US Navy's Pacific War session i

The U.S. Navy in World War II Part II- The Pacific War

session i-Problems of the Pacific

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Period Covered in Each Session

“The Navy that won World War II was very much the product of the two decades that preceded the war. Though Herman Wouk’s novel The Caine Mutiny is officially fiction, it overflows with large dollops of truth, and perhaps none is more fundamental than the author’s flippant observation, ‘The Navy is a master plan designed by geniuses for execution by idiots.’ He wasn’t speaking literally, but his meaning was clear nonetheless. The officers and petty officers of the prewar Navy brought with them ideas and ways of doing things that were then replicated thousands and thousands of times as each new Navy man or woman took the oath, went through training, and developed into a productive sailor or junior officer….”

Paul Stillwell, “Winning a Two-Ocean War; 1941-1945.” in The Navy. Washington, DC : Naval Historical Foundation. 2000. p. 95,

major topics in this session

I. Introduction

II. Amphibious Assault Doctrine

III. Carrier Doctrine

IV. Logistic Doctrine

Text

I. Introduction“The sea power situation of the 19th century is accurately

reflected by a Mercator projection of the earth with the prime meridian running down the middle.”—Sea Power, p. 628

BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES

“The sea power situation of the 19th century is accurately reflected by a Mercator projection of the earth with the prime meridian running down the middle. At the center sits England, a position won for her largely by her Royal Navy. In 1885 the nations of the world tacitly recognized Britain’s preeminence by adopting Britain’s prime meridian, that running through the Greenwich observatory in London.

Sea Power, p. 628.

BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES

preeminence by adopting Britain’s prime meridian, that running through the Greenwich observatory in London. Until then, major countries had their individual national meridians, to the confusion of chart makers and chart readers.1 “From the point of view of England, the land on the left edge of the England-centered Mercator projection is the Far West; that on the right edge, the Far East—and so they are called. On this projection the Pacific Ocean is split in two, along the 180th meridian. Such division correctly represents the naval view of the 19th century, for no navy had yet been obliged to solve the problem of projecting its power across the Pacific. The primary military communications between European nations and their Pacific interests and possessions had always been via the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The Pacific Ocean was, and remained till the end of the 19th century, a military aqua incognita..

Sea Power, p. 628.

__________ 1 In 1884 there were no fewer than 14 prime meridians. The United States only narrowly avoided adding to the confusion, for the early part of the century prominent Americans urged the U.S. Congress to follow the practice of other nations and adopt a national meridian, one running through Washington. The matter came to a head with the act of 1849 providing for an American Nautical Almanac. Preparation of the new Almanac was…directed by Lt. Charles Davis, USN….[He] argued for adherence to the British meridian, because this was the one American seamen were accustomed to through long use of the British almanac and charts. Congress settled the matter in 1850 by adopting the Greenwich meridian.

BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES?

“….The Pacific Ocean was, and remained till the end of the 19th century, a military aqua incognita. “When at the end of the century the United States acquired the Philippines on the far side of the Pacific, it had to face the military problem of protecting its new possession or of recapturing it should it be lost….”

op. cit, p. 628.

Today’s geographic data: It consists of 7,107 islands with 17 regions and 80 provinces; there are 175 individual languages in the Philippines, 171 of which are living languages, while 4 no longer have any known speakers; The first official census in the Philippines was carried out in 1877 and recorded a population of 5,567,685.[As of 2013, the Philippines has become the world's 12th most populous nation, with a population of over 99 million.!

Wikipedia

The Philippines—The Spanish-American War Changes Everything (1)

America briefly (1898-1902) joined the “Imperialist Scramble” which had obsessed the European Great Powers (1870-1914). The Cuban independence struggle enticed us to declare an unequal war on Spain. The fruits of victory included Cuba (which we renounced in 1902), Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Hawaii had also been acquired as a necessary stepping-stone for this “Far East” war. But the country was divided into Imperialist (“the White Man’s Burden”) and anti-Imperialist camps.

jbp


America briefly (1898-1902) joined the “Imperialist Scramble” which had obsessed the European Great Powers (1870-1914). The Cuban independence struggle enticed us to declare an unequal war on Spain. The fruits of victory included Cuba (which we renounced in 1902), Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Hawaii had also been acquired as a necessary stepping-stone for this “Far East” war. But the country was divided into Imperialist (“the White Man’s Burden”) and anti-Imperialist camps.

jbp


America briefly (1898-1902) joined the “Imperialist Scramble” which had obsessed the European Great Powers (1870-1914). The Cuban independence struggle enticed us to declare an unequal war on Spain. The fruits of victory included Cuba (which we renounced in 1902), Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Hawaii had also been acquired as a necessary stepping-stone for this “Far East” war. But the country was divided into Imperialist (“the White Man’s Burden”) and anti-Imperialist camps. Initially “welcomed as liberators,” we stayed as occupiers because the first commission decided that the Filipinos were not ready for democracy. This produced the Philippine Insurrection (PC name-Philippine-American War)—1899-1902 and the Moro Rebellion—1904-1913…..”

jbp


America briefly (1898-1902) joined the “Imperialist Scramble” which had obsessed the European Great Powers (1870-1914). The Cuban independence struggle enticed us to declare an unequal war on Spain. The fruits of victory included Cuba (which we renounced in 1902), Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Hawaii had also been acquired as a necessary stepping-stone for this “Far East” war. But the country was divided into Imperialist (“the White Man’s Burden”) and anti-Imperialist camps. Initially “welcomed as liberators,” we stayed as occupiers because the first commission decided that the Filipinos were not ready for democracy. This produced the Philippine Insurrection (PC name-Philippine-American War)—1899-1902…..”

jbp

Initially “welcomed as liberators,” we stayed as occupiers because the first commission decided that the Filipinos were not ready for democracy. This produced the Philippine Insurrection (PC name-Philippine-American War)—1899-1902 and the Moro Rebellion—1904-1913…..”

jbp


jbp


jbp

U.S.Pistol, M 1911A1, .45 cal. developed to stop “drug crazed” Moro ‘rebels’ when earlier issues were not powerful enough

–Robert A Fulton

“The backdrop is a bustling, raucous, newly-prosperous nation finding its way as a world and

imperial power. But with this new-found status came a near-religious belief that the active spread of

America's institutions, values, and form of government, even when achieved through coercion

or force, would create a better world.”


M o ro R e b e l l i o n — 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 1 3 . McKinley, then T.R., sent Cincinnatian “Big Bill” Taft to heal the bitterness (1900-1904). Taft took a paternalistic attitude toward “our little brown brothers.”

jbp


brown brothers.” Negotiated purchase of Church lands from Pope Leo XIII and sold them to the Filipinos on easy terms. His administration was popular there as well as at home. With mixed results, this policy of “nation building” would continue to tie the U.S. to this “colonial possession” until the end of WW II. This new role for America as a Pacific power was complicated by the emergence of another newcomer to the imperialist club—Japan.

jbp


“When at the end of the century the United States acquired the Philippines on the far side of the Pacific, it had to face the military problem of protecting its new possession or of recapturing it should it be lost. The problem was intensified by deteriorating Japanese-American relations following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. It became urgent when, by the Versailles Treaty…Germany’s Pacific islands north of the equator were mandated to Japan.

op. cit, pp. 628-629.


islands north of the equator were mandated to Japan. Japan’s new island empire comprised the Marshalls; all the Carolines, including the Palaus; and all the Marianas, excluding Guam, which the United States had annexed in 1898. Japan, in short, now controlled most of Micronesia, with numerous islands flanking any transpacific communications between the United States and the Philippines.• As a result of this shift in the strategic balance and of the growing tensions between the United States and Japan,…

op. cit, pp. 628-629.

