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n this session, Dr. Erica Chenoweth discusses how repression affects nonviolent campaigns. She provides empirical evidence that nonviolent movements are still effective even against brutally oppressive opponents. She discusses how movements "manage" repression through the promotion of backfire, as well as the strategic options movements have in dealing with repression. She also provides evidence suggesting that nonviolent movements that adopt violence or develop armed wings are not usually advantaged relative to nonviolent movements. This is because using violence against the regime, even when provoked, can undermine the necessary public participation that nonviolent campaigns enjoy, and can also undermine the backfiring of regime repression.
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Presentation prepared for the 2013 Fletcher Summer Institute
¡ Nonviolent resistance cannot succeed against very repressive or brutal opponents.
¡ Repression or violence forces nonviolent movements to adopt counter-‐violence.
“Ruling people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One cannot rule by force alone….For, in the long run, government systems are not held together by the pressure of force, but rather by the belief in the quality and the truthfulness with which they represent and promote the interests of the people.” ~ ???
“Ruling people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One cannot rule by force alone….For, in the long run, government systems are not held together by the pressure of force, but rather by the belief in the quality and the truthfulness with which they represent and promote the interests of the people.” ~ Adolph Hitler, 1943
¡ Power is based on obedience and consent, not on monopoly of force.
¡ The use of violence demonstrates weakness, since it demonstrates a the loss of voluntary compliance.
¡ Regimes are not monolithic.
¡ Power is never permanent. All powerholders must constantly replenish their power.
Regime Leadership
Pillars of Support
Civilians
Figure 2. The Effects of Campaign Participation on the Probability of Success
p=.02
Figure 3. The Effects of Campaign Participation on the Probability of Security Force Defections, by Campaign Type
p=.07
Source: Lee Smithey, 2011 (used with permission)
High Low
Low
High
Mobilization
Repression
¡ Do not assess the strategic position and asymmetries between campaign and opponent.
¡ Assume power is permanent and monolithic.
¡ Do not differentiate between methods of struggle.
¡ Do not incorporate the strategy or choices available to campaign participants.
¡ Summy 1994: nonviolent resistance can work against extremely brutal opponents when § A dependency relationship exists ▪ The opponent’s survival depends squarely on the obedience of the people ▪ Iran, Norway & Denmark, Chile, Serbia
§ An indirect dependency relationship exists or is produced ▪ Intervention of a third party that has linkages to movement and to the opponent ▪ United States civil rights movement, 1943 Rosenstraβe protests, East Timor, Tibet, Refusenick movement
¡ Chenoweth & Stephan 2011 § Repression reduces the chances of success for nonviolent and violent campaigns, BUT
§ When faced with violent repression, nonviolent campaigns have a 46% success rate, compared with only 20% for violent campaigns. ▪ Size => tactical innovation & resilience (Schock 2005) ▪ Repression against NV campaigns more likely to backfire
¡ Repression can produce “moral shock” and paradoxically backfire by: § Empowering a movement ▪ Can generate icons and martyrs. ▪ Movement participants increase the intensity of their attachments.
§ Enhancing recruitment among sympathetic publics ▪ Third parties may offer support.
§ Weakening a regime ▪ Turn public opinion and undermine legitimacy. ▪ Create internal dissent and divisions among elites, functionaries, and
security forces.
¡ Hess & Martin 2006: movements can “manage” repression by: § Portraying the act as unjust, unfair, excessive or disproportional. § Communicating information about the action to relevant audiences. § Possessing a plan to counter censorship and regime propaganda.
Shift Nonviolent Methods
Methods of concentration
Methods of dispersion
Maintain Status Quo
Try to manage effects of repression
Cross your fingers and hope for a lucky break!
Retreat
Respond with Violence
“[The Nazis] were experts in violence, and had been trained to deal with opponents who used that method. But other forms of resistance baffled them—and all the more in proportion as the methods were subtle and concealed. It was a relief to them when resistance became violent and when nonviolent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic repressive action against both at the same time.” ~ Basel H. Liddell-‐Hart
¡ Violence is typical against nonviolent campaigns that threaten the status quo.
¡ Repression can hurt campaigns and should be avoided or evaded whenever possible.
¡ But repression does not necessarily doom a campaign, and nonviolent campaigns are still more effect than violent or mixed campaigns under repressive conditions.
¡ There are strategic choices and ways to prepare for & “manage” the effects of repression.
“Courage is not absence of fear; it is control of fear, mastery of fear.”
~ Mark Twain
Blogs:
rationalinsurgent.wordpress.com politicalviolenceataglance.org
Email:
On Twitter: @EricaChenoweth
The Effects of Radical Flank on Campaign Participation
p=.05 Source: Chenoweth & Shock 2013
¡ May apply to a situation in which there are two or more groups challenging the same opponent
¡ “Radicals” are conceptualized as those with more extreme methods or more extreme demands relative to other opposition groups § My usage is more extreme methods = violence
¡ Radical flank effects may be intra-‐movement or inter-‐movement
¡ Radical flank effects may be positive, negative, or null
¡ A radical flank may increase the leverage of the nonviolent campaign by: § Raising the profile of the movement & its demands (Haines
1984) § Making the nonviolent movement seem less threatening and
therefore a better alternative § Creating a political crisis that is resolved in favor of the
nonviolent movement & more moderate voices § Protecting participants and civilians (Jouejati 2012) § Empowering participants & severing links to existing order
(Fanon 1964)
¡ It may also encourage citizen engagement in the workplace, society, etc. (Isaac, et al 2006)
¡ A violent campaign may decrease the leverage of the nonviolent campaign by: § Discrediting all regime opponents (Pearlman 2011) § Providing justification for widespread repression against all opponents (Carey 2010; Moore & Conrad 2012)
§ Reducing widespread popular participation § Shifting the struggle to a domain in which the regime has the clear advantage (Pearlman 2011)
§ Decreasing the likelihood of backfire
¡ Bob & Nepstad: movements can survive the assassination of their leader under four conditions § Leader is administrative rather than prophetic § Movement has a martyrdom ideology § The leader shares group’s guiding identity § The movement was unified prior to repression
¡ Examples § El Salvador (Romero) § Nigerian (Saro-‐Wiwa)