US Navy's Pacific War session iv

The U.S. Navy in World War II Part II- The Pacific War

session iv-Guadalcanal

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Period Covered in Each Session

Two new heroes will reassure us

major topics in this session

I. Planning and Invasion

II. Battle of Savo Island

III. Lull—August & September Attacks

IV. October & November Attacks

V. Battle of Tassafaronga & Guadalcanal Secured

Text

I. Planning and InvasionGuadalcanal in the Solomon Islands Group

Modern geographic data: S o l o m o n I s l a n d s i s a sovereign country consisting of a large number of islands in Oceania lying to the east of Papua New Gu inea and northwest of Vanuatu and covering a land area of 28,400 km 2 (11,000 mi2). The country's capital, Honiara, is located on the island of Guadalcanal. Solomon Islands should not be confused with the Solomon Islands archipelago, which is a collection of Melanesian islands that includes Solomon Islands and Bougainville Island."

Wikipedia

"Solomon Islands 1989" by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency - Solomon Islands (Political) 1989 from Perry Castañeda Library Map Collection: Solomon Islands Maps. Cropped to remove white space from edges of map.. Licensed under

Public domain via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Solomon_Islands_1989.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Solomon_Islands_1989.jpg

“The Battle of Midway jarred the Japanese out of their faith in their own invincibility. A week after the battle, Imperial General Headquarters cancelled the bold plan for the invasion of New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, originally scheduled for July, 1942. The immediate and imperative task was strengthening the defense perimeter. “To the Bismarcks came VAdm Gunichi Mikawa with a force of CAs and DDs. More planes and equipment arrived to buttress airdromes in New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and the Upper Solomons. Yet there still remained the Allied base at Port Moresby. The IJN had signally failed to eliminate that threat.Now the army would have a try, striking from the north coast of Papua across the Owen Stanley Mountains. To cover the flank of this op, work was begun on a bomber strip on Guadalcanal, 20 miles south of the Japanese seaplane base already operating at Tulagi.

Sea Power, p. 689.

“…at Tulagi. “To the Allies the results of Midway spelled opportunity. Now that the enemy was off balance, his preponderance of strength cut down, the time had come to seize the initiative and block his expansion by an offensive-defensive move.1 Where to strike depended upon probable enemy thrusts. As early as February 1942, Adm King • had pointed out the growing Japanese base at Rabaul as a likely springboard for the next enemy advance. To counter any move from this quarter and also to provide a jumping off place for an Allied drive through the Solomons and the Bismarcks, he ordered a base constructed on Efate in the New Hebrides. He then set up a separate command in the South Pacific, subordinate to Adm Nimitz’ Pacific Ocean Areas, and appointed VAdm Robert. L. Ghormley • Commander South Pacific Force and Area….”

Sea Power, p. 689.

__________ 1 Tactically offensive because the move would require seizing points not already held; strategically defensive because the immediate purpose was to thwart an enemy effort.

“…Force and Area. Ghormley established headquarters (hereafter, HQ) at Auckland, New Zealand and promptly began work on a second New Hebrides base on Espiritu Santo….”

“The Navy’s plan called for a CV-supported initial landing in the SE Solomons by the amphib trained 1st Marine Division.• Here the Americans would construct airfields to provide land-based air cover for capture of islands farther up the chain. On these islands they would build additional airdromes to advance their bomber line still closer to the main target. Thus in a series of steps, each new landing covered by land-based air, they would at length bring Rabaul itself under intensive air attack. Each step would have to be less than 300 miles, the extreme operational radius of American fighter planes in 1942, because fighters would be needed over the target to protect both bombers and the expeditionary force from enemy a/c. “After Midway, both Nimitz and Gen MacArthur were of the opinion that the counteroffensive should be launched as quickly as possible, but there were difficulties. Nimitz, as CinC Pac Fleet and POAs, controlled the marines, the transports to carry them to the beachhead, and the CVs and gunnery vessels needed to support them. The Solomons however were all within Gen MacArthur’s SW Pac Area. Accordingly, Nimitz and MacArthur each, with some reason, insisted that the entire campaign should be under his command. The latter moreover had his own idea about how to attain the objective. Give him the fleet and the CVs and the 1st Marine Division, said MacArthur, and he would go in and recapture Rabaul in a single uninterrupted op.”

op. cit, pp. 689-690.

“…on Espiritu Santo.

“…a single uninterrupted op. “There is much to be said for MacArthur’s bold strategy. Rabaul was growing steadily more formidable. With each month of delay it would be harder to capture. Once it was in Allied hands, the Japanese in the Solomons and Papua would be hopelessly cut off, the threat to Australia and US-Australia ses communications would be entirely removed, and the way would be open for an Allied advance on the Philippines. But the Navy • was unalterably opposed to sending scarce CVs and its single division of amphibious troops across the reef-strewn, virtually uncharted Solomon Sea into the teeth of a complex of enemy air bases.Later on, with more CVs and more amphib troops at their disposal—and more experience in using them—naval strategists could afford to be more daring. They would in fact stage amphib assaults on the most strongly defended enemy positions using air support from CVs only. But in the present circumstances they favored the step-by-step approach as the more likely to achieve success and avoid disaster. They insisted moreover that Pac Fleet forces should remain under naval control. “Here was an impasse that could only be settled in Washington, for Nimitz and MacArthur were each supreme in his own in his own area….”

op. cit, pp. 689-691.

“….supreme in his own in his own area. Here also was another of the many difficulties resulting from divided command in a single theater.• Should the entire Pac have been put under a single officer? There were convincing arguments for such a move. There were equally strong arguments that with a military front extending from the Aleutians to Australia, the strategic problems of the various areas were on too large a scale for one officer to grasp. Proponents of the latter view decried uncritical adherence to unified command. These advocated unified command only within a geographic entity that gives coherence for ops. Their opinion prevailed, and for better or worse MacArthur’s SWPac and Nimitz’ PacO Areas remained separate and independent commands, responsible only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

op. cit, p. 691.

Creation of the JCS Feb ’42-present

Inter-service rivalry had marred Army-Navy relations since the earliest days of the Republic. At the Arcadia Conference (Jan ’42) in Washington, DC, FDR agreed to form the “Charlie -

Charlies” (Combined Chiefs of Staff) to coordinate US-British Imperial conduct of the war. We had no supreme command structure like the British Imperial General Staff to referee inter-service rivalry.

So in Feb… jbp

“…responsible only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “It was within the Joint Chiefs that the differences were resolved. In a series of conferences, Gen Marshall and Adm King reached an agreement and on 2 July 42 issued a directive that substantially followed the Navy’s proposals. The opening ops, seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent positions, would be under the strategic control of Adm Nimitz….”

op. cit, p. 691.

“…of Adm Nimitz. To facilitate command problems in this first step, the boundary between the SPac and SWPac Areas was shifted westward to 159º East Long, just W of Guadalcanal….”

“…W of Guadalcanal. As soon as a suitable base had been secured in the Tulagi area, the strategic command would pass to Gen MacArthur, who would coordinate a move up the Solomons with a second thrust—up the Papuan Peninsula to Salamaua and Lae. The two Allied advances would then converge on Rabaul. Target date for the i n i t i a l i n v a s i o n s , c a l l e d O p WATCHTOWER, was set for 1 Aug.”

op. cit, p. 691.

Planning “Operation Shoestring”

“Adm Nimitz, anticipating the Joint Chiefs’ directive, had almost completed basic planning for Op WATCHTOWER by the first week in July. [“Forehandedness is the first precept of a naval officer.”—JRP to JBP]. VAdm Ghormley, as Nimitz’ deputy in the SPacA, would exercise strategic control, with VAdm Frank Jack Fletcher,• of Coral Sea and Midway fame, in tactical command of the Expeditionary Force.…’”

op. cit,, p. 691.


“…the Expeditionary Force. From King’s staff, where he had headed the War Plans Division, came RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner to command the Amphib Force.…’”

op. cit,, p. 691.


“…the Amphib Force. The 1st Mar Div, which would make the assault, was to be commanded by MGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, who had learned the business of fighting in the jungles of Nicaragua and the theory of amphib warfare on the staff of the FMF.

op. cit,, p. 691.


“…‘Op Shoestring.’ “While Fletcher and Turner were conferring with Nimitz at Pearl, there came the startling news that an American patrol plane had sighted an airstrip under construction on Guadalcanal. This information put a more urgent complexion on the WATCHTOWER project. Obviously Guadalcanal would have to be included in the Tulagi-Santa Cruz plan, but King and Nimitz would allow no more than one additional week to prepare for the expanded op. D-day was set definitely for 7 Aug. The airfield had to be captured before the Japanese could complete it. Whoever first put it into operation might well be the victor. “In the latter part of Jul the situation took another turn when a Japanese convoy landed 1,800 troops near Buna on the Papuan Peninsula directly opposite Port Moresby.…”

op. cit,, pp. 691-692.

