US Navy in the Pacific, session x, part ii

The U.S. Navy in World War II Part II- The Pacific Warsession x-The Defeat of Japan

part ii

Before the calendar ran out on this year, fiery devastation was to come to more than sixty-one Japanese cities. Those Japanese not killed in air raids would stand on the precipice of extinction through starvation. A great invasion would be planned but not executed. The Soviet Union would unleash a mechanized assault in Manchuria and plan to seize a Home island. Millions were to die, only a minority of them Japanese, and the Imperial Empire was to vanish in two atomic flashes. The Emperor would play a pivotal role in stanching—but not halting—the bloodshed….

Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. (1999), p.21

“…It is hard to exaggerate the differences between the endgames of the Asian and European wars. In the west, American strategy was dominated by a determination to confront the German army in Europe at the first possible moment…. The possibility of offering terms to the Nazis was never entertained. “In the Far East, by contrast, there was much less appetite for a ground showdown. Some in the Allied camp argued that the commitment to impose unconditional surrender upon the Japanese should be moderated, if this would avert a bloodbath in the home islands. Only in the Philippines and Burma did U.S. and British ground forces encounter, and finally destroy, major Japanese armies—though none was as large as the enemy host deployed in China. The U.S. Navy and Army Air Force (USAAF) sought to demonstrate that blockade and bombardment could render unnecessary a bloody land campaign in the Japanese home islands. Their hopes were fulfilled in the most momentous and terrible fashion.”

Max Hastings, Retribution; The Battle for Japan, 1944-45, pp. xvii-xviii.

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Period Covered in Each Session

major topics in this session

IV. Okinawa

V. VJ Day—15 Aug 45

VI. Epilogue

Text

III. Okinawa A U.S. Marine from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines on Wana Ridge provides covering fire with his Thompson submachine gun, 18 May 1945.—Wikipedia

"Ww2 158" by Staff Sergeant Walter F. Kleine - Research at the National Archives: Pictures of World War II (specifically ww2_158.jpg). Identification number: 127-N-123170. Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia

Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ww2_158.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Ww2_158.jpg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Battalion,_1st_Marines

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thompson_submachine_gun

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ww2_158.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Ww2_158.jpg

“Okinawa1. Love* Day”

Hastings, op. cit, p. 369.

“At the time Operation Iceberg was launched in the spring of 1945, it was perceived in Washington only as a preliminary to the decisive battle that must follow, for Japan’s home islands. Likewise in Tokyo, the defense of Okinawa was deemed vital to Japan’s strategy for achieving a negotiated peace. If the U.S. could be made to pay dearly enough for winning a single offshore island, reasoned the nation’s leaders and indeed its emperor, Washington would conclude that the price of invading Kyushu and Honshu was too great to be borne. They were correct in their analysis, but utterly deluded about its implications.”

__________ * This section title puzzled me when I first read it. Was Hastings being ironic? No. In the Pac the USN designated D-days as L-days

(for Landing) so that there would be no confusion at the top. And Love is the old name for ‘L’ in the WW II spoken alphabet. As in Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, Easy, Fox, George, How, Item, Jig, King, Love, &c.

* jbp

The Okinawa Campaign

Sea Power, p. 828.

“Shortly after the conquest of Saipan, Adm Spruance had suggested the capture of Okinawa, 350 mi SW of Japan. Okinawa in American hands, he pointed out, would provide airfields to supplement the bomber bases about to be established in the Marianas. The JCS • at that time rejected Spruance’s suggestion, for plans were being drawn up at that time for an invasion of Formosa. The plan of Formosa however was canceled by the decision to invade the Philippines because there were not enough troops in the PTO to occupy both. But whereas Luzon was as good as Formosa as a base for interdicting Japanese communications with the Southern Resources Area. and for staging an invasion of the home islands, it was too far away from Japan to provide airfields for effectively bombing Japanese industrial centers. So the JCs, reverting to Spruance’s proposal, decided that they had enough troops to capture Okinawa. In Oct 44, as we have seen, they issued orders for the capture of both Iwo Jima and Okinawa.…”

IWOOKINAWA15 Feb1 Apr


Ibid.

“To support and cover the new assault, TF 58 departed Ulithi in mid-Mar 45, with Spruance in strategic and Mitscher in tactical command. Spruance knew that the fast CVAs would not return to base for many weeks. The conquest of Okinawa, much the largest island invaded by the CenPac forces, would entail an extended campaign involving many troops.…”

“…Jima and Okinawa.


Ibid.

“To support and cover the new assault, TF 58 departed Ulithi in mid-Mar 45, with Spruance in strategic and Mitscher in tactical command. Spruance knew that the fast CVAs would not return to base for many weeks. The conquest of Okinawa, much the largest island invaded by the CentPac forces, would entail an extended campaign involving many troops.•…”



Ibid.

“To support and cover the new assault, TF 58 departed Ulithi in mid-Mar 45, with Spruance in strategic and Mitscher in tactical command. Spruance knew that the fast CVAs would not return to base for many weeks. The conquest of Okinawa, much the largest island invaded by the CenPac forces, would entail an extended campaign involving many troops.• The supply problem would be formidable, requiring a steady stream of shipping into an area that was within easy attack range of Japanese airfields on Formosa, in China, in the Ryukyus, and in Japan. Large scale kamikaze attacks could be expected. American airfields would of course be established ASAP on Okinawa, but flyers operating from these would have their hands full supporting the troops. They could not also protect the logistic shipping. That would be the main task of a/c from the CVAs, which accordingly would have to remain off Okinawa until the island was secured or the threat from the air had been greatly lessened.…”



op. cit., pp. 828-829.

“To pave the way for the invasion, TF 58 on 18 & 19 Mar launched a series of massive raids on the airfields of Kyushu, southernmost of Japan’s home islands, and on the dwindling Japanese fleet in the Inland Sea. This time Japanese a/c counterattacked, bombing CVs Enterprise, Yorktown, Franklin, and Wasp. Only the Franklin was seriously damaged….”

“…been greatly lessened.


op. cit., pp. 828-829.

“To pave the way for the invasion, TF 58 on 18 & 19 Mar launched a series of massive raids on the airfields of Kyushu, southernmost of Japan’s home islands, and on the dwindling Japanese fleet in the Inland Sea. This time Japanese a/c counterattacked, bombing CVs Enterprise, Yorktown, Franklin, and Wasp. Only the Franklin was seriously damaged.• Two bombs penetrated to her hangar deck while she was launching a/c and set off fires and explosions that took the lives of more than 800 of her crew.•.…”



op. cit., pp. 828-829.

“To pave the way for the invasion, TF 58 on 18 & 19 Mar launched a series of massive raids on the airfields of Kyushu, southernmost of Japan’s home islands, and on the dwindling Japanese fleet in the Inland Sea. This time Japanese a/c counterattacked, bombing CVs Enterprise, Yorktown, Franklin, and Wasp. Only the Franklin was seriously damaged.• Two bombs penetrated to her hangar deck while she was launching a/c and set off fires and explosions that took the lives of more than 800 of her crew.• No other ship in WW II, and possibly in history, suffered as extensive injuries and yet remained afloat.• Saved by an extraordinary feat of damage control, the battered Franklin headed under her own power for the US and a major repair job. These preliminary raids also cost the Americans 116 planes, but they damaged several enemy warships and did so much damage to installations and communications on Kyushu that the Japanese were unable to strike back again in force for nearly three weeks.



op. cit., pp. 828-829.

“…nearly three weeks. “On 23 Mar, after refueling, TF 58 began the pre-assault air strikes on Okinawa. On the 24th RAdm Morton L. Deyo’s • Gunfire and Covering Force of old BBs, CAs, and VAdm Lee’s new BBs from TF 58 began the preparatory naval bombardment.…”


op. cit., pp. 828-829.

