2. Major Advisor By Dr. K.B. Umesh K. Sravanthi Prof. & Head
Dept. Agricultural Economics. PALB 2004 Ph.D. II year 2 3. Flow of
presentation Natural resources: List, Quick facts Natural resource
management: Ownership regimes, approaches. Collective Action:
Types, Structure, conduct, performance, Benefits and Barriers of
Collective Action. Classification of collective action problems.
Solution Mechanisms for Collective Action Problems. Institutional
features that promote long-lasting cooperation. Factors to be
considered for analyzing the performance of collective action -
Case study Examples of collective actions (Joint Forest Management
in India ) - Case study 3 4. Natural resources ? stocks of
materials that exist in the natural environment that are both
scarce and economically useful in production or consumption, either
in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing. Source:
world trade report 2010 4 5. List of Natural Resources 1. Forest
resources 2. Aquatic / Marine resources 3. Edaphic resources 4.
Hydro geological resources 5. Animal resources 6.Microbial
resources 7. Human resources 8. Atmospheric resources 9.Crop
resources 10.Geological resources 11.Wildlife resources Source:
http://www.buzzle.com/articles/different-types-of-natural-resources.html
5 6. Natural Resources and Quick facts Forest Covers 21% of the
total geographical area of India. lost 367 square KM. of forest
cover in the past two years. Soil only 10% of the earth's surface.
India is losing 5,334 million tonnes of soil every year due to soil
erosion Water only 0.0007% of earth's water is suitable for
drinking. The rest is salt water, water trapped in glaciers, or
polluted. Groundwater accounting for over 65% of irrigation water
and 85% of drinking water supplies in India. it is estimated that
60% of groundwater sources will be in a critical state of
degradation within the next twenty years.
http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/07/30/indias-groundwater-crisis/comment-page-1/
http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/agriculture/india-losing-5334-million-tonnes-of-soil-
annually-due-to-erosion-govt/article915245.ece SOURCES: Kumar
Sambhav (2012) 6 7. Natural resource management Refers to the
management of natural resources such as land, water, soil, plants
and animals, with a particular focus on how management affects the
quality of life for both present and future generations. Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_resources 7 8. Ownership
regimes Natural resource management approaches categorized
according to the kind and right of stakeholders. State property
forest. Private property - Private land. Common property -
community forests & water resources. Non-property (open access)
Ocean. Hybrid native vegetation management, Australia. 8 9.
Management approaches Top-down (command and control) Adaptive
management - plan-do-review-act Precautionary approach Integrated
natural resource management Community-based natural resource
management 9 10. Collective Action: Definition Any action taken by
a group of people whose goal is to enhance the groups status and
condition, which is enacted by a representative of the group. The
action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through
an organization) in pursuit of members perceived shared interests -
Marshall (1998) Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action#In_political_science_and_econ
omics 10 11. Types of collective Action Davies (i) cooperation:
Bottom-up, farmer-to-farmer collective action (ii) coordination:
Top-down, agency-led collective action. Source: Davies (2004). 11
12. Fig. 1 Structure, conduct and performance of collective action
- Bain (1959) Determining variables Structure of entities
Collective action Outcomes Structure Conduct Performance (Source:
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004)) 12 13. Benefits and Barriers of
Collective Action Benefits Public goods provision Sharing knowledge
Possibility of tackling local issues efficiently Barriers Free
riding Higher transaction costs 13 14. Free Rider Problem
Individual may be able to obtain the benefits of a good without
contributing to the cost. Free-rider is a person who receives the
benefit of a good but avoids paying for it. Public goods:
non-rivalries. non excludable. 14 15. Table 1: Transaction costs in
collective action. Transaction costs Examples Search costs incurred
in identifying possibilities for mutual gains Identification of
funding sources Identification of relevant stakeholders Cost of
gathering information Bargaining costs associated with negotiating
an agreement Time spent at meetings Effort expended in verbal and
written communications Monitoring and enforcement costs involved in
making sure all parties keep to the agreement Employment of
external monitor Time and effort spent monitoring others informally
(Source: Singleton and Taylor, 1992) 15 16. Collective action
problem All the difficulties that arise in pursuit of members
perceived share of interest. Classification of collective action
problems 1) Harmony 2) Mere Distribution Problems 3) Pure Conflict
4) Defection Problems (Dilemmas) 5) Co-ordination Problems 6)
Disagreement Problems 7) Instability Problems 16 Source:
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2003_02online.pdf 17. Basis for
classification 1. Number of Nash equilibria in pure strategies
(none, one, two or more) 2. Pareto-optimality of the equilibria
(optimal, sub- optimal) 3. Conflict over the valuation of the
outcomes (no, irrelevant, partial, pure) 4. Equal payoffs in
Pareto-optimal outcomes or equilibria (yes/yes, yes/no, no) Source:
Holzinger (2003) 17 18. Fig 2: Classification of collective action
problems Source: Holzinger (2003) 18 19. Solution Mechanisms for
Collective Action Problems Problems of co-ordination: Resolved by a
variety of non-cooperative mechanisms that work at the individual
level and are based on rational expectations. Problems involving
conflict: Disagreement, distribution, defection, and instability,
can best be solved by collective and coercive mechanisms. 19 20.