Philippines

“…and of the growing tensions between the United States and Japan,”

• America had opened Japan to trade with the West in the 1850s with two visits by Commodore Matthew Perry.

jbp


• America had opened Japan to trade with the West in the 1850s with two visits by Commodore Matthew Perry. The emperor Mutsuhito inaugurated the Meiji (enlightened rule) era,1867-1912. The Japanese adoption of Western technology and colonialist-imperialist behavior was unique among the “backward” peoples.

jbp


• America had opened Japan to trade with the West in the 1850s with two visits by Commodore Matthew Perry. The emperor Mutsuhito inaugurated the Meiji (enlightened rule) era,1867-1912. The Japanese adoption of Western technology and colonialist-imperialist behavior was unique among the “backward” peoples. To avoid the fate of other “colored races” who were being “civilized” (exploited?), Japan modernized her armed forces with the aid of missions from France,• Germany • (land) and Britain (naval).•

jbp

“…and of the growing tensions between the United States and Japan,”!• She then embarked on empire-building with the annexation of Okinawa (1879), the

Sino-Japanese War (1894-95),…

jbp


Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), intervention during the Boxer Rebellion (1900)…

jbp


Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), intervention during the Boxer Rebellion (1900) the Russo-Japanese War over Manchuria (1904-05) which led to the annexation of Korea in 1910.

jbp

“…and of the growing tensions between the United States and Japan,”!• American labor organizations, seeking to restrict immigrant competition, pressured

Congress for racial quotas, beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882. California was to Japanese immigrants what the southern states were to blacks with segregated schools, restrictions on property rights and employment. The Root-Takahira Agreement (1908) tried to ease Japanese nationalist resentment. The gift of Japanese cherry trees to Washington, DC and the U.S. Naval Academy tried to combat the “Yellow Peril” racist atmosphere in America.

• both countries saw one another as rivals for “the illimitable markets of Asia” Sen. Albert Beveridge.

jbp


islands flanking any transpacific communications between the United States and the Philippines.• As a result of this shift in the strategic balance and of the growing tensions between the United States and Japan, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps gave increasing thought after 1920 to the military problems posed by a war in the Pacific area. “American planners at the Naval War College and elsewhere realistically equated the problems of defending or recapturing the Philippines with that of defeating Japan. To them it was apparent that Japan, like Britain, was peculiarly vulnerable to blockade, and that even if conquering the Japanese should require actual invasion of their home islands, they would have first to be weakened by a tight blockade that would cut them off not only from distant resources but from the continent of Asia as well….

op. cit, pp. 628-629.

AMERICA RULES THE WAVES?

“….well.This last required introducing submarines into the Sea of Japan through mined straits, a problem that was under study at the Naval War College as early as 1923 and which was at last solved in 1945. “But before the Americans could operate against Japan, they would have to deal with certain difficulties posed by geographic features unique to the Pacific Ocean—its huge size, for example, and the fact that it contained an immense number of islands and atolls, most of them easily defensible and many having sites suitable for the construction of airfields. To fight its way across the Pacific the U.S. Navy would have to operate for extended periods far from established bases, and it would have to seize enemy island bases and convert them to its own use. Waging a successful war against Japan thus would require solutions to three major problems: (1) how to free the fleet from dependence upon rearward bases, (2) how to isolate enemy island bases in the face of land-based air power, and (3) how to assault strongly defended island bases [emphasis added—jbp]. Solutions were found to all these problems but in reverse order, and in that order they will be considered.

op. cit, p. 629.

Text

II. Amphibious Assault DoctrineMarines in Nicaragua display a flag captured from Sandino’s rebels during the “Banana Wars” in 1932

–Rick Atkinson, Day of Battle, p. 70

“…as British official history warranted, ’invasions from the sea were professionally recognized to be all-

or - nothing affairs.’ Death or glory was back in fashion.”

In the early days of the Republic America’s interest in the Pacific focused on the clipper ship trade with China and our whaling fleet. In 1856 Congress authorized our first possessions there : Howland and Baker Islands. The object was guano, valuable as fertilizer and a source of saltpeter for gunpowder. In 1867 Midway Atoll (uninhabited, 2.4 mi2) became a U.S. possession for use as a coaling station.

jbp

Strategy, Tactics and Technology

Midway Is.

! In the 1880s increased American interest in the Hawaiian Islands was driven by the missionary lobby and economic interests. In 1893 a coup by American and European businessmen overthrew Queen “Lil”.

jbp


! In the 1880s increased American interest in the Hawaiian Islands was driven by the missionary lobby and economic interests. In 1893 a coup by American and European businessmen overthrew Queen “Lil”. Although President Cleveland refused to support her deposition, Congress viewed the importance of overseas trade and base acquisition otherwise.

jbp


! In the 1880s increased American interest in the Hawaiian Islands was driven by the missionary lobby and economic interests. In 1893 a coup by American and European businessmen overthrew Queen “Lil”. Although President Cleveland refused to support her deposition, Congress viewed the importance of overseas trade and base acquisition otherwise. The United States Marines, since their founding, 10 November 1775, have been an innovative force within the U.S. Navy. In 1894 Congress assigned them the task of developing “fleet infantrymen that could establish and defend outlying bases.”* The industrial revolution had presented to the sea service a major technological challenge. The shift from sail to steam. This made the navy more dependent on the shore establishment: (1) for coaling stations, and (2) for repair facilities.

jbp


______ * Sea Power, p. 629

“Gitmo”—The Spanish-American War Changes Everything (2)


1898-after watching the European Imperialist scramble for decades, America takes the plunge

Cuban revolutionaries had fought Spain for half a century with American sympathy

ironically, the “usual suspect” (American business interests) opposed involvement—bad for business

February-the Maine affair…





February-the Maine affair pushed a reluctant President McKinley into delivering a war message to Congress (April)





February-the Maine affair pushed a reluctant President McKinley into delivering a war message to Congress (April)

10 June-The Marine First Battalion made an amphibious (hereafter, amphib) landing on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to secure a base for Adm Sampson’s blockade of the Spanish fleet in Santiago harbor

USMC-technological innovators

1897-the Bureau of Naval Ordnance (BuOrd) announced adoption of a new high-velocity, smokeless powder, lower caliber cartridge—the 6mm Lee Navy— and related weapons



its rifle-Winchester’s M1895 Lee Navy



its rifle-Winchester’s M1895Lee Navy

the first modern machine gun-the Colt-Browning “Potato Digger”


its rifle-Winchester’s M1895Lee Navy

the first modern machine gun-the Colt-Browning “Potato Digger”

the U.S. Army was still using the Gatling gun, much heavier and animal-transported, really, a small artillery piece

9-14 June 1898-the Marines made the first tactical use of this new technology in seizing and holding our first overseas base

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE “In 1894 Congress assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps the mission of providing units of fleet infantrymen that could establish and defend outlying bases. Hard work then produced the battalion [six companies of around 650 men—Wikipedia] of fleet marines that in 1898 seized an advanced base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, stood off a more numerous enemy, and made Adm Sampson’s blockaders a ‘fleet that came to stay.’[i.e., amid swirling controversy, we hold “Gitmo” to this day—jbp] “Between 1900 and 1910 Marine Corps units constructed advanced base defenses and other facilities at Guam and in the Philippines. Serving as fleet infantry under direct control of the Commander in Chief (hereafter, CinC) of the Asiatic Fleet, marines from these units fought near Manila, in the Leyte area, on Samoa, and in China [55 Days at Peking—relief of the legations during the Boxer Rebellion, 1900—jbp].…”

op. cit, pp. 629-630.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE

“In 1894 Congress assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps the mission of providing units of fleet infantrymen that could establish and defend outlying bases. Hard work then produced the battalion [six companies of around 650 men—Wikipedia] of fleet marines that in 1898 seized an advanced base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, stood off a more numerous enemy, and made Adm Sampson’s blockaders a ‘fleet that came to stay.’[i.e., amid swirling controversy, we hold “Gitmo” to this day—jbp] “Between 1900 and 1910 Marine Corps units constructed advanced base defenses and other facilities at Guam and in the Philippines. Serving as fleet infantry under direct control of the Commander in Chief (hereafter, CinC) of the Asiatic Fleet, marines from these units fought near Manila, in the Leyte area, on Samoa, and in China [55 Days at Peking—relief of the legations during the Boxer Rebellion, 1900—jbp] In the process Navy and Marine Corps officers hammered out doctrine essential for employing infantry as an integral arm of the fleet. At the same time, regular tours of duty in combat vessels kept marine commanders in such close contact with naval officers that each group came to understand the others’ problems. From such experiences early in the century evolved the concept of complete tactical responsibility within a unified command.…”

op. cit, pp. 629-630.


“…the concept of complete tactical responsibility within a unified command. These ‘command relationships,’ as they came to be called, struck a nice balance between the loose committee system used by the British at Gallipoli, where the command responsibility was divided between Gen Hamilton and Adm de Robeck, and the rigidity of the over-centralized command system employed by the army-centered amphib forces even then evolving in Germany and Japan. “In 1913 the Marine Corps established a permanent Advance Base Force (ABF) of two regiments, one equipped for fixed base defense, the other for mobile defense. Early in 1914 it was reinforced by a small aviation detachment and participated in fleet maneuvers at the island of Culebra off Puerto Rico. During the next two years this type-force of reinforced infantry gained valuable experience in a series of Caribbean police missions that required prompt naval action. “During World War I the U.S. Marine Corps expanded to 73,000 men. Most of these fought on the battlefields of France, but the ABF remained in full strength and at the end of the war numbered more than 6,000. In 1920 the force was based at Quantico, and in the following year it was redesigned the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. As before the war, its primary function was to defend bases against enemy attack. No one had yet contemplated the problems of landing large assault forces on heavily-defended shores.”

op. cit, p. 630.


