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International Affairs 400 ­ Senior Research in International Affairs The Iranian Bomb; A Cross­Country Comparison with Pakistan

By: Branden Ryan

Contents:

I. Introduction

1.1 Introduction of the Topic 1.2 Research Questions

II. Literature Review 2.1 Factors of Nuclear Proliferation; Why Do States Develop Nuclear Programs?

2.1.1 Realism: Classical and Offensive Realism and the Security Dilemma 2.1.2 Domestic Factors 2.1.3 Quantitative Measurements: A Growing Field

2.2 Nuclear Pessimism versus Nuclear Optimism: A Debate III. Methodology

3.1 Research Design IV. Data Analysis

4.1 The Political Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation 4.1.1 Security Concerns and the Role of the Balance of Power 4.1.2 Domestic Politics 4.1.3 The Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty

4.1 The Economic Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation 4.3 The Social Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation; Religion

V. Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Research VI. Bibliography VII. Appendix

7.1 Acronyms 7.2 Figures for Section 4.1.1 7.3 Figures for Section 4.2

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction of the Topic Nuclear proliferation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a long­term concern for its

neighbors and the international community as a whole, particularly after the Iran­Iraq War of

1980­1988. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South East Asia region has presented a

variety of unique security concerns for the global community, and as sources of energy become

increasingly scarce, the desire to acquire nuclear technology for nuclear power has also

increased. However, nuclear technology for energy presents the risk of becoming nuclear

technology for weapons, and this concern underscores the foreign policy decisions of various

nations regarding Iran.

It is important to note that Pakistan is the only Muslim country that currently possesses

nuclear weapon technology. The Pakistani need for nuclear weapons as a source of deterrence

became pronounced during the conflicts along the borders of Pakistan and India and the inherent

issues between the two states. Iran is seeking to become a nuclear power in the region to affirm

its own security within the turmoil plaguing many of its neighboring states and to act as a bastion

of Islamic principles. The following sections will provide a theoretical framework of nuclear

proliferation and the explanation of nuclear proliferation according to the paradigms of

international relations and then will juxtapose nuclear pessimism and nuclear optimism. This

paper will seek to compare and contrast the nuclear programs of Pakistan and Iran and find

similarities between how Pakistan came to acquire and utilize their nuclear weapons as means of

deterrence, however peaceful they may be interpreted, and how Iran’s own strategy for nuclear

weapon acquisition affects the prospects of peace and the integrity of the nuclear

non­proliferation regime.

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1.2 Research Questions 1­ How does the development of the Iranian nuclear program compare to that of Pakistan? 2­ What are the prospects for Iran to develop peaceful nuclear technology? 3­ What are the implications of Iran developing a nuclear weapons program? How are these

implications similar or different to those of the existence of a Pakistani nuclear weapons program?

4­ Does nuclear pessimism or nuclear optimism describe Iran’s nuclear program?

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Factors of Nuclear Proliferation; Why Do States Develop Nuclear Programs?

2.1.1 Realism: Classical Realism, Anarchy, and the Security Dilemma There are numerous paradigms of international relations that attempt to describe the

actions of States. Alexander Wendt’s constructivst approach, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s

neoliberal institutionalist perspective, and Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist outlook all represent some

of the many paradigms that have emerged since the formal study of international relations began

at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, understanding the realist perspective, one of

the first and most important paradigms of international relations, is vital in interpreting the

significance of nuclear technology and weapons due to the nature of WMDs. Through the lens of

realism, the functions and purposes of nuclear arsenals is best explained as means of securing the

interests of States in the international system.

Hans J. Morgenthau’s “Six Principles of Political Realism” exemplifies the importance of

the author as one of the founders of political realism within international relations. This opening

chapter of Politics among Nations summarizes the primary tenets of political realism that are

essential in understanding nuclear weapons as means of power to secure interests. Political

realism creates a framework for obtaining a basic understanding of the principle of rationality of

States that provides motivation for certain actions, including the acquisition of nuclear

technology.

Morgenthau’s first assertion is that political realism is based on objectivity and the role of

natural laws in human nature (16). The role of natural laws is derived from the Enlightenment

tradition that serves to emphasize the importance of facts and objectivity over emotion and

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subjectivity in order to analyze the political system. Accordingly, the second point of

Morgenthau’s concept of realism is that interest is defined in terms of power (17). The

fundamental concern of States is the quest of power as a means of ensuring that their interests are

met. Historically, States have pursued power to fuel their motives, and foreign policy decision

making is rooted in this objective fact. Morgenthau notes that irrationality and emotionalism are

present in the objectives of States at times, but he notes that political realism “knows that

political reality is replete with contingencies and systematic irrationalities and points to the

typical influences they exert upon foreign policy,” implying that political realism notes the role

of subjectivity, but not over that of objectivity (18). However, interest defined as power is not a

fixed concept, which is the third point of Morgenthau’s principles. Context and circumstance

influence the formation of interests and the definition of power.

Morgenthau posits that morality cannot be used to define political reality; “realism

maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their

abstract formulation,” but rather, that the abstract concepts of statehood and States’ interests

must be governed by time and place (20­21). Similarly, the fifth point of Morgenthau’s political

realism is that the moral foundations of one nation do not constitute universal applications of

morality due to the subjective nature of the construction of morality. The concept of power and

interest are universals, but the role of morality and emotionalism affects each State individually.

Morgenthau’s final observation on political realism is that it “maintains the autonomy of the

political sphere” and that the political realities of international politics differ from moral or

individual concerns (22).

Whereas Morgenthau’s classical realism emphasizes the importance of rationality as a

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human characteristic that is personified by States, Kenneth Waltz’ neorealism attempts to

redefine realism in terms of structure as opposed to human nature. In this Theory of International

Politics, Waltz describes the structural importance of the international system as a means of

defining the interests of States. “A system is composed of a structure of interacting units,” and

these structural units make “it possible to think of the system as a whole” (2009, 37). Waltz’s

analysis is divided into three parts: ordering principles, the nature of the units, and distribution of

capabilities. According to Waltz, the international system is “decentralized and anarchic,”

referring to the fact that an anarchical system has no centralized hierarchy (2009, 40). Thus, the

nature of the units, which in this case, are States, means that each State is essentially equal in the

international system. As such, in terms of capability, each State has the same potential

capabilities. However, “the unites of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their

greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks,” referencing the importance of

measuring power (Waltz 2009, 46). Thus, Waltz’s neorealism emphasizes the nature of the

structure of the international system over the characteristics of each individual rational State.

Waltz notes that anarchy in the international system requires States to govern their

actions by the principle of self­help. According to Waltz, “self­help is necessarily the principle of

action in an anarchic order” where States must engage in high­risk to secure their interests (2000,

53). John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism highlights the importance of military power

as a means of ensuring the interest of the State. “Survival is the number one goal of great

powers,” and though States often pursue non­security goals, such as economic stability or social

programs, these are often made in order to bolster the nation’s position of security (Mearsheimer

66). These various strands of realism do differ from one another in specific details, but they all

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demonstrate the importance of the individual State as the primary actor in the international

community whose survival and security constitute the most essential foreign policy goals and

influence the conduct of international relations. As such, realism can operate on the individual,

unit, and systemic levels of analysis.

In order to cope with the conditions of uncertainty in the international system, Kenneth

Oye notes that “governments often bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action”

(79). States must decide what courses of action to take in different situations according to the

payoffs of the security dilemma. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler’s work on uncertainty and

the security dilemma demonstrate the importance of understanding international politics as a

situation of payoffs in which States must determine these courses of action. According to Booth

and Wheeler, “the security dilemma is a foundational concept because, above all, it engages with

the existential condition of uncertainty (133­134 Williams book). The security dilemma is

divided into two parts: the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. Essentially,

the dilemma of interpretation arises when a State is unsure how to interpret the actions of another

State, and the dilemma of response is the dilemma that State faces in determining what actions

constitute appropriate responses. When States engage in arms races and back­and­forth foreign

policy responses, Booth and Wheeler call this a security paradox in which responses to the

security dilemma create a cycle of responses to counter other States’ actions (137 williams

book). The dynamics of the security dilemma and uncertainty and the opportunity for payoffs are

articulated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma which creates a basic, four­outcome scenario for States.

