes/xdev –dloser 0day

Greetz to imax who actually bought a NAS back when we wrote the early versions of this exploit!

Popping Boxes/xdev

• Getting a shell is just step 1.

• Better payloads (tshd, for example) allow file transfer.

• This means we can upload tools and exfil files easily

• (A POSIX Meterpreter that worked on ARM/MIPS/PPC would be nice and all… Just sayin’)

Router Malware

• This stuff is being done ITW

• I had nice screenshots and pictures, but /tmp ate them

• So I’ll TL;DR it and explains some examples.

Linux\Flasher.A

• Discovered by myself and _ta0 in the wild.

• Firmware flashing malware, installed malicious firmware that included a password sniffer (dsniff) and exfil scripts using wput.

• Sent very little network traffic, un-killable unless you reflashed.

• Crude, held together with bash scripts, but highly effective.

Hydra/Aidra Family

• Worm/Botnet, IRC controlled.

• Spreads via telnet (and SSH) bruteforcing, also a D-Link config bug.

• Mainly used by script kiddies for DDoS purposes…

Moon

• Linksys only affected vendor.

• Discovered by some SANS handler (Johannes).

• Used a remote root command execution 0-day to spread.

• Functionality mostly unknown. Had hardcoded target ranges. Just spread… And spread. Possible test run?

Post Exploitation

• Exposed embedded devices put you firmly within an affected targets network

• Often (routers) in a privileged position (routing all traffic!)

• So much potential for pivoting, sniffing, etc… Going beyond rootshells…

• Persisting is a harder problem we will address!

Post Exploitation - Building Toolkits

• We need to statically link things so they will run on these devices.

• Uclibc.org – excellent cross compiler toolchains, 10/10 recommend.

• Now what tools do we actually need to do fun stuff?

Post Exploitation - Requirements

• C&C – So we can manage the devices

• Robust tools for getting shell access, transferring files.

• Tools for sniffing, spoofing, doing things.

• Persistence.

Post Exploitation – C&C

• For C&C, we should practice excellent OPSEC.

• Use Tor. Cross compiling static Tor is hard. I will publish the build guide in a week or so on Github

• Set up Tor to be a hidden service pointing at tshd bindshell.

• There was a screenshot, but bloody /tmp ate it

Post Exploitation – Access

• We need to be able to run commands, interactive shell, and transfer files.

• Tshd by Christopher Devine fits the bill for this.

• Encrypted file xfer/PTY/command exec, bind and reverse connect modes.

• Will publish the build-toolchain later

Post Exploitation – Hack The Planet

• Tcpdump && Ettercap && socat && nmap

• Its been done before

• We have to catch up

• Will publish the build-toolchains later

Persist

• How does firmware work?

• Its infectous!

• Unlesss you reflas…… Permapened

• “RPEF” by Michael Coppola are ITW

• Firmware infections here to stay

Rootkit Firmwares

• They exist

• They are using them

• If you believe otherwise you are an idiot.

• …

Tl;dr

• Embedded = owned

• Harass vendors

• Embedded rootshells are embedded root shells

Thanks

• Coworkers and such for tolerating weirdness

• F1nux, Alastair, digininja, `k, getting me talking

• Router mfg’s for making such products

Q&A

Questions & Comments & Abuse?

Contact:@info_dox (twitter)[email protected] (email)[email protected] (jabber, use OTR else /ignore)