“…opposite Port Moresby. This invasion was a source of grave concern to MacArthur, particularly as the SWPac Forces had been on the point of occupying the Buna area themselves. But in the SPac the news was received with a certain measure of relief. Japanese attention was focused on the old target of Port Moresby, not upon the end of the Solomons chain. Rabaul was looking SW instead of SE. Surprise was possible.”

The Allied Invasion“… Surprise was possible.

op. cit,, p. 692.

“Steaming from points as widely separated as Wellington, Sydney, Noumea, San Diego, and Pearl, the various components of the WATCHTOWER Expeditionary Force, some 80 vessels in all, met at sea on 26 Jul S of the Fijis. Here Adm Fletcher held council aboard his flagship, CV Saratoga.…”

The Allied Invasion

op. cit,, p. 692.

“…CV Saratoga. Adm Ghormley, then shifting his HQ to Noumea, could not be present. He neither saw the fleet over which he exercised a distant control nor met his top commanders to discuss operational plans. After a less than satisfactory landing rehearsal in the Fijis, the fleet steamed westward. In the Coral Sea it shaped course due N and headed for Guadalcanal through rain squalls that grounded all a/c, including Japanese search patrols. “Guadalcanal, part of the drowned volcanic mountain range forming the Solomons, rises steeply in the S from a narrow coastal flat.• Only on the N side of the island are there plains broad enough to provide level ground for airfields. Here on Lunga Plain, mostly rain forests traversed by numerous creeks and small rivers and broken here and there by coconut plantations and grassy fields, the Japanese had landed and begun their airdrome. This was the main objective. The secondary objective was the Japanese seaplane base in the Tulagi area, 20 miles to the N.”

The Allied Invasion

“…20 miles to the N.

op. cit,, p. 692.

“Under a clearing sky in the early hours of 7 Aug, the Saratoga, Enterprise, and Wasp CV groups moved into position S of Guadalcanal while Turner’s Amphib Force slipped up the W coast, split into two groups around little Savo Island, and entered Ironbottom Sound.2 The surprise of the Japanese was complete. After a brief naval bombardment and a strike by CV a/c, Higgins boats, LCMs, and LCPRs headed for the beach. Here they met no opposition. “By nightfall 10,000 marines were on Guadalcanal,…”__________ 2 …so called in memory of the many vessels sunk there in 1942 and 1943.

The Allied Invasion

“…20 miles to the N.

op. cit,, p. 692.

“Under a clearing sky in the early hours of 7 Aug, the Saratoga, Enterprise, and Wasp CV groups moved into position S of Guadalcanal while Turner’s Amphib Force slipped up the W coast, split into two groups around little Savo Island, and entered Ironbottom Sound.2 The surprise of the Japanese was complete. After a brief naval bombardment and a strike by CV a/c, Higgins boats, LCMs, and LCPRs headed for the beach. Here they met no opposition. “By nightfall 10,000 marines were on Guadalcanal,• and the beach was cluttered with supplies. One combat team had advanced W along the shoreline, while a second was penetrating the jungle in a south westerly direction. Most of the 2,000 or so Japanese on the island, chiefly construction workers, had fled westward during the bombardment, but a few determined warriors had remained behind to snipe and man machine guns. These the marines encountered and destroyed on the second day of their advance. In mid-afternoon of the 8th, one marine team had entered the main Japanese base, taking possession of machine shops, electric power plants, and considerable stores of provisions, firearms, and ammunition. A little later the other team occupied the airstrip, the future Henderson Field.3 ”

__________ 2 …so called in memory of the many vessels sunk there in 1942 and 1943.

"3 Named in honor of Maj Lofton Henderson, cdr of the marine bombing squadron in the Battle of Midway.

The Allied Invasion

“…future Henderson Field.3

op. cit,, pp. 692-693.

“On the N side of Ironbottom Sound, ops did not proceed so smoothly. Here the objectives were three small islands lying inside of a bight of the larger Florida Island: Tulagi, a two-mile-long ridge rising abruptly from the Sound, and Tanambogo-Gavutu, a pair of islets joined by a narrow causeway. In this area, despite naval bombardment and bombing and strafing by CV a/c, which quickly knocked out all the enemy seaplanes, the marines ran into trouble. “On Tulagi, by picking an unlikely beachhead, the invaders got ashore easily enough. It was only when they reached high ground that they found an enemy so well dug in that they had to dislodge him with machine guns, mortars and grenades. Gavutu had to be taken by amphib assault in the face of heavy small-arms fire, for this island, rising sheer out of a broad coral shelf, could be invaded only by way of the seaplane ramp. An attempt to take Tanambogo on 7 Aug was thrown back. Before these three little islands could be secured on the 8th, Vandegrift had to double the 1,500 marines he had originally sent against the 780 defenders. This used up all his reserves and meant that Op WATCHTOWER would be postponed and eventually abandoned.”

The Allied Invasion

“…and eventually abandoned.

op. cit,, pp. 693-694.

“A few hours after the first landing, enemy bombers and fighters from Rabaul appeared over Ironbottom Sound. Alerted by a coastwatcher,4 the American CVs sent in a strong CAP of fighter a/c which soon decimated and routed the intruders. Warned the following morning of approaching torpedo planes, Turner had his transports and screening vessels in cruising formation and maneuvering at top speed when they arrived. Caught between the devastating fire of more than 50 vessels and the CAP sweeping down from above, the torpedo planes were almost wiped out. “The Expeditionary Force came through the air attacks rather better than many would have ventured to predict—18 CV a/c lost from all causes, two DDs damaged, a transport set fatally ablaze. But the long absence of the cargo vessels from their anchorages had utterly confused an already critical logistics problem. By the evening of 8 Aug some of the vessels were no more than 25% unloaded, so Turner accepted the necessity of remaining in Ironbottom Sound at least two more days. Then came two bits of information that abruptly changed his mind….”__________ 4 The Australian coast watchers manned a network of small radio stations along the coasts of the Bismarcks and the Solomons Established before the war and incorporated into the Australian navy in 1939, some remained after the Japanese invasion; others returned later. Operating in concealment usually with portable radio equipment and assisted by loyal natives, they were of inestimable value in warning Allied commands of enemy ship, troop, and plane movements. A similar New Zealand network operated in the Gilberts, the Ellices, the Fijis, and the more easterly islands. Many coast watchers were captured or killed by the Japanese..

The Allied Invasion

op. cit,, pp. 693-694.

“…changed his mind. The first was news that Adm Fletcher, citing heavy loss of fighter planes and a need for refueling, had requested permission from Ghormley to withdraw the CV force from the Guadalcanal area.5 The second piece of news came from MacArthur’s HQ. That morning an Australian pilot on air patrol had sighted Japanese vessels heading to enter the passage—later known as ‘the Slot’—between the major Solomons….Not sure what he had seen, he identified two of the vessels as probably ’seaplane tenders.’ Turner, accepting this identification, included that the enemy force was en route to set up a seaplane base in the Central Solomons. With his Amphib Force about to be stripped of CV support and at the same time menaced by probable dangers from the air, he decided that he had no choice but to withdraw the following day. He therefore sent for Gen Vandegrift and RAdm V.A.C. Crutchley RN,• the screen commander, to come to his flagship to hear his decision and help him make plans.…”

__________ 5 Fletcher, having already lost two CVs since the outbreak of war, was understandably loath to risk further losses, but opinion is divided as to whether his situation off Guadalcanal was as critical as he implied, for he still had 83 fighter planes. Nimitz, calling Fletcher’s withdrawal ‘most unfortunate,’ suggested that he might have solved his fuel problem by sending the CV groups southward one at a time for refueling.

The Allied Invasion

op. cit,, pp. 693-694.

“…him make plans. “ C r u t c h l e y, s p e e d i n g t o t h e rendezvous in the CA Australia, had drawn up no battle plan for countering a surface attack and had designated no one to the over-all command of the CA/Ls and DDs in his absence. These vessels, in second condition of readiness, were divided several ways, in groups too far apart for quick mutual support. Light screens of DDs and minesweepers (AMs, for auxiliary, minesweepers) covered the Guadalcanal and Tulagi beachheads, where the transports were anchored. One CL-DD group patrolled the passage between Savo and Guadalcanal, while a third patrolled the E channels. Just NW of Savo was a radar patrol of two DDs. There were no picket vessels patrolling the outer approaches to Ironbottom Sound.”

"CanberraTulagi" by Unknown - Official US Navy Photograph 80-G-13485, now in the collections

of the US National Archives.. Licensed under Public domain via

Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File:CanberraTulagi.jpg#mediaviewer/File:CanberraTulagi.jpg

HMAS Canberra (center left) protects three Allied" transport ships (background and center right) "unloading troops and supplies at Tulagi.