“To pave the way for the invasion, TF 58 on 18 & 19 Mar launched a series of massive raids on the airfields of Kyushu, southernmost of Japan’s home islands, and on the dwindling Japanese fleet in the Inland Sea. This time Japanese a/c counterattacked, bombing CVs Enterprise, Yorktown, Franklin, and Wasp. Only the Franklin was seriously damaged.• Two bombs penetrated to her hangar deck while she was launching a/c and set off fires and explosions that took the lives of more than 800 of her crew.• No other ship in WW II, and possibly in history, suffered as extensive injuries and yet remained afloat.• Saved by an extraordinary feat of damage control, the battered Franklin headed under her own power for the US and a major repair job. These preliminary raids also cost the Americans 116 planes, but they damaged several enemy warships and did so much damage to installations and communications on Kyushu that the Japanese were unable to strike back again in force for nearly three weeks. “On 23 Mar, after refueling, TF 58 began the pre-assault air strikes on Okinawa. On the 24th RAdm Morton L. Deyo’s • Gunfire and Covering Force of old BBs, CAs, and VAdm Lee’s new BBs from TF 58 began the preparatory naval bombardment. Deyo’s force in its support capacity was a part of RAdm Blandy’s • Amphib Support Force, but Adm Spruance, suspecting that the Japanese might attempt a surface counterattack, had organized it as a detachable command to counter any such threat.…”



op. cit., p. 829.

“While the softening up of Okinawa was in process, an amphib attack force including troops of the 77th ID • carried out an inspired piece of planning by seizing the Kerama Islands, 15 mi W of southern Okinawa. These tiny islands were lightly held, for the Japanese considered them of little use to an invader. But to the Americans the Keramas were invaluable because they provided a sheltered anchorage where a seaplane and a logistic base could be set up. Into the Kerama anchorage on 27 Mar steamed the first of the tenders, AOs, ARs, AEs, and other auxiliaries of Service Squadron 10 to begin servicing the fleet. Thus was established a floating base for replenishment and light repairs right in the area of ops, supplementing Service Squadron 6, which remained underway to the SE. The Kerama attack force also unexpectedly removed a serious threat to shipping by capturing some 350 depth-charge-carrying powerboats such as had menaced the fleet at Lingayen Gulf. Following the invasion of the Keramas, a field artillery group landed on the Keise Islands, still nearer Okinawa, and emplaced 155-mm. guns on the Japanese flank…”

“…any such threat.


Ibid.

“During the preliminary ops, a/c from TF 58 and from CVEs in Blandy’s Amphib Support Force flew 3,000 sorties in the Okinawa area, and the gunnery vessels fired 5,000 tons of shell. As AMs cleared 3,000 square mi off the Okinawa coast, the support ships moved in ever closer, achieving increasingly effective results. After the mines were cleared, UDTs reconnoitered the selected invasion beaches on the W coast and blew out of the water about 2,900 wooden posts that the defenders had set up as obstacles to l/c. Involved in the final preparations, besides the gunfire and rocket vessels and the CV a/c of the Fifth Fleet, were bombers from the Marianas, the Philippines, and Western China. TF 58 covered the approaches from Japan, and at the other end of the line the British Pacific Fleet, designated TF 57, covered the approaches from Formosa and kept the intervening islands neutralized by cratering the airfields….”

“…the Japanese flank.


Ibid.

“Newly arrived via Sydney and Manus under the command of VAdm Sir Bernard Rawlings RN,• the British fleet included four CVs, two BBs, five CAs, and ten DDs—about the strength of one TG of TF 58. Though the British CVs had nearly the same displacement as American Essex-class CVAs, they could accommodate only about half as many planes, their logistic force was not designed to service them in long-sustained campaigns,4 and their closed-in hangars slowed ops and proved uncomfortable in tropical waters.…”

“…cratering the airfields.

__________ 4 From 20 Apr to 3 May, at the height of the Okinawa campaign, the British fleet was obliged to retire to Leyte for replenishment. During its absence, CVEs from Blandy’s Amphib Support Force took over the task of covering the SW approaches to Okinawa. For details of the British ops, including a frank comparison of British and American material and techniques, see Adm of the Fleet Sir Philip Vian, Action this Day (London, 1960).


op. cit., pp. 829-830.

“…in tropical waters. In the Okinawa campaign however their armored flight decks gave them special advantage, rendering them less vulnerable to kamikaze attack than the contemporary American CVs with wooden decks and armored hangar decks. “Adm Turner’s • Joint Expeditionary Force, assembled from such distant points as Espiritu Santo, Guadalcanal, San Francisco, Seattle, Oahu, Leyte, and Saipan, arrived off Okinawa on schedule in the early hours of D-day, 1 Apr. In the force were 1,300 ships bringing 182,000 assault troops. These included the III Amphib Corps, composed of the 1st and 6th MarDivs;• and the XXIV Army Corps, comprising the 7th and 96th IDs.…”


op. cit., pp. 829-830.

“…7th and 96th IDs. These two corps made up the U.S. Tenth Army • commanded by LGen Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. USA.• Three more IDs were available as reserve forces: the 27th, as floating reserve;• the 81st as area reserve;• and the 77th, after it had captured the Keramas and Ie Shima off the Okinawa W coast.…”

TENTH ARMY’S BUCKNERIn any language, Okinawa spells death.

June 18, 1945, Buckner had arrived in his command jeep which was flying its standard 3 star flag, to inspect a forward observation post. Visits from the general were not always welcome as his presence frequently drew enemy fire…. Buckner had arrived with his standard bright three stars showing on his steel helmet and a nearby Marine outpost sent a signal to Buckner's position stating that they could clearly see the general's three stars on his helmet. Told of this, Buckner replaced his own helmet with an unmarked one. However, a small flat trajectory Japanese artillery projectile…struck a coral rock outcropping next to the general and fragments entered his chest. Buckner was carried by stretcher to a nearby aid station, where he died on the operating table. He was succeeded in command by Marine General Roy Geiger. Total American deaths during the battle of Okinawa were 12,513.—Wikipedia

April 16, 1945

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roy_Geiger


op. cit., p. 830.

“Awaiting the invasion on Okinawa were about 100,000 defenders, of whom 67,000 were regular Imperial Army Troops and the rest were naval personnel and Okinawa draftees.…”

“…Okinawa W coast.


op. cit., p. 830.

“Awaiting the invasion on Okinawa were about 100,000 defenders, of whom 67,000 were regular Imperial Army Troops and the rest were naval personnel and Okinawa draftees. LGen Mitsuru Ushijima,• the army commander, had prepared his defenses in accordance with current Japanese doctrine. All Okinawans whose services could be spared by the armed forces had been transported to Japan or ordered into northern Okinawa. The main defense force took took position in a natural citadel of steep hills and narrow ravines in southern Okinawa NE of Naha.…”



op. cit., p. 830.

“Awaiting the invasion on Okinawa were about 100,000 defenders, of whom 67,000 were regular Imperial Army Troops and the rest were naval personnel and Okinawa draftees. LGen Mitsuru Ushijima,• the army commander, had prepared his defenses in accordance with current Japanese doctrine. All Okinawans whose services could be spared by the armed forces had been transported to Japan or ordered into northern Okinawa. The main defense force took took position in a natural citadel of steep hills and narrow ravines in southern Okinawa NE of Naha. This position they rendered even more defensible by siting mutually supporting artillery to cover all approaches and by linking pillboxes, caves, blockhouses, and all other strong points together with trenches and tunnels..…”



Ibid.

“…trenches and tunnels. About the main citadel they established smaller outlying bastions in concentric rings to slow down the invader’s advance. On Ushijima’s orders, the Japanese guns held their fire throughout the American preparatory bombardment so as not to disclose their positions to naval gunners. On his orders also, no troops were to be wasted in any attempt to stop the Americans at the beachhead, which he correctly estimated would be on the W coast N of Naha..…”


Ibid.

“…trenches and tunnels. About the main citadel they established smaller outlying bastions in concentric rings to slow down the invader’s advance. On Ushijima’s • orders, the Japanese guns held their fire throughout the American preparatory bombardment so as not to disclose their positions to naval gunners. On his orders also, no troops were to be wasted in any attempt to stop the Americans at the beachhead, which he correctly estimated would be on the W coast N of Naha..…”


Ibid.