“But the year 1921 also saw the appearance of an epochal and prophetic operation (hereafter, op) plan, ‘Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia,’ by Lieutenant Colonel (LCol) Earl H. Ellis USMC. In this plan Ellis correctly anticipated the ops of war against Japan by pointing out the need for seizing defended island bases in the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Palaus by amphib assault in order to project naval power across the Pacific into Far Eastern waters. He also predicted with astonishing accuracy the type of training, the number of troops, and the sort of techniques that would be required for carrying out his plan.3 Senior Marine Corps officers expressed themselves in complete agreement with Ellis, and from this point on the marines, except when other duties intervened, concentrated upon the problems of daylight amphib assault.

op. cit, p. 630.

__________ !3 Ellis died mysteriously in 1923 in the Japanese-held Palau Islands. See “The Mystery of Pete Ellis,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1954. [and the Wikipedia article on Ellis which contains much fascinating information about his military career, his personal problems, especially alcoholism and racism, and the latest speculation about his death—jbp]

The Wikipedia article on Ellis includes a link to the website which has the text of the remarkable document with this introduction and accompanying charts. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/ref/AdvBaseOps/index.html

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE “In 1922 and again in 1924 Navy and Marine Corps units tested the newest amphib techniques in a series of exercises conducted at Culebra and at the Panama Canal Zone. The 1924 exercise at Culebra was the most ambitious exercise of the sort since WW I. The Marines, in addition to their usual ship-to-shore movement and tactical problems ashore, experimented with pontoon bridging equipment to improvise docks similar to those the British had used for supplying troops at Gallipoli. [origin of the ‘Mulberries’ of D-day—jbp] The entire force devoted more attention to logistics than in any earlier amphib maneuver. Brief as they were, even these limited ‘laboratory’ efforts toward improved techniques ended in 1924 because the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force shifted its entire strength to China as part of a maritime division called there by threatening developments. “Amphib experiment by American forces did not end completely however, for in 1925 army and navy units in the Hawaiian Islands conducted an exercise to test the British-type amphib doctrine advocated by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy. This maneuver was a ‘combined operation’ in which the army and naval officers shared the top command as British officers had at Gallipoli. Though it presented a realistic problem and marked the first significant test of army and naval air units, the Hawaiian exercise proved disappointing. Yet if it did nothing else, the maneuver convinced key officers from all the American services that the British doctrine would not produce an amphib force capable of carrying out the United States’ Pacific war plan.”

op. cit., pp. 630-631.


“Decisions flowing from the Hawaiian maneuvers, and the temporary emergence of logistics as a major study at the U.S. Naval War College, made 1925 the pivotal year in American amphib development….American officers carried the evolution of modern amphib doctrine into its final phase. After 1925 the new ideas enjoyed steadily increasing official support, whereas before they represented merely the thinking of a few individuals. In 1927 the Joint Board established the landing force role of the Marine Corps as national military policy. That same year however trouble broke out in Nicaragua that absorbed all of the Corps’ energy for several years. “Even this interruption contributed to amphib development, for the anti-guerilla ops in Nicaragua focused attention on small-unit infantry tactics. It provided an opportunity for bringing up to date the fire-and-movement techniques evolved in 1918….”

op. cit., p. 631.


“Even this interruption contributed to amphib development, for the anti-guerilla ops in Nicaragua focused attention on small-unit infantry tactics. It provided an opportunity for bringing up to date the fire-and-movement techniques evolved in 1918….”

op. cit., p. 631.


“Even this interruption contributed to amphib development, for the anti-guerilla ops in Nicaragua focused attention on small-unit infantry tactics. It provided an opportunity for bringing up to date the fire-and-movement techniques evolved in 1918. Nicaraguan experience with small patrols convinced the Marine Corps that small, efficient combat teams were needed for successful infantry assault. From teams such as those used in Nicaragua, the Corps built its battalion landing teams of World War II….”

op. cit., p. 631.

LGen Lewis Burwell “Chesty” Puller, USMC; 1898-1971born in VA

1908—(age 10) father died. Grew up listening to old Confederate veterans, idolized “Stonewall” Jackson

1916—(17) wanted to join the army to fight in Mexico but was underage, his mother wouldn’t give permission. Enrolled at VMI

Aug 1918—(20) left VMI to enlist in WW I, inspired by the “Devil Dogs” of Belleau Wood, did boot camp at Paris Island. As USMC expanded he attended Officer Candidate School at Quantico. Graduated 2nd Lt but was peacetime ‘RIFed’ to Corporal

1920-25—over 40 engagements against the Caco rebels in Haiti. 1922 served as adjutant to Maj Alex Vandegrift (future Commandant, USMC)

1928- (30) Nicaragua—1st Navy Cross (of 5) led ‘5 successive engagements against superior forces of armed bandit forces’; stateside officer schools, then returned and won 2nd Navy Cross

1935-commanded Fleet Marine Force (FMF) detachment aboard USS Augusta (CA-31), commanded by Capt Chester W. Nimitz in the tiny Asiatic Fleet

First Lieutenant Lewis "Chesty" Puller (center left) and Sergeant William "Ironman" Lee (center right) and two Nicaraguan soldiers in 1931—Wikipedia

Archetype of the “Old Breed” Marine

Archetype of the “Old Breed” Marine

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINEteams such as those used in Nicaragua, the Corps built its battalion landing teams of World War II. “ Nicaraguan experience also taught marines the value of close cooperation between air and ground elements of the same force. Because wiping out the elusive guerrillas required the ground force to operate in widely scattered units, small marine patrols faced severe handicaps. Reconnaissance planes repeatedly discovered guerrillas lying in ambush and warned ground patrols.….”

Ibid.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINErepeatedly discovered guerrillas lying in ambush and warned ground patrols. Frequent aerial bombing and strafing helped ground units to drive off numerically superior guerrilla forces….”

Ibid.


and strafing • helped ground units to drive off numerically superior guerrilla forces. Time and again pilots demonstrated the value of air supply• and air evacuation of the wounded. Though none of these efforts was part of pre-planned cooperative effort, they demonstrated in dramatic fashion the kinds of assistance integrated air support could provide combat infantry….”

Ibid.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE“…assistance integrated air support could provide combat infantry. The growing conviction that close-support airmen were merely ‘infantrymen bearing other arms’ opened a whole new field for aircraft (hereafter, a/c) in time of war. “By 1930, as relaxation of tension in China and Nicaragua gradually released marines in substantial numbers, the various threads of amphib development began to assume a recognizable pattern. Work at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico in developing doctrine, the approach at Marine Corps Headquarters (hereafter, HQ) to the concept of a permanent type force of fleet infantry, and concern at the Naval War College for a chain of island bases and for a Service Force to support the combat fleet, all began to complement each other. “In the academic year 1930-31 the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools released marine Majs Charles D. Barrett,….”

Ibid.


“In the academic year 1930-31 the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools released marine Majs Charles D. Barrett, L.H. Miller, and Pedro del Valle • and Lt Walter C. Ansel USN from teaching duties so that…they might prepare a ‘Text for Landing Operations.’ The following year the schools devoted their entire time to amphib studies….they analyzed in detail the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign. Next they studied jointly with the Naval War College an advanced base problem following the current plan [Plan Orange—jbp] for a possible Pacific war. On 8 Dec 1933, the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) implemented the Joint Board’s 1927 policy decision by replacing the old Expeditionary Force with a Fleet Marine Force (FMF [tell a cleaned up version of the ‘I’d rather…’ joke]) to operate as an integral part of the US Fleet.”

Ibid.


“…part of the US Fleet. “Though the FMF provided the tactical structure needed to carry out the Corp’s primary assigned mission,the marines still lacked a textbook for carrying out the necessary training. Hence the USMC Schools suspended all classes, and faculty…devoted nearly a year to completing the work of the Barrett Committee….the Quantico officers drew heavily upon 40 years of amphib experiment of the naval services. Late in 1934 the Schools completed the first US manual to present a mature amphib doctrine. Published as the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, this work separated the doctrine into six elements: !!!!!!We shall now consider the six elements in this order…. “[(1)]As used in the 1934 manual, the term ‘command relationships’ covered organization of the amphib force as well as command doctrine….US overseas expeditions should be conducted as part of a naval campaign, with the expeditionary force organized as a naval Attack Force commanded by a naval flag officer [one of ‘flag rank,’i.e., O-7 and above, admirals, RAdm, VAdm, Adm, FAdm—jbp]•.…. ”

op. cit., pp. 631-632.