Text

II. Battle of Savo Island“…the first of several naval battles in the straits later labelled Ironbottom Sound….”—Wikipedia

"USS Quincy CA-39 savo". Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons - https://

commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File:USS_Quincy_CA-39_savo.jpg#mediaviewer/

File:USS_Quincy_CA-39_savo.jpg

The Battle of Savo Island

op. cit,, pp. 694-695.

“The Japanese force sighted by the Australian plane the morning of 8 Aug was composed of five CAs and two CLs and a DD, commanded by Adm Mikawa. Mikawa’s objective was Ironbottom Sound; his mission, to smash the Allied transports and break up the invasion by a night attack. “For years the Japanese navy had been training to offset superior opposition by making use of foul weather and darkness. Many of its major fleet exercises had been carried out in the stormy N Pac, where day and night it trained under conditions of such extreme severity that many men were killed in each exercise. For night work the Japanese developed superior binoculars, highly dependable starshells and parachute flares, and the most lethal torpedo in the world—the 24-inch Long Lance, which could carry a thousand pounds of explosive eleven miles at 49 knots, or 20 miles at 36 knots.6 Because limited resources made Japan a weak base for naval ops, the Japanese counted on surprise coupled with adverse forces of nature to give them the advantage over better-based adversaries….” __________ 6 The contemporary American torpedo was 21 inches in diameter and carried a 780 pound charge three miles at 45 knots, 7.5 miles at 26.5 knots. Through the first two years of the war the exploder and depth regulating mechanisms remained notoriously undependable, particularly when launched from SSs.


op. cit,, pp. 694-695.

“…over better-based adversaries. “After he had been sighted from the air, Mikawa entered the Slot and headed directly for Guadalcanal.Late in the evening two of his CAs launched float planes, which proceeded ahead to report the location of ships in Ironbottom Sound and to provide illumination when needed. Some Allied vessels saw the a/c and tried to warn the flagship but were defeated by static; others assumed, since no general alarm had been sounded, that the planes must be friendly. A few minutes after 0100, when Mikawa’s force was headed for the passage between Savo and Cape Esperance, Japanese lookouts dimly made out the hull of picket DD Blue.• Promptly the entire force prepared for action, training all guns. But there was no reaction from the picket, which steamed tranquilly away, having observed nothing. Mikawa, puzzled, suspecting trickery, detached his DD to watch the Blue and engage her if she should attempt to follow him. Then he entered the Sound.


op. cit,, pp. 694-695.

“Not since the Pearl Harbor attack had American or allied forces been takes so unaware. As the Japanese planes overhead eerily illuminated the area with parachute flares, Mikawa’s CA/Ls dashed past the South Patrol Force firing torpedoes and shells. DD Patterson had sounded the alarm by voice radio: ‘Warning! Warning! Strange ships entering harbor!’ but it was too late. Before the Allied vessels could bring their guns to bear or the surprised torpedomen could insert firing primers, Japanese torpedoes had blown a chunk out of the bow of American CA Chicago …”

USS Patterson

USS Chicago

USS Quincy (CA-39) caught in the searchlights


op. cit,, pp. 694-695.

“…American CA Chicago and crushed the side of Australian CA Canberra, which lost way and began to blaze under a hail of enemy shells. Still unscratched, the attacking column split into two divisions and wheeled N, three cruisers passing across the van • of the North Patrol Force and four steaming across the rear, searchlights open, guns blazing. In a manner of minutes all three cruisers of the North Force, the American CAs Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincey, were afire and listing. The Quincey managed to get a couple of shells into the Japanese flagship Chokai, smashing the staff chart room and killing 34 men. Hits made by other American CAs did only trifling damage. At 0220 Mikawa ordered ‘all ships withdraw,’ and hi attack force headed back up the Slot. N of Savo Island one of his CAs encountered the second picket DD, the Ralph Talbot, and concentrated upon her a massed fire that left her superstructure a shambles.”

A Story of Competence and Heroism

“…at 0145 on the 9th received word of three enemy ships inside Savo Island. Soon afterward heavy gunfire was seen to the southeast, the first Battle of Savo Island had begun and Ironbottom Sound was on its way to being named."Half an hour later Ralph Talbot was shelled by a friendly destroyer, the error was quickly rectified, but within minutes an enemy cruiser appeared off her port quarter. Both ships opened fire and searchlight switches were flicked on. Ralph Talbot's searchlight cables had been severed in the earlier shelling, but the enemy's worked. The spotlighted DD 390 took a hit in the chart house which destroyed radar equipment, cut fire control circuits, and ignited fires. Three more shells came in close succession, hitting the wardroom, the starboard quarter, and the underside of gun Number 4. Among the twelve dead were the Doctor and the Chief Pharmacist's Mate."At 0221 Ralph Talbot ceased firing. The enemy had disappeared, but the damage she had caused required a new fight. Fire enveloped the bridge and the ship listed heavily to starboard. Slowing to one-third speed, she turned toward Savo. At 0230 all radio communication to and from the vessel ceased, but twenty minutes later she stood in close to the shore where the crew continued the battle to save her. By 0330 fires and flooding were under control and repair work was begun. Soon after 0700 communications were reestablished and by 1210 repairs, including mattress patches on the hull, were sufficient to begin the journey back to the United States for repairs.”"

Wikipedia


op. cit,, pp. 695-696.

“Mikawa, mindful that he had not completed his mission, considered returning to Ironbottom Sound to blast the transports. He rejected the idea because he was sure that Fletcher’s CVs were already pursuing him and that they would attack at first light. The farther he could get to the NW, the better the chances would be for a successful counterattack out of Rabaul. But there was neither attack nor counterattack. Fletcher had received his permission to withdraw and was moving in the opposite direction. By dawn the CVs were far to the SE. The Japanese attack force retired up the Slot unmolested. “In the waters off Guadalcanal the Quincy and the Vincennes had gone down shortly after the battle. The Canberra, helpless, unable to leave the Sound, was sunk by an American DD at 0800 the next morning.• The Astoria lingered until noon before she plunged. The attack had cost the Allies four desperately needed CAs and a thousand lives. It had vindicated the confidence of the Japanese in their night-fighting techniques.”

“…superstructure a shambles.

Text

III. Lull—August & September Attacks “Map of the Lunga perimeter…showing the approach routes of the Japanese forces and the locations of the Japanese attacks….”—Wikipedia

The Lull

op. cit,, p. 696.

“The roar of battle had scarcely died away before the American sailors and marines resumed unloading cargo. After dawn, alarms of air raids that never materialized twice sent all ships into the open Sound for evasive maneuvers. Hence when the transports and cargo vessels weighed anchor that afternoon, they carried away more than half the supplies they had brought. The last ship of Turner’s Amphib Force cleared Ironbottom Sound just before dark. The 16,000 marines left behind on Guadalcanal and Tulagi would be limited to two daily meals of B and C rations eked out with captured rice. “For several days the Japanese limited their offensive against the new American positions to light aerial bombings and to bombardments by surfaced SSs. During this relative lull, marine engineers, using hand shovels and captured steam rollers and trucks, got the airstrip in good enough shape to receive light planes.…”

The Lull

op. cit,, p. 696.

“…receive light planes. On 15 Aug four American DD-transports darted into Ironbottom Sound bringing av-gas, bombs, ammo, and ground crews. On the 20th a CVE approached Guadalcanal from the SE and flew in twelve dive bombers [SBDs] and 19 fighters[F4Fs]. Fletcher’s CV force meanwhile patrolled the waters between the Solomons and Espiritu Santo, guarding the sea communications.”

The Lull

Ibid.

“Despite their apparent inactivity, the Japanese were not idle. They were gathering forces to recapture Guadalcanal and also to reinforce their campaign in Papua. By mid-Aug, the whole Combined Fleet had moved to Truk, and 17,000 troops had arrived in the area or were on the way. Because the Japanese, through a monumental misestimate, believed that no more than 2,000 Americans had landed in the Solomons, 11,000 of the new arrivals were promptly dispatched to Papua. The rest were assigned to the first of four attacks aimed at regaining Guadalcanal and its airfield.”

“…the sea communications.

The August Attack

Ibid.

“Because most of the Japanese transports in the South Pac were assigned to reinforcing the campaign against Port Moresby, only a few hundred troops at a time could be sent to Guadalcanal. Even the first Reinforcement Group, commanded by RAdm Raizō Tanaka,• split into two sections. One section, comprising six DDs, left Truk at dawn on 16 Aug, proceeded to Guadalcanal at 22 kts., and landed 900 troops two nights later W of Henderson Field. The second section, which left Truk shortly after the first, could only make 8 ½ kts. because its 1,300 troops were carried in three slow transports. Escorting the transports was CL Jintsu, Tanaka’s flagship, and four patrol boats.…”

“…and its airfield.”

The August Attack

Ibid.