“…trenches and tunnels. About the main citadel they established smaller outlying bastions in concentric rings to slow down the invader’s advance. On Ushijima’s • orders, the Japanese guns held their fire throughout the American preparatory bombardment so as not to disclose their positions to naval gunners. On his orders also, no troops were to be wasted in any attempt to stop the Americans at the beachhead, which he correctly estimated would be on the W coast N of Naha.• A regiment of Okinawans would man the hills overlooking the beach, but these were to serve only as a delaying force, retreating before the invaders and joining the rest of the defenders in their prepared positions. The general plan was to maintain the defense as long as possible, exposing the invasion forces on land and sea to a prolonged period of attrition, chiefly by Japanese air power. “On the morning of 1 Apr, after the heaviest neutralizing fire unleashed on any beach in the Pac, the Tenth Army began going ashore. At the same time, in a needless attempt to draw defending forces away from the beachhead, a Demonstration Group including the 2nd MarDiv staged a mock landing on the SE coast.…”


Ibid.

“The Tenth Army met only sporadic slammers and mortar fire. In the course of the day, 50,000 soldiers and marines went ashore. and advance elements seized two airfields. By noon of 2 Apr the invaders had thrust across to the E coast….”

“…the SE coast.


Ibid.

“…the E coast.• Then, while most of the XXIV Corps wheeled right, for an advance to the S and the 1st MarDiv secured the area opposite the b e a c h h e a d , t h e 6 t h MarDiv advanced up the long NE axis of the island. In northern Okinawa the marines met only scattered res is tance unt i l they entered the rugged hills of the Mobutu Peninsula….”


Ibid.

“ … t h e M o b u t u Peninsula.• Here the enemy fought back for several days. C a p t u r e o f t h e peninsula provided high elevations for b o m b a r d m e n t i n support of an assault on nearby Ie Shima, which the 77th ID invaded in order to o b t a i n a n o t h e r airfield….”


Ibid.

“ … t h e M o b u t u Peninsula.• Here the enemy fought back for several days. Capture of the peninsula provided h i g h e l e v a t i o n s f o r bombardment in support of an assault on nearby Ie Shima, which the 77th ID invaded in order to obtain another airfield.• By 18 Apr the marines had secured all of northern Okinawa but continued to patrol the coasts on the lookout for possible counterlandings….”

US Army Center of Military History, “Green Book” on Okinawa, pp. 105

ERNIE PYLE, WAR REPORTERHe knows people and bitter war.

“…a Mark Twain quality that knocked my eyes out….”— G.B. Parker, editor-in-chief, Scripps-Howard

1900—born on a tenant farm near Dana, IN

1917—joined the USNR. Served 3 mo before war’s end. Then IN Univ, student journalist

1923-1942—moved up the career line as a columnist until picked up by Scripps-Howard (1935) Became a war correspondent shortly after Pearl Harbor

his folksy coverage from the front in the ETO then PTO endeared him to the troops and the home front

John Powers’ scrapbook has many Ernie Pyle clippings

Ernest Taylor "Ernie" Pyle 1900 – April 18, 1945

“… et lux perpetua….”

US Army CMH, op. cit., p. 165


Ibid.

“Meanwhile the XXIV Corps, reinforced by the 27th ID,• had penetrated the outer defenses in the S and had come up against the main Japanese citadel.• This they attacked on 19 Apr but were bloodily repulsed. Thereafter the battle remained relatively stalemated for several days while American fleet guns and shore artillery blasted away in vain against the enemy stronghold. Around 1 May, the American front was reorganized to put fresh troops in the line. The 27th ID relieved • the 6th MarDiv in northern Okinawa, and the III Amphib Corps took over the W flank in southern Okinawa. The 77th ID, having completed its conquest of Ie Shima, relieved the 96th ID, which rested for ten days and then relieved the 7th ID for ten days of rest.….”

“…for possible counterlandings.

Shuri


Ibid.

“…days of rest. The Japanese, who had had neither rest nor relief, counterattacked on 4 May but were thrown back.….


Ibid.

“…days of rest. The Japanese, who had had neither rest nor relief, counterattacked on 4 May but were thrown back.• Toward the end of May, the Americans, closely supported by fleet guns, began to outflank the enemy citadel by advancing down both coasts….

10 May

10 May


Ibid.

“…days of rest. The Japanese, who had had neither rest nor relief, counterattacked on 4 May but were thrown back.• Toward the end of May, the Americans, closely supported by fleet guns, began to outflank the enemy citadel by advancing down both coasts. The defenders, to avoid being surrounded, thereupon began withdrawing under cover of rain to a new defense position in the southern tip of the island….

21 May

21 May

10 May

10 May


Ibid.


21 May

21 May29 May

29 May

10 May

10 May


Ibid.


21 May

21 May29 May

29 May

10 May

10 May

20 Jun20 Jun


op. cit., pp. 830-831.

“Because planning for the Okinawa op was largely completed before heavy kamikaze raids developed in the Philippines, the Fifth Fleet commanders had not anticipated large scale Japanese suicide attacks at Okinawa. They nevertheless took due precautions. Adm Mitscher stationed DDRs for early warning around TF 58. Adm Turner set up around Okinawa a double ring of radar picket stations, patrolled early in the campaign typically by a DD and two well-armed amphib vessels. On Okinawa, the Keramas, and Ie Shima the army emplaced aac batteries as quickly as possible, and from captured airfields marine fighter groups soon began to operate. “From the beginning, Japanese bombers and suicide planes made sporadic attacks on the American ships off Okinawa. On 31 Mar a kamikaze crashed into Spruance’s flagship Indianapolis, releasing a bomb that penetrated several decks and blew two holes in her hull. While Spruance transferred his flag to old BB New Mexico, the Indianapolis was patched up in the Kerama anchorage and then headed for Mare Island Navy Yard for extensive repairs. On 4 Apr a crashing kamikaze so mangled a DD-transport that she had to be sunk. By 5 Apr Japanese bombers and suicide planes had succeeded in damaging 39 naval vessels, including two old BBs, three CAs, and a CVE. These raids however were mere preliminaries to the general counterattack which the Imperial Army and Navy, acting for the first time in really close concert, launched on 6 Apr. On the morning of the 6th a Japanese recon plane sighted TF 58 E of Okinawa. Shortly afterward 355 kamikaze pilots in old a/c rigged for suicide attack began taking off from airfields in Kyushu. Some headed for TF 58, others for the shipping off Okinawa….”

“…tip of the island.


op. cit., p. 831.

“First and most persistently attacked by the kamikazes were the outlying picket vessels, which early in the campaign generally had only their own guns to protect themselves. In mid-afternoon of the 6th, suicide planes swarmed down on DD Bush on picket patrol N of Okinawa. and made three hits. DD Colhoun, patrolling the adjacent station, rushed to support the damaged Bush and was herself crashed by three kamikazes. Both DDs began to sink. An alert CAP and long-practiced countermeasures prevented the enemy a/c from reaching TF 58 that day, but about 200 reached the Okinawa area. Here most of the attackers were disposed of by fighter planes and by aac fire so intense that a hail of falling shell fragments caused 38 American casualties….”

“…shipping off Okinawa.


op. cit., p. 831.

“First and most persistently attacked by the kamikazes were the outlying picket vessels, which early in the campaign generally had only their own guns to protect themselves. In mid-afternoon of the 6th, suicide planes swarmed down on DD Bush on picket patrol N of Okinawa. and made three hits. DD Colhoun, patrolling the adjacent station, rushed to support the damaged Bush and was herself crashed by three kamikazes. Both DDs began to sink. An alert CAP and long-practiced countermeasures prevented the enemy a/c from reaching TF 58 that day, but about 200 reached the Okinawa area. Here most of the attackers were disposed of by fighter planes and by aac fire so intense that a hail of falling shell fragments caused 38 American casualties.• Nevertheless the enemy planes damaged 22 naval vessels, sank a DD-transport and an LST, and demolished two AEs, leaving the Tenth Army short of certain types of shells.….”

“…shipping off Okinawa.


op. cit., pp. 831-832.

“Meanwhile the second phase of this wholesale suicide attack got underway as the giant BB Yamato, CL Yahagi, and eight DDs emerged from the Inland Sea propelled by the last 2,500 tons of fuel oil in Japan—just enough for a one-way passage to Okinawa….”