Oye summarizes the four possible options in the Prisoner’s Dilemma:

The structure of payoffs in a given round of play ­ the benefits of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) and the benefits of unilateral defection (DC) relative to unrequited cooperation (CD) ­ is fundamental to the analysis of cooperation.

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[...] For a mutual benefit to exist, actors must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD). For coordination to be necessary to the realization of mutual benefit, actors must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD). (81)

Visually, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is as follows:

STATE A

Cooperation Defection

Cooperation STATE B

Defection

Image 2.1.1.A A variety of factors influence the decision of State A and State B to either cooperate or defect. A

cost/benefit analysis must be undertaken by each State to make these foreign policy decisions.

Possible methods of cooperation include alliances, bandwagoning, and engaging in mutual

security or defense initiatives. However, uncertainty makes it difficult to ascertain the goals of

the other state, thus contributing to the security dilemma between States.

Though other paradigms seek to explain the foreign policy decisions of States, none have

had as pervasive an effect on the study of nuclear proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear

technology as realism. Accordingly, this paper will operate under the theoretical assumptions of

realism when analyzing the foreign policy decision making processes of Pakistan and Iran.

2.1.2 Domestic Factors

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Though this paper assumes the primacy of the rationality of States and the importance of

survival as a security concern, it is important to make a brief note of the domestic determinants

of nuclear proliferation. Etel Solingen posits that domestic factors act as important filters through

which foreign policy decisions are made. Solingen’s liberal perspective focuses on how domestic

politics affect the notion of survival of the State. Solingen asserts that internal economic factors

and the need to strengthen domestic institutions can play an important role in the acquisition of

nuclear weapons. “Nuclearization [...] strengthen[s] bureaucracies and industrial complexes” and

can have effects on the nationalist sentiments of a nation (40). Regime legitimization can be an

important factor in the quest for nuclear weapons due to this facet of development. “Middle East

leaders faced lower barriers to, and stronger incentives for, the pursuit of nuclear weapons than

did East Asian ones” as a result of the need to strengthen domestic political institutions (41).

External behavior and internal behavior become interconnected, and as such, Solingen’s premise

is that the reasons for nuclear proliferation cannot be wholly dependent on the external

influences of a nation. Accordingly, “their inclusion may improve our understanding of the

actual effects of security dilemmas, international norms, and institutions when interacting with

domestic models” (44). Domestic determinants, including economic factors and political

institutions, regime type, leaders, and social characteristics such as ideology, are necessary in

creating a holistic analysis of the nuclear policies of a State.

2.1.3 Quantitative Measurements: A Growing Field Quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation have become increasingly important in

assessing the nuclear capabilities of States in recent decades due to the inherent failure of the

NPT to dissuade countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The following reviews summarize

the major studies that have comprised the main body of literature on the issue of nuclear

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proliferation from a quantitative stance.

Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way’s “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A

Quantitative Test,” published in the December 2004 version of The Journal of Conflict

Resolution, was one of the first quantitative studies on the variables that indicate a propensity to

proliferate. According to the authors, the research on nuclear proliferation was qualitative in

nature and the “theories are frequently tested as if they make deterministic claims” though based

on observation and not quantitative data (860). Singh and Way divide their variables into three

categories: technological, external, and domestic determinants, in order to create a holistic

approach towards analyzing the nuclear policies of various countries. Briefly defined,

technological determinants place “emphasis on technology as the driving force behind weapons

development” (862). Thus, States must reach a certain technological threshold to acquire nuclear

weapons, and after crossing this threshold, some States may be inclined towards nuclear

development. External determinants are environmental factors that create a sense of willingness

or necessity to develop nuclear capabilities as a response to threats, as per the realist paradigm of

international relations. Domestic determinants include internal motivations for acquiring nuclear

weapons. Singh and Way cite democracy, liberalization, social classes, and symbolism/status as

examples of domestic determinants (864). States are then divided into four categories to codify

the variables: no interest in nuclear weapons, exploring the nuclear option, developing nuclear

technology, and acquiring nuclear technology. For the purposes of their study, Singh and Way

treat the last three categories in that list. The variables that they treat can be found in the

following table.

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Table 2.1.3.A from Singh and Way, 2004

Through statistical analyses, Singh and Way find that GDP per capita, the industrial capacity

index, and the external determinants of a threat environment are the most significant variables in

explaining nuclear proliferation along all three categories of nuclear or aspiring nations. This

study does not find economic liberalization to be an indicator or prohibitor of nuclear

proliferation; “the direct economic costs and foregone economic opportunities of pursuing or

even acquiring nuclear weapons do not seem prohibitive, as the relatively mild and short­lived

sanctions levied against India and Pakistan demonstrate” (Singh and Way 882 ).

Dong­Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke approach their quantitative study of nuclear proliferation

using different variables and statistical methods to analyze their data. In their 2007 article,

“Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Jo and Gartzke divide variables based on

willingness and opportunity, or the desire versus the capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

Opportunity variables include latent production capability, economic capacity, and diffusion of

knowledge, whereas willingness variables include threats (conventional and nuclear), collective

security agreements, diplomatic status, domestic politics, membership in the NPT, and regional

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status (Jo and Gartzke 171­175). Through conditional probability analysis, Jo and Gartzke find

that latent nuclear weapons production capability is the most important opportunity variable in

explaining nuclear programs, though not for weapons purposes. They also conclude that “the

economic barrier to nuclear weapons possession is much more severe than that to nuclear

weapons programs” (181). Surprisingly, in terms of willingness variables, their findings indicate

that conventional threats are significant determinants of nuclear proliferation and that, if a state

possesses a nuclear threat, the probability of a nuclear weapons program decreases. Similarly,

diplomatic isolation plays little significance in determining whether or not a state will pursue

nuclear weapons. Jo and Gartzke also find little significance in domestic politics when

considering their effects on the willingness of states to proliferate in contrast to the hypothesis

asserted by Solingen. However, the desire to become a major power or the status of a nation as a

major power is a powerful determinant of nuclear proliferation. “Major powers with nuclear

weapons programs are more likely to have nuclear weapons than nonmajor powers” considering

the role of economic and technological capabilities (Jo and Gartzke 185). The proliferation of

nuclear weapons through trade is rare, and therefore, Jo and Gartzke conclude that willingness

cannot fuel a nuclear program alone, but must be coupled with opportunity.

Philipp C. Bleek utilizes hazard modeling when analyzing proliferation variables. He

combines elements of Singh and Way’s divisions of nuclear states with the variables used by Jo

and Gartzke to determine the extent to which these variables affect nuclear proliferation, not just

whether they are statistically significant or not. Bleek categorizes proliferation variables into five

categories: economic resources and technological capacity, security motivations, institutional

constraints, status motivations, and domestic politics (171). This broadens Jo and Gatzke’s

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opportunity and willingness categories into five specific groupings to be treated individually in

his statistical analysis. Economically, Bleek finds that countries that gain GDP at lower levels

tend to proliferate more than those with already­high levels of GDP, which he does not find

surprising due to the connection between economy and technology.. Similarly, Bleek notes that

the role of security and the threat environment of States plays an important role in proliferation

as well, particularly in the case of conventional security threats and threats to regional and

international status and power. Therefore, the NPT and the non­proliferation regime do not play

significant roles in mitigating nuclear aspirations. Bleek finds little support for the role of

domestic factors in nuclear proliferation.

In another important study, Matthew Kroenig argues for the importance of opportunity

through supply­side economics by analyzing the role of States in providing nuclear assistance for

aspiring nuclear powers. As he notes, “a state’s ability to produce nuclear weapons often hinges

on the availability of external assistance from a more advanced nuclear state” (164). The

following table shows these types of relationships.

Table 2.1.3.B from Kroenig, 2009

Kroenig employs extensive hazard modeling to determine the role of assistance, economic

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factors, rivalries, alliances, economic openness, regime type, and other variables in nuclear

proliferation. Kroenig concludes that States that receive sensitive nuclear assistance from

advanced nuclear states are more likely to proliferate than those who do not. Similarly, States

with the technological capacity to manufacture their own weapons are more likely to do so than

States that cannot. Due to the relatively low probability of States reaching these economic

capabilities, Kroenig asserts that studies in nuclear proliferation must consider nuclear

assistance.

