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TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THE BRITISH CULPABLE FOR THE SINKING OF THE

LUSITANIA ON MAY 7, 1915?

Grace Lee

February 21, 2006

IB History 2, Pd. 2

Mr. Hines

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To what extent were the British culpable for the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915?

Part A: Plan of Investigation

The Lusitania was one of a pair of huge, fast, and technologically advanced luxury liners

that were created by the Cunard Line of Britain for use as passenger ships, but which could be

easily converted into warships1. During World War I, the Lusitania continued its regular

voyages across the Atlantic Ocean, sparking rumors that it was carrying illicit munitions from

America to Great Britain. On May 7, 1915, the German submarine U-20 sank the Lusitania off

the coast of Ireland, killing 1,195 people, including 123 Americans2. However, controversy

surrounds the factors that led the Germans to sink the Lusitania. To what extent were the British

culpable for the sinking of the Lusitania? Some historians theorize that Winston Churchill, First

Lord of the British Admiralty, purposefully provoked the Germans to sink the Lusitania. For

example, Churchill commissioned a report to determine how other nations would react to the

German sinking of a passenger ship, and he ordered British ships to be threatening so that

passengers would not be allowed to disembark before the ship was sunk3. Other historians

believe that British culpability was minimal and the sinking was primarily due to Germany’s

desire for military and naval superiority. This investigation will cover Britain’s alleged

involvement in the plot through a comparative study of Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy, by Diana

Preston, and The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All

Disasters of the Sea, by Colin Simpson. Most of the research will be from books written by

modern historians, either on the Lusitania in particular or on infamous ship disasters of the

twentieth century, which incorporate many primary sources, including telegrams between

government officials, government documents, and newspapers published during World War I.

Part B: Summary of Evidence

Some historians attribute the sinking of the Lusitania to many other factors besides

British involvement, focusing on Germany’s goals and intelligence in the United States. One of

Germany’s primary reasons for sinking the Lusitania was to establish naval supremacy, which

they believed would be a key factor in winning World War I4. The British Royal Navy had

already asserted its power by establishing an illegal blockade of Germany. In retaliation, Kaiser

Wilhelm II of Germany declared a policy of “unrestricted submarine warfare” around the British

Isles in January 19155, meaning that all British ships would be sunk and that neutral ships sailing

in the Isles could not be guaranteed protection6. The United States government immediately

1 Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New

York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995, Page 20. 2 Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New

York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995, Page 13. 3 Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the

Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 32-33. 4 Pickford, Nigel. Lost Treasure Ships of the Twentieth Century. London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1999, Page 65.

5 Many German submariners believed that “as England completely disregards international law, there is not the least

reason why we should exercise restraint.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker

Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 67; Gibson, R.H. The German Submarine War, 1914-1918. London:

Constable, 1931, Page 26. 6 Coffey, Michael. Days of Infamy: Military Blunders of the 20

th Century. New York: Nugus/Martin Productions

Limited, 1999, Page 23.

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warned Germany that it would be held accountable for any American lives lost due to submarine

warfare. Nevertheless, the Germans assumed that the United States would not be able to

mobilize quickly enough to make a difference in the war. Germany also wanted to show the

United States that they would not tolerate a neutral country funneling war materials to Britain.

The Germans were well aware of American aid to the Allies7, and a spy ring, led by the German

military and naval attachés, Franz von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed, uncovered that the Lusitania in

particular would be carrying arms to Britain on her May 1, 1915 voyage8.

The sinking of the Lusitania was also partly due to the personality of Walther Schwieger

(U-20 commander). Schwieger believed in taking advantage of any opportunities that arise, even

if they diverged with orders. For example, the day before he torpedoed the Lusitania, Schwieger

tried to sink an unmarked passenger steamer9. Historian Diana Preston acknowledged that the

British could have protected the Lusitania more, given that the Germans had published a warning

to all passengers embarking on the Lusitania10

and that Britain had acquired Germany’s three

main naval codes, enabling them to pinpoint the location of German U-boats11

. Nevertheless,

Preston believed that British involvement in the sinking was minimal.