“…types of shells.


op. cit., pp. 831-832.

“Meanwhile the second phase of this wholesale suicide attack got underway as the giant BB Yamato, CL Yahagi, and eight DDs emerged from the Inland Sea propelled by the last 2,500 tons of fuel oil in Japan—just enough for a one-way passage to Okinawa.• Due to arrive at the island at dawn on the 8th, they were to beach themselves there and fire at the American forces until all the Japanese ships had expended their ammunition or been destroyed. But two American SSs patrolling off Kyushu sighted the Japanese force before dark on the 6th and flashed a warning. Adm Spruance thereupon alerted Adm Deyo’s BB force to prepare to carry out its covering function. Deyo was to let the Japanese ships come S, too far for retreat into a Japanese port and beyond easy protection from Kyushu airfields. Then at the appropriate time on 7 Apr Deyo’s force was to advance and take them under fire. But Adm Mitscher had no intention of leaving the enemy ships be dealt with by the surface forces. Before dawn on the 7th he began leading TF 58 northward for the kill. A little after 0800, his search planes relocated the enemy force steaming westward, and Kerama-based PBMs kept it under surveillance as it changed to a southerly course. At 1000 Mitscher launched his air groups….”


op. cit., pp. 831-832.

“Meanwhile the second phase of this wholesale suicide attack got underway as the giant BB Yamato, CL Yahagi, and eight DDs emerged from the Inland Sea propelled by the last 2,500 tons of fuel oil in Japan—just enough for a one-way passage to Okinawa.• Due to arrive at the island at dawn on the 8th, they were to beach themselves there and fire at the American forces until all the Japanese ships had expended their ammunition or been destroyed. But two American SSs patrolling off Kyushu sighted the Japanese force before dark on the 6th and flashed a warning. Adm Spruance thereupon alerted Adm Deyo’s BB force to prepare to carry out its covering function. Deyo was to let the Japanese ships come S, too far for retreat into a Japanese port and beyond easy protection from Kyushu airfields. Then at the appropriate time on 7 Apr Deyo’s force was to advance and take them under fire. But Adm Mitscher had no intention of leaving the enemy ships be dealt with by the surface forces. Before dawn on the 7th he began leading TF 58 northward for the kill. A little after 0800, his search planes relocated the enemy force steaming westward, and Kerama-based PBMs kept it under surveillance as it changed to a southerly course. At 1000 Mitscher launched his air groups. Two hours later the CV planes struck the enemy in overwhelming force, sending down the Yamato, the Yahagi, and two DDs and so damaging two other DDs that the surviving vessels sank them before returning to base.….”

Text

U.S. aircraft, such as this Curtiss SB2C-3 Helldiver, begin their attacks on Yamato (center left). A Japanese destroyer is in the center right of the picture—Wikipedia

Text

Yamato steering to avoid bombs and aerial torpedoes during Operation Ten-Go—Wikipedia

Text

Yamato under attack. A large fire burns aft of her superstructure and she is low in the water from torpedo damage.—Wikipedia

Text

Yamato moments after exploding—Wikipedia


“Back on the Yorktown, Air Group 9 sang: ‘Yamato been a beautiful BB, but BB, you should see yourself now!’ It had been a turkey shoot. Mitscher was irritated that four Japanese destroyers escaped.”

“Okinawa2. At Sea”


op. cit., pp. 831-832.

“On 7 Apr a kamikaze at last penetrated the TF 58 air patrol and crashed into the deck of CV Hancock, killing 43 men.• By nightfall, suicide planes had damaged four more naval vessels. The 6-7 Apr raid was only the first of ten general kamikaze attacks launched against the fleet and shipping off Okinawa. Smaller-scale suicide and conventional air raids occurred nearly every day. An additional suicide device used in the 12-13 Apr raid and in subsequent attacks was the Oka (cherry blossom)5, a winged, rocket-propelled bomb that was released from the undercarriage of a bomber and then guided into the target by a pilot.• “For nearly three months the Fast CV TF remained E of Okinawa patrolling a 60-mi-square area, while its planes supported the troops ashore, combated enemy a/c, and executed antisubmarine patrols. TGs left the patrol area from time to time to refuel. they also moved N six times to strike at Kyushu airfields, but blanketing the fields as had been done at Luzon was out of the question because there were too many, they were scattered, and they were too well protected by aac batteries….”

“…returning to base.


op. cit., pp. 831-832.



__________ 5 Called Baka (foolish) bomb by the Americans.


op. cit., pp. 831-832.



__________ 5 Called Baka (foolish) bomb by the Americans.

A former colleague advised Frank Gallenstein to open his story with “an exciting event:”

“My search area was the port side of the ship, so the bogie (kamikaze) was out of my view, except for an occasional look-around glance. Just a moment after a glimpse of one of five bogies reported in the area by our radio personnel, I heard someone shout, ‘HERE HE COMES!’ Again I gave a quick look. Sure enough, here he came. I managed to divert my attention to the port side to search for the others. I heard someone screaming,’PERMISSION TO FIRE, CAPTAIN, PERMISSION TO FIRE!!!’ It seemed as if the guns started to fire even before the captain responded,’PERMISSION GRANTED!’ Glancing back I could see the bogie heading down toward us. His wings were dipping, and at the same time the plane was yawing (moving sideways). Bursts from our 3-inch guns were scattered and somewhat distant from our target, it seemed. Tracers were flying in the bogie’s direction and all over the sky. I kept my senses enough to tell myself to observe carefully the actions of those on the bridge and about the ship. Somehow I thought if I lived through this, I wanted to tell it like it was.

Gallenstein, op. cit., p. 5.

“An Exciting Event” [on Friday the 13th April—jbp]

This is the black and white copy which he includes in his published story. When I visited him in his retirement home, the color original was framed on his wall. He sees that kamikaze coming at him every day. How many other survivors have never shaken off that memory?

jbp

Hastings, op. cit, pp. 400,403.

“The overall cost of kamikaze operations to the U.S. fleet off Okinawa was appalling: 120 ships hit, of which twenty-nine were sunk…. “New York Times correspondent William L. Lawrence wrote from the Pacific. ‘Considered carefully, the fact that literally thousands of men, many young and in their prime, will go out on missions of certain death…is not one calculated to breed optimism….”



op. cit., p. 832.

“Though the kamikazes continued to find most of their victims among the radar pickets and the ships off Okinawa, the fast CV force took its share of hits. Adm Mitscher lost a large part of his staff and had to shift flagships twice in three days as CVs Bunker Hill and Enterprise were successively hit and put out of action by crashing kamikazes. SE of Okinawa the British TF also came under persistent kamikaze attack. All four British CVs were hit but able to continue ops. “The American aviators and ships’ crews obtained some relief as vessels were sent back to Ulithi or elsewhere for repair, upkeep, or overhaul. The Fifth Fleet commanders however remained at the scene of ops until the strain they were under became almost unendurable. At last Adm Nimitz, toward the end of May, took the unprecedented step of changing the command in the midst of a campaign. Halsey relieved Spruance, McCain relieved Mitscher, and Hill relieved Turner, whereupon the Fifth Fleet again became the Third Fleet. Halsey was not happy to remain off Okinawa in what appeared to him a purely defensive role, but he quickly perceived that he had no choice. He continued the tactics inaugurated by Spruance, but urged that American air power based on Okinawa be built up as rapidly as possible so that the Fast CV TF, now again called TF 38, could be relieved of its covering and support duties….”

“…by aac batteries.


Ibid.