(1) command relationships (2) naval gunfire support (3) aerial support (4) ship-to-shore movement (5) securing the beachhead (6) logistics


“…officer [one of ‘flag rank,’i.e., O-7 and above, admirals, RAdm, VAdm, Adm, FAdm—jbp]•. This task force was to have two main components : the Landing Force, comprising elements of the FMF, and the naval Support Force, including the Fire Support Group, the Air Group, the Transport Group, and the Screening Group. The Landing Force commander and the commander of each naval group was responsible to the Attack Force Commander, who had authority to make decisions affecting any of these subordinate units. The principal shortcoming of the manual on this subject was that it did not define when the assault phase of the invasion ended or provide for any change in the command structure t that point—nor did it envisage the possibility that the Landing Force might be army or mixed army and marine, situations that arose more often than not in WW II. The first American landing of the war, that on Guadalcanal in Aug ’42, followed the manual precisely. In the following Oct the Landing Force commander was still subordinate to the Attack Force commander, though the latter was usually far away. To correct this situation the command relationships were altered. In subsequent landings, as soon as the Landing Force commander established HQ and indicated his readiness to control the forces ashore, he ceased to be subordinate to the Attack Force commander.Thereafter he had entire tactical control of his troops and reported to the next higher echelon, which in the Med-European theater (ETO) and in the Southwest Pacific (SoWestPac) area was army, and in the Pacific Ocean Areas (Pac) was naval. “[(2)]Though amphib assault follows exactly the same pattern as offensive action in conventional ground warfare, the fact that so much of the troop movement takes place on water seriously complicates the pattern of fire support for assault riflemen. Adapting naval guns to missions performed by ground artillery was a formidable task. Though naval fire control equipment was far more effective…”

op. cit., p. 632.

Mark 1-Able analog fire control computer, located below decks in the Combat Information Center (CIC)—Wikipedia

MK 37 Gun Fire Control System (GFCS)!although some of the elements shown here were not implemented until post-WW II, the concept began to be implemented in the 1930s—jbp

Mk 37 Director

Mk 1A Fire Control Computer

Mk 30 5”/38

Gun turret

Fletcher class DD designed 1939

commissioned 1942-44

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE“…accuracy. “[(3)] The Tentative Manual did pioneer work in spelling out for the first time the role of aircraft (hereafter, a/c) in support of assaulting infantry. It provided for preliminary visual or photographic reconnaissance, air cover over transports and boats from disembarkation through the ship-to-shore movement, and for airborne fire support of boat waves during the final 1,000 yards of their trip to the beach. The manual also provided for aerial fire support once the troops stepped ashore until artillery could be landed in sufficient strength to assume its conventional role. The plan laid down by the manual was an outgrowth of Marine Corps experiences in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Caribbean area, but there the planes had been slow, open-cockpit craft piloted by ex-infantrymen. To adapt to close support the new, swifter, closed-cockpit planes, flown by aviators with no experience in ground tactics, presented complex problems, not the least of which was maintenance of fast and dependable communications between ground and air. Really close support of infantry did not materialize until 1944. “[(4)] In dealing with ship-to-shore movement, the Tentative Manual provided for precise preliminary planning and rigid control of boat movements during the attack. When possible each transport should carry one battalion of infantry reinforced with artillery and other arms to make it self-sufficient. Each transport should carry the landing boats [usually ‘landing craft,’ hereafter l/c] assigned to the troops it had aboard. The manual specified the organization of boat groups and boat waves, with special formations adapted to the various situations a landing force might encounter. It prescribed control boats to lead the boat groups to lead the boat groups from the rendezvous area to the line of departure (LOD), buoys or picket boats to mark the LOD, and guide boats and guide planes to lead the boats to the beach.”

op. cit., p. 633.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE“…boats to the beach.. “[(5)] For securing the beachhead, the manual emphasized the techniques that permit infantry to survive the twilight period between full reliance on seaborne fire support and the landing of its own artillery. It gave special attention to establishing prompt communications between echelons ashore and afloat, as well as to the complex problem of organizing supply and medical services in the shallow area behind the front line. The 1934 manual prescribed both a Beach Party and a Shore Party. The former, commanded by a naval officer called the beachmaster, was to control not only boat movements but the unloading of supplies and equipment. The latter, besides other functions, would control the movement of supplies from the beach to supply dumps and to the front line. In exercises carried out in the summer of 1941 however, the Landing Force commander, MGen Holland M. (‘Howlin’ Mad’) Smith USMC, found this system unworkable. He recommended consolidating the two parties into a Shore Party under Landing Force control, with a naval beachmaster as assistant and adviser to the Shore Party commander. He further recommended use of special labor troops for unloading. Smith’s recommendations were adopted, but by then war had been declared and they could not be tested in large-scale exercises. This lack of experience was to lead to serious confusion on the beach at Guadalcanal. “[(6)] In the field of logistics, the Tentative Manual laid heavy stress upon tailoring all cargo loading to the requirements of the Landing Force. The 1934 planners asserted that each transport should not only carry one assault battalion and its landing boats, but that it should also carry the battalion’s equipment—stowed in the order in which the various items would be needed. This concept of ‘combat unit loading’”

op. cit., p. 633.


“…stowed in the order in which the items would be needed. This concept of ‘combat unit loading… ran counter to the usual doctrine for loading cargo vessels because it implied stowing heavy equipment on deck, with lighter equipment in the hold [enclosed cargo area below the main deck—jbp]. Yet inconvenient as this practice was from the point of view of seamen, it was essential to the success of the entire op. The manual’s emphasis on this point gradually forced navy men to develop attack transports [the purpose-built classes: APA for troops and AKA for cargo—jbp]….”

op. cit., p. 634.


entire op. The manual’s emphasis on this point gradually forced navy men to develop attack transports [the purpose-built classes: APA for troops and AKA for cargo—jbp]….” suited especially to amphib needs. As transports improved, the original combat unit loading doctrine underwent steady improvement until by 1944 it had become an essential element in the successful drive across the Pacific. “The basic doctrine set down in the Tentative Manual for Landing Ops in 1934 withstood prolonged trial by fire without fundamental change. Beginning in 1935 the Naval War College, the Marine Corps Schools, and units of the fleet took up the task of refining the techniques that were to convert a doctrinal theory into the kind of practiced teamwork required for military success….”

op. cit., p. 634.A series of fleet training exercises, 1935-1941: • Culebra • San Clemente Island near San Diego • New River, North Carolina led to Fleet Training Publication 167 (1938). In 1941 the Army issued virtually the same text as a field manual. Both would be refined steadily during WW II, but remained the basic guides for amphib planning and training.

summary JBP


“The vital link between fleet and shore in any amphib assault is sturdy dependable landing craft (hereafter, l/c) for troops and equipment, but as late as 1936 no really suitable craft had been designed or built. That year Andrew Higgins,• a New Orleans boat builder, offered a shallow draft boat originally designed for use by trappers and oil drillers….

op. cit., pp. 634-635.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DOCTRINE “The vital link between fleet and shore in any amphib assault is sturdy dependable landing craft (hereafter, l/c) for troops and equipment, but as late as 1936 no really suitable craft had been designed or built. That year Andrew Higgins,• a New Orleans boat builder, offered a shallow draft boat originally designed for use by trappers and oil drillers….The addition of a ramp…provided the Navy and Marine Corps very nearly with what they wanted….the prototype of the LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle [a jeep, officially designated a quarter ton truck—jbp] and Personnel [a platoon, 36 men, weapons and equipment—jbp],• which according to Gen Holland Smith ‘did more town the war in the Pacific than any other piece of equipment.’ op. cit., pp. 634-635.


equipment—jbp],• which according to Gen Holland Smith ‘did more town the war in the Pacific than any other piece of equipment.’ • Larger Higgins boats…were the precursors of the LCM (Landing Craft, Mechanized)….

op. cit., pp. 634-635.


equipment—jbp],• which according to Gen Holland Smith ‘did more town the war in the Pacific than any other piece of equipment.’ • Larger Higgins boats…were the precursors of the LCM (Landing Craft, Mechanized)….

op. cit., pp. 634-635.


any other piece of equipment.’ • Larger Higgins boats…were the precursors of the LCM (Landing Craft, Mechanized). A swamp vehicle called the ‘Alligator’ developed into the LVT (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) • or amtrac, which could crawl ashore across coral reefs. In 1940 an armored vehicle designed by the Marine Corps went into production as the LVT (A)…. op. cit., pp. 634-635.

