Rise of Militancy and ISIS in Bangladesh, January 2016 Special Report

Analysis: Growth of militancy and ISIS in

Bangladesh

Intelligent Security Solutions Limited

www.issrisk.com

Intelligent Security Solutions Limited Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis

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Executive Summary

As ISIS continues to make violent forays into countries across Europe, North Africa, Central

Asia and Southeast Asia, the pertinent question becomes what is their strategy for South

Asia? Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have for long been recognised as the epicentres of

global terrorism and conflict, clearly feature in this ISIS plan. Bangladesh, on the other hand,

has had little to no real attention given to it regarding its now potentially pivotal importance

as a bridge between ISIS‟ South and Southeast Asian aspirations. Whether these ambitions

are realised though a truly regional sized Caliphate, „a Khurasan State‟ or through the

construction of an „archipelago of mini Caliphates‟ across the region; Bangladesh‟s

geographical location and the religious demographics of its population by definition merit its

close examination.

What role will the militants in Bangladesh potentially play in ISIS plans? What is the situation

regarding domestic militancy now? Who are indeed the main players in this largely traditional

society, one which has repeatedly struggled and at times failed to retain its founding

ideology of constitutional secularism? What are the dynamics of the intra-religious tensions

in its 86% Muslim population? This report will examine the broader jihadist and militant

landscape in the country and then move into an analysis of how ISIS is capitalising on the

lack of recognition being awarded to the existence of a growing local problem – one that is

transitioning into a regional problem.

Introduction

Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh is growing. Despite the steady increase in evidence

as to the growing presence of ISIS, the Bangladeshi government moved to wilfully ignore,

deny and then suppress at times alarming evidence throughout 2015. These actions are

continuing in 2016. Regardless of this political decision, multiple incidents not only point to

an irrefutable growth in support for ISIS within Bangladesh but also to worrisome trends of

an organic Islamic fundamentalism coupled with a seemingly general rise in radicalisation.

ISIS are both capitalising and promoting these trends for their own ends.

The government‟s position and stance, one of denial, is counterproductive, particularly at a

time when localised groups are making significant overtures to the broader Islamic or jihadist

campaign that is evolving regionally and globally. This jump from localised to regionalised

agendas is the greatest risk if individual countries choose to ignore what is happening in

their own back yards for expediency or political reasons. By the time the problem has

morphed into a regional one, it is too late to start addressing it, the strategy then becomes

one of engagement and containment.


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This report outlines the evidence and provides analysis that the localised groups pursing that

radical agenda are communicating more, sharing intelligence, training and pooling resources

and potentially working towards a commonality of purpose, much more so than ever before,

more importantly, that commonality is currently centring around ISIS. However, it would be

easy to bang the ISIS drum and lay all the ills on their door. It is, however, not that simple.

The jihadist landscape in Bangladesh is changing, but it has been a slow and quiet and

largely unnoticed transition over the past 10 – 15 years and appears to be gaining some

tempo now. The cross fertilisation of know-how, experience and common ideologically

objectives that are merging into a homogenous agenda is becoming very pronounced.

Presence of Other Islamist Militant Groups in Bangladesh

According to a report published by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,

Bangladesh has witnessed two waves of religious radicalism in recent decades. The first

(1999-2005) was led by Bangladeshis who fought alongside the Afghan mujahideen in the

1980s and was dominated by groups like Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami-Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB); this wave included hundreds of Bangladeshi

youth waging jihad in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Upon returning home, they

radicalised others and joined local extremist organisations. At the national level, a

fundamentalist-friendly coalition led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which

included the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and the Islamic Oikya Jote came to power in 2001. It was

only in 2005 that the Bangladesh government, acting under international pressure, began

banning various extremist and jihadist groups within its borders. The crackdown caused a lull

in extremist activity, although various banned outfits continued to function quietly under new

names or front organisations.

A second wave in religious radicalism was sparked by the secular Awami League-led

government‟s setting up of a domestic tribunal in 2010 to try JeI leaders and other Islamists

accused of war crimes during the 1971 liberation war. Islamist mobilisation gathered further

momentum in early 2013 in response to the Shahbag protests when secular liberals took to

the streets and cyberspace to demand the death penalty for those guilty of war crimes. In

their blogs, these individuals were extremely critical of Islam and the intolerance of Islamists.