Other historians assert that the British government organized a conspiracy that would

ensure the Germans sank the Lusitania. Historian Colin Simpson blamed the entire plot on

Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. From the start of the war, Churchill ordered that

all British merchant ships be armed, thus provoking increased aggression from Germany by

breaking the Cruiser Rules12

. Churchill also violated international code by transporting

munitions from neutral America to Britain on passenger ships13

. Additionally, Churchill ordered

a report to study the effect on other nations of a German attack on a passenger ship, illustrating

Churchill’s ruthless determination to strengthen the Allied side. Churchill’s inflammatory orders

also included a mandate for all British merchant ships to disguise themselves as American ships

and to “immediately engage the enemy” if a U-boat ordered them to halt14

. In fact, Churchill

even states, “The maneuver which brings an ally into the field is as serviceable as that which

7 Official German communications mentioned “heavy artillery fire in certain sections of the Western front, mostly

with American ammunition” and that “captured French artillery officers say that they have great stores of American

ammunition.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002,

Page 81; Gerard, J.W. My Four Years in Germany. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927, Page

159, as cited in Preston. 8 Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Pages 87-88.

9 Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 170.

10 Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 91.

11 Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 160-162.

12 The Cruiser Rules stated that unarmed ships could be stopped and the crew could be allowed to disembark before

the ship was captured or destroyed. However, armed ships could be attacked without warning. Simpson, Colin.

The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 32-33. 13

On May 20, 1915, Vice Admiral Oliver (Chief of the Naval War Staff) stated, “It also frequently happens that the

ship has sailed before it is known [at the Admiralty] that troops or valuable government warlike stores are on

board.” Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters

of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 69; Fisher, Lord John A. Memories and Records.

Volume 2. New York, 1920, Page 215, as cited in Simpson. 14

Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All Disasters of the

Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 36.

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wins a great battle”15

, implying that the sinking of the Lusitania was necessary for bringing

America into the war as a British ally.

Part C: Evaluation of Sources

Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company,

Inc., 2002.

Diana Preston, who studied modern history at Oxford University, is a historian and the

author of several books. She has written articles and reviewed books for numerous newspapers

and magazines, including The Wall Street Journal, and is a broadcaster for the BBC. Preston’s

purpose for writing this book was to reach a conclusion, after analyzing recently released

German documents and other materials, about the motivations behind the sinking of the

Lusitania and its worldwide ramifications16

. This source is valuable because it provides a very

balanced, objective account of the events surrounding the attack on the Lusitania based on many

primary sources, including interviews with survivors and previously-classified American,

British, and German documents17

. Also, Preston uses extensive endnotes, making it simple to

trace the basis for her claims back to the evidence. Additionally, one of the appendices focuses

on the technical aspects of the sinking, which includes diagrams of the ship’s configuration and

which refutes Britain’s initial claims that the Lusitania was not carrying any munitions18

. The

only limitation is that only about one-fourth of the book focuses on the reasons behind the attack

on the Lusitania, while the rest discusses the passengers on the ship, the attack itself, and its

consequences.

Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful

of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.

Colin Simpson was a British journalist and historian who became famous for his theory

that the British were part of a conspiracy to sink the Lusitania. After extensive searches on the

Internet, no other information on Simpson could be found, though many other prestigious

historians refer to him in their works. Simpson’s purpose for writing this book was to advance

his assertion that Churchill purposely instigated and enabled Germany to sink the Lusitania in

order to bring America into the war on the Allied side19

. This source is valuable because, not

15


Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 35; Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. Revised Edition.