“…four patrol boats. “While Tanaka was still at sea with his slow convoy, he and Japanese HQ received three reports that changed the whole strategic picture. The first report on 20 Aug, was that Fletcher’s CV TF was cruising SE of Guadalcanal. The second, also on the 20th, was that American planes were operating from Henderson Field. The third, on 21 Aug, was that the 900 troops put ashore on Guadalcanal had attacked prematurely and had been wiped out almost to a man.…”

The August Attack

Ibid.

“…to a man. The Japanese would have been even more shocked had they known that this action, known as the Battle of the Tenaru River, had cost the marines only 25 lives.”

The August Attack

op. cit., pp. 696-697.

“As a result of the first of these reports, Rabaul radioed Tanaka orders to reverse course. The following evening he was told to resume his advance toward Guadalcanal. VAdm Nobutake Kondo • was bringing down the Combined Fleet to support his landing and, if possible, destroy Fletcher’s TF. This decision led to the second naval battle of the campaign, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons..

“…only 25 lives.”

The August Attack

op. cit., pp. 696-697.

“Dawn on 24 Aug saw the Japanese sea forces emerging on a southerly course from an overcast that had concealed their advance—Tanaka 250 miles N of Guadalcanal, with Kondo, his main air strength concentrated in the sister-CVs, Shokaku and Zuikaku, 40 miles to the E covering his flank. Far in advance was a third group, centered about CVL Ryujo, whose a/c were assigned the task of neutralizing Henderson Field.”

op. cit., pp. 696-697.

“When Fletcher, cruising 150 miles E of Guadalcanal, learned from patrol planes of the presence of the Ryūjō, he was taken aback. Not anticipating fleet action, he had sent the Wasp group southward to refuel. Though this left him only two CVs to oppose to an enemy of undetermined strength, he decided to seize the initiative. Retaining his entire CAP of 53 F4F Wildcat fighters to defend his fleet from attack, in the early afternoon he sent 30 bombers and eight torpedo planes against the Ryūjō . These found the little CV shortly after she had launched the bulk of her a/c against Henderson Field. In a well coordinated attack the Americans sent her down….”

“…neutralizing Henderson Field.

The August Attack

op. cit., p. 697.

“When American patrol planes located the big CVs to the N, Fletcher promptly made preparations for an attack from that quarter. He turned fighter-plane direction over to RAdm Thomas Kinkaid’s• Enterprise group and, hoping to divide the enemy, withdrew with the Saratoga group ten miles to the SE.…”

“…sent her down. The August Attack

op. cit., p. 697.

“…to the SE. When radar detected a/c approaching from the N, he ordered the remaining bombers and torpedo planes of both American CVs to take to the air and seek out the hostile fleet, while the fighters stacked themselves over the American groups and on the line of approach of the enemy planes. Kincaid’s Wildcats quickly broke the enemy formations and shot down half a dozen bombers before they could begin their dives. The rest of the enemy a/c, ignoring the Saratoga, swooped down upon the Enterprise group, where they ran into blistering a-a/c fire which no torpedo plane and few bombers penetrated.”

The August Attack

Ibid.

“Three determined bomber pilots however bored through the fire and made direct hits in quick succession on the flight deck of the Enterprise, killing 74 men, knocking out two elevators, wrecking compartments, and blasting holes in her side. Six minutes after the first attack on the CV, the battle was over, and a small remnant of the attacking squadrons was fleeing northward with Wildcats in hot pursuit. The Americans had lost only 15 planes. Within an hour damage control parties aboard the Enterprise had corrected her slight list and she was steaming S at 24 kts landing a/c.…”

“…few bombers penetrated.The August Attack

“…The American air attack squadrons meanwhile had missed the main enemy CV force and instead struck a detached group, sending the seaplane CV Chitose • flaming out of action….”

Ibid.

“At 2400 Kondo, having lost a CV and 90 planes, withdrew toward Truk.• But Tanaka’s Reinforcement Group, accompanied by DDs, steamed doggedly southward through the night to become the morning target of Henderson Field bombers, which severely damaged the Jintsū and sank a transport. Not long afterward B-17s from Espiritu Santo struck the Reinforcement Group and sank a DD.• Rabaul thereupon acknowledged the failure of this first attempt to recapture Guadalcanal by recalling Tanaka and canceling the op.”

“…few bombers penetrated.The August Attack

“Tanaka, though shaken by his experiences in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, had scarcely reached the naval staging base in the Shortland Islands before he was busy with his inadequate transport facilities pushing more troops into Guadalcanal. In a sunset attack on 28 Aug, Henderson Field bombers • [hereafter, a/c from here will be designated CAF for Cactus Air Force, their proud self-designation, ‘Cactus’ being the code name for Guadalcanal—jbp] sank a troop-carrying DD and damaged two others. Thereafter the Japanese timed their approaches more carefully. Hovering up the Slot until dark, DDs and small transports darted into Ironbottom Sound by night so regularly that the marines began to refer to them as the ‘Tokyo Express.’ After putting men and supplies ashore they would lob a few shells at the airstrip and be back up the Slot out of reach of the CAF before light. Allied vessels, after the night sinkings of two DD-transports by Japanese DDs, shunned the Sound after nightfall as conscientiously as did the enemy after dawn. Thus the Americans, under protection of the CAF, commanded the waters around Guadalcanal by day, and the Japanese commanded these waters by night. Every surface action in Ironbottom Sound resulted from contacts made when Allied warships outstayed the sun or ventured into the waters N of Guadalcanal after dark.

The September Attack

op. cit., pp. 697-698.

“By 10 Sep, the Japanese had 6,000 troops on Guadalcanal, divided between positions E and W of the American perimeter. The time had come for a second drive to recapture the airfield. The Imperial Army commander ashore, accepting the official underestimate of American forces, reported that he had sufficient strength for an attack. Thereupon Kondo’s Combined Fleet • again departed Truk to lend support and fly planes in to the airstrip as soon as it was captured. The Japanese troops, after chopping a trail through the jungle, at nightfall on 12 Sep struck with their main force along the high ground, subsequently known as Bloody Ridge, that led from the S directly to Henderson Field. But their move had been anticipated, and marines were waiting for them with mortars and machine guns backed by 105-mm. howitzers. The American lines held through the night and the next day. When darkness came on the 13th, the marines opened and maintained a continuous barrage of shells which the Japanese for lack of artillery could not counter. Just before midnight Imperial Army troops launched a final attack that carried them perilously close to the airfield before collapsing under withering massed fire. By first light the Japanese were in disorderly retreat. Planes taking off from Henderson Field peppered the jungle with strafing fire, helping to bring enemy losses to 1,500. American casualties were 40 KIA and 103 WIA. “Once more Kondo’s fleet retired on Truk. The second attack had failed.


Ibid.

“…dark.

“In the Coral Sea however, where Fletcher’s CVs continued to patrol, Japanese SSs were taking a grievous toll of American naval strength.On the last day of Aug, a SS had fired a torpedo into the Saratoga, putting her out of action for the three crucial months to follow. Two weeks later, the Wasp, new BB North Carolina, and DD O’Brien were all torpedoed within a quarter of an hour.• The two torpedoes that struck the Wasp ignited • open fuel lines and at the same time broke her water mains so that effective fire fighting was impossible. Capt Forrest P. Sherman, her CO, after vainly attempting to confine the flames by turning her undamaged stern into the wind, at length ordered Abandon Ship,• and a DD sent her down with torpedoes. The North Carolina, with a 32-foot underwater rip in her hull, made Pearl for repairs, but the O’Brien broke up and sank before she could reach drydock.…”


Ibid.

“…second attack had failed.

“…could reach drydock. “That day’s series of calamities left the Allies with only one operational fleet carrier (CVA), the Hornet, and one undamaged new BB, the Washington, in the whole Pac. Luckily, the convoy that the Wasp and the Hornet had been supporting reached Guadalcanal safely. Aboard were 4,200 troops, Turner’s last marine reserves, which he had withdrawn from the defense of Samoa.”


Ibid.

Text

IV. October & November AttacksMap of the battle, 23–26 October. Sumiyoshi's forces attack in the west at the Matanikau (left) while Maruyama's 2nd division attacks the Lunga perimeter from the south (right)—Wikipedia

“The crushing defeat of the Imperial Army forces in the Battle of Bloody Ridge had a profound effect on Japanese strategy. It shocked Tokyo into realizing that the Americans were on Guadalcanal in considerable force and that Japan was likely to lose the island for good unless stronger measures were taken to recapture it. “Over in Papua, the troops based on Buna had penetrated a 6,500-foot-high pass in the Owen Stanley Mountains, descended the southern slope and come almost in sight of Port Moresby despite courageous resistance by MacArthur’s Australians. On 18 Sep Imperial GHQ ordered the Japanese troops to cease their advance and withdraw back across the mountains to Buna, where they were to take a strong defensive position and hold it until Guadalcanal had been recaptured. Everything was now to be subordinated to that objective. In line with the new emphasis, the Tokyo Express stepped up ops until by 1 Oct it was transporting as many as 900 troops a night down the Slot. Meanwhile a fresh Japanese division moved to the Shortlands for transfer to Guadalcanal….”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 698-699.