Islamists in return denounced secular liberals as “apostates” and openly called for their

elimination. For instance, the Chittagong-based Hefajat-e-Islam issued a 13-point demand

for Shahbag protestors and “atheist[s]... bloggers and anti-Islamists” to be hanged to death.

Of the 84 “enemies of Islam‟” on its “hit list,” nine people have been killed so far and several

others have been attacked.

“The mujahidin of Bengal (Bangladesh) realised that there was no room for blind partisanship towards


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any organisation once the Khilafah (Caliphate) had been declared and that there was no longer

legitimacy for any independent jihad organisation … Thus, the sincere men from the various jihad

groups rushed to support the Khilafah and join the ranks of its soldiers in Bengal. They united their

ranks behind a single Qurashi imam (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi)… Thus, Allah united the ranks of

mujahidin in Bengal once again after they were fragmented. He gave them the honour of becoming

soldiers of the Khilafah upon the prophetic methodology, inshallah.” − Dabiq - Issue 121

In September 2015, United States officials informed Bangladeshi authorities that terrorists

linked to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group were planning to ramp up activities

inside Bangladesh. In the months that followed a series of unusual terrorist attacks were

witnessed in different parts of the nation and after each incident, ISIS claimed responsibility

for carrying out those attacks through social media accounts known to be used by the group.

Despite this, Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, and her government rejected

those claims outright, denied the existence of ISIS within Bangladesh, and even went ahead

to describe the terrorist attacks as part of a conspiracy by the opposition parties to tarnish

the government‟s image and the nation‟s progress.

Such diametrically opposed views between the Bangladeshi government (and intelligence

apparatus) and foreign intelligence services as to the presence of ISIS in Bangladesh have,

to say the least, created high levels of confusion on the matter. In real terms this lack of

formal acceptance by the Bangladesh authorities notably impedes the understanding of the

risks from ISIS in the nation, and as such adds real difficulties in constructing a clear

intelligence picture of this critical new threat to their domestic security landscape.

In this report, ISS Risk will undertake an objective assessment of the various developments

in Bangladesh during the last 18 months, based on open source media reports as well as

comments from our own in-country sources, so as to identify the existence of any trends and

in turn address the following key questions:

Whether ISIS has any operational presence in Bangladesh?

What is the potential for organic growth of ISIS in Bangladesh in the near term?

What risks are posed to foreign nationals and corporations operating in

Bangladesh?

Combat Indicators

Despite denials by the Bangladeshi ruling political party and authorities several significant

events have taken place in the nation during the last 18 months, highlighting, at the very

least, the significant ideological and theological influence of ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al-

1 Dabiq is an official monthly online magazine published by ISIS.


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Baghdadi over some Bangladeshi nationals.

Chronology of events

August 2014

A group of five Bangladeshi nationals declared their oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi

through a video posted in Youtube entitled „Muslims in Bangladesh give Bayah to the

Caliphah Ibrahim (Hafiahulla)‟. The five masked men took the oath in Bengali, whilst

holding copies of the Quran in their hands and were waving a black and white ISIS style

banner written in Arabic.

September 2014

Indian security forces arrested four Indian youths in Kolkata who were planning to enter

Bangladesh to meet an ISIS recruiter in Dhaka. Their interrogation revealed that another

11 Indian youths were in touch with ISIS handlers in Bangladesh.

Bangladeshi security forces arrested seven members of the banned Bangladeshi

Islamist militant group Jamaa‟tul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), including Abdullah al-

Tasnim, the acting chief of JMB. As per Bangladeshi police reports, the militants were

arrested for establishing contact with ISIS in Syria. Further investigations revealed that

JMB was trying to recruit Bangladeshis to fight along ISIS in Syria and Iraq. At the same

time, they were also planning to carry out attacks against senior government figures to

gain international attention.

A British national of Bangladeshi origin named Samiun Rahman aka Ibn Hamdan Mian

was arrested in Dhaka for recruiting Bangladeshi nationals on behalf of ISIS. Police also

arrested two local youths for volunteering to travel to Syria with the help of Samiun

Rahman.

October 2014

Investigations by Indian intelligence agencies revealed that JMB was trying to recruit

Muslim youths from West Bengal state in India for fighting along ISIS in Syria.