The growing body of literature regarding quantitative analyses of nuclear proliferation

highlights the importance of combining figures and data sets with qualitative observations on the

nature of specific nuclear programs through case­studies. It is important to consider the role of

these various factors in determining the scope and applications of nuclear proliferation and the

purpose of specific nuclear programs.

2.2 Nuclear Pessimism versus Nuclear Optimism: A Debate As aforementioned, nuclear proliferation in Pakistan and Iran has raised concerns within

the international community over issues regarding the security and use of nuclear weapons. As

such, the current hypotheses posed by this research paper represent two views of Iranian

proliferation; The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran will not pose a

regional threat to security, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran

will pose a regional threat to security. Proponents of each hypothesis can be divided into two

categories: nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists.

Nuclear optimists believe that nuclear proliferation increases stability between states due

to the fear of second­strike capabilities, thus decreasing the potential for attack and decreasing

uncertainty in other states’ actions: they will not strike because of the presence of a nuclear

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deterrent. Pessimists, conversely, believe that the nuclear factor allows countries to pursue more

aggressive foreign policies, thus increasing the chances of instability in regions and promoting

conflict escalation and increasing uncertainty.

According to the nuclear optimist, nuclear weapons “make the cost of war seem

frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of

such weapons” due to the doctrine of mutually­assured destruction and the usefulness as nuclear

weapons as deterrents (Waltz 1981). Nuclear weapons dissuade States from attacking enemies

that they know possess nuclear weapons out of fear of retaliation. Waltz asserts that “in a nuclear

world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated. If force is used and not kept within

limits, catastrophe will result” (1981). Waltz gives seven reasons that States seek to acquire

nuclear weapons on the premise of becoming secure with deterrent capabilities. Powerful States

follow the examples of other states who are nuclear powers in acquiring nuclear weapons as well

as preventing attack from those States. Similarly, if a State has multiple nuclear enemies or fears

the nuclear potential of those States, it will be more prone to proliferate. Economic incentives,

strategic goals, and international status also contribute to the desire to proliferate. Waltz

discounts the argument that fears about nuclear use have been founded on speculation.

There are three requirements that Waltz cites for effective deterrence. These include a

force that can survive and counter­attack, a force that acts out of deliberation, and a force that

cannot be used accidentally or without authorization (1981). The difficulty in acquiring nuclear

weapons and the technological advances required to create an arsenal mean that arms races that

are not founded on these requirements are unlikely. Therefore, Waltz claims that “the spread of

nuclear weapons threatens to make wars more intense at the local and not at the global level,

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where wars of the highest intensity have been possible for a number of years” (1981).

Conventional weapons possess greater risk to countries due to the tradition of non­use of nuclear

weapons present among States.

Waltz provides six reasons that outline the benefits of nuclear proliferation from a

nuclear optimist perspective. Because self­help governs the actions of States, States will not

attack nuclear powers out of fear of MAD. It is also highly improbable that States will be able to

destroy the entire arsenals of another nuclear power while judging strength based on the size of

arsenals. The fear of initiating nuclear war has also contributed to the tradition of non­use.

Nuclear weapons possess defense purposes in addition to their roles as deterrents and the

importance of responsibility with nuclear weapons is an important behavioral constraint.

Scott Sagan provides four components of stable nuclear deterrence: “prevention of

preventive war during periods of transition [...], the development of survivable second­strike

forces, the avoidance of accidental nuclear war, and [...] terrorists” (2001). However, he asserts

that it is difficult to achieve stable nuclear deterrence in many aspiring nuclear nations. In

relation to the case study between India and Pakistan, Scott Sagan doubts the ability for nuclear

weapons to act as a deterrent and Kenneth Waltz cites the existence of a tradition of non­use of

nuclear weapons as an integral facet. Sagan expresses doubts that Pakistan’s nuclear technology,

controlled by its military, will act as a stable deterrent due to the potential for aggression and

misuse as a military tool (Waltz and Sagan 2002). Due to Iran’s perceived instability, the issue of

a stable nuclear program becomes a concern, much like Pakistan and India. Similarly, geographic

proximity and the nature of the Indian­Pakistani conflict further complicate nuclear relations

between the two states. Sagan cites the 1988 Ojheri Incident as an example of the potential for an

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accident to spark full­scale nuclear war and believes that “nuclear South Asia will be a

dangerous place because of any unique culture inhibitions against strategic thinking in both

countries” (Sagan 2009, 220) Waltz does not share these prescriptions due to the historical

narrative provided by the past two centuries. The Cold War did not result in nuclear conflict

between the U.S. and the USSR despite the conflicts and crises that punctuated the period, and

indeed, nuclear weapons have never been used as tools of war between any states (with the

notable exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although scholars note that Japan did not have the

means to retaliate and the attacks only expedited inevitable loss). Instead, Waltz argues that the

presence of nuclear weapons increases stability based on the fear of mutually assured destruction

via second­strike capability. “In a nuclear world, any state ­ whether ruled by a Stalin, a Mao, a

Saddam, or a Kim Jong­Il, will be deterred by the knowledge that aggressive actions may lead to

its own destruction,” thereby asserting that states should acquire nuclear weapons in order to

stabilize the world system (Waltz 2009, 233). This study will determine if the development of an

Iranian nuclear weapons arsenal will present a threat of nuclear warfare or if it will lead to

regional stability per the views of the nuclear pessimist and the nuclear optimist.

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III. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design A cross­comparison between Pakistan and Iran is being made for one primary reason:

religion. As it currently stands, Pakistan is the only Islamic country with nuclear weapons

technology, thus earning its arsenal the name the Islamic Bomb. Iran is another country marred in

similar controversy within the realm of global politics over its intended goals of its nuclear

program. Current concerns over Iranian proliferation are similar to those during the formative

years of Pakistan’s nuclear testing; Will this country be able to sacrifice economic goals for

nuclear technology acquisition? What are the consequences of a functioning Iranian nuclear

program? How will this impact security concerns in the region? Due to the inherent similarities

between the development of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and the current Iranian government’s

nuclear policies, this research project will focus on a comparison between the two and will seek

to determine whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will result in a nuclear conflict

or if it will stabilize the region through active nuclear deterrence.

By drawing parallels between Iran and Pakistan, this paper will aim to determine the

future prospects of the Iranian program based on the traditional principle of non­use of nuclear

weapons by Pakistan. Three areas will be explored in order to analyze the nuclear programs of

Pakistan and Iran: the political aspect, the economic aspect, and the social aspect. The

assessment of the political factors of nuclear proliferation will be sub­divided into three parts:

the balance of power, domestic concerns and politics, and commentary on the relationship

between the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty and Pakistan and Iran. The economic aspect of

proliferation will be used quantitatively to examine the economic factors that have influenced the

development of the nuclear programs, including the resources spent on nuclear technology and

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the impact of domestic economies and international sanctions and embargoes. Finally, the role of

religion will be treated as this is the lynchpin of the Pakistan­Iran comparison. The analysis of

the role of religion in the decision­making processes of the two countries will constitute the

social aspect of nuclear proliferation. The analysis will include a statement of facts regarding

Pakistan, then a statement of facts regarding Iran, followed by a synthesis of the information.

Through these different levels of analysis, a conclusion will be made regarding whether or not

nuclear pessimism or nuclear optimism best describes the future of Iran’s nuclear program.

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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 4.1 The Political Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation

4.1.1 Security Concerns and the Role of the Balance of Power The security concerns of both the Islamic Republics of Pakistan and Iran have, by the

nations’ own admissions, played integral roles in the quest for nuclear technology as a means of

protecting sovereign interests. This aspect of the nuclear proliferation process of the two nations

affirms the aforementioned conclusions by the studies presented in the Literature Review of this

paper that emphasize the significance of external determinants in nuclear proliferation. Through

security concerns and the external environments of Pakistan and Iran, it is clear that the threat of

existence vis­à­vis other actors in the anarchic international system is a primary motivator of

nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, it is important to trace the historical influence of security

concerns on the foreign policies of both countries in order to ascertain the extent to which

Pakistan and Iran’s nuclear programs have similar origins.