“At the time of the change of command, the Americans, steadily improving their techniques, had got the kamikaze menace nearly under control. They had supplemented their surface radar pickets with picket planes, strengthened the surface pickets with additional DDs and amphib vessels, and provided the more exposed picket stations with their own CAPs. They had set up radar stations in northern Okinawa and on offshore islands that they had seized for that purpose. The smaller and more maneuverable American ships had learned to present their beams to diving kamikazes for maximum fire power and to work up speed in order to present a difficult target problem to diving suicide planes, which generally came down so fast that air pressure froze their controls. “The kamikazes, on the contrary, could develop no body of data on which to base improvements none who went into a final dive ever returned to base to report his experiences. Moreover the nature of the Special Attack Corps had undergone change. All the willing glory seekers had been expended, and Japanese aviators were now being coerced into giving up their lives. Among these unwilling suicides there was a growing feeling that they were making a useless sacrifice because Okinawa was already obviously lost. Pilots began returning to base claiming that they could not locate any enemy ships. One pilot vented his resentment at being sent to his death by strafing his commanding officer’s quarters as he took off….”

“…and support duties.


“…Okinawa exercised an important influence on the development of events thereafter, through its impact upon the civilian, military and naval leadership of the United States. To capture an outpost, American forces had been obliged to fight the most bitter campaign of the Pacific war. The prospect of invading Kyushu and Honshu in the face of Japanese forces many times greater than those on Okinawa, and presumably imbued with the same fighting spirit, filled those responsible with dismay….To the U.S. chiefs of staff, however, any alternative which averted such necessity would be deemed welcome. “So dramatic was the succession of events which crowded into the last months of the war that it is hard to grasp the notion that, in June, the prospect of the atomic bombs did not loom foremost in the consciousness of the U.S. chiefs of staff. At that stage, their hopes of achieving victory without Olympic [code name for invasion of Kyushu—jbp] rested chiefly on blockade, incendiary air bombardment and Russian entry into the Japanese war. All of these represented more immediate realities…than the putative fulfillment of the Manhattan Project.…”



Ibid.

“By 10 Jun the decline in kamikaze attacks, coupled with the build-up of air power on Okinawa and the successes of the B-29s operating against Kyushu out of China and the Marianas, had created a situation that permitted TF 38 at last to be released from Okinawa waters. When the When the fast CV force arrived at Leyte Gulf on the 13th to prepare for a series of July attacks against Japan, it had been at sea 92 days. “Gunfire support ships and CVEs remained off Okinawa till the Japanese southern bastion had been taken. The island was then declared secured on 21 Jun. The next day Gen Ushijima and his chief of staff acknowledged defeat by ceremoniously committing suicide. Mopping-up ops continued however until the end of the month. By then practically all the defending forces except 11,000 POWs had been killed. American naval guns, shore artillery, and a/c had also killed some 24,000 Okinawan civilians who had the misfortune to be near Japanese troops or installations. For the invaders too the campaign had been costly. Nearly 13,000 Americans had been killed of whom 3,400 were marines and 4,900 were navy. In the fleet most of the casualties among ships men were the result of enemy air attack, chiefly by suicide planes. By air attack alone 15 naval vessels were sunk, none larger than a DD, and more than 200 were damaged, some beyond salvage. This costly sacrifice had purchased a position for bringing air power to bear heavily upon the industrial centers of southern Japan and a base for completing the blockade of the home islands and for supporting the invasion of Kyushu.”

“…he took off.

After Okinawa, the word was “Out and alive in ’55"

eMail correspondence with retired Univ of Arkansas professor

Evan Bukey

After Okinawa, the word was “Out and alive in ’55"

eMail correspondence with retired Univ of Arkansas professor

Evan Bukey

Text

IV. V-J Day—15 Aug 45Celebration in Times Square, NYC—Wikipedia

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May 21, 1945

EMPEROR HIROHITOHow long can an anachronism last ?

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m.jpg Hirohito / Emperor Shōwa裕仁 / 昭和天皇1901-1926-1989

The Japanese Surrender

Sea Power, p. 833.

“On 22 Jun, 1945 Emperor Hirohito of Japan at a meeting of his Supreme War Council gave utterance to what others in authority had been unwilling or afraid to state officially: Japan must find a way to end the war. It was high time. Clouds of American bombers were turning Japan’s cities into ashes.• The strangling blockade was bringing the nation’s production of war materials to a standstill. In Apr the Soviet Union had made the ominous announcement that it would not renew its Neutrality Pact with Japan. In May the surrender of Germany had dispelled the vain hope that some decisive weapon might yet be obtained from that quarter, and at the same time released the combined forces of the Allied world for ops against Japan. Okinawa, the last Japanese outpost, had fallen to the Americans. “Ending the war was not simple. Powerful factions in Japan and in the armed forces abroad favored a war to the bitter end, and neither the rulers nor the people would accept a peace that did not preserve the imperial system. Negotiations therefore had to be carried out in secret, and terms short of ‘unconditional surrender’ had to be obtained. Since of the major powers only Russia was even ostensibly neutral with respect to the Pacific war, it was appropriate that peace feelers be extended through Moscow. The Supreme Council hoped also by bringing the Soviet government into the negotiations to obtain a new neutrality commitment from Russia in exchange for concessions in Manchuria….”


Sea Power, p. 833.

“On 22 Jun, 1945 Emperor Hirohito of Japan at a meeting of his Supreme War Council gave utterance to what others in authority had been unwilling or afraid to state officially: Japan must find a way to end the war. It was high time. Clouds of American bombers were turning Japan’s cities into ashes.• The strangling blockade was bringing the nation’s production of war materials to a standstill. In Apr the Soviet Union had made the ominous announcement that it would not renew its Neutrality Pact with Japan. In May the surrender of Germany had dispelled the vain hope that some decisive weapon might yet be obtained from that quarter, and at the same time released the combined forces of the Allied world for ops against Japan. Okinawa, the last Japanese outpost, had fallen to the Americans….”


Sea Power, p. 833.

“On 22 Jun, 1945 Emperor Hirohito of Japan at a meeting of his Supreme War Council gave utterance to what others in authority had been unwilling or afraid to state officially: Japan must find a way to end the war. It was high time. Clouds of American bombers were turning Japan’s cities into ashes.• The strangling blockade was bringing the nation’s production of war materials to a standstill. In Apr the Soviet Union had made the ominous announcement that it would not renew its Neutrality Pact with Japan. In May the surrender of Germany had dispelled the vain hope that some decisive weapon might yet be obtained from that quarter, and at the same time released the combined forces of the Allied world for ops against Japan. Okinawa, the last Japanese outpost, had fallen to the Americans. “Ending the war was not simple. Powerful factions in Japan and in the armed forces abroad favored a war to the bitter end, and neither the rulers nor the people would accept a peace that did not preserve the imperial system. Negotiations therefore had to be carried out in secret, and terms short of ‘unconditional surrender’ had to be obtained. Since of the major powers only Russia was even ostensibly neutral with respect to the Pacific war, it was appropriate that peace feelers be extended through Moscow. The Supreme Council hoped also by bringing the Soviet government into the negotiations to obtain a new neutrality commitment from Russia in exchange for concessions in Manchuria….”


op. cit, pp. 833-834.

“…concessions in Manchuria. But when the Japanese ambassador in Moscow approached the Soviet foreign office on the subject of peace terms, he found the Russians disposed to stall. At the July conferenceof the victors over Germany held at Potsdam, Premier Stalin at first said nothing to President Truman or to Prime Minister Churchill about Japan’s request for mediation.6 The Russians evidently had no intention of helping the Japanese get out of the war until they themselves could get into it and thereby share the fruits of victory. “But President Truman knew about the peace feelers because American intelligence was reading the coded radio messages passing between the Japanese foreign minister in Tokyo and the Japanese ambassador in Moscow. On 26 Jul the governments of the United States, Britain, and China gave Japan her answer in the Potsdam Proclamation, which specified that for Japan ‘unconditional surrender’ was to apply only to the armed forces. The Proclamation further stated that Japan was to be stripped of all her territorial gains and possessions except the four home islands, and that points in Japan would be occupied until a ‘peacefully inclined and responsible government’ had been established in a free election. Nothing was said about the fate of the Emperor or the imperial system because the Allied governments had not yet made up their minds on that point. Two days after the Proclamation was issued, Stalin at last informed his colleagues of the Japanese request for terms….”__________ 6 Clement Attlee replaced Churchill as British prime minister before the end of the Potsdam Conference.

“…request for terms.


op. cit, p. 834.