Table 2: List of Solution Mechanisms for Collective Action Problems
Group of Mechanism Solution Mechanisms Individual solutions based
on motivations Altruism Equity and fairness norms Pacta sunt
servanda norms Individual solutions based on rational expectations
Mixed strategies Focal points Social conventions Correlated
strategies Sequential play Infinite and finite repetition
Collective solutions decision-making mechanisms Co-ordinative
communication Bargaining Voting Coercive solutions enforcement
mechanisms Enforceable contracts Hierarchically set and enforced
rules Monitoring Sanctioning Source: Holzinger (2003) 20 21.
Institutional features that promote long-lasting cooperation 1.
clear and detailed rules 2. Congruence 3. Monitoring. 4. credible
sanctions for deviators 5. forum to resolve conflicts. 21 22.
Factors to be considered for analyzing the performance of
collective action factors have been grouped into four basic
categories by Agrawal: 1. Resource system characteristics type of
goods, type of knowledge 2. Group characteristics size and
homogeneity 3. Institutional arrangements rules and Institutional
thickness 4. External environment financial and non-financial
support http://www.springer.com/978-94-007-7456-8 22 23. Case study
on Water Community: An Empirical Analysis of Cooperation on
Irrigation in South India by Pranab Bardhan 23 24. Research
Objectives This paper concentrates on a quantitative analysis of
the (physical, institutional and socio-economic) determinants of
cooperation in irrigation communities on the basis of a large
survey conducted in Tamil Nadu. 24 25. Study Area and Sampling
Framework Data was collected from 48 villages spread over 6
districts in Tamil Nadu. a selected unit (called ayacut) of
irrigation system in each village (either a tank or a branch of
canal with roughly about 50 hectares size of command area). Half of
the irrigation units belonged to canal systems, and the other half
to more traditional tank systems. 25 26. All the canal systems are
under the general administration of the government. Within tank
systems, half belonged to isolated or chain tank systems, and the
other half to system tanks. Within each system the villages were
randomly chosen. Within each village a stratified sample of 10
farmers were chosen. 26 27. Table 3: Dependent and Independent
Variables Variable Name Mean Standard deviation Min Max Description
of Variable DISTFDCH 1.31 0.92 0 2 Index of Quality of Maintenance
of Distributaries and Field Channels H2OCOOP 0.67 0.48 0 1 No
Conflict over Water Within Village in the last 5 Years VIOLH2O 0.52
0.5 0 1 Water Allocation Rules Frequently Violated by at least One
Group NUMUSERS 52.67 54.29 11 279 No. Of Beneficiary Households
Using this Irrigation Source NUM_ACRE 0.36 0.02 0.06 1.07 No. Of
Beneficiary Households per acre of Ayacut Area GINI 0.41 0.11 0 1
Gini Coefficient of Landholding of Beneficiary Households in Ayacut
CASTE75 0.69 0.47 0 1 At least 75% of Sampled Farmers are Members
of the Same Caste Group AVGACCES 3.65 1.2 2 7 Number of Months
there is Access to Irrigation TOPOGRPH 0.46 0.5 0 1 No equal Access
to Water Because of Topographical Nature of the Ayacut LINED 1.96
0.82 1 3 If System is Partially or Fully Lined CANAL 0.5 0.51 0 1
If Ayacut is in a Canal System Source:
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
27 28. Dependent and Independent Variables cont. Variable Name Mean
Standard deviation Min Max Description of Variable PWDDECID 0.25
0.44 0 1 If PWD Takes All Decisions on Water Allocation TAILEND
0.75 0.44 0 1 If Village is Situated at Tailend of the Irrigation
System PRIORAPP 0.44 0.5 0 1 No Conflict with Other Villages over
Water LINKAGE 2.46 0.74 1 3 Index of Connection with Urban Areas
MARKET 2.39 0.7 1 3 Measure of Extent to which Farmers are Market
Oriented OTHIRRIG 0.26 0.18 0 0.66 Estimated Fraction of Total
Irrigated Land Held by Sampled Farmers Outside the Ayacut TRADLORG
0.56 0.5 0 1 Where Irrigation Organization Has Been There for 20 or
More Years GUARD 0.38 0.49 0 1 There Exists at least One Guard in
the Ayacut SHRPROP 0.19 0.39 0 1 Cost-sharing Proportional to
Landholding LEGALRGT 0.33 0.48 0 1 When Formal Water Rights Exist,
as opposed to Customary Rights Source:
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
28 29. Table 4: Ordered logit estimates Dependent variable:
DISTFDCH Source:
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
29 30. Table 5: Logit estimates Dependent variable: H2OCOOP Source:
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
