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Prof. Dr. Hardy Bouillon University of Trier, SMC University, Vienna, and New Direction Foundation, Brussels Why social justice is not just

CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

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Konzervatívny inštitút M. R. Štefánika v spolupráci s New Direction – The Foundation for European Reform a ďalšími partnermi organizovali dňa 19. novembra 2012 v Bratislave ďalšiu z cyklu prednášok CEQLS. Tentoraz bol našim hosťom Hardy Bouillon, profesor filozofie na Universität Trier a profesor filozofie a ekonómie na SMC University, Viedeň. Viac informácií nájdete na www.konzervativizmus.sk. Conservative Institute organized another of the CEQLS Lectures: Hardy Bouillon, Professor for Philosophy at the University of Trier and Professor of Philosophy and Economics at SMC University, Vienna, was our guest on November 19, 2012 in Bratislava. More information is available at www.institute.sk.

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Page 1: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Prof. Dr. Hardy Bouillon

University of Trier,

SMC University, Vienna, and

New Direction Foundation, Brussels

Why social justice is not just

Page 2: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Many thanks …

… for inviting me to Bratislava!

Page 3: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Preview

Compatibility problem Social Justice as:

unjustified redistribution mixing of spheres complementary justice limiting formal justice

Finders-Keepers-Principle correcting original appropriation?

Page 4: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

To start with

Conceiving social justice as complement to justice without prefix Based on the assumption that a more

comprehensive notion of justice is necessary for achieving a more just world.

Page 5: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Justice without adjective

What does „justice without prefix (or adjective)“ mean? each to his own (suum cuique) leaning towards Aristoteles

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Aristotelian justice

Justice in a universal sense vs particular justice Justice in a universal sense means

virtuous life – conformity to law. particluar justice divided into commutative

and distributive justice.

Page 7: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Commutative and distributive justice in Aristotle

Commutative (or rectificatory) justice to preserve or restitute the legitimate status

Distributive justice to order collective gains and honour

… according to merit alone Commutative justice and distributive justice

are complementary.

Page 8: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Merit based justice as social justice?

Distributive vs social justice Worthiness based on merits vs based on

neediness, etc. Distributive justice as complement to

commutative justice Can social justice also be a complement to

commutative justice?

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Justice and unjustified redistribution

Redistribution to change the market results Anthony Flew: Social justice contradicts

commutative justice because it implies: Taking away from A, what he does not

unjustly possess, in order to give it to B, who was not unjustly deprived of it.

Page 10: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Market results: social just oder unjust?

Assumption: If market results are unjust they ask for correction.

Friedrich A. von Hayek: mixing of spheres Only individuals act, justly or unjustly … if and only if they intend and sufficiently

cause the result. The market, in turn, is not an actor, and its

results originate unintentionally from endless market interactions by individuals.

Hence, the results of the market are neither socially just nor socially unjust.

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Social justice from a different perspective?

Calling for social justice without claiming the market was socially unjust SJ as complementary justice

Assumption: Under certain conditions, market actors would prefer a different distribution of market results.

SJ as limiting formal justice Assumption: Under certain conditions

commutative justice leads to injustice.

Page 12: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Social justice as complementary justice

John Rawls: Under the veil of ignorance and following

the maximin rule, people would prefer redistribution that matches the difference principle.

Explaining veil of ignorance, maximin rule, and difference principle

Page 13: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

With a little help of Pareto and Popper

Alfredo Pareto: If one or more superior alternatives to A exist, then it is not rational to insist on A. Of course, this does not say which of the

superior alternatives should be chosen. Karl Popper: For logical reasons, it is

impossible to exclude the possibility that a superior alternative to A could exist.

Page 14: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

Interim conclusion

One or more alternatives, superior to market results, could possibly exist. If at least one in fact exists, it is not rational

to insist on market results. If more than one superior alternative

exists, then redistribution should be in favour of the worst-off, following the maximin rule and the difference principle.

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Maximin rule and difference principle

Rawls in short: ‘Thus, in comparing different arrangements of the

social system, we can say that one is better than another if in one arrangement all expectations are at least as high, and some higher, than in the other. The principle gives grounds for reform, for if there is an arrangement which is optimal in comparison with the existing state of things, then, other things equal, it is a better situation all around and should be adopted.’* *(John Rawls, ‘Distributive Justice’, Philosophy, Politics and Society.

Third Series, ed. by Peter Laslett and Walter G. Runciman, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967, p. 64.)

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Criticising Rawls

„Veil of ignorance“ is unrealistic. Saying that people could rationally prefer

the Rawlsian conception is not enough. Fictitious contracts are not contracts at all

… and no subclass of contracts either. Without real contractual approval by all

individuals, Rawlsian redistribution implies an unjustified prioritization of competing utility preferences.

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Social justice as limiting formal justice

Thesis: Market actors use private goods as well as

common goods. Using the latter calls for tolls. Joel Feinberg, James Griffin et al.

Market actors consume „pool goods“, owned by the common.

He who uses the pool more often than others should pay more than others (proportionally to his use rate).

Socially just redistribution finally serves commutative justice.

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Criticising the pool goods theory

Anthony de Jasay: Pool goods are not common goods, but

positive externalities. Hence, they are free goods.

On top of that: Pool goods are not only consumed. They also

become produced. The latter implies that redistribution from

indolent to deligent market actors would more than compensate the reverse redistribution.

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SJ to correct original appropriation?

Thesis: Though the chain of accumulation might be just, how about first possession?

Let us look at: the argumentum pro libertate asymmetric claims

Page 20: CEQLS Lecture: Hardy Bouillon: Why Social Justice is not Just

First possession and the finders keepers principle

Gerard Radnitzky: argumentum in favour of freedom:

For logical reasons, it is impossible to proof that no justified objection to original appropriation taken in freedom exists.

Ought implies can. Anthony de Jasay:

First possession does not imply any asymmetric claim.

Demanding suspension of originally appropriated goods implies an asymmetric claim, namely a one-sidely worsening of the original owner.

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Conclusions

The cardinal conceptions of social justice are incompatible with formal justice. This holds for the „complementary“ as well

as for the „limiting formal justice“ version of social justice.

Market results based on original appropriation and (commutatively) just accumulation of wealth are compatible with prefix-free or formal justice.

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Thanks a lot!