“…transfer to Guadalcanal “In an attempt to counter this formidable enemy buildup, Adm Ghormley • stripped his New Caledonia garrison of 3,000 US Army troops and embarked them to reinforce Vandegrift’s marines. TFs built around the Hornet and Washington cleared the way for the convoy, and a force of four CLs and five DDs under RAdm Norman Scott • advanced to derail the Tokyo Express….”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 698-699.

“In preparation for their October offensive, the Japanese planned a series of naval bombardments of Guadalcanal which, together with intensified air attacks, were calculated to put Henderson Field out of operation. The first bombardment group, three CA/Ls and two DDs from Rabaul, came to grief when it blundered head-on into Scott’s CA/L-DD force just N of Cape Esperance toward midnight on 11 Oct. For once Japanese cat-eyes had not penetrated the darkness, and the American force was almost equally blind because Scott had chosen as his flagship the San Francisco,• which was not equipped with the new SG surface-search radar.…”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 698-699.

“…to derail the Tokyo Express.

“…SG surface-search radar. But good fortune was with the American CA/Ls. They had just reversed course by column movement. This is a dubious maneuver in disputed waters because it masks one’s batteries and provides the enemy with a stationary point of aim, but as luck would have it, the move carried the American CA/L column on a T-capping course directly across the head of the oncoming Japanese column….” op. cit., pp. 698-699.

“At length becoming aware of the enemy, the Americans opened fire, sinking a CL and a DD and setting another CA ablaze. In the subsequent pursuit of the surviving Japanese vessels, Scott’s force battered the previously undamaged enemy cruiser with shellfire, but one of h is own CLs was put out action and another was damaged by two hits. The American van DDs had no luck at all. The initial countermarch, led by the CA/Ls threw them out of line. As they raced to regain the head of the column, they were caught between the opposing forces. One of the DDs was holed by two American shells; another, furiously battered by friend and foe, caught fire and sank.…”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 699-700.

“…the oncoming Japanese column.

The October Attack

“…fire and sank.

“This action, known as the Battle of Cape Esperance, temporarily lifted the flagging Allied spirits in the South Pac, particularly as the Americans greatly overestimated the damage they had done the enemy.…”

op. cit., p. 700.

“…done the enemy. The situation looked still brighter on the 13th when the convoy from New Caledonia reached Guadalcanal, discharged soldiers and cargo, and got safely away. But that night two Japanese BBs entered Ironbottom Sound and systematically pounded the Henderson Field area for an hour and a half with hundreds of high-capacity shells, churning up the landing strips and destroying half the a/c on the island. Two air raids the next day and a bombardment by CAs the following night added to the destruction. Only a few planes were left to oppose a convoy of six transports which in the early hours of 15 Oct brought in some 4,500 Japanese soldiers. The new arrivals raised the enemy garrison to 22,000,• the majority fresh troops,…”

The October Attack

op. cit., p. 700.

“…the majority fresh troops, to oppose 23,000 Americans, mostly battle-worn, malaria-ridden marines As the Imperial Army forces confidently prepared for what they regarded as the inevitable recapture of the airdrome,…”

The October Attack

op. cit., p. 700.

“…recapture of the airdrome, Adm Kondo brought down from Truk the most powerful BB-CV fleet assembled since the Battle of Midway.”

The October Attack

op. cit., p. 700.

“In the face of these vast enemy preparations, morale in the S Pac took a new plunge. Part of the general lack of confidence grew out of command problems that had haunted the Guadalcanal op from the beginning. Now Turner was finding fault with Vandegrift’s perimeter defense, insisting that the American troops should go on the offensive from a number of points along the coast of Guadalcanal.…”

The October Attack

Ibid.

“…Battle of Midway.

“…coast of Guadalcanal. Vandegrift for his part felt that he was getting inadequate support from the fleet. Ghormley, who from the beginning had had his doubts about the invasion, seemed able neither able to resolve these differences nor to instill confidence in his subordinates.…”

The October Attack

Ibid.

“…in his subordinates. Nimitz therefore relieved Ghormley of the S Pac command, replacing him with the confident and aggressive William F. Halsey.…”

The October Attack

Ibid.

“…William F. Halsey. “Halsey promptly called a conference at Noumea and settled the disagreement on strategy in favor of Vandegrift, to whom he said, ‘Are we going to evacuate or hold?’ ‘I can hold,’ said Vandegrift, ‘but I’ve got to have more active support than I’ve been getting.’ ‘All right,’ replied Halsey. ‘Go on back. I’ll promise you everything I’ve got.’7.Backing up his word, he directed the Washington force to put a halt to the enemy reinforcement and bombardment of Guadalcanal. He then daringly ordered Kinkaid, who had recently relieved Fletcher, to take two CV forces, one centered around Hornet and the other around the hastily-repaired Enterprise, to the waters NE of Guadalcanal.”

The October Attack

Ibid.

__________ 7 From William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947), p. 117.

“The Japanese army launched its drive on 23 Oct. It quickly became apparent however that this was to be no easy march to Henderson Field. The well-entrenched Americans refused to give ground. The three lines of the Japanese advance got out of phase.…”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 700-701.

“…NE of Guadalcanal.

“…out of phase. After the army command had thrice notified Kondo’s CVs that they might approach and send in planes, and each time postponed the hour, Adm Yamamoto, at Truk, lost patience. He warned the army that the fleet was running out of fuel and would have to retire unless Henderson Field were soon captured. “In the early hours of the 26th, PBYs from Espiritu Santo reported that Kondo was heading northward, away from the Guadalcanal area. Kinkaid’s two CV forces had by this time reached the vicinity of the Santa Cruz Islands, within striking range of the Japanese fleet. Adm Halsey noted all this on his ops chart in Noumea and just before dawn flashed the electrifying order: ‘Attack—Repeat—Attack.’ Search planes promptly left the deck of the Enterprise and began the day auspiciously by locating the major enemy CV group and with a pair of 500-pound bombs blasting a hole in the flight deck of the CVL Zuiho.”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 700-701.

“Thereafter events worked increasingly to American tactical disadvantage. Kinkaid, whose experience prior to Op WATCHTOWER had been with BBs and CAs, adopted Fletcher’s plan of controlling all fighter-direction from the Enterprise, but with less precision and certainly with less luck. Because the Japanese got the jump on him by putting a strike in the air 20 minutes before the Americans launched,…”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 700-701.

“…the CVL Zuiho.

“…the Americans launched, Kinkaid had to accept battle over his own decks before his fighters attained altitude; and as ill fortune would have it, the enemy concentrated on the Hornet force while the Enterprise was ten miles away. Five bombs struck the Hornet’s flight deck, some penetrating deep into the hull before detonating. Two torpedoes exploded in her engine spaces, severing electrical cables and water mains and flooding fire rooms. [fire rooms are the large compartments where the boilers generate steam, engine rooms house the turbines where the steam drives the shafts which turn the screws (propellors)—jbp]. Listing, ablaze, without power or communications, the CV went dead in the water….”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 700-701.

“…in the water. Meanwhile, far to the NW, the Hornet’s bombers were exacting vengeance by fighting their way through strong Japanese air patrols to cripple CA Chikuma and put CV Shokaku out of the war for several months….”

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 700-701.

“An hour later a second Japanese air strike found the Enterprise force unready and in a state of some confusion because a SS had just torpedoed DD Porter. Accuracy and volume of a-a/c fire, especially from the new BB South Dakota, limited damage this time to three bomb hits on the flight deck of the Enterprise. After a third morning attack had damaged two more of his ships Kinkaid ordered the Porter scuttled, and the Enterprise force retreated to the SE. “Left thus without fighter cover, the Hornet became the target of repeated afternoon air attacks. When another torpedo and two more bomb hits made her blaze afresh and heel over dangerously, the force commander ordered the CV abandoned.• He then withdrew, leaving two DDs behind to sink her. These expended all their torpedoes and more than 400 shells without producing any effect except to start new fires. After dark, when the American DDs had departed, ships of Kondo’s fleet approached the burning derelict. Unable to take her in tow, they sent her down with four Long Lances.

The October Attack

op. cit., p. 701.

“…for several months.

“Though tactically the Americans had got the worse of this action, known as the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, in the long run it worked to their strategic advantage. Kondo had lost 100 planes; Kinkaid, 74. This disparity was more one-sided than the bare numbers indicate, for the Japanese were to be quickly outmatched by the upsurging American pilot training and a/c construction programs.

The October Attack

op. cit., pp. 701-702.

“…four Long Lances.