Additionally, JMB was also using West Bengal as a safe haven to export explosives to

Bangladesh.

January 2015

Police arrested four suspected member of ISIS, including a local coordinator, who was

planning the organisation of a series of attacks on important government offices as part

of a strategy to establish a Caliphate in Bangladesh.

May 2015

Bangladeshi police forces arrested two ISIS recruiters from Dhaka. One of the arrested

suspects, Aminul Islam Baig, is reportedly a coordinator for ISIS and also a member of


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JMB. The second person arrested was confirmed as a member of JMB.

August 2015

Two British nationals of Bangladeshi origin, Ruhul Amin and Reeyad Khan, who had

joined ISIS, were killed in British military drone strikes in Syria.

September 2015

Bangladeshi PM Sheik Hasina informed British PM David Cameron that British

Bangladeshis are fanning extremism in Bangladesh and recruiting people from

Bangladesh for fighting in Syria. She requested Cameron step up efforts against the ISIS

recruiters coming from Bangladeshi communities in the UK.

Three unidentified assailants shot and killed an Italian aid worker as he walked on the

street in the high-security diplomatic quarter of Dhaka. ISIS later claimed responsibility

for the attack through a verified social media account and warned that citizens of the

„crusader coalition‟ would not be safe in Muslim nations.

October 2015

Five days after the murder of the Italian aid worker, another group of unidentified

gunmen killed a Japanese national in Rangpur, Northern Bangladesh. ISIS again

claimed responsibility for the attack. Two months later, following investigations,

Bangladeshi police claimed that JMB was involved behind the murder of this Japanese

national.

One person was killed and more than 100 others were injured when three IEDs were

detonated amid thousands of Shia Muslims gathering for the Ashura procession in

Dhaka. ISIS later claimed responsibility for the attack.

More than two dozen Christian priests, nuns and aid workers from different parts of the

nation received death threats. Those who sent the threats claimed they belonged to both

ISIS and JMB.

November 2015

ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack on a police checkpoint outside Dhaka that left

one police officer killed and a second injured.

ISIS claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt on a minority Bahai

community leader in Rangpur, northern Bangladesh.

ISIS claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt on an Italian priest in

Dinajpur, northern Bangladesh.

One person was killed and three others injured when attackers opened fire during

evening prayers at a Shia mosque in Shibganj, northern Bangladesh. ISIS claimed

responsibility for the attack.

ISIS published an article titled „The revival of Jihad in Bengal with the spread of the light


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of the Khilafah‟ in its monthly online magazine, Dabiq. The article heaped praise upon

JMB for being „a true jihadi organisation‟, whilst labelling other political parties of the

nation as apostates and atheists. Inside the article ISIS claimed responsibility for several

different attacks that had been carried out in Bangladesh, whilst threatening to carry out

more attacks. The article also announced that a regional leader had been appointed for

Bangladesh – although the name of the individual was not given.

Al Hayat, the media platform of ISIS, published an audio clip in Bengali urging Muslim

youths of „Bengal‟ (note: this could refer to both the West Bengal state in India and / or

simply to Bangladesh itself) to join the group. Indian intelligence officials were able to

trace the origin of the audio clip to within Bangladesh.

Image 1: ISIS claiming responsibility for the attack on Shia mosque in Bogra on 26 November,

2015

Image 2: ISIS publishing a timeline of its attacks from September – November, 2015


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December 2015

ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide attack targeting a minority Ahmedia mosque in

Rajshahi, northern Bangladesh, killing one person and injuring another ten people. The

police chief of Bangladesh described the incident as the first suicide attack of the nation

and blamed JMB for the incident.

A British educated Bangladeshi national Siful Haque Sujan aka Abu Khalid al-Bengali

was killed by US drone strikes near Raqaa in Syria. He was considered a prominent

member of the ISIS external operations department, and was considered among the

group‟s top cyber experts, actively involved in hacking and counter-surveillance

activities.

Discernible patterns

ISIS has clearly devoted a significant amount of its media and propaganda resources

to Bangladesh.

This has been aptly demonstrated through publications focused on Bangladesh via its

online Dabiq magazine or Al Hayat media front platforms, or through the claiming of

attacks through (verified) ISIS social media accounts.

