NUCLEAR EMP AND SOLAR GMD

EFFECTS, NATIONAL PROTECTION

IMPASSE, AND RECOMMENDED

SOLUTIONS

George H. Baker, Professor Emeritus James Madison University Congressional EMP Commission Foundation for Resilient Societies Infragard EMP SIG

Outline

• Threat Thumbnail

• EMP Commission:

Recommendations and

Implementation Status

• Progress Impediments • Prevalent Misconceptions re. Effects, Costs

• Reluctant Stakeholders

• No One in Charge

• Recent Developments

• Recommendations

Electromagnetic Threat Thumbnail

• Three electromagnetic effects have the potential to

debilitate the electric power grid over large regions • Solar Superstorm Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD)

• High Altitude Burst Nuclear EMP

• Radiofrequency Weapons (RFWs)

• Effects are known to cause failure of electrical and

electronic systems necessary for the operation of

critical infrastructures

• Preparedness initiatives should address these in a

combined fashion • Operational “work-around” procedures are helpful but insufficient

• Physical protection is necessary for critical infrastructures

High Altitude Burst EMP

Environments

4

• Short duration, high peak field • Broad-band frequency content • Couples efficiently to short and

long conductors

Ground

E1

E3

• Long duration, low peak field • Very low-frequency energy • Couples efficiently only to very long

conductors (kilometers in length)

Power Spectra

Waveform

EMP Distinguishing Feature: Single Weapon

Produces Effects Over Multi-State Regions • Even a modestly sized

nuclear weapon could affect

a large region of the United

States.

• A relatively low-yield

weapon – 10 kilotons in this

case – detonated at an

altitude of 70 km above the

earth, would generate an

electromagnetic pulse a

circular area of more than

1000 mile diameter

• Graphic shows the strength

and area that would be

affected by an EMP weapon

targeted at DC area

• Infrastructure would be

debilitated across the

northeast corridor

21,000 Volts/m

18,000 Volts/m

15,000 Volts/m

12,000 Volts/m

9,000 Volts/m

6,000 Volts/m

3,000 Volts/m

10 Kiloton Weapon

70km Burst Altitude

580 mile radius

Solar Storm Physics and Effects • Waveform, earth coverage, system effects and

protection methods similar to EMP/E3

• Solar GMDs are the result of excursions in the flux levels of charged particles from the Sun (comprising the “solar wind”) interacting with the earth’s magnetic field. • Protons are the chief component.

• There is also an x-ray photon precursor useful for warning.

• Distortion of earth’s magnetic field induces voltages in long lines analogous to EMP/E3 • Effects: over-voltages in long conducting lines

affecting electric power grid, communication systems, and pipeline operation

• Long Term Outages possible if systems are damaged

Storm Analysis Consultants

Radiofrequency Weapon (RFW)

Characteristics • Environment and effects comparable to EMP/E1, except:

• Design frequency range extends higher [10 MHz – 10 GHz]

• Local effects only:

• RF energy falls off as 1/r2

• Effective range from 1 meter to few km depending on weapon size

• May be narrow-band (sinusoidal waveform) or wide-band (pulsed waveform)

Gigawatt-Class

Truck-Mounted RFW Kilowatt- Class

Briefcase RFW

RFWs

Comparative Power Spectra

Direct1 System Effects vs. Threat System Type EMP/E3 or

GMD

Vulnerability

EMP/E1

Vulnerability

RF Weapon

Vulnerability

Grid High Voltage Transmission/

Distribution Equipment

3 3 2

Electric Power Grid Electronic

Control, Monitor Systems

1* 3 3

Telecom/Internet

Communication & Data Centers

1* 3 3

Telecom/Internet Long-Haul

Lines & Repeaters for Data

Transmit

3 3 3

Ubiquitous SCADA, Process

Control Systems

1* 3 3

Vehicles, Ships, Aircraft

Electronics

0 2 3

Hand-held Electronics 0 2 3

3 – High Vuln.

2 – Medium Vuln.

1 – Low Vuln.

0 – No Vuln. 1As opposed to cascading

*Vulnerable to transformer saturation harmonics

Electric

Power

Telecom/

Internet

Common

Electronics

Congressional EMP Commission Conclusions

• The EMP threat is one of a few potentially catastrophic threats to the United States

• By taking action, the EMP consequences can be reduced to manageable levels

• U.S. strategy to address the EMP threat should balance prevention, preparation, protection, and recovery

EMP Commission Strategy and Recommendations ~ Pursue Intelligence, Interdiction, and Deterrence to

Discourage EMP Attack – highest priority is to prevent attack

– shape global environment to reduce incentives to create EMP

weapons

– make it difficult and dangerous to try

X Protect Critical Components of Key Infrastructures – especially “long lead” replacement components

X Maintain Ability to Monitor/Evaluate Condition of Critical

Infrastructures – absence of information can make things worse either

through inaction or inappropriate action.