It is important to note the conflictual nature inherent to the relations between India and

Pakistan as this is the nexus of Pakistani nuclear policy and reflects the role of security and the

need to act as a balance in terms of regional divisions of power. Conflicts between the Hindu and

Muslim factions in British­controlled India resulted in the partitioning of the region, thus

creating the two nations which were essentially born of conflict. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first

Prime Minister of India, reflects the unfavorable sentiments of India on the creation of Pakistan:

Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should not have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind the foolish idea of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. [...] We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. (Hilali 33)

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Pakistan viewed its larger neighbor as an expansionist and hegemonic threat, seeking to reabsorb

the territory into a greater, Hindu­dominated Indian subcontinent. “India’s efforts immediately

after independence to undo Pakistan, particularly its attempt to seize Kashmir, were the main

causes for the bitterness and sense of insecurity” that became prominent features of Pakistani

foreign policy and cemented India as the foremost threat to the Pakistani state (Amin 39) . Amin

also notes that “the principle objective of Pakistan’s strategic policy has been at least to prevent

India from over running or subjugating Pakistan and, at the most, to pose as an equal of India”

(165). Thus, this context reflects the need to secure the survival of the Pakistani state, a motive

upon which Pakistan’s nuclear policies are best understood due to the significance of the Indian

threat.

The early notions of a Pakistani nuclear program date to the policies of the Ayub Khan

and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto administrations during the 1960s and 1970s. Ayub Khan did not view

the nuclear option as a viable source of security for the Pakistani people, although he was a

vehement supporter of the formation of a clear Pakistani identity separate from India with

significant regards to religion and asserted that reconciliation would not be possible given their

two ideologies. Thus, while peaceful reunification of the subcontinent was not a viable option,

the security dilemma between India and Pakistan did not necessitate a nuclear deterrent. “As

evident in the writings and speeches of Ayub Khan, the nuclear option was conspicuously absent

in Pakistan’s strategic discourse” throughout his tenure in the 1960s (Nizamani 72). The conflict

between the United States and the Soviet Union was subsequently characterized as a problem of

the others and parallels were not drawn between the Indian­Pakistani relationship and the Cold

War. Strengthening Pakistan’s Muslim identity featured heavily in Ayub Khan’s domestic and

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foreign policy decisions.

The absence of nuclear strategy in Ayub Khan’s foreign policy decision starkly contrasts

with that of Z. A. Bhutto, whose foreign policy emphasized the importance of acquiring nuclear

weapons in order to address the Indian threat. In the wake of the 1971 conflict that resulted in the

loss of East Pakistan and subsequent creation of Bangladesh, it became clear to Bhutto that the

development of nuclear weapons would act as a viable deterrent option for Pakistan. In an

address to the UN General Assembly in 1965 while serving under Ayub Khan’s government, he

said that Pakistan was “facing a great monster” and a “great aggressor” whose goal was to

“annihilate Pakistan” (Nizamani 75). Bhutto also emphasized the importance of fighting for

Kashmir and linked Pakistani identity to the acquisition of the disputed territory, thus embedding

this issue deep in the minds of Pakistanis and again condemning the actions of India and

emphasizing that the differences between India and Pakistan, including their historical legacies,

cultures, and identities, were irreconcilable. As such, Bhutto articulated that “Pakistan’s security

and territorial integrity are more important than economic development” and that a nuclear

deterrent acts as a tool to ensure this security (Nizamani 78). When the five permanent members

of the United Nations Security Council drafted the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty in 1968,

Bhutto recognized that this treaty was incompatible with the security goals of Pakistan if India

did not also agree to the tenets of the NPT, to which it did not; consequently, Pakistan has not

ratified the NPT to this day.

The loss of East Pakistan as a result of conflict between Pakistan and India in 1971

caused Bhutto actively seek to create a nuclear program in Pakistan, though it was not yet an

immediate concern for the Pakistani government. Bhutto created the Pakistan Atomic Energy

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Commission in order to research and develop nuclear technology. It was not until 1974, when

India tested its first nuclear explosion, that nuclear weapons became a foremost issue for the

government in order to remain competitive with India and obtain a nuclear deterrent to prevent

future acts of aggression by a potentially­nuclear India. On May 18, 1974, India conducted what

officials called a “peaceful nuclear explosion” which was viewed with skepticism and

apprehension by the Pakistani government, media, and population as an Indian nuclear weapon

would invariably give the country an advantage in the India­Pakistan security dilemma

(Nizamani 85). In seemingly contradictory diplomacy, Pakistan also pushed to create a nuclear

weapon­free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia in order to prevent the emerging nuclear arms race

between India and Pakistan from escalating. This was coupled with attempts to agree to a

simultaneous ratification of many arms­limitations treaties. However, India’s repeated refusal to

agree to such treaties exemplified the security concerns in the region. In a significant push

towards nuclear development, Bhutto negotiated a deal with the French government that would

give Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant despite attempts by U.S. Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger to persuade Pakistan otherwise.

The importance of nuclear development in political discourse continued after General

Zia­ul­Haq’s military coup against Bhutto and remained an important element of Zia’s domestic

and external policies. The coup also threatened Pakistan’s deal with France due to the regime

change, to which Bhutto heavily criticized while jailed, and caused France to withdraw from

negotiations. It was also during the end of Bhuttos tenure as President and the beginning of Zia’s

government when Abdul Qadeer Khan brought his technical expertise to Pakistan in order to

develop Pakistani nuclear technology. Educated in Europe, Khan worked for various energy

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companies, including the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory in the Netherlands while

touring various centrifuge facilities (“A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology”). While at these facilities,

Khan made numerous inquiries into various types of technologies and was monitored by

authorities for his actions, though he was not detained and questioned. In 1975, Khan left the

Netherlands “for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and other components and

contact information” for companies that would provide the necessary components to build

centrifuges needed to enrich uranium and other nuclear materials (“A.Q. Khan Nuclear

Chronology”). He then began work in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to research and

conduct nuclear experiments in power and weaponry under Bhutto and then Zia. “The Zia

regime adopted Bhutto’s views on the nuclear issue as a cornerstone of the security discourse,”

so there was little change in Pakistani foreign policy regarding the importance of acquiring

nuclear weapons (Nizamani 98). For Pakistan, the importance of a nuclear deterrent against India

could not be understated.

Operation Brasstacks of 1986­1987 and the Kashmir crisis of 1990 were two major

periods of escalation between India and Pakistan and contributed to the strained relations

between the two nations. 1986 saw provocative brinksmanship by the Indians when General

Sundarji commanded a training exercise in the Rajasthan desert (Khan 101). This was intended

to dissuade Pakistan from aiding Sikh insurgents in Punjab, but it resulted in the positioning of

both Pakistani and Indian troops at the border between the two nations. “Some people have

argued that there was some power asymmetry in conventional weapons in favor of Pakistan” as

well as the threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan, demonstrating that this was, indeed, the first

nuclear crisis between the two countries, whether or not the presence of nuclear weapons was

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true (Khan 103). Resolution to this example of brinksmanship was only possible due to

third­party intervention by the U.S., and de­escalation occurred in 1987, though the nuclear

dimension of Operation Brasstacks was clear.

The 1990 Kashmir Crisis was driven by the value placed on Kashmir by Pakistan and the

adamant opposition of any claims to Kashmir by India. After supporting the mujahideen in

Afghanistan and the Sikhs in the Punjab area, the Kashmir Crisis allowed Pakistan another

opportunity to exercise its brinksmanship abilities to deter India. The Kashmiri uprising against

the Indian government prompted Pakistan to position troops and military equipment along the

border once again, increasing the tension along the line of control separating the region. As noted

by Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s nuclear policy was not Kashmir­centric, but rather a byproduct

dispute resulting from the overarching conflict with India, and that “the nuclear capacity’s utility

in Kashmir ‘came out’ as a major factor in Pakistani strategic thinking” (Ganguly and Kapur 38).

Like Operation Brasstacks, this crisis did not result in direct conflict and again, de­escalation was

only possible due to the U.S.’s efforts. In the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. had

few lingering interests in the region but pursued mediation in order to prevent nuclear war.

Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear technology in Pakistan has occurred as the country has acted

more aggressively against India. The cyclical nature of escalation near the line of control

between India and Pakistan and the absence of conflict vis­à­vis one another indicates the de

facto deterrence power that existed between the two during these crises, and this dynamic would

soon become consolidated when both countries were officially declared nuclear states in 1998.

Like Pakistan, Iran’s quest for nuclear acquisition has been defined by Iran’s desire for

regional influence in the Middle East and its long­standing conflicts with its neighbors. Iran’s

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perceived threats to security include Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and, indirectly, the United States.

The relationship between Iran and these actors has prompted the continued development of

Iran’s nuclear program. Though Iran continues to deny the existence of nuclear weapons within

the republic, the growth of the program has increased as the perceived threats against Iran have

done so in turn.

Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s during the reign of Shah Mohammad

Reza Pahlavi, as Iran sought to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as a means of

securing stable sources of energy. “By the mid­1970s, his nuclear plans became remarkably

ambitious and included the construction of twenty nuclear power reactors, research reactors, a

uranium enrichment facility, and a plant for the reprocessing of spent fuel” to achieve these

means (Mukhatzhanova 43). Iran entered into agreements with several nations, including the

United States, to acquire the materials needed to support these emerging nuclear programs,

subsequently linking the Shah’s regime with the interests of the U.S. In order to solidify the

peaceful nature of the program as a means of promoting Iranian energy independence, Iran,

under the Shah, signed the Nuclear Non­proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, agreeing to the

protocols therein regarding the stipulations of a nuclear program. The construction of

infrastructure needed to support these programs continued throughout the Shah’s regime and was

supported by many economic trading partners in addition to the U.S., such as Germany, France,

and South Africa, until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In an effort to combat against

Westernization and secularization of the Islamic state, revolution leaders, led by founder

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, proceeded to overthrow the Shah and move Iran towards

deep­rooted Islamic principles. After the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April of

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1979, “Iran has not acted like the typical state, carefully calibrating its national interests, but

rather as the vanguard of a revolutionary movement” and “its constitution openly calls for the

‘continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad’” (Gold 23). Thus, the propagation of

Islamic ideals (Shiite, specifically) throughout countries became the focal point of Iran’s foreign

policy which was also marked by the desire to become a regional power to balance the Sunni

majority. “The regime's preoccupations with consolidating power, the war with Iraq, and its

international isolation precluded it from aggressively pursuing the nuclear option,” and as such,

nuclear technology was not a primary focus of the Ayatollah (Dueck and Takeyh 190). The

Revolution effectively ended Iranian nuclear development partnerships with Western nations due

to trade concerns and apprehension by Iran to conform to Western nuclear standards.

The Iran­Iraq War during the 1980s marked a distinct shift in the political rhetoric

regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means to address security threats against Iran

and its people. As Gold appropriately notes, “The Iranian government viewed the Shah’s nuclear

projects as prohibitively expensive to maintain,” but because “the Iranians absorbed terrible

losses throughout the Iran­Iraq War— ultimately one million casualties— Khomeini began to

have serious doubts about his own fatwa” banning nuclear research and development (111).

Chemical and nuclear weapons became necessary instruments of security, defense, and

deterrence for the Iranians as Saddam Hussein’s government began actively pursuing the

development of such technology. According to intelligence reports published by the U.S., Iran’s

nuclear development program resumed in 1982 (Kerr 1). The literature on Iran’s nuclear program

fails to offer many details on the status of Iran’s nuclear program during this period. However,

authors agree that Russia began to act as the primary source of nuclear materials for Iran. Dueck

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and Takeyh posit that “the Russian Federation soon began to fill the void left by the withdrawal

of the other international actors and assisted Iran in building its two nuclear reactors at Bushehr,

which suffered from neglect during the Iran­Iraq war” and that “Russia has also [possibly]

provided Iran with fuel fabrication technology and [...] uranium enrichment centrifuge plans”

(190­191). Similarly, Lewis and Olson note that “Iran signed contracts with Argentina, Russia,

and China to build the program,” cited from various reports from those nations, though the

veracity of these claims is unclear (207). Mukhatzhanova offers different sources, claiming that

“by 1984, however, Iran expressed renewed interest in nuclear power and engaged in talks with

India and China on nuclear cooperation” (43). Delpech asserts that Russia was the primary

source of Iran’s nuclear technology; “the Iranians tie any strategic partnership with Russia to the

pursuit of nuclear co­operation” due to Russia’s consistent economic support of Iran’s nuclear

program (46). Though the discrepancies in the reports of the sources of Iran’s nuclear materials

during the 1980s make it difficult to determine which country Iran did acquire them from, it is

clear that Iran’s program was nascent during this decade.

“A more detailed focus on the nuclear infrastructure began during Hashemi Rafsanjani's

presidency in the early 1990s and was sustained by Muhammad Khatami's reformist

government” after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the succession of Ali Khamenei as

Ayatollah (Dueck and Takeyh 190). General consensus in the literature confirms Russia’s

involvement while also emphasizing the importance of the A.Q. Khan Network. Sahimi claims

that “first protocol on the Bushehr project with the Soviet Union [which] called on Moscow to

complete the Bushehr project and build additional two reactors in Iran, but financial problems

delayed the deal” (2003). However, a new deal was concluded between Iran and Russia in 1995,

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though the Bushehr project still remains unfinished. The bilateral negotiations conducted

between the Islamic Republic of Iran indicate a commitment to continue developments of the

nuclear program on the basis of security concerns and balancing power in the region.

Indeed, the relations between states have had significant impact on the shape of Iran’s

nuclear program, both in which nations have been alleged with providing nuclear assistance to

Iran as well as those which have seemingly antagonistic relationships with Iran. “Washington’s

perception of the Iranian question is largely overdetermined by its perception of the Iraqi

question,” and the relationship between Iran and Iraq must factor significantly in understanding

the foreign policy of Iran regarding nuclear weapons (Delpech 35). As a supporter of the Shah’s

regime and the subsequent measures, embargoes, and efforts to prevent Iran from developing its

nuclear technology, the U.S. plays an adversarial role in the development of Iran. As Lewis and

Olson appropriately conclude, “a policy of sanctions adds stress to U.S.­Iran relations, and

increases Iran’s perception of a treat from the United States” (210). Similarly, Saudi Arabia

continues to be a focal point of Iran’s foreign policy concerns. “Saudi Arabia has a long­standing

tradition of hostility towards Iran” due to the issue of regional leadership and “Iran has never

forgiven Riyadh for supporting Baghdad during the Iran­Iraq War” (Delpech 79). Saudi Arabia’s

advanced military technology and close relationship with the U.S. and its military and defense

contractors has raised Iranian concerns about Saudi Arabia’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons.

However, to date, Saudi Arabia has pursued neither nuclear technology for the sake of power due

to their abundance of fossil fuels nor nuclear weapons to carry out its military goals. “Saudi

Arabia [also] took a clear and public stance against Iran’s nuclear programme in 2005” and has

encouraged the U.S. to continue its strong support against the militarization of Iran’s nuclear

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technology (Delpech 79). According to Alani, if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the

security threat posed in the region would prompt the Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia, to then

arm and develop their own nuclear arsenals (2012). This is in accordance with the notion that

regional leadership plays an especially important role in the nuclear policies of these nations. As

previously stated, the Middle East as a region is Sunni­dominated, reflected in the overwhelming

support of the Arab countries for Iraq during the Iran­Iraq War, when only Syria (who possesses

a large Shi’a population) defended the territorial integrity of Iran. Thus, “the acquisition of

nuclear weapons could conceivably change the balance [of power in the region], placing Iran in a

position of strength” to exercise its foreign policy (Mukhatzhanova 50).