The allocation of such resources by ISIS unequivocally denotes the Group as having

genuine interest in Bangladesh, as part of their wider strategic objectives. Bangladesh,

as the third most populous Muslim nation in the world (with over 94% of these Muslims

following Sunni Islam), both logically and naturally holds great interest for ISIS.

ISIS recruiters have been identified as being both present and active in Bangladesh

since September 2014 … with intelligence garnered from arrests in India identifying an ISIS

recruiter operating in Dhaka at that time.

This observation gains further credence from two further incidents later that same month.

Firstly, arrests by Bangladeshi police of JMB cadres for establishing contact with ISIS

and attempting to send recruits to Syria, and secondly the arrest of a British national

operating as an ISIS recruiter in Dhaka.

For recruiters to have begun operating in Bangladesh from September 2014, it is our

conclusive assessment that actual contacts between ISIS and potential Bangladeshi

recruiters should have taken place months earlier, and that this was most likely facilitated

or done through (the unspecified number of) Bangladeshi jihadis who had already joined

ISIS in Syria.

This September 2014 „tipping point‟ in Bangladesh makes even more sense when it is

put in a wider context of ISIS‟ global profile at the time. During the middle months of


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2014, ISIS was making global headlines from its operations in the Middle East and North

Africa – the military capture of Mosul in Iraq, the declaring of a Caliphate, a long series of

unprecedented brutalities and (strategic) violations of human rights against minorities.

Such achievements and headline grabbing actions made ISIS an undisputed leader of

the global jihad movement in the eyes of radicals from across the world - including those

in Bangladesh. Undoubtedly such a time was considered most suitable for ISIS to initiate

a serious recruitment drive into Bangladesh, as it did elsewhere.

A definite and close connection exists between ISIS in Bangladesh and the JMB …

many incidents where JMB cadres have been found as having established contact with

ISIS, former JMB members identified as active recruiters for ISIS, attacks claimed by

ISIS identified as being carried out by former or current JMB members, threats to

minorities being issued in the name of both JMB and ISIS etc.

These observations could be interpreted two ways – either JMB is using the ISIS brand

name to gain support and credibility, or JMB has made a strategic decision to ally with

ISIS and in turn, has been allowed to look after the Bangladeshi operations and grow the

organisational structure of ISIS in the country.

To contextualise these interpretations further, a critical piece of contemporaneous data

should be highlighted. In the latest issue of Dabiq, a leading article on jihad in Bengal

saw much praise shown to both the JMB and its deceased spiritual leader Shaykh Abdur

Rahman for having founded a „proper jihad organisation in Bangladesh‟ based upon the

Salafi ideology.

What needs to be recognised at this juncture is that ISIS is very sceptical and reticent in

acknowledging the activities of other jihadi organisations, or as accepting them as

pursuing a „proper jihad‟, as it wants to project itself as the only true follower of jihad and

Islam. On top of this, ISIS has rarely praised other jihadi organisations openly for

pursuing the jihad the „proper way‟. So this open endorsement of JMB by ISIS is most

likely the result of an understanding between the two groups.

It is our assessment that JMB has either become an affiliate of ISIS or it is in the

advanced stage of becoming one. A formal and open declaration is, perhaps, not being

made for tactical reasons – to avoid increased domestic and international attention and

scrutiny.

When examining these events it has been noted that until the middle of 2015, the

Bangladeshi security forces were arresting ISIS recruiters and suspected ISIS

members as well as confiscating their weapons on a regular basis. Up until this point

Bangladeshi security forces were openly acknowledging ISIS‟ operational presence within

Bangladesh. However, this recognition of ISIS operating within its borders changed with the

murder of the Italian aid worker in Dhaka in September 2015. Overnight, all reference to ISIS


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was removed from any police/security forces press release.

A source from within Bangladesh stated that ISIS related activities continued at an even

pace throughout 2015; the only difference being that following September the

government decided to replace any reference to ISIS with that of JMB. In short, attacks

by ISIS in Bangladesh are being purposefully attributed to JMB alone, by the

Bangladeshi government. In fact as discussed in the previous section, very little

difference exists between JMB and ISIS in the Bangladeshi context. Therein, attacks

claimed by ISIS in late 2015 but publically attributed to the JMB by the Bangladeshi

government, should in all likelihood be considered as a corroboration of ISIS‟ own claims

of direct involvement.