The most significant losses for the Japanese Navy, however, were in aircrew. The U.S. lost 81 aircraft along with 26 pilots and aircrew members in the battle.[75] The Japanese, on the other hand, lost 99 aircraft and 148 pilots and aircrew members including two dive bomber group leaders, three torpedo squadron leaders, and 18 other section or flight leaders. Forty-nine percent of the Japanese torpedo bomber aircrews involved in the battle were killed along with 39% of the dive bomber crews and 20% of the fighter pilots.[76] The Japanese lost more aircrew at Santa Cruz than they had lost in each of the three previous carrier battles at Coral Sea (90), Midway (110), and Eastern Solomons (61). By the end of the Santa Cruz battle, at least 409 of the 765 elite Japanese carrier aviators who had participated in the Attack on Pearl Harbor were dead.[77]"Having lost so many of its veteran carrier aircrew, and with no quick way to replace them because of an institutionalized limited capacity in its naval aircrew training programs and an absence of trained reserves, the undamaged Zuikaku and Hiryū were also forced to return to Japan because of a scarcity of trained aircrew to man their air groups. Although the Japanese carriers returned to Truk by the summer of 1943, they played no further offensive role in the Solomon Islands campaign.[73][78]"

Wikipedia

“Though the fleet at a heavy price had won important long-term gains, it was the American soldiers and marines on Guadalcanal who saved the immediate situation. They held firm while the enemy attack rose to a crescendo and finally died out on the 26th Henderson Field remained in American hands, and Japanese casualties were roughly ten times the American losses. Enemy ground forces would no longer pose a serious threat.”

“Convinced that they had barely missed recapturing Guadalcanal, the Japanese in early November duplicated their Oct preparations, but at a swifter pace. The night-running Tokyo Express sped up ops until Imperial Army forces on Guadalcanal outnumbered the Americans by several thousands. These piecemeal reinforcements however were merely a preliminary to the 13,500 troops which the persistent Adm Tanaka was about to bring down from the Shortland Islands in a Reinforcement Group of 11 transports escorted by 11 DDs. Exactly as in Oct, a BB group and CA/L group would bombard Henderson Field on successive nights, and bombers would raid by day. To provide some air cover for Tanaka’s transports, Kondo’s CVs would maneuver N of the Solomons, but they were under orders to avoid a fleet engagement. “Arrival of fresh troops from New Zealand and the US enabled Halsey to strip the remainder of his island garrisons and rush 6,000 soldiers and marines to Guadalcanal escorted by Turner’s surface forces. By direct intervention of FDR, additional CA/Ls, DDs, and SSs were ordered to the S Pac; bombers and fighter planes were flown in from Hawaii and Australia. Finally, as the Nov showdown became imminent, Adm Kinkaid set out from Noumea with the Enterprise force, now including the Washington as well as the South Dakota, taking a tender so that repairs to the damaged CV could continue at sea. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands had taught Halsey caution also, for he directed Kinkaid under no circumstances to take the Enterprise into the waters N of the Solomons.”

The November Attack

op. cit., p. 702.

“ T h o u g h Tu r n e r b e a t Ta n a k a t o Guadalcanal, he did not arrive undetected by the enemy. Bombers struck repeatedly at the American troop convoy in Ironbottom Sound. On 12 Nov, a Japanese pilot crashed his burning plane into the San Francisco, knocking out a gun director and fire control radar and killing or injuring 50 men. Some of the bombers were from the CVs, for Kondo had already brought his fleet down from Truk to a position N of Santa Isabel Island. Thence he dispatched VAdm Hiroaki Abe • southward with the first Bombardment Group. Tanaka’s Reinforcement Group was on the point of departing the Shortlands for its dash down the Slot.…”

The November Attack

op. cit., p. 702.

“…Solomons.

“…down the Slot. “Notified by scout planes of the approaching Bombardment Group, Turner at sunset withdrew his convoy to the SE. To break up the impending night attack on Henderson Field, he detached five CA/Ls and eight DDs from his convoy escort and sent them back to Ironbottom Sound under the command of RAdm Daniel J. Callaghan.• He thereby set the stage for the opening action of the three-day Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. “Callaghan’s force was a David sent against a Goliath, for Abe, besides a CA and 14 DDs was bringing down BBs Hiei and Kirishima….”

The November Attack

op. cit., p. 702.

Approximate routes of Japanese force under Abe (red line) and U.S. force under Callaghan (black line) as they head towards each other early on 13 November in Ironbottom Sound between Savo Island, Cape Esperance, and Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The green area near Lunga Point on Guadalcanal marks the location of Henderson Field.—Wikipedia

"NavalGuadalcanal1". Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/

wiki/File:NavalGuadalcanal1.gif#mediaviewer/File:NavalGuadalcanal1.gif

“…Hiei and Kirishima. Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese 14-inch guns were provided with bombardment rather than armor-piercing shells; otherwise the US force could hardly have avoided annihilation. In any event, it was hardly prepared for the sort of battle it was about to fight. Callaghan neither issued a battle plan nor provided for any means of scouting ahead. In imitation of Scott in the Battle of Cape Esperance, he disposed his vessels [2 CAs: San Francisco and Portland; 3 CLs: Helena, Juneau, and Atlanta; eight DDs—jbp] in a single column, CA/Ls in the center, DDs divided between van and rear. Also like Scott, he chose for his flagship the San Francisco with her inferior radar. Scott, now second in command, led the CA/Ls in Atlanta, which also lacked SG radar.. “Under a moonless but starry sky, Callaghan’s force passed back through the eastern channel and re-entered Ironbottom Sound. His vessels had almost reached the waters N of Lunga Point, when Abe’s Bombardment Group, without radar, entered the Sound through the passage S of Savo Island with a pair of detached DDs scouting out ahead. The two forces were thus speeding toward each other almost on a collision course…”

The November Attack

op. cit., pp. 702-704.

“…a collision course when CL Helena detected the enemy 14 miles away and warned the flagship by voice radio. Callaghan thereupon ordered two successive column movements to the right which put him on a course due N.• He apparently hoped by this maneuver to reproduce Scott’s capping position of the month before. But the leading DD Cushing, suddenly espying enemy scout DDs dead ahead, swung out of line and threw the van into disorder. Callaghan’s CA/Ls then wheeled left to avoid their own DDs, and Japanese and American ships intermingled….”

The November Attack

op. cit., pp. 702-704.

“… intermingled. “There followed a half-hour melee which for confusion and fury is scarcely paralleled in naval history. All formations broke and the engagement became a series of individual ship duels with each side at one time or another firing on its own vessels. From this midnight brawl the contending forces at length managed to extricate themselves, but both had been desperately hurt. Dawn revealed the extent of their injuries.…”

The November Attack

op. cit., p. 704.

“… intermingled. “There followed a half-hour melee which for confusion and fury is scarcely paralleled in naval history. All formations broke and the engagement became a series of individual ship duels with each side at one time or another firing on its own vessels. From this midnight brawl the contending forces at length managed to extricate themselves, but both had been desperately hurt. Dawn revealed the extent of their injuries.• The Japanese had lost two DDs; and Abe’s flagship Hiei, riddled by more than 50 shells, was helpless N of Savo, where a/c from Henderson Field struck her again and again until she sank.• Adms Callaghan and Scott and most of their staffs had been killed. Four American DDs had been lost.• CA Portland and a DD were unnavigable.• CL Atlanta, flame-gutted, and shelled by friend and foe, had to be sunk.• All but one of the other American vessels were damaged. CL Juneau, while retiring from the battle with a weakened keel, was torpedoed by a SS and went down, carrying nearly 700 of her crew.• Yet the Americans, despite overwhelming odds, had by sheer valor carried out their mission. Abe’s BBs had been turned back; Tanaka’s transports returned to base….”

The November Attack

op. cit., p. 704.

“…returned to base. “The frustration of their intended BB bombardment interrupted the Japanese schedule scarcely at all. Down came Mikawa from the Shortlands with his CA/L Bombardment Group and in the early hours of the 14th carried out his bombardment of Henderson Field, achieving considerably less damage than Abe might have with his 14-inch guns. The fortunes of war were turning against the Japanese however, for Kinkaid’s Enterprise force had at last arrived within flight range of the Solomons. “Daybreak on 14 Nov disclosed two Japanese forces to American search planes—Mikawa’s CA/L Bombardment Group S of New Georgia Island on a westerly retirement course and Tanaka’s • Reinforcement Group once more in the Slot approaching Guadalcanal….”

The November Attack

Ibid.