The issue of Israel in relation to Iran’s nuclear program is divisive, though there is

general consensus that Israel does factor into the foreign policy decision making process of

Tehran. Delpech views the chronology of Iran’s program as indicative of its motives:

Israel, it must be stressed, is not the reason why Tehran wants to acquire the nuclear bomb. The key dates when decisions were made, i.e. the 1970s under the Shah, who had good relations with Israel, and then 1985 during the war with Iraq, suggest that there was a different agenda [which includes] regional domination [and] a decisive response to Saddam Hussein’s lethal chemical weapons attacks on Iranian troops. (65)

Thus, power politics become the focal points of Iran’s foreign policy instead of Israel, according

to Delpech’s reasoning. However, the evolving relations between states in the Middle East have

fundamentally altered the threat perception of Iran. In contrast, Mukhatzhanova views the

growing tension with Israel as a primary motivator for Iran’s nuclear development, as “Israel is

Iran’s enemy of choice, the target of most radical rhetoric and opposition for its very existence,

occupation of Palestinian Territories, unconditional support of the United States, and its nuclear

arsenal” (52). Iran has been a continued supporter of Hezbollah and Hamas. However,

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Mukhatzhanova does note that Israel “provides a ready justification,” not a direct threat, for Iran

to develop nuclear weapons capabilities and that Israel has only recently become a foreign policy

concern of Iran (53). This is largely in part due to the inflammatory rhetoric of Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, current President of Iran.

The qualitative nature of the historical facts regarding the development of Pakistan and

Iran’s nuclear programs reflects trends found in the aforementioned studies of the significant

variables that affect nuclear development. Though it is difficult to say that one nation is directly

responsible for the foreign policy decisions of another, or that India possesses a percentage of

responsibility for Pakistan’s nuclear program, for example, the developments of conflict between

Pakistan, Iran, and their regional, existential threats are of important note. Given the complex

nature of Pakistan’s relationships with other countries, depicted in Appendix Figure 4.1.1.A, it is

likely that Iran’s similar webs of relationships will present the republic with security concerns

that will necessitate the development of a diplomatic tool, whether economically, politically, or

with conventional or nuclear weapons. The notion of a deterrent becomes important from a

nuclear optimist perspective, and it is significant to note that Pakistan itself has not used nuclear

weapons despite continued conventional engagements with India. The various conflicts between

India and Pakistan reflect continued tension over borders and territory. These have elevated the

importance of possessing nuclear weapons in order to assert primacy in the region against a

particular threat to the balance of power. Iran’s relationship with Iraq, the Middle East, and the

West has been strained since the Iran­Iraq War as many nations in the Middle East supported

Iraq’s invasion. Saudi Arabia was the primary economic contributor to Iraq, and Saudi Arabia’s

close strategic relationship has also been a concern for Iran. The lack of a security guarantee

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through an alliance or mutual defense agreement increases the perception of insecurity and

uncertainty. Thus, it is likely, based on the historical trends of conflict and insecurity and the

elements of support within the international community, that Iran will follow Pakistan’s example

and work to develop a nuclear weapon deterrent in the future.

4.1.2 Domestic Politics

The domestic political environments of Pakistan and Iran during their periods of nuclear

development, both past and present, are difficult to understand. The closed political

environments during the last three decades have rendered an analysis of the domestic politics of

each nation insignificant in order to ascertain the role of domestic factors in nuclear proliferation.

Solingen’s study refers to bureaucratic institutions, industrial complexes, and national sentiments

as the primary elements of domestic factors of proliferation. Industrial complexes in this paper

are considered as an economic factor, not an internal determinant based in politics. Bureaucratic

institutions and the importance of nationalism comprise the domestic political factors of nuclear

proliferation. However, the nature of both countries makes an in­depth analysis of the domestic

patterns of behavior seemingly inferior to the impact of external factors on nuclear proliferation.

This reflects the conclusions of the literature that find stronger correlations between external

factors and the prevalence of nuclear proliferation in nations that are influenced by many of these

factors.

Pakistan is characterized as a federal parliamentary republic, and Iran is a unitary Islamic

republic. Pakistan’s leaders are its President and Prime Minister and roots its government in

Islamic principles. Similarly, Iran, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, maintains strict

Islamicism in its government and is headed by a President and a Supreme Leader. The latter acts

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as the spiritual head of the government, which is consolidated and centralized in order to afford

the national government with a majority of political power that is subsequently relegated to

subsidiary political organs. Both of these countries have gone through prolonged periods of

political isolation in the international community due to their nuclear programs. As such,

information on the public support or opposition to the nuclear option is difficult to find as both

governments engaged in propaganda and suppression of opposition during the formative years of

their respective nuclear programs.

In Pakistan, Ahmed notes that “discourse on security issues in Pakistan is determined by

the lack of transparency in the formulation of policy and the absence of an informed public

debate” characterized by the oppression of the state itself (54). Indeed, the existential threat of

Pakistan versus the hegemonic aggressor of India is used in order to boost nationalist sentiments

and garner support for the nuclear program. Domestic issues within Pakistan, including

economics, are tied with the external threats against Pakistan, and the foreign policy section

above elaborates on the connection between Pakistan’s nuclear program and India. As Ahmed

states, “all aspects of policy in the nuclear field remain the military’s sole prerogative,” and

therefore, domestic factors of nuclear proliferation hold little significance in explaining

Pakistan’s desire to proliferate (55). Low literacy rates in Pakistan and the authoritarian nature of

the country’s government provide few examples of public polling regarding the acceptance of

Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons. Domestically, Pakistan’s government has sought to

use “the external threat to foster internal unity, exploiting anti­Indian sentiment and suspicions”

to legitimize the nuclear program as a means of guarding the state against their existential threat

(Ahmed 59). The political parties in Pakistan have all supported the country’s nuclear program

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as a means of gaining public support due to the pro­nuclear stance of the populace due to the link

between India and nuclear weapons. Regime legitimacy is an important domestic determinant of

nuclear proliferation, but in the case of Pakistan, the role of external factors creates the need for

proliferation and supporting nuclear policies is a method of maintaining, not acquiring, political

power. Therefore, Vahhabi notes that “ the dominance of the security discourse over Pakistan’s

nuclear policy process is to such a degree that the domestic model’s dynamics echoes the trends

of the security model” (2011). “Pakistan’s proliferation policy, witnessing a high level of

military influence, lacked a domestic politics perspective and was mostly concerned with

security perspective” and public support was a method of bolstering the Pakistani ideology and

identity against India (Vahhabi). The security model of analyzing the Pakistani­Indian nuclear

relationship, addressed at length in the previous section, is so pervasive within the country that

considerations regarding domestic politics or public polling analyses are, effectively, elements of

an analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear program based on external factors.

The domestic politics model of nuclear proliferation in Iran functions similarly to that of

Pakistan. Because Iran’s foreign policy decisions are influenced by their external environments

more than the domestic components of the country, the model assumes a subsidiary role to

foreign relations. However, the nature of Iran’s domestic politics itself is fundamentally different

from Pakistan. Shahram Chubin summarizes Iran’s domestic environment as follows:

For the public, the nuclear program also initially enjoyed broad popular support since it promised energy independence and scientific progress. It was also popular because the regime depicted it as an assertion of Iran’s rights against foreign arrogance. But the program has not been subjected to informed debate or public discussion about its ultimate goals, the costs, and the relationship with Iran’s other objectives. Consensus ends where specifics begin. (Chubin)

Though domestic support for the program exists, there are no polls or figures present to

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quantitatively demonstrate that the Iranian public, as a whole, supports the nuclear program in

Iran. The nuclear question has also become highly politicized in recent years in Iran, particularly

after increasing sanctions on Iran between 2000­2012 and the disputed election of Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad in 2009. The dispute between various political factions in Iran have divided the

nuclear issue between those who seek to work with the international community and those who

proclaim Iran’s right to proliferate as a nation. At times, these lines become blurred as parties vie

for power; “Since 2009, factions take positions that do not reflect their real preferences, mainly

to thwart political rivals” (Chubin). Nevertheless, the Iranian government continues to deny the

existence of nuclear weapons and asserts that uranium­enrichment facilities are allowed under

the tenets of the NPT. The issue of domestic politics in Iran questions the motivation of the state

to develop nuclear weapons because the way in which the issue has been politicized, thus

becoming an area of debate for status and legitimacy opposed to one based out of a strategic

concern.