ISIS Operational Presence in Bangladesh

Based on our own research and source comments, we have sufficient reason to believe that

ISIS has a developed operational presence within Bangladesh. Specifically this means that

there are individuals inside Bangladesh who have direct contact with ISIS‟ Syria-based

leadership and that these individuals act upon instructions received directly from this high

command structure.

Leadership

The current operational head of ISIS in Bangladesh is a dual Canadian-Bangladeshi citizen

– let us call him Mr TAC for the purposes of this Report. As the operational chief, Mr TAC is

entrusted with the responsibility of developing an ISIS network within Bangladesh and also

to act as a conduit between pro-ISIS elements inside the nation and the ISIS leadership in

Syria.

Inside Syria, the Bangladesh operations of ISIS were historically handled by the now

deceased London based Bangladeshi national Siful Haque Sujan aka Abu Khalid al-Bengali

and his close associate, an Australian jihadi named Neil Prakash aka Abu Khalid al-

Cambodi2.

It is worth mentioning at this point that al-Bengali was a member of the ISIS‟ external

operations departments – the wing responsible for ISIS‟s organisational growth outside Iraq

and Syria as well the execution of cell-based attacks abroad. The Paris attacks of November

2015 were sanctioned by this external operations department of ISIS and it is headed by

Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, who is also the spokesperson of ISIS. The department‟s central

importance to ISIS and its global caliphate ambitions speaks for itself.

2 Al-Cambodi is also known for his recruitment and radicalisation of the British teenager of

Bangladeshi origins who planned an attack during ANZAC Day in Melbourne in April 2015


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Mr TAC‟s primary directive is the facilitation of travel for jihadists from Bangladesh to Syria.

A mission he reportedly received guidance on from al-Bengali and al-Cambodi. Mr TAC‟s

close associate in this endeavour was a Muhammed Aminul Islam Baig, also a former

member of JMB, who was arrested by the Bangladeshi police in May 2015 on charges

related to him being an ISIS coordinator. During interrogation, Baig revealed that he had

recruited at least 25 students to join ISIS in Syria. Additionally, he also revealed that both

financing and logistical support were channelled through a Bangladeshi national based in an

East Asian country. Baig further revealed that Bangladeshi recruits were sent to Syria via

Turkey disguised as volunteers for Islamic NGOs such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and Ummah

Welfare Trust (UWT) – organisations which have deep penetration in Bangladeshi society3.

It is our assessment that this particular East Asian nation was selected for an aggressive

recruiting drive by ISIS as part of its strategy in Asia, as travelling to the Middle East from

this country would not trigger red flags unlike for persons travelling to the same destination

from Southeast Asia.

Another known close contact of Mr TAC was former JMB Acting Chief Abdullah al-Tasnim,

who was arrested in September 2014. As mentioned earlier in the Report, al-Tasnim was

arrested for establishing contacts with ISIS and for recruiting Bangladeshi nationals to fight

with ISIS in Syria. In the Dabiq article on Bangladesh it was reported that a leader had been

appointed for Bangladesh, although the identity of this appointed person was kept hidden. It

is our assessment that Mr TAC was actually appointed as the leader of ISIS in Bangladesh,

most probably as such an appointment would had given him at once both sufficient authority

to deal with and the right to command the different jihadist factions in Bangladesh.

Recruitment and efforts to establish allegiances with indigenous groups

The Dabiq article on Bangladesh was very interesting in two separate senses in that it was

written by a Bangladeshi, who clearly held a deep understanding of the jihadi ideological and

theological discourse inside Bangladesh and that secondly, the article gave real insight into

ISIS‟ target audience within Bangladesh. Other key features to the article were it‟s ridiculing

of groups which follow al-Qaeda and it‟s blaming of al-Qaeda for the acceptance of Mullah

Omar as the leader of the global jihad movement. The article also mocked Ayman al-

Zawihiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda, as an unwise man, hiding in some unknown place,

releasing outdated video messages with pledges of allegiance to a dead man and scolding

others for not doing the same. In the Bangladeshi context, the true target of this extended

ridicule and anti al-Qaeda diatribe was the banned militant outfit Ansarullah Bangla Team

(ABT), the group responsible for the murder of several secular bloggers in Bangladesh in the

3 HuT in particular has an extended and significant presence across universities in Bangladesh.


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last few years.