“…transports returned to base. “The frustration of their intended BB bombardment interrupted the Japanese schedule scarcely at all. Down came Mikawa from the Shortlands with his CA/L Bombardment Group and in the early hours of the 14th carried out his bombardment of Henderson Field, achieving considerably less damage than Abe might have with his 14-inch guns. The fortunes of war were turning against the Japanese however, for Kinkaid’s Enterprise force had at last arrived within flight range of the Solomons. “Daybreak on 14 Nov disclosed two Japanese forces to American search planes—Mikawa’s CA/L Bombardment Group S of New Georgia Island on a westerly retirement course and Tanaka’s • Reinforcement Group once more in the Slot approaching Guadalcanal.• Bombers from Henderson Field and from the Enterprise first struck Mikawa, sinking one CL and damaging three others….”

The November Attack

Ibid.

“…damaging three others. Then, joined by B-17s from Espiritu Santo,they struck repeatedly at Tanaka’s lightly-protected transports. By evening seven of them, carrying about 1,000 troops each, were sunk or sinking….”

The November Attack

Ibid.

“…sunk or sinking. “The complicated Japanese scheme was becoming absurd as well as tragic. The transports were the heart of their whole November offensive, yet they had come down the Slot shielded by a mere handful of DDs and a meager cover of fighter planes operating at near extreme range out of the Upper Solomons and from the decks of Kondo’s CVs maneuvering far to the N. In his extremity Tanaka now rose to a sort of magnificence. With remarkable if perhaps foolhardy tenacity he pushed on toward Guadalcanal with four damaged transports, all he had left of his convoy. Meanwhile Kondo himself with the Kirishima, four CA/Ls and nine DDs was heading down from the N to redeem Abe’s failure of two nights before by blasting Henderson Field with a really effective bombardment.”

The November Attack

Ibid.

“…effective bombardment. “At the same time up from the S came the Washington, the South Dakota, and four DDs, detached from the Enterprise group with orders from Halsey to protect the field. The American force, under command of RAdm Willis A. Lee • in the Washington, reached Guadalcanal first, and late in the evening under a setting moon passed into Ironbottom Sound through the passage N of Savo….”

The November Attack

op. cit., pp 704-705.

“…N of Savo. Though Lee had detected nothing, Kondo had seen Lee and divided his force into three groups, two to attack and the third to keep the Americans under observation….”

The November Attack

op. cit., pp 704-705.

“…Americans under observation. “As Lee’s force, in column with the DDs leading, turned W toward Cape Esperance, the BBs made radar contact with the sweeping group and chased it away with a series of salvos….”

The November Attack

op. cit., pp 704-705.

“…series of salvos. But one of the attack groups, a CL leading several DDs,• had passed W around Savo so that it could not be detected by American radar. This group now attacked Lee’s van with shells and torpedoes, sinking two of his DDs and putting the other two out of action.• To avoid colliding with the disabled vessels the Washington shifted to port and the South Dakota swung to starboard toward the enemy. This accidental separation of the American BBs occurred at a critical moment, for Kondo was about to strike again….”

op. cit., pp 704-705.

“…to strike again. His main attack group, the Kirishima, two CAs, and two DDs, which had been maneuvering NW of Savo, emerged from behind the island and took the nearby South Dakota under fire, so wrecking her superstructure that she was obliged to retire….”

op. cit., pp 704-705.

“…obliged to retire. “The Washington was thus left to face the entire Japanese force. Lee, with the advantage of radar fire control, at which he was expert, accepted the challenge and quickly evened the score. With his 5- and 16-inch guns, he concentrated fire on the Kirishima.• Seven minutes and 50 shell hits later the Japanese BB was helpless and turning in circles. Lee continued for a while to the NW to attract the enemy away from his cripples and then withdrew to the S. “Kondo now gave up, ordering the Kirishima and a disabled DD scuttled, and left the area. But ‘Tenacious Tanaka,’who had steamed unflinchingly through the embattled waters, continued on to Guadalcanal, where he beached his four remaining transports. After dawn American planes and ship and shore artillery quickly smashed them to pieces—but not before the surviving troops had landed. “Japan’s final attempt to recapture Guadalcanal had ended in failure like all the rest. Thereafter Yamamoto risked no more capital ships in the Solomons campaign.”

The November Attack

op. cit., pp 704-705.

"Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee is presented with the Navy Cross" by US Navy - Official US Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.. Licensed under Public domain via W i k i m e d i a C o m m o n s - h t t p s : / /c o m m o n s . w i k i m e d i a . o r g / w i k i /File:Rear_Admiral_Willis_A._Lee_is_presented_with_the_Navy_Cross.jpg#mediaviewer /File:Rear_Admiral_Willis_A._Lee_is_presented_with_the_Navy_Cross.jpg

Bull Halsey presents Lee with the Navy Cross for his actions during "the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, circa January 1943—Wikipedia

Text

IV. Battle of Tassafaronga & Guadalcanal Secured“TF67 heads for Guadalcanal on 30 Nov. USS Fletcher (DD-445) (foreground), is followed by Perkins, Maury, Drayton and the cruisers (far distance).”—Wikipedia

The Battle of Tassafaronga

“Following the collapse of their Nov attack the Japanese went entirely on the defensive, maintaining their garrison on Guadalcanal merely as a holding force to keep the Americans occupied while they prepared a new defense line by constructing a pair of airfields on Colombangara and New Georgia in the Central Solomons. In the meantime Adm Tanaka contrived a streamline Tokyo Express of fast DDs to keep the garrison precariously alive by dropping floating drums of food and medical supplies offshore and then darting back up the Slot before daylight. To derail this new express Halsey assigned to Adm Kinkaid a force of CA/Ls and DDs. “Kinkaid, an able tactician with surface forces, prepared a detailed battle plan designed to secure him from the errors his predecessors had made. Not for him was the blind approach or the single unbroken column. In night engagements he would use float planes for early warning and for parachute flare illumination when needed. His DDs were to speed ahead to make a surprise torpedo attack and then turn away. His CA/Ls, holding off at 12,000 yards, out of visual range of the enemy were to open with their guns the minute the torpedoes hit. But Kinkaid was detached for duty elsewhere and it fell to his successor, newly-arrived RAdm Carleton Wright,• to execute this plan.

Sea Power, p. 705.


“Warned [by both an intercepted and decoded order and the observation of an Australian coastwatcher—jbp] that Tanaka was about to begin ops, Wright approached Guadalcanal on 30 Nov and that evening took his force through the E channel—four DDs in the van, follower by five. [4 CAs & 1 CL]. Two additional DDs which joined too late for briefing, were stationed at the rear of the column. Forming a line of bearing inside Ironbottom Sound, the CA/Ls swept westward with the Dds on their flanks. Meanwhile Tanaka with eight DDs had entered the Sound from the opposite direction; but of this Wright was unaware, for the float planes which were to give him warning had been unable to rise from the water because of the dead calm. “At 2300 Wright’s flagship made radar contact with the Japanese, whereupon the CA/Ls wheeled to parallel the enemy. Now was the moment to release the van DDs, but Wright hesitated because he could get no clear radar data; Tanaka’s force speeding past on an opposite course, merging with the opposite shoreline. When at last Wright ordered his van DDs to launch torpedoes, the moment of opportunity had passed. The range was opening rapidly and none of the [24 inferior Mk 14—jbp] torpedoes found a target. The CA/Ls however opened fire on a DD, somewhat nearer than the others, and sent her down in flames.”

op. cit, pp. 705-706.


“The other Japanese DDs had now reversed course by division. Since the Americans had no fleshless powder, their gun flashes provided Japanese torpedo directors with a point of reference. Tanaka’s well-drilled team released a score of deadly Long Lances at the extended American track. Because they were well aimed and ran true, and Wright’s CA/Ls maintained course and speed, the torpedoes inevitably found their targets.…”

op. cit, p. 706.

“…down in flames.


“…found their targets. Every one of the CA/Ls except the Honolulu took one or more hits. The Minneapolis and the New Orleans had their bows ripped away.• The Pensacola, her engine room flooded, three of her turrets knocked out, was quickly wreathed in oil fires.• Worst hit of all was the Northampton; blazing oil drenched her decks, the crew abandoned ship and she heeled over and sank. By that time Tanaka’s seven surviving DDs, virtually undamaged, were far up the Slot. This brief battle, which besides vitally needed CA/Ls cost the Americans 400 lives, provided a sort of textbook, later well studied, on how not to combat the powerful and accurate Japanese torpedo.

op. cit, p. 706.


“Wright’s battered force was obliged to withdraw from the Guadalcanal area. Its retirement seemed to open the way for Tanaka’s Express, which was scheduled to come down the Slot at four-day intervals, covered by Zekes from the Shortlands. The Americans however found ways to complicate Tanaka’s problems. As his ten DDs started down the Slot on 3 Dec, a/c of the CAF flew out to meet them. They damaged one DD slightly, shot down three Zekes, and lost two of their own planes. Tanaka’s force nevertheless pressed on and dumped 1,500 drums of supplies off Tassafaronga. Such was the exhausted and weakened state of the Japanese garrison however that the troops succeeded in hauling only 310 of these ashore by dawn. American fighter planes then sank the rest of the drums with machine gun fire….”

op. cit, pp. 706-707.