London, 1931, Page 298, as cited in Simpson. 16

Preston states that she wanted to “provide a fresh perspective on why some acted as they did and how their actions

and decisions influenced not only the fate of the Lusitania but, as a consequence, the outcome of the First World

War and the conduct of warfare in general.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker

Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 5. 17

Preston includes many direct quotes from survivors, particularly in Chapter 14 (entitled “My God, We Are Lost”)

in which she recounts the actual attack on the Lusitania. For example, many survivors commented on seeing the

torpedo speeding towards the ship underwater. Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker

Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Pages 189-200. 18

Appendix B, entitled “A Technical Account of the Sinking.” Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New

York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Pages 441-454. 19


Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 35-36.

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only does it express a unique viewpoint, but it bases its conclusions on evidence taken from

primary sources. For example, Simpson quotes from one of Richard Webb’s (head of the Trade

Division of the Admiralty) memos in which he claimed that Captain William Turner (of the

Lusitania) had been “inviting disaster” in order to illustrate Webb’s blatant lies and attempts to

place the blame away from the Admiralty20

. Simpson also includes many maps, illustrations,

and diagrams in order to clarify his points, such as the map of St. George’s Channel, which

shows how the U-20 had approached the Lusitania21

. However, this book has many limitations,

primarily because of Simpson’s blatant bias in favor of his conspiracy theory. In some cases,

Simpson tends to interpret ambiguous sources in ways that support his thesis but that may not be

accurate22

. For example, Churchill states in his autobiography that “the maneuver which gains

an important strategic point may be less valuable than that which placates or overawes a

dangerous neutral,” a statement which Simpson interprets as a clear indication of Churchill’s

desires to do anything in order to bring America into the war as a British ally23

. Another

limitation is that the book was written in 1972, so the materials may be outdated, and many

historians have since then attempted to discredit Simpson’s thesis.

Part D: Analysis

While one can conclude that Germany sank the Lusitania in an attempt to enforce the

unrestricted submarine warfare policy, it would be difficult to assert that the British had played

as large a role in the conspiracy to sink the ship as Colin Simpson would claim. In response to

Simpson’s conspiracy theory, Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan published a book that attempted to

discredit Simpson’s argument. Bailey and Ryan asserted that the Lusitania was attacked because

of Captain Turner’s negligence and because of excessive German aggression, not because of a

plot by the British24

. However, some of Bailey’s other arguments are founded on more flimsy

evidence. For example, Bailey asserted that the Lusitania “was not being used as a warship,” but

he never provided any source as to where he obtained this information25

. Much more evidence

supports the theory that the British were involved in some way with the sinking of the Lusitania,

20


Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 185; The Webb memorandum in Lord Mersey’s papers,

duplicated in P.R.O., ADM / 137 / 1058, as cited in Simpson. 21

Another example is the diagram showing what cargo the ship was carrying on its last voyage and where the cargo

was placed in the ship’s interior. Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most

Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Pages 135 and 104. 22

For example, the Admiralty War Diary documents Lord Fisher (Admiral of the Fleet) and Churchill’s discussion

of the Lusitania’s arranged escort ship. The diary stops abruptly after the escort ship’s futility against submarine

attack was discussed, which Simpson claims clearly indicates Churchill and Fisher’s desires to mask their decision

of withdrawing the Lusitania’s escort. Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the

Most Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 130. 23


Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 35. 24

Bailey claimed that “Captain Turner had deliberately violated five of his top-secret instructions,” quoting one of

Captain Webb’s memorandums to show that the Admiralty was blameless; Webb believed that “not only had [the

Lusitania’s] course leaked out but that ‘misleading directions’ had been sent to the liner while en route ‘in [the

British] code.” The five instructions were “high speed, zigzagging, a mid-channel course, avoiding headlands, and

shunning approaches to harbors.” Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer

Behind the World’s Most Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, Page 179. 25

Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the World’s Most

Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, Page 178.

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though their degree of involvement is probably not as extreme as Simpson asserted. For

example, Churchill’s order for a report predicting the effect on other nations of an attack on a

passenger ship is irrefutable, and as was his deliberately antagonistic arming of British merchant

ships; Churchill was certainly desperate for any advantage that could be brought to the Allied

side26

.