ABT is known to subscribe to the al-Qaeda ideology and according to some sources, is a

part of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Very interestingly however, and although

appearing to be deeply contradictory owing to ideological differences, there are reports that

ISIS coordinators and recruiters in Bangladesh have forged and maintained contact with

members of ABT. Among the suspected ISIS recruiters and members arrested by the

Bangladesh police in the last year or so, a small number were identified as former known

members of ABT. Consequently, it is our assessment that ISIS Bangladesh is in fact

favourably disposed towards ABT and would like to have ABT enter its fold. Through its

radicalised members and proven capacity for violent attacks, the ABT has shown itself to be

a worthy potential ally / affiliate of ISIS Bangladesh and that this outreaching by ISIS to ABT

members (and therein the group) is an appeal to ABT to ditch al-Qaeda and join ISIS.

ISIS operational claims in late 2015 – validity of these claims?

Regarding the different attacks claimed by ISIS in the last 3-4 months, it is our assessment

that they were indeed sanctioned by the Bangladesh chapter of ISIS and that these were

most likely executed by local members of JMB. The speed of ISIS‟ claiming of responsibility

after the vast majority of the attacks in this period would also indicate that someone with

prior operational knowledge to the attacks was also co-ordinating the “claiming of the attacks

on behalf of ISIS”. Yet controversy has surrounded these initial attack claims from ISIS (or its

conduit), with the Bangladesh government (and some sections of its media) defaming SITE

Intelligence Group4, for spreading false rumours against Bangladesh.

Objectively speaking however, the attacks disputed as being ISIS driven or not, were in fact

subsequently claimed by ISIS in its official Dabiq magazine on its report on Bangladesh. This

arguably proves two things – first, that the claims by ISIS were genuine and that second,

ISIS high command in Syria had approved the carrying out of these attacks under their

banner. Both points, either singularly or together further prove that ISIS does have a

potentially significant operational presence inside Bangladesh.

Key points to ISIS’ organisational setup in Bangladesh

These points being:

Presence of a local executive structure, with a locally appointed leader who discharges

his operational role with several close associates

Local leadership and command structure receives instructions and advice from ISIS‟

4 A Maryland, USA based private organisation which had tracked each of these claims via the social

media sources


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external operations wing headquartered in Syria

Local Leader holds the responsibility for facilitating the travel of recruits to Syria through

Bangladesh

Clear evidence of both the establishment of local alliances, the takeover of local jihadist

groups and ongoing works to build further alliances with local jihadist groups – examples

being the potent strategic partnership achieved with the JMB, and the strongest

indications that efforts are ongoing to enter into the same with ABT

ISIS Bangladesh‟s core members are mostly ex-JMB operatives, with a small but growing

number of ex-ABT operatives also likely to have joined

Intelligence gathered showing that ISIS Bangladesh members have close personal

contacts with JMB and ABT through previous organisational connections / group

membership

Documented evidence that attacks carried out in the name of ISIS are being mostly

carried out by local JMB cadres

Escalation in Modus Operandi

Operational capabilities - Explosives

Until September 2014, the terrorist attacks carried out by groups like JMB were very

rudimentary from an explosives technology perspective. Crude bombs were used, with

Molotov Cocktail style explosives being the most common. A prime example of the limits to

the JMB‟s explosives capabilities prior to 2014 comes from what was then perceived as one

of the most daring militant attacks in Bangladesh to that date. JMB operatives attacked a

prisoner transport van so as to set free three of their members. Media reports at the time

described how many crude bombs were exploded during the raid, but the only police fatality

came not from an explosion but from a gunshot. A further example of this leading local

terrorist group‟s clear limitations as to its explosives‟ potency owing to an absence of

technical know-how and sophistication comes from the country‟s biggest terrorist attack to

date. In August 2005 approximately 500 bombs exploded at 300 locations in 63 of the

nation‟s 64 districts, all within a 30 minute window – yet only two people were killed by the

explosions themselves. Reflective of the limited potency of the explosive devices used

despite their number and the locations used for their detonation.