Text

III. Carrier DoctrineThe first purpose-built carrier, USS Ranger, CV-4 under way in the 1930s

It’s important to remember how recent military aviation was in the interwar period. “The first use of an air-dropped bomb (actually a hand grenade) was carried out by Italian Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti during the 1911 Italo-Turkish war in Libya, although his plane was not designed for the task of bombing, and his improvised attack had little impact.”—Wikipedia. Aviation was evolving and military establishments were challenged to adapt.

jbp


Carrier Doctrine “When Adm Beatty in the North Sea on 31 May 1916 ordered seaplane carrier Engadine to send up a plane for observation, he was making the first use of aircraft in connection with a naval battle. The Engadine’s plane rose a few hundred feet and then was forced down by a broken fuel line, having seen no enemy ships larger than a light cruiser (CL). Half an hour later the British and German battle cruiser lines sighted each other with mutual surprise, and the Battle of Jutland was under way. Three hours after the battle cruiser contact, the British battleship (BB) line capped the T of the German BB line without either fleet realizing what was happening. The CLs, ‘eyes of the fleet,’ had twice failed in their reconnaissance function. It was to provide better, more far-seeing eyes that the British Admiralty later in 1916 ordered several ships converted into carriers for land planes. Two of these, the Furious, built on a cruiser hull, and the Argus, converted from an unfinished liner, were completed before the end of the war. There were no more sea battles in World War I, but planes from the new carriers proved useful for general reconnaissance, for destroying Zeppelins, and for antisubmarine work (ASW). “Following the British lead, the US Navy by 1922 had converted a collier into the first American aircraft carrier (CV) the Langley. Providing a floating airstrip however was only the beginning. Fleet aviators and the Langley’s crew spent six years mastering the complex techniques for handling seaborne a/c. The program stressed taking off, landing, air navigation, gunfire spotting, and aerial gunnery. Though carrier planes of the period were designated only as fighters, scouts, and gunfire observers, individual pilots also experimented with aerial bombs and torpedoes. The six years of training and experiment with the Langley had far-reaching effects. Immediately they provided a nucleus of aviators for the Saratoga and Lexington when these carriers, built on battle cruiser hulls, joined the fleet in 1928.”

Sea Power, p. 635.

“… joined the fleet in 1928.” “Meanwhile the Navy, to the accompaniment of much heated public discussion had already passed through the first stages of the long controversy over how to divide funds between heavy ships and CVs. In the public mind this controversy soon came to transcend mere naval policy, and embraced the national policy toward all civil and military aviation. It focused the first serious attention upon the question of whether there should be a US air force independent of control by either the Army or the Navy—an air force that alone would control all military flying. Most vocal of proponents for a separate air force was BGen William (“Billy”) Mitchell of the Army Air Service. Mitchell went so far as to insist that air power was capable by itself of providing for the national defense. Armies he saw as useful only for occupying space conquered by planes. Surface warships he regarded as utterly obsolete. ‘If a naval war were attempted against Japan, for instance,’ he once wrote, ‘the Japanese submarines and a/c would sink the enemy fleet long before it came anywhere near their coast.…’

op. cit, pp. 635-636.

Carrier Doctrine

would sink the enemy fleet long before it came anywhere near their coast.’ When newspaper controversy over the alleged obsolescence of the navy reached white heat, the services in 1921 attempted a series of objective tests wherein planes bombed ships slated for scrapping. “As events were to prove, devising a realistic mock combat between ship and plane was virtually impossible. The services selected as targets the captured German BB Ostfriesland and several other over-age vessels. None of these ships afforded the kind of armored decks required to resist even the aerial bombs available in 1921, and none had anti-aircraft armament. Even if they had been designed to resist a/c few Americans would have approved a sham-battle in which combat crews and damage-control parties manned the vessels while they were under attack….”

op. cit, pp. 635-636.

Carrier Doctrine

“… control parties manned the vessels while they were under attack. The inconclusiveness of the tests was heightened by the fact that the main attack, against the Ostfriesland, was made while the BB was at anchor off the Virginia Capes without any sort of defense and that it was not carried out according to plan. The Navy had assigned officers to go aboard after each bombing run to assess damages and to estimate the effect of proper damage control. But Gen Mitchell ignored the rules and ordered continuous bombing. Nevertheless at the end of the first attack the old BB was still afloat. On the second day the army planes, again bombing continuously, climaxed their attack by dropping from a low altitude seven 2,000-pound bombs, some of which hit the Ostfriesland squarely and at last sent her down. She thus was sunk without affording any objective evidence of what steps alert defenders might have taken to save her.

op. cit, p. 636.

Carrier Doctrine

what steps alert defenders might have taken to save her. “Most naval observers of the tests considered Gen Mitchell’s violation of the rules a tacit admission that bombers could not sink a well defended BB. But for Mitchell the tests were a springboard for intensifying his campaign, which included a verbal attack on CVs as worthless in war because of what he considered their extreme vulnerability. The Navy’s air devotees now entered the fray in force, headed by their chief spokesman, RAdm William A. Moffett, • chief of the new Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer).

op. cit, p. 636.

Carrier Doctrine

RAdm William A. Moffett, • chief of the new Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer). The strident emotionalism of the “Billy Mitchell Controversy” at length moved President Coolidge in 1925 to appoint a board headed by his friend, the widely respected Dwight W. Morrow, to recommend basic aviation policy for the U.S. [four years later Morrow’s daughter, Anne, would marry the world-famous aviator, the “Lone Eagle,” Charles Lindbergh—jbp]• The Morrow Board’s findings, reached after extensive hearings, established the pattern that produced effective working relationships among the armed services, civilian aviation, and the aircraft industry…. ”

op. cit, p. 636.

Carrier Doctrine

“… armed services, civilian aviation, and the aircraft industry. The Board went on record as opposing an independent air force at that time. It recommended that army aviator be organized as a separate air corps, in keeping with basic army organization, but proposed that naval aviators be integrated with the corps of naval line officers. Congress accepted the board’s findings and enacted them into law in the Air Commerce Act and the Air Corps Act of 1926. “…for Moffett the new legislation was a victory all the way.’Hell, we won’t secede from the Navy,’ said he. ‘If we are half as good as we think we are, we’ll take it over!’

op. cit, p. 636.

Carrier Doctrine

said he. ‘If we are half as good as we think we are, we’ll take it over!’ “As for Gen Mitchell, he at length overreached himself by accusing his army seniors of ‘criminal negligence.’ He was tried by an army general court-martial, found guilty of indiscipline, and allowed to resign from the service. As a civilian he continued to crusade for air power. Though in some respects a man of great vision, Mitchell lacked the objectivity to formulate military policy—and certainly he was much too far ahead of his time. “The Morrow Board’s findings…left unresolved the original controversy over the relative emphasis to be placed on CVs and heavy ships.….Many officers regarded the CV strictly as an auxiliary, of little use beyond reconnaissance and gunfire spotting. Others, including Adm Moffett, saw the CV as nothing less that the capital ship of the future.”

op. cit, p. 636.

Carrier Doctrine

“In Fleet Problem X of Jan 1929 the naval air enthusiasts found an opportunity to demonstrate that the CV could not only be used offensively but that it could operate successfully against shore targets. An attacking fleet from San Diego…including the Saratoga,• was to strike the Panama Canal, which would be defended by 48 a/c based on the Canal Zone and by a defending fleet including the Lexington.• RAdm Joseph M. Reeves,* Commander A/C Squadrons, Battle Fleet, persuaded Adm Pratt [cdr of the attacking fleet—jbp]• to approve a significant change in the plan for employing the Saratoga.

op. cit, pp. 636-637.

Carrier Doctrine

_______ * “…often called “the Father of Carrier Aviation.”He received an appointment in 1890 to attend the Naval Academy, where he became a football hero. In addition to his on-field heroics, he is credited with the invention of the modern football helmet, in which he had a shoemaker create for him after he was told by a Navy doctor that a kick to his head could result in "instant insanity" or death.Reeves graduated from the Academy in 1894—Wikipedia.