Though Iran asserts that its nuclear program is peaceful in nature, Iran has become

aggressive in its research endeavors, and the emphasis on the right to clean energy roots the

proliferation factors of Iran in domestic concerns. However, foreign policy statements by Iran’s

leaders does present a contradictory perspective. Most famously, Ahmadinejad’s statement that

Israel should be “wiped off the map” has become the so­called catchphrase of Iranian

nuclear­hardliners’ foreign policy stance towards Israel. The mere fact that Israel exists is,

according to Ahmadinejad, an “insult to mankind and an affront to all world nations”

(Gladstone). However, Ahmadinejad has also claimed that nuclear technology in Iran will only

be used for peaceful purposes, aligning his position on nuclear weapons with that of Ayatollah

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Khomeini, citing that nuclear weapons are not in line with Islamic principles. These statements

on nuclear policy vary, and therefore, imply a shift in language that is contextually determined

for political purposes. In an NBC Nightly News interview in 2008, Ahmadinejad make the

following statement:

Nuclear energy is very beneficial and very clean, by the way. All nations must use it. A bomb, obviously, is a very bad thing. Nobody should have such a bomb. If there are parties that claim a bomb is a bad thing, it’s only appropriate for them, as a first step, to destroy their stockpiles. Destroy their bombs and allow clean energy to be utilized by all. (Ahmadinejad)

According to this spoken policy, deterrence is not a goal of Iran’s nuclear program. However, the

aforementioned investigations by the IAEA are contraindicative to this position. Nevertheless,

the presence of nuclear weapons would allow Iran to engage in practices of brinksmanship

similar to Pakistan:

A nuclear Iran could also lead to an escalation of attacks against Israel by Iran’s main surrogates on its borders, Hezbollah and Hamas, increasing the chances of a new Arab­Israeli War erupting and washing away any nascent peace arrangements between Israel and more pragmatic parts of the Palestinian leadership. Israel, itself, will have to make some hard judgments given Iran’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities and the declared intentions of most of the Iranian leadership— and not just Ahmadinejad— to see “Israel wiped off the map.” (Gold 293).

Thus, the true intentions of Iran’s nuclear program become unclear due to the ways in which

previous conflicts between other nations have been affected by the presence of nuclear weapons

and the ever­changing political climate in Iran to date.

The current status of Iran’s nuclear program cannot be assessed. Though Iran has been

slightly amenable to IAEA inspections, there is a high unknown factor in terms of what Iran is

and is not capable of producing at this moment, and there is an element of uncertainty in the

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domestic support of the program. The clandestine nature of Iran’s nuclear program since the

1980s has limited the knowledge and evidence available to make an effective quantitative

analysis on the prospects of Iran’s nuclear program, if Iran truly is capable of producing nuclear

weapons, and if shifts in political power in Iran will alter its nuclear status. There are various

surveys that have attempted to codify public support of Iran. For example, a World Public

Opinion poll found over 60% support for the Iranian uranium enrichment program despite

economic sanctions (“Two­Thirds”). Similarly, a 2010 Rand Survey found overwhelming

support for the right of Iran to develop nuclear energy ­ 97% (Esfandiary). However, statistical

data on both Iran and Pakistan and scarce and the veracity of these polls is difficult to determine.

In many regards, the domestic political models of Pakistan and Iran are similar because neither

program acts independently from its external determinants. The closed environments in which

each program has developed and the close links between the government, the military, and the

program preclude substantial involvement from the general population. However, general

support for Pakistan during its phase of nuclear development is similar to the type of support that

Iran enjoys now, though impacted by continued international sanctions and embargoes. Even

though Iran’s program has become politicized, Pakistan’s nuclear history reflects that the nuclear

issue ­ tied to India ­ was a relative constant in domestic political discourse, and therefore, Iran’s

nuclear program will likely remain a similar fixture of political dialogue in Iran.

4.1.3 The Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty In an effort to curb the growing presence of nuclear weapons in the twentieth century, the

five nuclear powers worked to broker the Treaty on the Non­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

abbreviated the NPT. It is important to understand the importance of the NPT in establishing an

international standard of nuclearization and proliferation that would preclude states from

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acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, essentially creating an exclusive Nuclear Weapon State

(NWS) club versus Non­Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). However, the marked failures of the

NPT present few constraints on the nuclear programs of willing and able nations.

The NPT was a method of institutionalizing concerns of proliferation and promoting a

tradition of non­use of nuclear weapons. The articles of the NPT were intended to assure nuclear

states that weapons would not become subject to trade, but would also allow for states seeking to

acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to be able to do so under strict observation.

Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT prohibit NWS from transferring or aiding in the acquisition of

nuclear weapons to NNWS and NNWS from seeking to acquire or manufacture such weapons.

Article 4 does, however, allow NNWS to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

thereby assuring NNWS that they do have the right to obtain nuclear technology but not for the

manufacture or transfer of weapons. Article 6 requires that NWS work to stop the manufacture of

nuclear weapons and disarm existing nuclear arsenals. All of the P5 nations are parties to this

treaty and are “among the 187 states forswearing their nuclear weapons options,” though there

are four prominent non­signatories to the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (Paul

158). It is important to note that North Korea was a signatory but then invoked their rights, under

Article 10, to withdraw from the treaty. Noting the prevalence of nuclear assistance in the past

four decades, there has been a clear dismissal of the articles prohibiting such actions.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a United Nations­sponsored

organization, is tasked with the responsibility of monitoring compliance with the NPT. Iran

ratified the NPT on 1 July, 1968, and has not invoked Article 10 to remove membership from the

regime. However, the IAEA has found Iran in violation of its NPT commitments repeatedly,

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resulting in various United Nations and bilateral sanctions that will be discussed further in the

following section. Given the ability of India and Pakistan to develop their nuclear weapons

technology out of their nuclear programs while refusing to sign the NPT and the constraints the

international community placed on these programs, it is unlikely that the presence of the NPT

and Iran’s ratification of the treaty will be a significant factor in limiting the willingness or

ability of the country to develop its nuclear program.

4.2 The Economic Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation

The economic aspect of nuclear proliferation is characterized by the ability of a nation to

produce or acquire the materials and technology needed to develop a sustainable nuclear

program. The primary reason for analyzing the economic variables associated with proliferation

is to determine the capabilities of a nation prior and post nuclearization. The importance of an

economic comparison is to look at the factors that affected Pakistan during the development of

its nuclear program and then see how the current economic situation in Iran is similar or

dissimilar. Pakistan was able to create a nuclear arsenal in the midst of difficult economic

circumstances, and thus, this section will determine whether or not Iran will be precluded from

the same abilities as a result of its economic characteristics.

The first significant area of note is the relative Gross Domestic Product levels of both

Pakistan and Iran. Figures 4.2.A and 4.2.B in the Appendix chart the growth of GDP levels.

Iran’s abundance of oil and associated exports have allowed Iran to enjoy a stronger economy

than Pakistan, and based on this fact alone, Iran would have a stronger economic predisposition

to developing a nuclear program. Iran is 18th in the world based on GDP measured by

Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), whereas Pakistan is 28th (taken from the Central Intelligence

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Agency’s country profiles). Similarly, nominal GDP in 2012 for Iran was 483.8 billion USD as

opposed to Pakistan’s 230.5 billion USD. Per capita, Iran currently possesses 13,100 USD per

capita of GDP and Iran’s per capita GDP is only at 2,900 USD. In 1998, the year of Pakistan’s

nuclear test, nominal GDP was only at 75,966 million USD, according to estimates from the

International Monetary Fund. Given these basic figures, Iran’s economy is significantly stronger

than Pakistan’s during the development of its nuclear program.

The security budgets of Pakistan and Iran have not been disclosed publicly, so any

quantitative analysis of related figures must be made from second­hand reports and statements

on the allocation of funds for the nuclear program. In a recent news article in Pakistan Today, A.

Q. Khan disclosed that the budget of Pakistan’s nuclear program was not over $25 million USD

while in development (Abbas). This is a stark decrease from the earlier estimates of $1 billion

USD. Currently, the statistics on Pakistan’s security budget indicate that the nation spends $2.5

billion USD on its nuclear program, according to a report by the Women’s International League

of Peace and Freedom (“Pakistan”). There is little consensus on the true amounts that Pakistan

has spent or currently spends on its nuclear arsenal. Iran’s budget is under similar scrutiny.

Champion asserts that the cost of Iran’s nuclear program totals to more than $100 billion USD

(Champion). The ambiguity of the reports on the budget of the nuclear programs of both

countries makes it difficult to determine how money is allocated to the different aspects of

development, from infrastructural projects to the purchase of raw materials. However, neither

country was free from the hardship of debt and sanctions.