The limitations to the JMB‟s bomb making capabilities and the explosive‟s potency

demonstrated a stark change following September 2014 - the so called „tipping point‟ date to

ISIS‟ establishment of its footprint in Bangladesh. First indications of this change were found

when JMB‟s then Acting Chief Abdullah al-Tasnim was arrested in Dhaka in September

2014 in possession of four IEDs, 75 electronic detonators, 10kg of Powergel and other bomb


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making equipment.

Image 3: Items recovered during the arrest of Abdullah al-Tasnim, September 2014

Only a few weeks later in October 2014, JMB operatives hiding in India accidentally

triggered an explosion while preparing IEDs in a safe house in the border state of West

Bengal. What was found by investigators revealed that the group‟s technical know-how

relating to explosives‟ was changing dramatically, and that equally worryingly that some of

the raw materials recovered could only have been procured from abroad. Forensic tests

revealed the presence of Class II type gel explosives, the remnants of electrical circuits as

well as dummy shells from rocket propelled grenades. Apart from traces of potassium and

nitrate ions, articles like soldering irons, small ball bearings, table clocks, metallic springs,

iron sockets, batteries, signal switch boards and fine wires were also found. Investigators

also found several pieces of „Powergel 90‟ explosives. Blueprints for making IEDs were also

recovered, as were documents that had detailed information on various chemical

compositions and the mechanical processes and electrical circuits used in conjunction with

home-based materials as well as explosives such as RDX and PETN. In short, the forensic

tests by the Indian authorities concluded that the explosives found were of very high quality.

Evidently, JMB‟s bomb making techniques were rapidly becoming increasingly sophisticated

within the shortest time subsequent to ISIS establishing itself in Bangladesh in September

2014. Given the close relations between the two organisations, the JMB‟s very rapid

improvement in its bomb making skills cannot be seen as a mere coincidence. It is our

assessment that this significant change in their operational capabilities in relation to


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explosives was made possible only through the knowledge transfer from veterans of the

Syria conflict who had fought with ISIS.

A year later, the potency of the JMB‟s explosives capabilities was demonstrated when an

explosives attack was made during the Ashura procession in Dhaka in October 2015. The

attack killed one and left over 100 persons injured.

Further changes brought to the jihadi landscape of Bangladesh by ISIS’ entry

As one can imagine the impact of ISIS establishing itself in Bangladesh is not limited to just

the introduction of a higher level of explosives expertise. The group has fundamentally

changed the jihadi discourse in Bangladesh through its targeting on non-Sunni Muslims,

thereby introducing a sectarian overtone to the jihadi landscape in the nation for the first

time. Another „first‟, was the suicide attack committed in December 2015 – something which

had not been witnessed in the jihadi movements in Bangladesh.

Within a year of its operations within Bangladesh ISIS have not only provided relatively

advanced IED capabilities to the jihadis in Bangladesh, it has also convinced its followers to

direct their hatred towards non-Sunnis, so-called rafidah (rejecters), so much so that Iraq-

style suicide vests were used to kill these „rejecters‟. This is a rather impressive performance

for a group which is still barely a year into its entry into the nation. A performance made

doubly impressive by the fact that according to the nation‟s government, ISIS does not even

have a presence in the nation.

The trends and evidence proffered above point unambiguously to the improving capabilities

of the indigenous groupings in Bangladesh. Under the stewardship and leadership of ISIS

these formally disparate groups pose a larger threat. Their inclusion into a regional network,

a network being developed to be not just to have a „regional presence‟, but will ultimately

feed into and become ingrained, in an ideological sense, into a much larger network.

The Other Militant Players and Historic Growth of Activity in

Bangladesh

Bangladesh has witnessed a steady growth in militant activity over the past 10-15 years, but

particularly in the past 5 years. However, one must clarify that a lot of this „militant activity‟

was not concentric around radical Islam. There were many „local issue militant groups‟ that

have emerged in this time frame pursuing limited and manageable agendas, some of which

may not even count as actual „militancy‟, it really depends on one‟s definition.


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a) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B)

The group was established in 1992, allegedly with the support of Osama Bin Laden‟s

International Islamic Front. Their overall goal is to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh

through waging war and over the past have long seen to be heavily influenced by the

Taliban, demonstrated through their motto „Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe

Afghanistan’ (We will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan).

