3. Who is bringing wood? In small groups there is no problem
with that. But imagine a fire for a few dozens of people. This will
not happen so spontaneously
4. Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action Group definition all
who cannot be excluded from consumption of a good. For example the
warmth of the fire. This shows the relativity physically it would
be possible to exclude someone, but that would break some silent
rules. Other similar examples: roads, TV program, national defence,
environment. Another example workers of a company.
5. Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action In small groups it
is often rational to do something for the group only because we
would benefit from it as well. For example bring wood for the fire.
In big groups the situation is different our benefit is lower than
the effort needed to produce the good. For example bring wood for
the fire for a 1000 people.
6. Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action Big groups need
other means to incentivise their members. This can be: rules of
law, various social pressure etc. But it is a big threshold because
it changes the expectation of the members about the actions of
their peers. Sometimes those who act ostensibly for the benefit of
the group are shunned for being gullible (i.e. maybe their actions
are not really good).
7. Examples Unions Cooperatives and housing associations Free
Software 'scratch your itch'
8. The tragedy of the commons Copyright Chris Yeates and
licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence.
9. The tragedy of the commons Overgrazing One more cow benefit
for the owner, costs shared It is actually the same as the above
just with negative numbers Hardin's conclusion is that there are
only two solutions either privatisation or state control.
10. Common Pool Resources
11. Common Pool Resources Underground water in some location
Irrigation systems Common pastures Forests Fisheries
12. Common Pool Resources - definition It is hard (but not
impossible) to exclude someone. Using the resource deplets it
13. Classification of goods Excludable Non-excludable Rivalrous
Private goods: food, clothes, etc. Environment, parking space
Non-rival Club goods: private schools, theaters, cinemas, clubs
Public goods: national defence, police, fire fighting,
information
14. Governing the Commons Watching others is also work. The
second-order problem The state originally was mostly concerned
about defense i.e. public good, but it now also governs common pool
and other types of resources
15. Governing the Commons Pastures and forests (Toerbel w
Szwajcarii, Hirano, Nagaike i Yamanoka - wsie w Japonii) Irigation
systems (Huerta in Spain and Zanjera - Philipines) Underground
water case study in California Fisheries in Turkey, Sri Lanca and
Nova Scotia
16. Governing the commons Clearly defined boundaries (effective
exclusion of external un-entitled parties) Rules regarding the
appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to
local conditions
17. Governing the Commons Collective-choice arrangements that
allow most resource appropriators to participate in the
decision-making process Effective monitoring by monitors who are
part of or accountable to the appropriators
18. Governing the commons A scale of graduated sanctions for
resource appropriators who violate community rules Mechanisms of
conflict resolution that are cheap and of easy access
19. Governing the Commons Self-determination of the community
recognized by higher-level authorities In the case of larger
common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers
of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base
level.
20. Governing the Commons Self-determination of the community
recognized by higher-level authorities In the case of larger
common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers
of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base
level.
21. Literature Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the commons:
the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge New
York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521405997. Ostrom,
Elinor (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691122380. Olson, Mancur
(1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups (PDF). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1965.
ISBN 0-674- 53751-3. Hardin, G (1968). "The Tragedy of the
Commons". Science 162 (3859): 12431248.