RAdm Joseph M. Reeves,* Commander A/C Squadrons, Battle Fleet, persuaded Adm Pratt [cdr of the attacking fleet—jbp] to approve a significant change in the plan for employing the Saratoga. Instead of advancing from San Diego directly toward the Gulf of Panama in a safe position behind the battle line, for which she was expected to scout, the big CV made a wide sweep southward past the Galapagos Islands and then up the coast of South America, approaching the Canal from the southwest. En route the Saratoga was sighted by a defending scout cruiser which tracked her through the night, broadcasting her position by radio. The Lexington, advancing through thick weather to attack, came under ‘fire’ from Pratt’s battle line and had her speed, by decision of the umpires, reduced to 18 knots As a result, the Saratoga was able on the morning of 25 Jan while still 200 miles at sea, to take the Canal defenders by surprise with 17 dive bombers, 17 torpedo bombers, and 32 fighters. They quickly overwhelmed the defending land-based planes, struck at assigned targets, and returned to their carrier with only one technical loss. Theoretically, according to the umpires, two sets of canal locks had been blown up and two airfields damaged. This performance demonstrated that a CV could assault targets far beyond the range of fleet guns.”

op. cit, pp. 636-637.

Carrier Doctrine

_______ * “…often called “the Father of Carrier Aviation.”He received an appointment in 1890 to attend the Naval Academy, where he became a football hero. In addition to his on-field heroics, he is credited with the invention of the modern football helmet, in which he had a shoemaker create for him after he was told by a Navy doctor that a kick to his head could result in "instant insanity" or death.Reeves graduated from the Academy in 1894—Wikipedia.

“The lessons of the Panama Canal attack were confirmed and emphasized by subsequent fleet problems. Of these, none was more convincing than Fleet Problem XIX, held in the spring of 1938. As part of the exercise, the Saratoga and Lexington, commanded by VAdm Ernest J. King,• were to strike first Pearl Harbor Naval Base and then Mare Island Navy Yard near San Francisco. A sudden epidemic among her crew kept the Lexington out of the Pearl Harbor attack, but King proceeded with the other CV. Steaming far to the northwest of Oahu, the Saratoga entered an eastward-moving bad weather front and under its cover ran a thousand miles back toward the Hawaiian Islands. Oahu-based Army Air Corps flyers, insufficiently trained to navigate over water in foul weather, completely missed the CV; but the Saratoga’s a/c struck out of the clouds and theoretically destroyed ships and numerous installations at the Pearl Harbor base without losing a plane. King thus foreshadowed the Japanese attack nearly four years later. The Saratoga accompanied by the Lexington and several cruisers, now headed for the U. S. En Route King was annoyed to find his force was being observed by a fast Japanese oiler. Defending American air and naval forces were not so successful for again King achieved complete surprise. His a/c approached the Mare Island yard at 15,000 feet, dived, made their attack, and returned to their decks, again without a single loss. “The success of the CV planes was in large part the result of improving techniques, not the least of which was dive bombing. As early as WW I, naval aviators had recognized the difficulty of bombing moving objects from level flight. Individual fliers of several nations perceived the advantages of aiming the nose of the plane at the target, going into a shallow dive, and then releasing the bomb. After the war

op. cit, p. 637.

Carrier Doctrine

“…beyond the range of fleet guns.

many pilots experimented with this technique. During the Nicaraguan campaign, US marines adopted dive bombing as standard procedure in squadron ops, particularly against guerrilla bands. After returning from Nicaragua, marine fliers did much to popularize dive bombing by conducting exhibitions at air shows. During the 1930s, as stronger planes were made available, it became possible for aviators to dive steeply from 1,000 feet to 300 feet, drop bombs as they pulled out, and then use tail guns to strafe the enemy as they withdrew. But such techniques, the subject of experiment in all the armed services, could not be perfected until planes specially designed for dive bombing were provided in quantity. The same sort of restriction hobbled the development of doctrine for using CV-based fighters and torpedo planes. “The US possessed the capital, the engineering skills, and the industrial capacity to foster the development of the needed a/c, but several practical factors impeded progress. First among these was the extremely high rate of obsolescence to which expensive a/c are subject. Even a wealthy nation could not afford to mass-produce a particular model when designers promised far superior ones within a short time. Yet there could be no sound evaluation of either flight technique or CV doctrine until the fleet acquired enough suitable planes to support realistic, full-scale maneuvers. On the other hand, a decision to provide the fleet with enough planes might well have alienated the public if even a single experimental foreign model had surpassed a/c operating with the US fleet. “American naval policy planners wisely resisted the temptation to standardize too soon. Not until 1937 did Chance Vought begin producing a single-wing scout bomber (SB2U) • suitable for CV ops, and only in 1941 did the Grumman Wildcat fighter (F4F) • and the Douglas Dauntless dive bomber (SBD) • join the fleet….”

op. cit, pp. 637-638.

Carrier Doctrine“… the nose of the plane at the target, going into a shallow dive, and then releasing the bomb. After the war

“…(SBD) • join the fleet. The Douglas Devastator torpedo plane (TBD) • was available as early as 1938, but the Grumman Avenger torpedo plane (TBF) • did not reach the fleet until after the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

“…(SBD) • join the fleet. The Douglas Devastator torpedo plane (TBD) • was available as early as 1938, but the Grumman Avenger torpedo plane (TBF) • did not reach the fleet until after the Battle of Midway in June 1942. by waiting until industry produced true CV a/c susceptible of rapid refinement, the policy makers enabled American naval aviators to fight WW II with steadily improving planes that performed exacting missions. A more conservative decision would have held the American naval pilots in the position of their German or Japanese contemporaries, who were obliged to adapt planes designed in the mid-1930s for missions conceived during the 1940s. “Problems inherent in producing assault a/c were no more complex than those facing designers of carriers capable of serving as capital ships. When USS Ranger,…”

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“Problems inherent in producing assault a/c were no more complex than those facing designers of carriers capable of serving as capital ships. When USS Ranger, the first American vessel conceived as a CV from the keel up, joined the fleet in 1934, CV concepts had developed beyond her. Designed to carry fleet reconnaissance a/c, she was never modified for assault missions….”

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“…carry fleet reconnaissance a/c, she was never modified for assault missions. The Langley, long obsolete as a CV, was converted in 1936 into a tender….”

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“…as a CV, was converted in 1936 into a tender. Not until the Yorktown was commissioned in 1937 did the fleet acquire a third assault CV….”

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“…as a CV, was converted in 1936 into a tender. Not until the Yorktown • was commissioned in 1937 did the fleet acquire a third assault CV. By then flight techniques and a/c design had progressed far enough to justify steady building. CVs Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet • were all commissioned before the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941. Nineteen more were then on order, but on Pearl Harbor day the US Navy had only six assault CVs. “If American CV doctrine had not fully matured by the time the US entered WW II, it was largely because a substantial number of naval officers in positions of power and influence had not accepted the CV as a capital ship. Many of these believed the next war would be fought in much the same manner as the last, that fleet battles would again consist of gunnery duels between heavy ships, and that the gun and not the plane was still the decisive weapon.…”

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“…and not the plane was still the decisive weapon. Through most of the 1930s, in accordance with doctrine, CVs normally cruised to the rear of the battle line, which was in columns abreast. The CVs were attended by a pair of guard DDs to rescue crews of a/c that landed in the water….”

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“…landed in the water. On contact with the ‘enemy,’ the BBs deployed into single column, as in the Battle of Jutland, and the CVs took station on the disengaged side. For flight ops the CVs left the fleet in order to turn into the wind and moved freely about, keeping only within signaling distance. As late as 1939 doctrine assigned to CVs only the following missions:

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“… As late as 1939 doctrine assigned to CVs only the following missions:

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

(1) reconnaissance and shadowing (2) spotting of fleet gunfire in surface actions and shore bombardments (3) assisting to protect the fleet (particularly the CVs themselves) from attacks by

enemy submarines and a/c, and (4) attacking a faster enemy attempting to escape, in order to reduce his speed so as

to enable the pursuing surface ships to take him under attack

op. cit, p. 638.

Carrier Doctrine

“As early as 1930 Lcdr Forrest B. Sherman, who was to become US CNO 20 years later, advocated a fleet formation that anticipated the CV-centered task force (hereafter, TF) of WW II. The Navy was not then ready to experiment along such lines, but during the next few years development of the TF principle made Sherman’s suggestion feasible….”