“The Potsdam Proclamation came a little too suddenly for the Japanese Cabinet, for they had not taken steps to prepare the Japanese people for surrender, they had not received the hoped-for commitment from the Soviet Union, and they had not settled disagreements among themselves. The chief stumbling block however was the failure of the Proclamation to spell out what the Allies intended to do about the Japanese Emperor….”


op. cit, p. 834.

“While the Russian leaders were stalling and the Japanese leaders were procrastinating, the Americans and the British were actively planning an invasion of Kyushu for Nov 45, with an assault on Honshu and an advance into the Tokyo Plain to follow in Mar 46. On 16 Jul, the world’s first man-made atomic explosion was set off at Alamogordo, NM, and within a few hours the erstwhile Fifth Fleet flagship Indianapolis, newly repaired from the battering she received off Okinawa, was en route from San Francisco to the Marianas with the first military atomic bomb. Bombers from Okinawa and the Marianas were now appearing over Japan in waves of 500 or more, burning out vast areas of Japan’s major cities. On 10 Jul, TF 38 had raided airfields near Tokyo. From this date on, with a single break, the Third Fleet CV force paraded up and down the Japanese coast till the end of the war, bombing and bombarding with virtual impunity while Japan hoarded her a/c to throw back the expected invasion. On 17 Jul, Halsey’s 105 men-of-war were joined by 28 British warships, designated TF 37. This combined fleet, the most powerful striking force in history, then raided the naval bases at Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay and at Kure on the Inland Sea, sinking or heavily damaging the remnants of the Imperial Japanese Fleet….”

“…the Japanese Emperor.

“…request for terms.


op. cit, p. 834.

“The Potsdam Proclamation came a little too suddenly for the Japanese Cabinet, for they had not taken steps to prepare the Japanese people for surrender, they had not received the hoped-for commitment from the Soviet Union, and they had not settled disagreements among themselves. The chief stumbling block however was the failure of the Proclamation to spell out what the Allies intended to do about the Japanese Emperor. “While the Russian leaders were stalling and the Japanese leaders were procrastinating, the Americans and the British were actively planning an invasion of Kyushu for Nov 45, with an assault on Honshu and an advance into the Tokyo Plain to follow in Mar 46. On 16 Jul, the world’s first man-made atomic explosion was set off at Alamogordo, NM, and within a few hours the erstwhile Fifth Fleet flagship Indianapolis, newly repaired from the battering she received off Okinawa, was en route from San Francisco to the Marianas with the first military atomic bomb. Bombers from Okinawa and the Marianas were now appearing over Japan in waves of 500 or more, burning out vast areas of Japan’s major cities. On 10 Jul, TF 38 had raided airfields near Tokyo. From this date on, with a single break, the Third Fleet CV force paraded up and down the Japanese coast till the end of the war, bombing and bombarding with virtual impunity while Japan hoarded her a/c to throw back the expected invasion. On 17 Jul, Halsey’s 105 men-of-war were joined by 28 British warships, designated TF 37. This combined fleet, the most powerful striking force in history, then raided the naval bases at Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay and at Kure on the Inland Sea, sinking or heavily damaging the remnants of the Imperial Japanese Fleet….” HALSEY

“Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs!”

July 23, 1945


Ibid.

“…Imperial Japanese Fleet. On 30 Jul, the Third Fleet ended the first phase of its intensive ops against Japan with a raid on airfields and factories in central Honshu. On this date also, the Indianapolis, having delivered her bomb to Tinian touched at Guam, and then headed for Leyte, was sunk in the Philippine Sea by a Japanese SS with the loss of nearly 900 lives….”


Ibid.

“…nearly 900 lives. “Japan waited a little too long for a commitment from the Soviet Union, for the Americans at length interpreted the continued Japanese silence as a rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation. On 6 August, a B-29, taking off from Tinian, flew over Japan and dropped an atomic bomb that seared and flattened most of the city of Hiroshima. The Russians now realized that if they were to get into the war at all, it must be soon. On 8 Aug the Soviet foreign minister at Moscow handed the Japanese ambassador his long-awaited answer. It was a declaration of war. Within a few hours the Red Army marched into Manchuria. On the 9th another air-borne atomic bomb devastated the city of Nagasaki.….”


Ibid.

“Japan waited a little too long for a commitment from the Soviet Union, for the Americans at length interpreted the continued Japanese silence as a rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation. On 6 August, a B-29, taking off from Tinian, flew over Japan and dropped an atomic bomb that seared and flattened most of the city of Hiroshima. The Russians now realized that if they were to get into the war at all, it must be soon. On 8 Aug the Soviet foreign minister at Moscow handed the Japanese ambassador his long-awaited answer. It was a declaration of war. Within a few hours the Red Army marched into Manchuria. On the 9th another air-borne atomic bomb devastated the city of Nagasaki. • Also on the 9th the Third Fleet, having ridden out a typhoon, returned to Japanese waters and raided airfields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido. On the 10th Russian forces entered Korea….”

LeMAY OF THE B-29SCan Japan stand the bombing that Germany got?

August 13, 1945


Ibid.

“…Imperial Japanese Fleet. On 30 Jul, the Third Fleet ended the first phase of its intensive ops against Japan with a raid on airfields and factories in central Honshu. On this date also, the Indianapolis, having delivered her bomb to Tinian touched at Guam, and then headed for Leyte, was sunk in the Philippine Sea by a Japanese SS with the loss of nearly 900 lives. “Japan waited a little too long for a commitment from the Soviet Union, for the Americans at length interpreted the continued Japanese silence as a rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation. On 6 August, a B-29, taking off from Tinian, flew over Japan and dropped an atomic bomb that seared and flattened most of the city of Hiroshima. The Russians now realized that if they were to get into the war at all, it must be soon. On 8 Aug the Soviet foreign minister at Moscow handed the Japanese ambassador his long-awaited answer. It was a declaration of war. Within a few hours the Red Army marched into Manchuria. On the 9th another air-borne atomic bomb devastated the city of Nagasaki. • Also on the 9th the Third Fleet, having ridden out a typhoon, returned to Japanese waters and raided airfields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido. On the 10th Russian forces entered Korea….”

“…forces entered Korea.


op. cit, pp. 834-835.

“These startling events both ended the procrastination of the Japanese government and solved one of its most difficult problems. Until then the imperial councillors had been at a loss how to present the facts to a nation long deluded by propaganda. There was a strong chance that any attempt to surrender would precipitate mutiny in the armed services and civil war among the people. But the power and mystery of the new bomb, with the swift advance of the Red Army, and the resumption of Third Fleet raids persuaded all but the most hot-headed that further resistance was useless. Shortly after midnight in the morning of 10 Aug, Emperor Hirohito rose with deep emotion before his Supreme Council and advised immediate acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. The Cabinet unanimously agreed but only on the condition that the imperial system remain unimpaired. This decision they forwarded via Switzerland and Sweden to Washington, London, Moscow, and Chunking. On receipt of the Japanese decision, American Secretary of State James Byrnes, acting on behalf of the Allied governments, drafted a reply accepting the condition but imposing two stipulations : that during the occupation the Emperor must submit to the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, and that the Japanese people should decide the Emperor’s ultimate status through free election….”

“…through free election.


op. cit, p. 835.

“While the Allies were considering the Japanese condition and the Japanese were considering the Allied stipulations, the Third Fleet raided northern Honshu again and struck at the Kurils. It then turned S and on 13 Aug once more attacked Tokyo.….



op. cit, p. 835.

“While the Allies were considering the Japanese condition and the Japanese were considering the Allied stipulations, the Third Fleet raided northern Honshu again and struck at the Kurils. It then turned S and on 13 Aug once more attacked Tokyo.• On the 14th the Japanese Cabinet, again on the Emperor’s advice, accepted the Allied stipulations. On 15 Aug, when one CV strike was already over the Tokyo area and another had just been launched, the Third Fleet received the order to ’cease fire’….

NIMITZ OF THE PACIFICNaval arithmetic has brought him to Japan’s front yard.



op. cit, p. 835.