Reports suggest that their area of operations and training are largely to the South-East of the

country, in both the coastal and mountainous areas around Chittagong. In addition the group

has been suspected of infiltrating the eastern corridors of India, maintaining contact with

Islamic extremist elements over the border and allegedly being responsible for attacks in

Indian urban areas over the years.

Reports also indicate a connection between the group and the Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI), Pakistan‟s external intelligence agency, during both training and operations in the area.

Although the last several years has not born witness to confirmed large scale attacks by this

group and instead seen continued arrests and detention of its members, raids are still

uncovering elements of the group with the equipment necessary for launching an attack.

This became apparent most recently in June 2015, when police conducting separate raids in

Dhaka arrested nine militants belonging to the group, along with five kilograms of explosives

and 14 different types of explosive devices.

b) Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)

The Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), was an Islamist vigilante outfit that


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espouses the ideals of the Taliban, attempting to ensure that the north-western region of the

country is „swept clean‟ of the activities of left-wing extremist groups, primarily the Purba

Banglar Communist Party (PBCP). Although violent activity stemming from the group seems

to have stopped completely by mid-2005, the group is still listed as a banned organisation by

the government.

c) Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT)

It‟s believed that the group originated in 2007 known as Jama‟atul Muslemin with funding

from different NGOs. The group ceased operation when funding dried up and resurfaced

under the current name in 2013. At present the ABT is best known for claiming responsibility

for the killing of six secular bloggers including a U.S. citizen, Avijit Roy, since 2013. In

addition the ABT has officially become a banned organisation with an announcement by the

Interior Ministry in May of this year due to the group‟s involvement in a bank heist, allegedly

in order to assist their funding in further operations against the state. Considered to have

been inspired and possibly associated with Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS),

the group according to police has links to another radical group Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS).

Interestingly, the official media outlet for ABT is a global Islamist propaganda organisation

named Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), which is known to be associated with

transnational jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) –

demonstrating the international connections of ABT.

d) Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)

This group is the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeI), a banned yet extremely

influential political party which came into existence in 1941. The JeI, despite its mantra of

“Allah‟s Law” may resemble rhetoric similar to that used by ISIS and JMB, however its main

focus is deemed to lie with gaining more influence politically. The ICS have been known to

conduct violent attacks mainly in the form of petrol bombings, setting vehicles and other

infrastructure alight. The alleged motive of such attacks are said to be aimed at protesting

decisions made by the ruling party as opposed to enforcing Sharia Law.

In addition, it has been suggested that the group maintains strong links with Pakistan‟s ISI.

With its assistance, it is reportedly working to support Islamist subversive agendas in many

regions in India, particularly in areas bordering Bangladesh. The ISI, as well as foreign

nations such as Saudi Arabia are also reportedly providing a substantial amount of funding

to the ICS.

Lastly the group, being one of the largest Islamist student organisations in South Asia is also

considered to be a feeder organisation to groups such as the Taliban, especially during


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recent years in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Against this backdrop of latently increasing radicalisation and the emerging ISIS presence,

coupled with the refusal by the government to acknowledge a growing ISIS presence, the

conditions are being nurtured to allow ISIS to explode onto the scene in Bangladesh in a

„seemingly unexpected way‟. That tends to be the impression if one has one‟s head in the

proverbial sand! In reality if the organisations being courted by or offering allegiance to ISIS

were to be infiltrated and curtailed at this early stage of growth then the prospects for an

„alleged surprise ISIS emergence‟ in the country could be mitigated. However, this is wishful

thinking and it is unlikely to play out like that.

ISIS will make their presence felt in due course, the government will continue to pursue their

„all is fine, there is no ISIS problem in Bangladesh‟ attitude, until ISIS makes it presence

undeniably felt. Then the scrabble for deflection of blame and shirking responsibility will start

in earnest. By then the tentacles of ISIS and more importantly, a broadening of the

aspirations of the Islamic Jihadists towards the globalisation of the greater Jihad, or a clash

of civilisations, exacerbating existing fault lines as such will be advanced. Fault lines within

the Bangladeshi society, and within Islam in Bangladesh are at this stage facing serious

stresses which can potentially threaten its political system, national economy, viability as a

destination for foreign investment, international / regional business and commerce, domestic

security and of course it‟s founding secular principles.

News & Politics

Rise of Militancy and ISIS in Bangladesh, January 2016 Special Report