“…principle made Sherman’s suggestion feasible. For centuries ships of similar type had operated together. Hence there was no conflict between fleet logistic and fleet operational organizations; one served for both. But in the 1930s the US Navy went further than ever before in mixing types to attain flexibility for special missions. As a result, the fleet had to be organized in two different ways. While types—BBs, CVs, cruisers, and DDs—might be intermingled in TFs for certain sorts of ops, they usually had to be serviced according to type, because a DD, for example, has quite different needs from a BB. Hence for administrative purposes ships continued to be grouped according to type in squadrons and divisions, but for operational purposes they could be, and frequently were, intermingled freely in TFs. “ In 1939, when RAdm William F. Halsey’s • CV Div 2, the new Yorktown and Enterprise, joined VAdm King’s CV Div 1, the Saratoga and Lexington, King began experimenting with CVs operating together and turning into the wind simultaneously to launch or receive planes.…”

op. cit, pp. 638-639

Carrier Doctrine

“… launch or receive planes.. He then went on to experiment with CV task groups, including cruisers and DDs, to escort and protect the CVs when they left the fleet formations to carry out flight ops. King strongly urged that cruiser-DD screens be permanently assigned to the CVs so that they could learn to operate efficiently together. But the ‘line’ admirals, who always held the senior billets, consistently refused—on the grounds that the cruisers and DDs could not be spared from the ‘main’ formation. As a result, whenever the CVs operated with a screen, there was much confusion and excessive signaling. When war came to the US, the CV commanders had not yet found answers to such elementary questions as whether one or more than one CV should operate within a single screen, or whether CV forces should rely more upon maneuver or upon antiaircraft fire when under air attack. And of course there were never enough planes or flyers available in the pre-war years to develop the system of CV air groups (hereafter, CAGs) that later in WW II enabled the CVs to operate almost continuously.”

op. cit, pp. 638-639

Carrier Doctrine

“…WW II enabled the CVs to operate almost continuously. “The Japanese, by disabling the American battle line, settled the BB-CV question for the United States on the first day of the Pacific war. The American CVs of necessity became capital ships at last, and at once acquired permanent escorts. As new fast BBs reached the Pacific, they were promptly integrated into the CV screens. A similar BB-CV controversy in the Japanese navy was not so quickly settled. If it had been, the Battle of Midway might not have proved the turning point it was. At least, the four CVs in the Japanese striking force would not have been exposed to sinking by American CV attack while the heavy Japanese ships with their powerful antiaircraft batteries were 400 miles away. “In view of the widespread undervaluing of the CV in the US Navy, it is remarkable that the US had enough CVs at the outbreak of war to stop the Japanese advance and still more remarkable that enough were already under construction to enable the US to go on the all-out offensive in late 1943. It was the CV force that spearheaded the American drive across the Central Pacific, isolating enemy island bases in the face of land- and fleet-based air power and providing support and cover for a whole series of amphib assaults.”

op. cit, p. 639

Carrier Doctrine

This e-Mail describes the coming state-of-the art CVN:

jbp

Fast Forward to 2016

Text

IV. Logistic DoctrineSS John W. Brown—one of two surviving operational Liberty ships photographed in 2000—Wikipedia

Logistic Doctrine

“The problem of freeing the fleet from rearward bases to operate at great distances across the Pacific is essentially one of logistics, the science of supplying, transporting, and maintaining forces [emphasis added—jbp]. Yet the US Navy, during its years of planning for possible war with Japan, while emphasizing strategy, tended to neglect the logistic base on which strategy would have to be erected. As a result, most of the logistic problems of America’s war in the Pacific had to be solved shortly before the outbreak and during the war. The Navy’s logistic structure had largely to be improvised all the way from the Navy Department to the fleet and forward bases. It is remarkable that the problem was solved so quickly and so well. “No fleet can operate for long independent of the shore, and every improvement in naval ships during the industrial revolution increased the need for ships to return to base for replenishment and repair. As navies shifted from sail to steam and could no longer rely on wind for propulsion, they had to sacrifice storage space for fuel.• Improvements in gunnery led to more rapid expenditure of ammunition, necessitating frequent replenishment.• Increasingly complex machinery to be repaired, the need to carry large numbers of spare parts, enlightened personnel policies that required more space per man—all these cut down on space available and heightened the dependency of ships on bases.”

Sea Power, pp. 639-640.

Battle of Manila Bay—The Spanish-American War Changes Everything (3)

“When Adm Dewey received orders to attack the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in 1898, he had only to proceed to Hong Kong and purchase a coaling steamer and coal from the British. But if he had not won a quick and complete victory, his logistic problem would have been serious, because the British had decided to deny him further coal. His nearest source of supply for fuel and for replacement ammunition was the west coast of the United States. “To solve this problem of keeping ships in operating areas and freeing them from dependence on home bases except for major repairs, all navies began adding to the fleet groups of auxiliary vessels which came to be known as the Fleet Train. When the American Great White Fleet set out on its round-the-world cruise in December 1907, it was accompanied by two store ships, a torpedo flotilla parent ship, a tender, and a repair ship, and was joined by several chartered colliers.• In spite of all these auxiliaries, the Great White Fleet obtained about three fourths of its fuel from foreign purchases. Thus the famous cruise exposed a greater logistic weakness than anyone had anticipated during the planning process.”

op. cit, p. 621.

Logistic Doctrine

“Though President Theodore Roosevelt understood sea power and its uses, American strategic thinking continued to be conditioned by the concept of the Navy as America’s first line of defense—with the mission of driving an attacker from American shores. Accordingly the Joint Board in 1909 advised against significant strengthening of establishments in the Philippines, but it did make the very important recommendation that the chief American naval base in the Pacific be established at Pearl Harbor. Locating a naval base more than 2,000 miles from the continent forced the Navy to expand its auxiliary branches in order to transport the necessary equipment and stores to the Hawaiian Islands. The next three decades marked a constant growth in the strength and importance of the Pearl Harbor base.

Ibid.

“King Bee”—Father of the Sea Bees

1913-graduated Washington U., St. Louis, with a BS in civil engineering

1917-commissioned a Lt. J.G. in the Civil Engineer Corps, USN

got to know Asst. SecNav, FDR who would advance his career over the next thirty years

1937-selected to be Chief Civil Engineer and Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks (BuDocks)

before 7 Dec 41-urged construction of two giant dry-docks at Pearl and other improvements at Wake and Midway

Admiral Ben Moreell!1892 – 1978

dedication of the Pearl Harbor dry-dock

“King Bee”—Father of the Sea Bees

1913-graduated with a BS in civil engineering

1917-commissioned a Lt. J.G. in the Civil Engineer Corps, USN

got to know Asst. SecNav, FDR who would advance his career over the next thirty years

1937-selected to be Chief Civil Engineer and Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks (BuDocks)

before 7 Dec 41-urged construction of two giant dry-docks at Pearl and other improvements at Wake and Midway

28 Dec 41-began the recruitment of a “militarized construction force” to replace the prior policy of hiring local civilians to build bases

Admiral Ben Moreell!1892 – 1978

Logistic DoctrineThe next three decades marked a constant growth in the strength and importance of the Pearl Harbor base. “World War I was the first extended, large scale war that the US fought far from its continental base, but because the US Navy was able to use British bases, it did not have to face fully the problem of overseas maintenance. Tenders could provide parts and equipment not available from the British, while major repairs and overhauls were carried out in the US. Building bases in France took more of a toll of American energy, but even here much of the material and most of the labor came from French sources. The chief American naval problem in WW I was shipping. Yet in dealing with this problem, the Navy had to serve principally as carrier, for the Army handled the assembling and loading of cargoes. The US Navy moreover did not have to face the complete burden of transporting troops to Europe for…American vessels carried less than half the total. WW I did however spur the Navy into conversion to oil fuel and the development of swift, alongside refueling at sea, which were to prove of major importance in America’s later conquest of the Pacific. “With the end of the war, the US Navy at last began seriously to look westward. Many of America’s fine new ships transited the Panama Canal, and in 1920 the US Pacific Fleet was organized. [a proposal to have a “Fleet Train plus” a floating naval base, able to replenish the fleet at sea and to service it in any suitable anchorage in all respects except major repairs—never materialized].The Washington Treaties [1922-23], limiting the fleet and providing for non-fortification of the Pacific islands, removed the possibility that the U.S. Navy would in the foreseeable future dominate the Pacific Ocean. Actually the treaties merely gave legal sanction to the decisions already made by Congress and by the American people….”

Ibid.