“While the Allies were considering the Japanese condition and the Japanese were considering the Allied stipulations, the Third Fleet raided northern Honshu again and struck at the Kurils. It then turned S and on 13 Aug once more attacked Tokyo.• On the 14th the Japanese Cabinet, again on the Emperor’s advice, accepted the Allied stipulations. On 15 Aug, when one CV strike was already over the Tokyo area and another had just been launched, the Third Fleet received the order to ’cease fire’….

VJ-day 15 Aug 45

—— the country

rejoices

“… to ’cease fire.’


Ibid.

“On 2 Sept aboard BB Missouri in Tokyo Bay, with ships of the Third Fleet standing by, the Japanese foreign minister, acting for the Emperor, the Government, and Imperial GHQ, signed the instrument of surrender.…”



Ibid.

“On 2 Sept aboard BB Missouri in Tokyo Bay, with ships of the Third Fleet standing by, the Japanese foreign minister, acting for the Emperor, the Government, and Imperial GHQ, signed the instrument of surrender.• Gen of the Army Douglas MacArthur then signed the acceptance as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. FAdm Chester Nimitz next affixed his signature as Representative for the United States.• He was followed by representatives for the UK, China, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. “Soon afterward Gen MacArthur moved into HQ in Tokyo to direct the occupation of Japan.”


Ibid.

“On 2 Sept aboard BB Missouri in Tokyo Bay, with ships of the Third Fleet standing by, the Japanese foreign minister, acting for the Emperor, the Government, and Imperial GHQ, signed the instrument of surrender.• Gen of the Army Douglas MacArthur then signed the acceptance as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. FAdm Chester Nimitz next affixed his signature as Representative for the United States.…”



Ibid.


MacArthur

Wainwright

Halsey

MacARTHUROn to Tokyo for the Peace of the World



Ibid.




Ibid.




Ibid.


MacARTHUROn to Tokyo for the Peace of the World

Sep 13, 1945:

British troops arrive to disarm the Japanese, 13 Sept 1945

In accordance with the Potsdam Agreements at the end of WWII, 5,000 British troops of the 20th Indian Division, commanded by Gen. Douglas Gracey, arrive in southern Indochina to disarm the defeated Japanese forces. In August, Ho Chi Minh.…”

http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/british-troops-arrive-to-disarm-the-japanese?et_cid=65589156&et_rid=744978421&linkid=http%3a%2f

%2fwww.history.com%2fthis-day-in-history%2fbritish-troops-arrive-to-disarm-the-japanese

Sep 13, 1945:


In accordance with the Potsdam Agreements at the end of WWII, 5,000 British troops of the 20th Indian Division, commanded by Gen. Douglas Gracey, arrive in southern Indochina to disarm the defeated Japanese forces. In August, Ho Chi Minh • and the Viet Minh had seized power in Hanoi and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and independence from French colonial rule. However, Gracey, who detested the Viet Minh, rearmed some 1,400 French soldiers who had been imprisoned by the Japanese. This effectively was the first step in the re-establishment of French colonial rule and set the stage for the conflict between the French and the Viet Minh that led to a bloody nine-year war which would not end until the Viet Minh inflicted a humiliating defeat on the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.



Sep 13, 1945:


In accordance with the Potsdam Agreements at the end of WWII, 5,000 British troops of the 20th Indian Division, commanded by Gen. Douglas Gracey, arrive in southern Indochina to disarm the defeated Japanese forces. In August, Ho Chi Minh • and the Viet Minh had seized power in Hanoi and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and independence from French colonial rule. However, Gracey, who detested the Viet Minh, rearmed some 1,400 French soldiers who had been imprisoned by the Japanese. This effectively was the first step in the re-establishment of French colonial rule and set the stage for the conflict between the French and the Viet Minh that led to a bloody nine-year war which would not end until the Viet Minh inflicted a humiliating defeat on the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.



Text

V. EpilogueRuin of Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall (Genbaku or A-bomb dome)—Wikipedia

"Genbaku Dome04-r" by Oilstreet - Own work. Licensed under Creative

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r.JPG#mediaviewer/File:Genbaku_Dome04-r.JPG

"Atomic bombing of Japan" by Nagasakibomb.jpg: The picture was taken by Charles Levy from one of the B-29 Superfortresses used in the attack.Atomic_cloud_over_Hiroshima.jpg: Personel

aboard Necessary Evilderivative work: Binksternet (talk) - Nagasakibomb.jpgAtomic_cloud_over_Hiroshima.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File:Atomic_bombing_of_Japan.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Atomic_bombing_of_Japan.jpg

Hiroshima Nagasaki

Lt Cdr John R. Powers, USNR

in 1953 at Charlie Gray’s

The father I knew was a sensitive, loving human being. But here’s his take after 3 years, 6 months, and 22 days of the Pacific war:

“21 Aug 45 1500“Betty Precious,“…The end of the war didn’t come quickly but it came suddenly. From a safe distance I’d love to see one of those atomic bombs go off in a big Jap city. The accounts say they are scorchers—that for miles around they sear every living thing to a crisp and they tumble buildings and all cover down on every living thing under cover. That bomb is a lulu. I wish we’d given Germany a few….“Never pick a cave to get away from War. The sport of burning Japs alive in caves with flame throwers has blossomed to magnificent proportions over here….“I do hope Jim gets to go to Clifton. But I prefer Guilford to Lotspeeches [sic] absolutely. The class of children [at Clifton] is superior mentally, morally, and physically. Same for teachers…“I’m pleased if Jim is thrilled at the prospect of getting his dad home….“I want to but a tail suit and take you to dance in evening clothes once every week. We must….”

Powers, ed., op. cit. n.p.

“…those atomic bombs…”

Our understanding of the past is conditioned by the questions we ask of the historical data which we have. Much of human thought focuses on anxiety about the future and regret about the past. The developments of the Cold War (1945-1990?) raised great anxiety about the threat of nuclear war and a resultant regret about the decision to drop, if not to create, the bomb. Immediate post-war exuberance about avoiding the invasion of the home islands gave way to (1) remorse over the suffering of the bombs’ victims—1946 (2) fear over the Soviet bomb—1949 (3) and ensuing nuclear arms race—1950s (4) “Ban the Bomb” movement—1950s-present (5) Cold War historical revisionism—1960s-present

jbp

No event in WW II has produced more revisionism


“IN THE FINAL PHASE of the Second World War, Allied generals and admirals played a minor role in the decisions which precipitated Japan’s surrender. These will remain a focus of controversy until the end of time, first, because of the use of atomic bombs; second, because of the mountains of historical evidence, detailing the principal actors’ words and deeds, stands so high. Much of it invites inconclusive or even contradictory interpretation. [all historical accounts are interpretation—jbp] Leading figures changed their minds, some more than once. Several wrote disingenuously afterwards, to justify their own actions. The Japanese aspect of the story is rendered opaque by a familiar chasm between what the nation’s leaders said, and what each afterwards claimed or is conjectured privately to have thought.”

“The Bombs1. Fantasy in Tokyo”

The “New Journalism,in which storytelling techniques of fiction are adapted to non-fiction reportage.”—Wikipedia


descended from Mayflower settlers, born in China to missionary parents, learned Chinese before he spoke English

1924-returned to US to prep for Yale

1937- after Cambridge, summer job as secretary to Sinclair Lewis, then Time China correspondent

1942-45—Hersey covered fighting in Europe as well as Asia, writing articles for Time-Life. Accompanied troops on the invasion of Sicily, survived four airplane crashes, and was commended by the SecNav for his role in helping evacuate wounded soldiers from Guadalcanal.

winter of 1945–46—“was in Japan, reporting for The New Yorker on the reconstruction of the devastated country, when he found a document written by a Jesuit missionary who had survived the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The journalist visited the missionary, who introduced him to other survivors.”—Wikipedia


descended from Mayflower settlers, born in China to missionary parents, learned Chinese before he spoke English

1924-returned to US to prep for Yale

1937- after Cambridge, summer job as secretary to Sinclair Lewis, then Time China correspondent

1942-45—Hersey covered fighting in Europe as well as Asia, writing articles for Time-Life. Accompanied troops on the invasion of Sicily, survived four airplane crashes, and was commended by the SecNav for his role in helping evacuate wounded soldiers from Guadalcanal.

winter of 1945–46—“was in Japan, reporting for The New Yorker on the reconstruction of the devastated country, when he found a document written by a Jesuit missionary who had survived the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The journalist visited the missionary, who introduced him to other survivors.”—Wikipedia

Remorse

• The origin of the Clock can be traced to the international group of researchers called the Chicago Atomic Scientists who had participated in the Manhattan Project.