30 31. Table 6: logit estimates dependent variable: VIOLH2O Source:
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
31 32. Table 5: First-stage logit estimates Source:
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
32 33. conclusion cooperative behavior in an irrigation community
is by and large significantly related (negatively) inequality of
landholding, urban or market connections. (positively) duration of
access to water, monitoring by guards, to social homogeneity, small
group size, proportional cost-sharing rule, collective adversarial
relation with other villages over water. 33 34. Examples of
collective actions The management of Forest resources - Joint
forest management. Grazing pastures - Community Pasture Program
(Canada) Irrigation systems - Participatory ground water
management. 35. Joint Forest Management in India The process of
institutionalizing peoples participation in forest protection and
regeneration is termed as Joint Forest Management. The programme in
the present form can be traced to the Arabari experiment initiated
by foresters in West Bengal. Small village groups have started to
protect and reclaim degraded forestlands through collective action.
27 State Governments have adopted resolutions for implementing the
JFM programme. There are different nomenclatures for the JFM
committees in different States. 35 36. Nomenclatures for the JFM
committees in different States State Nomenclature Andhra Pradesh
Vana Samarakshana Samithis (VSS) West Bengal & Maharashtra
Forest Protection Committess Haryana Hill Resource Management
Societies Karnataka & Tamil Nadu Village Forest Committee
Rajasthan Village Forest Protection and Management Committees
Orissa Van Samrakshan Samiti 36 37. Official ground for JFM
Prepared by the National Forest Policy of 1988. Followed in 1990 by
a circular from MoEF providing guidelines for involvement of
Village Communities and Voluntary agencies in regeneration of
degraded forests. The National Forest Policy of 1988 and the JFM
resolution of 1990 combined with state level resolutions
acknowledged the need to give greater rights and authority to
community groups. The State Governments register the JFM or village
committees under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 to provide
them with legal back up. 37 38. Table 2: Extent of Area under Joint
Forest Management Programme in India States No. of JFM Area under
No. of Families involved Total no of families Committee JFM (in ha)
SC ST General involved in JFM Andhra Pradesh 7606 16,79,084
2,44,655 4,14,650 - 6,59,305 Arunachal Pradesh 13 5,810 - 766 - 766
Assam 245 6,970 3,179 - 1,495 4,674 Bihar 296 5,04,602 - - - Na
Chhatisgarh 6,412 33,91,305 76,920 2,33,585 1,61,017 4,71,522 Goa
26 13,000 36 - 300 336 Gujarat 1,237 1,38,015 1,124 1,01,890 3,495
1,06,509 Haryana 471 65,852 1,612 0 7,950 9,562 Himachal Pradesh
914 1,11,247 9,973 159 35,098 45,230 Jammu & Kashmir 1,895
79,546 - - - NaJharkhand 1,379 4,30,463 - - - Na Karnataka 2,620
1,85,000 15,800 9,600 44,200 69,60038 39. Table conti Kerala 32
4,994 781 - 2,841 3,622 Madhya Pradesh 9,203 41,25,837 1,77,272
4,29,307 2,59,323 8,65,902 Maharashtra 2,153 6,86,688 35,877 41,000
25,626 1,02,503 Manipur 58 10,500 - - - Na Mizoram 129 12,740 - - -
Na Nagaland 55 1,50,000 - 550 - 550 Orissa 12,317 7,83,467 - - - Na
Punjab 188 97,193 4,429 0 4,973 9,366 Rajasthan 3,042 3,09,336
55,724 1,32,133 84,641 2,72,498 Sikkim 158 600 669 835 1,764 3,268
Tamil Nadu 799 2,99,389 43,323 - 1,04,497 1,47,820 Tripura 160
23,476 716 5,804 1,783 8,303 Uttar Pradesh 502 45,025 - - - Na
Uttaranchal 7,435 6,06,608 - - - Na West Bengal 3,545 4,88,095 - -
- Na Total 62,890 1,42,54,845 6,72,090 13,70,279 7,38,967 27,81,336
Source: Indiastat.com 39 40. Case study Economic Impact of Forest
Management Institutions of Collective Action on Groundwater
Recharge in Karnataka, India By Vikram S Patil 40 41. Research
Objectives To analyze the economic impact of JFPM on groundwater
recharge. To Analyze the incremental net returns of the farmers due
to JFPM over non-JFPM area. To analyze the equity in income
distribution among different categories of the farmers in JFPM
area. (JFPM: Joint Forest Planning and Management) 41 42. Study
Area 42 43. Sampling Framework Population of farmers possessing
irrigation wells JFPM + Watershed village (23 farmers). JFPM
village (42 farmers). Watershed village (24 farmers). Control
village (15 farmers). 43 44. Results and Discussion Table 1:
Estimated contribution due to JFPM development program, 2007-08.