Logistic Doctrine

“…Congress and by the American people. Fleet exercises had to be undertaken under the limitations of meager budgets, regardless of whether such exercises were strategically relevant to geography and to probable wartime missions. In the temper of the times, treaties or not, nothing could have been done to strengthen naval bases in the Philippines and Guam, while the two Pacific bases already marked out for first priority, the Canal Zone and Pearl Harbor, under budgetary starvation, grew only slowly. “Many American naval officers of the Old School looked upon ‘shoveling coal and combat loading’ as unworthy of serious consideration of an officer. As a result of this kind of thinking, the Logistics Section of the Naval War College was abolished in the late 1920s, and Fleet Problems were conducted on logistic assumptions that were wide of the mark. Not until 1940 were these trends reversed, particularly with regard to Pearl Harbor, where by the summer of 1941 it was at last barely possible to base the entire Pacific Fleet. “The cure however for logistic weakness was not to be found at Pearl Harbor but rather in Washington, where the leaders at the end of 1941 found themselves directing war on two oceans and with little logistic support available to implement strategic decisions. Fortunately for the Allies, American economy and American industry had already begun to shift to war production to fill orders from the British. “When a highly industrialized nation shifts from a peacetime to a wartime economy, it must make severe adjustments in its economic patterns. [‘Guns and butter’—Hermann Göring and LBJ—jbp] The military forces require equipment on an unprecedented scale, and these demands must be met by diverting civilian requirements.…”

op. cit., pp. 640-641

Logistic Doctrine

“…diverting civilian requirements. Minimum civilian necessities must be met as well, and sooner or later military and civilian desires conflict. Then allocations have to be made to each. These allocations in the U.S. are controlled by high-level civilians in the government. This realm of activity is known as producer logistics. The military departments present their requirements to civilian officials who make the allocations in accordance with their views of the over-all situation. Military personnel are little involved in this phase of logistics, except for design and production supervision of the items allocated to them by an allocation board. “The other chief aspect of logistics is called consumer logistics, a preponderantly military function. From the military point of view there are four major steps in the logistic process : !!!!The first two of these are closely connected with producer logistics and require careful liaison with the various boards charged with the responsibility of balancing civilian and military requirements. The last two…are also connected with the civilian economy, but to a less extent than the first two. “In preparing…[refer to Logistics handout—jbp]

op. cit., p. 641.

(1) determination of requirements (2) procurement (3) transportation, and (4) distribution.

the solid lines represent command authority (it goes without saying, from the top down) the broken line from the Asst. CNO to the Bureaus represents liaison (info exchange only)

jbp

ORGANIZATION OF PRINCIPAL LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES IN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AT THE BEGINNING

OF WORLD WAR II(SecNav)

(CNO)

Logistic Doctrine“…remained weak throughout the war. “Before strategic planning could be advanced very far, plans for bases had to be made and their requirements determined so that they could function in support of the fleet and forward area naval activities. In the Pacific, bases often had to be wrested from the enemy, and their sites usually had to be developed by bringing in all the necessities for ops, from wharves to accounting machines. The first attempt to establish a base in the Pacific theater of ops (hereafter, PTO) was on the island of Bora Bora in the Society Islands….” !!!

op. cit., p. 642.

“World War II[edit]!!“In World War II the United States chose Bora Bora as a South Pacific military supply base, and an oil depot, airstrip, seaplane base, and defensive fortifications were constructed. Known as "Operation Bobcat", it maintained a supply force of nine ships, 20,000 tons of equipment and nearly 7,000 men. Seven artillery guns were set up at strategic points around the island to protect it against potential military attack.!“However, the island saw no combat as the American presence on Bora Bora went uncontested over the course of the war. The base was officially closed on June 2, 1946. Only one former US serviceman, Fred Giles, returned to the island.[2] The World War II airstrip, which was never able to accommodate large aircraft, was French Polynesia's only international airport until Faa'a International Airport was opened in Papeete, Tahiti, in 1960.[3]” Wikipedia

Bora Bora

Logistic Doctrine

“… in the Society Islands.• The difficulties, delays, and frustrations encountered in this undertaking during the early months of 1942 led to a recognition that more systematic planning of such endeavors was essential. Improved methods paid off in subsequent bases established at Tongabutu, Efate, Samoa, Noumea, and Auckland. To operate these bases Service Squadron Six was set up with broad logistic responsibilities in the forward areas. “Recognizing that as American offensives began to seize enemy positions in the Pacific it would be necessary to establish bases on islands recently captured from Japan, naval logistic planners concluded that it was essential to have standardized base components ready to move in quickly. These package components were supposed to include all material and personnel necessary for setting up the bases, maintaining them, and developing supply functions with respect to the fleet and shore-based activities. The advanced base units were designated LIONS and CUBS, for major and secondary bases respectively….In theory, these units were ideal, but local conditions varied so greatly that commanders had to request many modifications….The basic components were eventually made flexible by a Catalogue of Advance Base Functional Components, a kind of mail order catalogue in concept….Even so, the catalogue grew so fast…that before the end of the war it consisted of 479 volumes weighing 250 pounds.”

op. cit., pp. 642-643.

Logistic Doctrine“… 250 pounds. Similarly established was an organization to recruit and train the men to build and service bases.• At first these Construction Battalions, or Seabees, were comparatively standardized; later they were formed into more specialized units such as Base A/C Service Units (BASUs) and Carrier A/C Service Units (CASUs). Thus came the flexibility in base construction and servicing that was to prove essential to Allied victory in the Pacific war. “To move men and material to the advanced bases and to the forces afloat required a complete reorganization of American mercantile shipping. The problems of shipping involved far more than continuing ship movements under control of shipping lines but with the Navy assuming responsibility for their safety. The demands for military cargoes are far greater in war than in peacetime, while the demands for goods needed for non-military aspects of the economy do not lessen to the extent of the increase in military requirements. [emphasis added, jbp] Overseas shipping activities during wartime show most clearly the intricate interrelationship between the civilian economy and military ops. Both the military and non-military activities must draw on the same pool of shipping, for the navy and army never have enough of their own cargo-carriers to meet the needs of war. Thus a constant close liaison is required between civilian and military activities to assure the efficient procurement, repair, allocation, loading, unloading, routing, and protection of ships. Except for ships built exclusively for the military services [e.g., APAs, AKAs, AEs, AOs, &c., jbp], the first three of these ops are exclusively civilian functions while the last is exclusively a military function. Loading, unloading, and routing are customarily performed by the user of the vessel, although when a convoy system is in effect, routing becomes a function of the military.”

op. cit., pp. 642-643.

Logistic Doctrine

“… effect, routing becomes a function of the military. “Since the national policy determines both military and economic policy, the decisions on the number and kind of ships to be built under any kind of wartime emergency program must be based on decisions reached on a very high level. Limiting factors are the capacity of building yards,….”

op. cit., p. 643.

Logistic Doctrine

“… effect, routing becomes a function of the military. the availability of labor for construction and repair,• stevedoring facilities, and the ability of trained crews to take the ships to sea.• Once allocation has been made for materials for ships, and the vessels have been completed,• then a predominantly civilian authority makes allocations of ships themselves to the military forces and to civilian shippers. In this way a relatively satisfactory arrangement…can be worked out….”

op. cit., p. 643.

BuC&R merges with BuEngineering; becomes BuShips, 1940

1904-became a naval architect

1917-1919—key developer of the S-Class submarine

1932-37—Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair; here developed the first “fleet boat” subs, crucial to the Pacific war

1938-retired from the USN, became Chairman of the US Maritime Commission, overseeing the construction of 4,000 Liberty and Victory Ships during WW II

RAdm Emory S. Land, USN 1879-1971

picture in full dress uniform, 1936 USNA, Class of 1902






1942-made concurrently Administrator of the War Shipping Administration which allocated ships to both military and civilian use RAdm Emory S. Land, USN

1879-1971 picture in full dress uniform, 1936

USNA, Class of 1902






1942-made concurrently Administrator of the War Shipping Administration which allocated ships to both military and civilian use

1943-oversaw the creation of the US Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, RI

RAdm Emory S. Land, USN 1879-1971

picture in full dress uniform, 1936 USNA, Class of 1902

William Franklin "Frank" Knox! 1874 – 1944!

SECNAV 1940-1944

Ernest Joseph King!USNA, 4th in the Class of 1901 !

1878 – 1956!

CNO 1942-1945

FDRLAND

Logistic Doctrine

“… arrangement…can be worked out….. “The logistic problems of the US Navy were solved in WW II largely because production was so plentiful that weaknesses of distribution and planning were cancelled out by abundance.• Nevertheless, without the planning that provided advanced bases, ashore and afloat, bases that moved forward with the fleet, bases backed by ample shipping, the Navy could not have projected its power across the Pacific nor kept it in Far Eastern waters month after month. By virtue of such planning, the US Pacific Fleet of WW II regained much of the reach and endurance of fleets in the age of sail.”

op. cit., p. 645.

But that’s another story… jbp

Education

US Navy's Pacific War session i