• After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they started to publish a mimeographed newsletter and then a bulletin.

• Since its inception, the Clock has been depicted on every cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

• Its first representation was in 1947

WikipediaCover of the 1947 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists issue that first featured the Doomsday Clock at seven minutes to midnight (11:53 pm),—-Wikipedia

New Left Revisionism

‘60s-along with other leftist professors, energized by the revolutionary atmosphere, he began a renewed “debunking” of patriotic American history

1965-Atomic Diplomacy : Hiroshima and Potsdam began his career of exposing the sinister motivation behind US foreign policy

New Left Revisionism

‘60s-along with other leftist professors, energized by the revolutionary atmosphere, he began a renewed “debunking” of patriotic American history

1965-Atomic Diplomacy : Hiroshima and Potsdam began his career of exposing the sinister motivation behind US foreign policy

1995-he returns to his theme with this defense of the original thesis—not to end the war but to establish American imperialism

2014-“Understanding the Imperialist System Changed My Life”—Gar Alperovitz on the independent tv news show “Reality Asserts Itself” on the [so-called] Real News

And Fear

And Fear

jbp

1995-The 50th Anniversary Controversy at SI

Concurrently with Alperovitz’ later polemic, he and other leftist historians Barton Bernstein and Kai Bird encouraged the director of Smithsonian’s Air & Space Museum to mount “a ‘blockbuster’ exhibit” of the Enola Gay, the B-29 which delivered the Hiroshima bomb. A friend of a friend of mine happened to be the current chairman of the Aero committee. When they read the ‘hush hush” proposal he and his committee believed it “ill-advised.”

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jbp


I felt the idea was foolish, wondering, too, if we had the curatorial expertise in place to even attempt it. In fact, I sent two memos to the director, which recorded the reluctance of most curators in Aero to the project. As an alternative, I suggested we do an exhibit on Strategic bombing, to open in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the ending of the war. Such an exhibit might and should deal with the EG and Hiroshima, but the legendary plane would not be the centerpiece. Also, this alternative exhibit might afford a more creative path to deal with history, one where we could give emphasis to all sides on the matter of the efficacy of bombing to win wars. I thought this was sweet reason.—eMail to jbp, Apr 2008

Needless to say, the Director, encouraged by the radical professors, ignored the good advice of his subordinates and continued with a New Left slant which condemned “wartime racism.” The “EG label script” was leaked


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Soon, of course, the Air Force Association and vets arose to challenge the Museum on its proposed EG exhibit. What a fiasco. You no doubt know the melancholy story.—Ibid


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Soon, of course, the Air Force Association and vets arose to challenge the Museum on its proposed EG exhibit. What a fiasco. You no doubt know the melancholy story.—Ibid

The exhibit was scrubbed, the director fired, and the Enola Gay remained ‘in exile,” one of many a/c, at the Dulles International Airport Annex.

Bess begins the forum with his perceived divide between professional historians and “popular culture.” But, as we have seen, there is no consensus within “academic culture.” He cites David Kennedy, The American People in World War II, which “somberly lays before the reader many of the morally questionable acts…committed by the United States between 1939 and 1945…. “On the other side [there are popular books]…selling like hotcakes…that reinforce the underlying virtuousness of ‘our side.’ “— Historically Speaking, (Mar/Apr 2008), pp. 34-49

jbp

2008-The Debate Continues

I find it almost incomprehensible that anyone would claim to discover moral ambiguity in World War II….[It] was an obscene bloodbath that poisoned the hearts of everyone involved….And it is a credit to the civilized nations of the Earth that many grew to regret both the pain inflicted on the vanquished and the means used to inflict that pain. This was particularly true as time began to blur the moral calamity that overcame the world during the war. In Stimson’s famous article in 1946 explaining the use of the atomic bomb, it is very clear that the wise old man knew, above all, that some of his countrymen would forget what the world looked like in 19456 and how people acted in 1945. I wish more historians of today understood Stimson’s point.The general public in the West, however, does not seem to suffer any major ethical quandary concerning the war….Machiavelli, criticized by Bess, was quite right when describing a necessary war as a just war. If World War II was not necessary, no war has been.—Eric Bergerud, reply to Bess, op. cit.

The forum title, “Moral Dimensions of WW II” reminds me of a French officer’s comment at the Second Hague Convention, 1907: “Civilizing war? You might as well speak of civilizing hell!”

Bess concludes the forum with thanks to his critics for their comments. He accepts some of their input and defends other parts of his work by arguing against their views. Finally, he defends his right to take up this topic even though he is not a military historian:

2008-The Debate Continues (Concluded)Bess’s discussion of atomic diplomacy, however, is one instance where he overlooks some vital scholarship. It is difficult to see how, on the one hand, Bess can reject the atomic diplomacy thesis, and, on the other, find that Alperovitz’s evidence is ‘quite solid.’ Alperovitz’s thesis is built on sand; moreover, it is sand that Alperovitz has shifted for his own purposes. Bess would know this if he had consulted diplomatic historian Robert James Maddox, an expert on Truman’s foreign policy and the bombing of Hiroshima. More than three decades ago, Maddox demonstrated that Alperovitz’s footnotes could not be trusted; Alperovitz repeatedly misled his readers about the context of important statements and used ellipses to change the meaning of others.—Michael Kort, reply to Bess, op. cit., p. 42.

…I think that war (to paraphrase the old adage) is too important a subject to be left to military historians alone. Wars—especially colossal ones like the conflict of 1939-1945—powerfully affect every area of human life, from politics and economics to science and philosophy. They are rightly everyone’s concern, because they touch all of our lives. Thus, while it is vitally important to remain grounded in the field of military history when studying a conflict like WW II, it is also equally important to bring to bear the critical and analytical tools of other historical subfields, and indeed of other disciplines such as anthropology, psychology and philosophy, in seeking to understand this phenomenon. This should not be a subject reserved to specialists…—op. cit., pp. 45-49 (quote on p. 48).

The US Navy’s role in World War II can be said to have ended with the massive return of the millions of servicemen of both branches who had been poised for Op DOWNFALL. My father returned in Dec 45, dressed in his SWPA khakis by air to the Seattle NAS. I remember the handsome leather, fleece-lined jacket a sympathetic airman gave him.

But, unlike the massive demobilizations after past wars, our armed forces were not stripped to perilous levels. We have FDR’s friend, ‘Uncle Joe’ Stalin to thank for that. The fall of Nationalist China, the Soviet ‘bomb,’ and, finally, Kim Il-sung’s invasion of our client state in 1950 began the military expansion which worried Ike a decade later. And underlining the tensions of the Cold War, with its proxy wars, was the shadow of the ‘bomb.’

The US Navy’s role in World War II can be said to have ended with the massive return of the millions of servicemen of both branches who had been poised for Op DOWNFALL. My father returned in Dec 45, dressed in his SWPA khakis by air to the Seattle NAS. I remember the handsome leather, fleece-lined jacket a sympathetic airman gave him.

But, unlike the massive demobilizations after past wars, our armed forces were not stripped to perilous levels. We have FDR’s friend, ‘Uncle Joe’ Stalin to thank for that. The fall of Nationalist China, the Soviet ‘bomb,’ and, finally, Kim Il-sung’s invasion of our client state in 1950 began the military expansion which worried Ike a decade later. And underlining the tensions of the Cold War, with its proxy wars, was the shadow of the ‘bomb.’

This legacy of WW II is as current as the negotiations with Iran, the efforts of China and Kim Il-sung’s grandson to develop their ‘bombs’ and delivery systems.

I remember the chilling Top Secret lecture on nuclear weapons capabilities given to us just before we graduated from USNA, Jun 62.

But that’s another story

Education

US Navy in the Pacific, session x, part ii