The Ballistic Axis: Strategic Implications of DPRK and Iran's Cooperation in Missiles and Space

The Ballistic Axis : DPRK and Iran's cooperation in missiles and

space - strategic implications

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Tal Inbar

Head, Space Research Center The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies, Israel

April 21, 2016, Washington DC

Disclaimer

• The presentation is based exclusively on unclassified open source information

• The views represents the author and are NOT necessarily represent an official Israeli governmental position;

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Content of the presentation

• Introduction to Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal

• Introduction to DPRK ballistic missile arsenal

• Recent revelations on DPRK missile technologies and nuclear warhead

• Iran’s silos for ballistic missiles

• Iran’s space program – and DPRK technologies incorporated

• Prospects for the future

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Iran’s Ballistic missiles

First missiles acquired from DPRK during the Iran-Iraq War.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Teharani Moghadem, “Father of Iranian missiles”

Refueling vehicle

Scud Missile

Note the horizontal

refuel

Iran’s Ballistic missiles

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Standard Scud TEL. Note 1980’s DPRK Scheme

Scud Missile

Shahab 2 (DPRK Scud C)

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Shahab 3 (DPRK Nodong)

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Shahab 3 / Ghadr (DPRK Nodong)

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Shahab 3 production in Iran

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Sajil – 2 stage, solid propelled

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Sajil – 2 stage, solid propelled

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Thrust termination

port (1/4)Housing for second stage jet vanes (1/4)

Fateh 110 – the accuracy revolution

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Fateh 110 – the accuracy revolution

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Guidance section

Khalij Fars – Anti ship ballistic missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Hourmuz – Anti ship ballistic missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Fateh 313 – Extended range

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Note the pattern – possible carbon

fiber outer skin of the missile


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Test launch of the missile (2015)

Shahab 3 with sub munitions

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Note the sub-munitions inside

the missile’s warhead

Advanced Zelzal – Sub munitions

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Heavy sub munition

Fins

Ya Ali cruise missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Soumar cruise missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Soumar cruise missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Qiam ballistic missile – A Scud replacement

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Shahab 2 with new guidance

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Movable steering fins

Emad – advanced Ghadr

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Note the movable steering fins

Emad – advanced Ghadr

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Retro rocket (1 of 2)

Iran’s Silo basing

Iran has different types of silos:

• Conventional designed (missile in vertical position on alert)

• Underground “missile city” – tunnels and TEL’s

• Coffin type silo

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Shahab 3 on alert – vertically mounted

Blast doors to the silo

Doors on ground level


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Qiam missile

Launch hole


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Underground missile depo

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Note: missiles are stored without the

warheads


©2016 by Tal Inbar

North Korean ballistic missiles

• The NK arsenal of ballistic missiles consist of former Soviet Union

technologies and origin: Scud, SS-21(KN-02) and BM-25 (aka Musudan,

BK-1)

• Original design: Nodong, HS-13 – two versions

Soviet Origin Original NK design

©2016 by Tal Inbar

HS-13 (KN 08) missile

• The missile was first shown on a military parade on April 15, 2012.

• Photographic materials indicated that the missile was under development

or production in Kim Jong Il time.

• It is described by North Korea as ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile).

• On October 2015, a second version of the missile was shown.

• No test flight was conducted for either type.

©2016 by Tal InbarHS-13 HS-13 mod. 2


©2016 by Tal Inbar

1st stage2nd stage

3rd stage Re-entry vehicle

HS-13 mod. 2 missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Note the same support

structure for the missile

Kim Jong Un, March 2016

Kim Jong Il, Date UNKNOWN

When was the HS-13 built?

Nuclear equipped warhead (RV) of the HS-13 missile

• On March 9, 2016, DPRK displayed, for the first time, a nuclear equipped

warhead for its HS-13 (KN-08) long range ballistic missile.

HS-13 (KN-08) RV on its cradle ©2016 by Tal Inbar

• Triconic RV configuration

• Blunt Nose-Tip

• Low ballistic coefficient (b)

Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead

Electronic package for the nuclear bomb

or ballast weight

Nuclear explosive

device

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Aft Skirt (for stabilization)Nose

Tip


©2016 by Tal Inbar


or ballast weight

Nuclear explosive

device

Aft Skirt (for stabilization)Nose

Tip


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile

• DPRK leader Kim Jong Un was shown the nuclear bomb that was

designed to fit inside the re-entry vehicle of the HS-13 missile. Note the

missile in the background.

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

HS-13 missile first stage

HS-13 missile second stage

Place for the nuclear explosion device

Nuclear Bomb for HS-13

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Explosive Lens

Nuclear Bomb for HS-13

Electrical cords for explosive lens

activation

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Geometry of the nuclear explosive device

Nuclear bomb with some

pentagons and hexagons

superimposed

Probable geometry of the

nuclear device (minus

external features)

©2016 by Tal Inbar


Inside view of the re-entry vehicle of the HS-

13 ballistic missile


OR ballast

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Aft Squirt

Mounting point

Location of the Nuclear payload

The strategic significance

• It is a devastating combination of long range ballistic missile AND a

nuclear warhead.

• North Korea never tested a missile to a range exciding 1100 km –

the HS-13 family is a quantum leap in it’s capabilities.