“…accurate Japanese torpedo.


“…machine gun fire. “The Tokyo Express in its 7 Dec approach came under a more severe air attack that left one Japanese DD so damaged that she had to be towed back to base under escort. Hence only a portion of the Express reached Ironbottom Sound, and here they were met by torpedoes and machine gun fire from eight PT boats • out of Tulagi. None of the torpedoes found a target [are we sensing a pattern yet? jbp] and one PT boat was heavily damaged, but the Express was constrained to retire without delivering any supplies….”

op. cit, pp. 706-707.


“…delivering any supplies. Tanaka led the 11 Dec Express in person, flying his flag in Japan’s newest and best DD, the 2,500 ton Teruzuki. • His force passed unscathed through the usual sunset air attack…”

op. cit, pp. 707.


“…sunset air attack and dropped 1,200 drums off Cape Esperance. As the DDs were withdrawing however, the AmericanPT boats found them and put a torpedo into the Teruzuki, which caught fire. Her after powder magazine blew up, and Tanaka was among the wounded. Two other Japanese DDs stood by to remove survivors from the sinking vessel. They rescued Tanaka and a few others, but before they could complete their task they were driven away by the arrival of more PT boats. Following this repulse, Tokyo at last concluded that Guadalcanal would have to be abandoned.”

op. cit, pp. 707.

Guadalcanal Secured

“In Dec the malaria-ridden veterans of the 1st Marine Division together with their cdr, Gen Vandegrift, were evacuated to Australia, and MGen Alexander M. Patch USA • took cmd of the Guadalcanal garrison,…

“…Guadalcanal would have to be abandoned.

Guadalcanal Secured

“…the Guadalcanal garrison, which was soon raised to corps strength by the arrival of an additional army division directly from the US. In Jan 1943 Patch had 50,000 soldiers and marines10 under his cmd. Unaware that the enemy had already conceded defeat, he began an all-out offensive in mid-Jan, driving westward from the American defense perimeter toward the area where all the enemy were now concentrated. “The Japanese, using cleverly sited artillery, gave ground stubbornly, fighting for time to carry out their evacuation. This they achieved by means of a neatly-timed stratagem. While transports and DDs assembled at Rabaul and in the Upper Solomons, Adm Kondo brought the Combined Fleet once more to the waters N of Guadalcanal. As the Japanese had expected, all this activity caught Halsey’s attention. What did it portend? Was the enemy, after failing four times, about to make a fifth attempt to recapture the island? If so, the South Pac at long last had power aplenty to turn him back. Halsey promptly dispatched to Guadalcanal an additional troop convoy supported by five TFs, including two CVs and two CVEs and three BBs. But no fleet action ensued, for Kondo had brought his ships down…merely to create a diversion. Instead, the Japanese struck from the air. At night, using parachute flares and floating lights, torpedo planes from the recently-constructed airfield of New Georgia succeeded in sinking the CA Chicago. Evidently the enemy had developed yet another technique for turning the night to his advantage.”

Ibid.

__________ 10 Of the 2nd Marine Div.

Guadalcanal Secured

“As the main body of Patch’s troops advanced westward along the N coast of Guadalcanal, a battalion was ferried around to a new beachhead W of Cape Esperance. The newly-landed troops then advanced eastward to meet the approaching main body in order to nip off the enemy’s communications with the coast and seal him up in the jungle for annihilation. But when the American forces made contact on 9 Feb, they found that the quarry had slipped through their fingers. While American attention had been diverted elsewhere, a score of DDs in three high speed night runs down the Slot had carried away the 12,000 half-starved survivors of the Imperial Army garrison. Thus on a note of mingled frustration and triumph for both sides, the Guadalcanal campaign came to an end.

op. cit, pp. 707-708.

“…to his advantage.

op. cit, pp. 707-708.

Papua Secured “While the Americans were tightening their grip on Guadalcanal, Allied forces a thousand miles to the W were with equal difficulty and equal success wresting from the Japanese the peninsula of Papua. As Australian troops pursued the retreating enemy via the direct route across the Owen Stanley Mountains, • American and Australian forces crossed the mountains by a roundabout trail or were flown to airfields on the north coast in areas not held by the enemy. All Allied forces then converged on the Buna area • and in mid-Nov 42 began a coordinated offensive to capture it from the Japanese defenders.”

Papua Secured

op. cit, p. 708.

“…the Japanese defenders. “The Allied situation on Papua was now the reverse of that on Guadalcanal, for on Papua it was the Allies who were assaulting a well fortified perimeter defense—fighting along matted jungle trails, across fields of man-high kunai grass, and through dense mangrove swamps. The Papuan campaign however, unlike that on Guadalcanal, never involved major fleet elements. A strong naval force might quickly have turned the tide either way by repeated bombardment and by supporting rapid waterborne supply and reinforcement. But neither side ventured major ships into this area of uncharted waters and hostile airfields. The sea however did play an important part in the campaign. The Japanese tried first to reinforce and then to evacuate the Buna area by means of night-running barges, but American PT boats made such attempts too costly. And although airdrop and later airlift were an important means of Allied supply, more than three quarters of the material brought in to the investing [here, besieging] forces came by luggers and small commercial steamers. “Though MacArthur at length committed nearly 30,000 troops, half Australian and half American, to dislodge some 12,000 enemy from Papua, the Japanese held their bit of coastline until Jan 43. Then at last their defenses collapsed, as much from starvation and disease as from outside pressure. In recapturing Papua, 3,095 Allied troops had lost their lives, nearly twice as many were killed on Guadalcanal. “The long and critical preliminaries were over. The S Pac and SW Pac forces had each captured a base that the Japanese had intended to use as a springboard for further aggression. For the Allies two roads to Rabaul were now open.”

“…fierce hand-to-hand jungle fighting ensued. "I have never heard or read of this kind of fighting," wrote one American major general on the scene. "These people refuse to surrender."

The Americans were at a particular disadvantage, being assaulted from both the sea and air. But the U.S. Navy was able to reinforce its troops to a greater extent, and by February 1943, the Japanese had retreated on secret orders of their emperor (so secret, the Americans did not even know it had taken place until they began happening upon abandoned positions, empty boats, and discarded supplies). In total, the Japanese had lost more than 25,000 men, compared with a loss of 1,600 by the Americans. Each side lost 24 warships.

The first Medal of Honor given to a Marine was awarded to Sgt. John Basilone for his fighting during Operation Watchtower. According to the recommendation for his medal, he "contributed materially to the defeat and virtually the annihilation of a Japanese regiment."

http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/us-forces-invade-guadalcanal?et_cid=64516867&et_rid=744978421&linkid=http%3a%2f%2fwww.history.com%2fthis-day-in-

history%2fus-forces-invade-guadalcanal

A 2014 Appraisal from history.com

1st Battalion, 7th Marines insignia"1st Marine Division

“Just over a year after its rebirth, the Battalion deployed to take part in the Pacific Theater during World War II, where its personnel saw their first action of the war at Guadalcanal. Under its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller,• the Battalion distinguished itself many times over for valor and bravery as it valiantly held its positions against the onslaught of a regiment of seasoned Japanese attackers.…”—Wikipedia

1st Battalion, 7th Marines insignia"1st Marine Division

“…seasoned Japanese attackers. It was also during this campaign that the legendary Sgt "Manila John" Basilone • was awarded the Medal of Honor for defending the regiment from a comprehensive Japanese assault using only a machine gun [after 12 of his 15-man squad had been KIA—jbp]. Throughout the remainder of the war, the "First Team" distinguished itself throughout many campaigns, including the Battle of Cape Gloucester, the Battle of Peleliu and the Battle of Okinawa.”—Wikipedia

Epilogue—The Second Turning Point: Guadalcanal

29 Aug 44 Betty, darling, "“…I still think the war out here has been over since Feb 1943–3 months before I [Lt. John R. Powers, D-V USNR] • got here…. “Of course there can be a hell of a lot more war, but my point is that, even if you get killed in it, war is easy when your side is winning for sure. The boys who were out here at the time that they were sure to lose every engagement, really fought the war. That’s fighting. “But do not even think such a thing in front of…loved ones of people who have just now come out. It’s still serious to them.” "" Jim Powers, ed. “Citizen Sailor; The Wartime Correspondence of John R. Powers.” ms. (2001), pp. 24-25.

In one very limited sense John Powers was correct when he said that the war was over before he got there. At Midway and even more after Guadalcanal, the sentē had passed to the ‘round eyes.’ Japan would fight on with a futile tenacity and disregard for human life which still amazes. "The outcome became clearer and clearer. Only the time was undetermined. Would it be “The Golden Gate in ’48”? "In the beginning of 1943, “For the Allies two routes to Rabaul were open.” "But that’s another story… "

jbp

Homer knew that

Education

US Navy's Pacific War session iv