– Salutary example ~ Blackout of August 13, 2003

~ Recognize EMP Attack and Understand How Effects

Differ from Other Disruptions

~ Plan to Carry Out Systematic Recovery of Key Infrastructures

–demonstrate will and capacity to recover from any attack

~ Train, Evaluate, “Red Team,” and Periodically Report to Congress

X Define the Federal Government’s Responsibility/Authority to Act –Governance distributed among Federal, State, regional and

variety of non-governmental entities and associations

–DHS has unique responsibility to coordinate homeland response to threat

–DOD has unique responsibility to assure survivability and continued

operational effectiveness of our military forces in face of EMP threat

X Recognize Opportunities for Shared Benefits – planning for rapid recovery/restoration of key infrastructures confers

protection against other disruptions; natural, accidental, or advertent

– some protective steps may enhance the reliability and quality of critical

infrastructures

~ Conduct Research to Better Understand Infrastructure System

Effects and Develop Cost-Effective Solutions to Manage Effects

EMP Commission Strategy and

Recommendations, (2 of 3)

X Homeland Security Council • Prioritize government- and society-wide efforts to counter the small

number of threats that can hold our society at risk

X Department of Homeland Security • Establish a specific, dedicated program for protection of America against

society-threatening attacks

• Establish a senior leadership position with accountability, authority, and

appropriate resources for the mission of defending against the most

serious threats

• Develop metrics for assessing improvements in prevention, recovery, and

protection

• Provide regular, periodic reporting on the status of these activities

EMP Commission Strategy and

Recommendations (3 of 3)

Impediment 1: Prevalent Misconceptions • Convenient to adopt misconceptions that

avoid need for action • Threat minimization places action on back-burner

• Threat exaggeration places action in the too hard column,

perpetuates “additional studies” mode

• Most harmful misconceptions. The following statements

are untrue: X Nuclear EMP will burn out every exposed electronic system.

X EMP/GMD effects will be very limited and only result in “nuisance” effects in

critical infrastructure systems.

X Megaton class weapons are needed to cause any serious EMP effects –

low yield, “entry-level” weapons will not cause serious EMP effects.

X To protect our critical national infrastructure against EMP and GMD is not

affordable

Impediment 2: Stakeholder Reluctance • Concern about costs and liabilities makes stakeholders in the

private sector and government reluctant to admit vulnerabilities

• Swayed by the familiar, the convenient, the bottom line

• Familiarity and profitability are the touchstones of acceptability

• Tendency to downplay the likelihood of EMP and GMD

• In cases where stakeholders have decided to take action, the

actions have been limited, delayed, and ineffective

• NERC task force to set reliability standards for GMD rejected EMP

responsibility – Resulting GMD-only standards are procedure-based,

do not apply to Generator Authorities and Load-Balancing Authorities

and are contrived to require essentially no physical protection

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission-accepted 2011 Petition for

Rulemaking to protect nuclear plants – still unaddressed

• White House wide-area electromagnetic threat SWORM

framework addresses GMD only and is non-directive

• Present bi-furcated “stove-pipe” grid preparedness/protection

approach is cost- and outcome-ineffective.

Impediment 3: There is No One in Charge • To a major extent, lack of progress

is due to amorphous/distributed

Federal agency responsibility • No national protection plan or direction

because nobody is in charge

• Finger-pointing, duck-and-cover game at

present

• Catastrophes are continental in

scale – everyone is in trouble – at

all levels • Action needed at local, state, and federal

levels

• Government and industry should be involved

• Lack of federal initiative has left states and

localities foundering

Current Events: Recent [amorphous] Developments • New draft GMD standards – continuing issues

• Set by NERC – crafted to avoid liability and

protection investment

• FERC NOPR ‘request for comments’ is now closed

• Standard is under internal FERC consideration

• CIPA Bill

• In limbo – still in Committee

• Foundation for Resilient Societies Cost Study

• White House National Space Weather Strategy • Omits EMP, RF Weapons

• Inconsistent with NERC GMD Standard [proposes data sharing]

• Majors on further studies and analysis rather than protection

• Imposes no requirements on named organizations

Electric Generation Plants $23,000M

Electric Transmission & Distribution $2,300M

Electric Grid Control Centers $1,390.M

Telecommunications $1,480M

Natural Gas System $640M

Railroads $1,380M

Blackstart Plant Resiliency $80M

$30,270M total

Current Events, Recent [amorphous] Developments,

• Federal Government R&D Initiatives

• DTRA SBIR: Electric Power Island-mode Enhancement Strategies

and Methodologies for Defense Critical Infrastructure

• DOE Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium

• Edison Electric Institute “Fact” Sheet, Rebuttal

• JINSA EMP Task Force Report

• Foundation for Resilient Societies Petitions, Cost-Benefit

studies

• CSP State-level initiatives

• Infragard State and local initiatives, TTX’s/play book

• Ambassador Cooper - National Guard initiatives and letter

to the President

• DHS initiatives

• Draft EMP Protection Guidelines

• Draft EMP Scenario

• Recent Congressional Committee hearings

• House Oversight and Government Reform

• Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs

• Recent EMP brief to Virginia public officials at

State Police Fusion Center

continued

October 2015 JINSA EMP Task Force

Conclusions

• There are advantages to be

gained by addressing the

overlapping EM threat spectrum with integrated

solutions, rather than treating threats individually.

• Deterrence strategies specific to EMP can add

value.

• Leveraging the emergence of smart grids, micro-

grids; the rapid turnover of electronic systems;

and industry initiatives will add value.

• Public-private partnerships can be leveraged in

new ways for improved EM protection [including

insurance industry in process]

• Increased public awareness is essential.

Recommendations for Future Progress • Come to grips as a nation with EMP/GMD preparedness challenges

• The consequences of these threats are preventable

• The engineering tools are available

• Huge cost benefits for protecting a meaningful set of high-priority infrastructures

• Initiatives that would aid in this endeavor:

• A designated national executive agency and EMP/GMD/RFW protection director is

needed – DHS and DoD are likely candidates

• Establishing a national EMP/GMD protection plan including a set of national

planning scenarios • Coordination with State and Local stake-holders is crucial

• Begin a national program to protect the electric power grid including essential

infrastructures used for fuel supply and communication – protection standards are

important to ensure a unified approach

• Congress should address problems inherent in the regulation of electric reliability

as conceived in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

• FERC-NERC oversight has proven ineffective

• A new independent commission solely focused on electric grid reliability would be helpful

• Commission should have the power to issue and enforce standards/regulations