Nevertheless, the British cannot be fully blamed for the sinking of the Lusitania since a

great deal of evidence indicates that Germany was already planning on sinking ships carrying

munitions into Britain. Germany needed to deter neutral countries from sending military aid to

the Allies, to demonstrate their naval power, and to impose a blockade around Britain that would

prevent her from receiving illegal aid27

. Establishing a war zone around the British Isles, with

unrestricted submarine warfare28

, could achieve these goals, and sinking the Lusitania would

demonstrate their ability and willingness to enforce it. Even without Churchill’s questionable

actions (i.e. telling passenger ships to arm themselves and ram submarines29

), the Germans

clearly intended to sink the Lusitania, as demonstrated by their warning published in

newspapers, stating that “travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies

do so at their own risk”30

. Furthermore, the Germans directly responsible for the sinking,

Captain Schwieger and Hermann Bauer (commander of the U-20 and two other submarines),

both believed that attacking passenger ships, even unmarked and potentially neutral ones, was

acceptable in the war zone31

. Therefore, the British played only a minor role in the sinking of the

Lusitania; German political and military motivations were the primary factors.

Part E: Conclusion

Like in most military and government decisions, a multitude of factors combined to cause

the Germans to sink the Lusitania. However, the British were not primarily responsible for the

attack; their actions simply enabled the attack to occur. Britain may have played a part in

instigating Germany, but ultimately German motivations would cause the sinking. Churchill’s

actions ensured the attack’s success by making the Lusitania an easy target; he did not directly

cause her to be attacked in the first place. Ultimately, the sinking of the Lusitania brought the

Americans one step closer to war; the United States’ declaration of war on Germany on April 6,

1917 would change the outcome of the war and affect international relations dramatically.

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In his autobiography, Churchill stated, “The first British countermove, made on my responsibility … was to deter

the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to rely increasingly on underwater attack and thus ran

the greater risk of mistaking neutral for British ships and of drowning neutral crews and thus embroiling Germany

with other Great Powers.” Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most

Fateful of All Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972, Page 36; Churchill, Winston S. The

World Crisis. Revised Edition. London, 1931, Pages 724-725, as cited in Simpson. 27

Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the World’s Most

Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, Page 30. 28

Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 67. 29

Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 73. 30

Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed History. New

York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995, Page 31. 31

When U-boat captains were told not to sink neutral ships, Bauer angrily expressed that “his U-boats should not be

put at risk because of political wavering and that his captains must have some freedom to act.” Preston, Diana.

Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, Page 149.

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Preston’s book was more valuable to this investigation than Simpson’s book because her

book showed a more balanced, objective viewpoint and was based on more reliable sources.

Simpson tended to be biased and made some of his claims based on questionable evidence.

Part F: Source List

Primary Sources

Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. Revised Edition. London, 1931, as cited in Simpson.

Fisher, Lord John A. Memories and Records. Volume 2. New York, 1920, as cited in Simpson.

Gerard, J.W. My Four Years in Germany. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton,

1927, as cited in Preston.

Webb memorandum in Lord Mersey’s papers, duplicated in P.R.O., ADM / 137 / 1058, as cited

in Simpson.

Secondary Sources

Bailey, Thomas A., and Ryan, Paul B. The Lusitania Disaster: The Real Answer Behind the

World’s Most Controversial Sea Tragedy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.,

1975.

Ballard, Robert D. Exploring the Lusitania: Probing the Mysteries of the Sinking that Changed

History. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1995.

Coffey, Michael. Days of Infamy: Military Blunders of the 20th

Century. New York:

Nugus/Martin Productions Limited, 1999.

Gibson, R.H. The German Submarine War, 1914-1918. London: Constable, 1931

Pickford, Nigel. Lost Treasure Ships of the Twentieth Century. London: Pavilion Books

Limited, 1999.

Preston, Diana. Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy. New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc.,

2002.

Simpson, Colin. The Lusitania: Finally, the Startling Truth about One of the Most Fateful of All

Disasters of the Sea. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.

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