• The unveiling of the miniaturized nuclear bomb is a direct response to the

west’s claims that NK lack the capability to produce them.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Re-entry simulation for the nose tip of the HS-13 (mod. 2) missile

• On March 15, 2016, NK published detailed view of a ground test of the

nose tip of the HS-13 mod. 2 ballistic missile.

• The simulated atmospheric re-entry was conducted by using a static test

stand and exposure of the nose tip to the exhaust gases of a Scud missile.

Front page of the Rodong Sinmun revealing the test ©2016 by Tal Inbar

• The test aim was to evaluate and prove of the

nose tip in heat loads and heat fluxes typical to

the critical phase of atmospheric reentry.

Erosion and Ablation test of the Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2

Nose tip – probably made of ceramics

Ablative material

Electrical connectors

Attachment Bolts

(to the missile)

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Note the cover up design

Author

Erosion and Ablation test of the Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2

Nose tip poised for

test

Scud engine

Exhaust from the

scud engine

Nose tip

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Scud engine

Schematic drawing of the nose tip

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Gauge to measure the curve of the

nose tip: note that very little material has been ablated

Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2

Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Electronic package used for the nuclear explosive device OR

ballast

Electrical connectors


Charred nose tip

Thermal blankets

(possible use of Asbestos Phenolic )

Ablative material. Note that MOST of the material withstand the

heat during the test

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Electronic equipment – probably related to the

nuclear bomb. Some may be avionics.Antenna

Bolts unaffected by

the heat

©2016 by Tal Inbar


HS-13 missile

First stage

Cables duct

Second stage

First stage main engine

©2016 by Tal Inbar

HS-13 mod. 2

Nose tip (as was tested on March 15, 2016) Large compartment for nuclear bomb

(Larger than the one shown on march 9, hence larger yield possible)

Technological assessments

• The HS-13 missile shown with the nuclear warhead looks authentic.

• The 6 HS-13 (mod. 2) missiles shown looks authentic.

• The design of the nuclear bomb looks authentic.

• The nose tip used for simulated re-entry is authentic in every aspect.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Solid propelled rocket motor

• On March 2016, DPRK performed a static test of a new, large diameter

(probably 1.25 meters) solid rocket motor.

• DPRK leader Ki Jong Un attended the test.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Solid fuel engine test

©2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

Rails

Engine’s exhaust

Jet vane mount



Electrical Connector

Nozzle

Jet Vane


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar








©2016 by Tal Inbar

Burning time of the rocket

engine in seconds (?)





Welding

Jet vane mount





Static test fire of HS-13 engines

• On April 2016, DPRK performed a static test of the engines which are

installed in the HS-13 missile.

• Kim Jong Un attended the test.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Static test of a cluster of engines forHS-13 ballistic missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar





Static test of dual-combustion chamber rocket engine for HS-13 ballistic missile

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Flame from engine 2

Flame from engine 1

Truss – connecting the engines

to the missile

Cables for measurements during the test

Probable location of

turbo-pumps

assembly

Solid propelled SLBM

• On April 23, 2016, DPRK conducted a test flight of a SOLID PROPELLED

SLBM, from under the sea.

• DPRK state run television claimed it was launched from a submarine.

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Protective cover of the launch tube

Hand grips

Outer cover of the launch

tube. Note the DPRK submarine

color


©2016 by Tal Inbar



©2016 by Tal Inbar

Missile’s nose tip

Cables Duct


UNHA SLV first stage

©2016 by Tal Inbar


©2016 by Tal Inbar

Preliminary conclusions

• DPRK has finished the design of two versions of the HS-13 ballistic

missile.

• DPRK has succeeded to built a miniaturized nuclear bomb to fit its large

ballistic missiles.

• DPRK has the technology to design, manufacture and test of re-entry

vehicles for ballistic missiles.

• Transfer of DPRK missile technologies is conformed in regard to Iran and

Pakistan, among other countries.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Future prospects

• Static tests of both versions of the HS-13 must be conducted (including

separation tests – for stages of the missiles, AND the re-entry vehicles

must be conducted). NOTE – This might have been partially achieved

through launches of the UNHA satellite launch vehicle.

• Nuclear test with the miniaturized bomb must be conducted (this MAY

HAVE been done already, with reduced yield).

• Dynamic tests (launches) of both versions of the HS-13 missile must be

conducted to test the design and build reliability.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Future prospects

• NK might develop even smaller nuclear warheads, to fit its arsenal of

Nodong missiles.

• If they will, it will have a profound influence on all assessments

regarding Iran – since Iranian Shahab 3, Ghader 110 are Nodong

derivatives.

©2016 by Tal Inbar

[email protected]

©2016 by Tal Inbar

Contact Information

Back up slides

©2016 by Tal Inbar

©2016 by Tal Inbar

©2016 by Tal Inbar

First presentation of a space launcher to Iran’s supreme leader

Half section of the fairing

Launcher forward section

Satellite

©2016 by Tal Inbar

The satellite launcher – integral part of Iran’s missiles arsenal

Shahab missile

Sajil missile

Safir satellite launch vehicle

©2016 by Tal Inbar

©2016 by Tal Inbar

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The Ballistic Axis: Strategic Implications of DPRK and Iran's Cooperation in Missiles and Space