Sl. No. Particulars Rs. Per acre 1 Contribution of JFPM program: A.
net returns in only JFPM minus net returns in control area = 20044
6702 =13342 B. Net returns in JFPM + watershed minus net returns in
watershed =13068 -13045 = 23 2 Contribution of JFPM + Watershed:
Net returns in (JFPM + watershed) minus Net returns in control area
=13068- 6702 =6366 3 Contribution of Watershed: A. Net returns in
watershed minus Net returns in control area = 13045- 6702 = 6343 B.
Net returns in JFPM + watershed minus net returns in only JFPM
=13068 20044 = -6976 Source: Vikram S Patil 44 45. Table 2:
Incremental net returns, per acre 2007 -08. Type of farm JFPM over
Non-JFPM area = Rs. 16355.09 Rs. 10605.25 = Rs. 5749.84 For sample
farmers in JFPM + watershed over watershed (Chitradurga) For sample
farmers in JFPM over control area (Davanagere) Small and marginal
farmers 1996 23959 Medium farmers 2118 8944 Large farmers -548 2243
Overall 23 13342 Note: Incremental net return in JFPM over Non-
JFPM = net return per acre from all sources in JFPM minus that in
non-JFPM area Source: Vikram S Patil 45 46. Table 3: Gini
coefficient for income distribution for different classes of
farmers in all the four study areas, 2007-08. Type of farm JFPM+
watershed Only watershedOnly JFPM Control area Small and marginal
farmers 0.72 0.65 0.64 0.66 Medium farmers 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.66
Large farmers 0.73 0.88 0.73 0.77 Overall 0.72 0.69 0.63 0.76
Source: Vikram S Patil 46 47. Table 4: ANOVA for net returns per
acre from all the sources across different categories of sample
farmers in Chitradurga and Davanagere districts, 2007-08. Sl. No
Particulars Mean F statistic 1 a. only JFPM 88764 40.608**b. JFPM +
watershed 32149 2 a. only JFPM 88764 46.904**b. only watershed area
30059 3 a. only JFPM 88764 52.766**b. Control area 11798 4 a. JFPM
+ watershed 32149 0.232b. only watershed area 30059 5 a. JFPM +
watershed 32149 21.248**b. Control area 11798 6 a. only watershed
area 30059 26.576**b. Control area 11798 Note: ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively Vikram S Patil
47 48. Conclusion Net returns realized by the farmers in JFPM areas
is higher compare to non-JFPM area. The collective action of the
farmers in the JFPM and watershed programs is largely responsible
for statistically and economically significant net returns. The
collective action paves the way for improved, equitable and
efficient access to groundwater and natural resources for small and
marginal farmers in Karnataka through JFPM and watershed
developmental programs. 48 49. References Williamson, O., (2000)
The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead.
Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII, 595 613. Bardhan, p. (2000)
Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation
communities in south India, Economic Development and cultural
change, vol 48, no 4, pp845-865. Davies B, Blackstock K, Brown K,
Shannon P (2004) Challenges in creating local agrienvironmental
cooperation action amongst farmers and other stakeholders. The
Macaulay Institute, Aberdeen Agrawal A (2001) Common property
institutions and sustainable governance of resources. World Devel
29(10):16491672 Meinzen-Dick R, Di Gregorio M, McCarthy N (2004)
Methods for studying collective action in rural development. Agric
Syst 82(3):197214 49 50. Thank you 50