On May 28 and 30, 1998, two weeks after India’s first nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted

six tests at Chagai in Balochistan. “The tests were a technological expression of political value

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invested in the nuclear option as a guarantor of national sovereignty,” demonstrating to the world

that Pakistan would be able to actively deter India from future acts of aggression (Nizamani

111). According to the Congressional Research Service, seismic activity suggests that Pakistan’s

tests yielded explosions between ten and five kilotons, capable of inflicting much damage if used

(Kerr and Nitin 4). The importance of these tests was felt around the country as public

sentiments responded positively to Pakistan’s reaction to India’s tests and elevated the approval

of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The international community strongly condemned the tests of both India and Pakistan,

but Pakistan, in particular, was punished by an array of sanctions, including those from the U.S.,

for its nuclear tests. As a state that had yet to ratify the NPT to the CTBT and refused to sign the

FMCT, the nuclear explosions further alienated Pakistan from the non­proliferation goals of the

West despite its earlier attempts to promote non­proliferation. United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1172 was issued a week after Pakistan’s tests, condemning both India and Pakistan

for conducting tests and calling upon “India and Pakistan [to immediately] stop their nuclear

development programs,” abide by international non­proliferation norms, cease nuclear activity,

and adopt the treaties intended to promote non­proliferation (UNSC Res 1172). Despite

international condemnation, Pakistani leaders believed that this was a significant display of

national self­reliance and that the price of sanctions was inconsequential when compared to the

security concerns that these tests helped erase. The dominant Hindu threat to Pakistani security

was now able to be deterred, thus constituting a foreign policy and an economic victory for

Pakistan.

Fiscal irresponsibility in Pakistan led to a debt crisis that plagued the country in 1998. A

IAF 400 Ryan 42

large trade deficit, defaulted loans, and continued borrowing, along with the East Asian Financial

Crisis that affected the region in 1997, were the primary contributors to the debt crisis in

Pakistan. Mahmood traces the history of debt during the Musharraf regime prior to the testing of

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and claims that “by 1995, the external debt situation had [...]

enlarged to approximately half Pakistan’s GNP” (65). Both domestic and foreign debts were at a

high during this period, with 96.7% of GDP in debt as of June 30, 1999, according to

Mahmood’s sources (65). The IMF worked to provide a financial package for Pakistan totalling

$596 million USD in order to assist Pakistan in its debt recovery. Through this package, Pakistan

has been able to secure multilateral loans and has worked to devalue loan agreements and

increase taxation. However, “a significant problem with Pakistan’s economy is that a substantial

portion of the loans the country receives is consumed by debt servicing,” and therefore, loans

that Pakistan has received go towards the repayment of prior loans, so the debt burden on

Pakistan increases (Mahmood 68). Though Pakistan’s economy has grown, “added together, debt

servicing and defense expenditures exceed Pakistan’s total national income” and the government

outspends its income through tax revenue in order to maintain its security infrastructure

(Mahmood 69). Pakistan has worked to increase its economic base by promoting growth in its

private sector and creating a large base of exports, including cotton and agricultural products.

Due to the military structure of Pakistan’s government and the prevalence of war­hawks in the

various political parties in Pakistan, it is unlikely that Pakistan will experience significant budget

cuts in the area of defense spending, particularly due to the ever­present security concerns that

stem from India.

After it became evident that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons through the

IAF 400 Ryan 43

development of its program, a variety of sanctions were placed on the nation to dissuade it from

its continued pursuit of proliferation and to hinder the economic ability of Pakistan to acquire

nuclear technology. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Symington Amendment of

1977 both prohibited the U.S. to provide aid to countries that were found seeking to acquire

nuclear weapons. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Pakistan, but the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan altered the U.S. stance towards Pakistan as a result of its geostrategic

importance during the Cold War. As such, Pakistan continued to receive aid from the U.S., but

stipulations were added under the Pressler Amendments that would require Pakistan to provide

assurances to the U.S. that it was not seeking to develop nuclear technology. Bilateral

negotiations between Pakistan and the U.S. fluctuated during the 1990s, and many aid programs

were cancelled. Malik describes the economic situation following the 1998 tests:

Across Pakistan, the economic affairs suddenly started deteriorating. Since the nuclear tests

in May, the prices of basic goods like food and gasoline had shot up by as much as 25 percent. The Karachi Stock Exchange had lost 40 percent of its value before

Thursday­and it dropped again after the missile strikes. The rupee, Pakistan's currency, had lost 30 percent of its value against the dollar.[14] G­8 countries (the G­7 plus Russia) at the G­8 summit in London on June 12, 1998 opposed new non­humanitarian lending by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank to India and Pakistan. Henceforth, Pakistan’s downturn started as its economy was heavily dependent on the IMF loans.

(143) Economic sanctions from the U.S. directly affected the economy of Pakistan during the nascent

period of Pakistan’s nuclear program, and further hindrances from the IMF and World Bank also

limited the development of Pakistan’s economy along with its nuclear weapons. Despite the

economic hardships associated with sanctions, Pakistan’s security concerns outweighed the

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economic consequences of proliferation, thus demonstrating that economic sanctions do not

preclude a nation from developing nuclear weapons if the infrastructure and commitment to

proliferate exist.

Nuclear enrichment of uranium is necessary in light­water reactors and in fuel

assemblies, but enriched uranium can also be used as fissile material for weapons and to power

nuclear weapons. Given the need for enrichment programs for both nuclear power and weapon

programs, ambiguity has served to cover the intentions of the Iranian government which are not

as pronounced as the intentions of Pakistan were during the development of its nuclear program.

According to Kerr’s Congressional Research Service report, there are three enrichment facilities

in Iran of which the U.S. possesses intelligence: two near Natanz and one near the city of Qom

called the Fordow Enrichment Facility (15­17). Intelligence predictions believe that there is

enough low­enriched uranium (LEU) to produce enough high­enriched uranium (HEU) for five

nuclear weapons, though such an enrichment program would be detected (Kerr 15). Numerous

centrifuge programs at Natanz and Fordow raise concerns that Iran might be attempting to

convert high amounts of LEU into HEU. Kerr notes that “Iran’s failure to inform the IAEA of

the Fordow plant’s existence until well after Tehran had begun constructing it has raised

concerns that the country may have other covert nuclear facilities” (18). Kerr provides an

extensive review of intelligence reports on these enrichment facilities as well as the reactors at

Arak and Bushehr and the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, but does not indicate that

Iran has nuclear weapons. Testing is vital in confirming the presence of nuclear weapons, and as

such:

It is also worth noting that Iran could produce only fairly simple nuclear weapons, which are not deliverable by longer­range missiles, without conducting explosive nuclear tests. Such tests, many analysts argue, would likely be detected. It is also worth noting that

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moving from the production of a simple nuclear weapon to more sophisticated nuclear weapons could take several additional years. (Kerr 37)

Kerr asserts that Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons and the existence of any such

weapons will not go undiscovered. This report demonstrates the miscommunications and failures

to communicate between Iran, the IAEA, and the international community at large regarding the

status of Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Iran’s

nuclear program has grown and towards what direction the program is evolving. However, Iran

has been able to buy and trade for its nuclear facilities with little economic loss but has faced

numerous sanctions from the international community.

While Pakistan was heavily dependent on U.S. aid during the Cold War and experienced

sanctions on a bilateral basis, the United Nations Security Council has been the most active body

in sanctioning Iran. Similarly, many individual nations have initiated trade embargoes against

Iran in order to discourage continued efforts to develop a nuclear program. Table 4.2.A in the

Appendix provides a comprehensive list of sanctions, multilateral embargoes, and significant

bilateral embargoes that Iran has experienced. The vast amount of sanctions imposed on Iran is

significantly higher than the amount of sanctions imposed on Pakistan. Iran’s status as a

fledgling member of the nuclear community has been an issue of contention within the

international community, as evidenced by the above table of sanctions. While this list is not

exhaustive, it does serve to demonstrate the pressure that the international community has placed

on Iran to dissuade the country from continuing its nuclear aspirations. However, despite these

trade embargoes and sanctions, Iran continues to enjoy strong oil exporting relationships with

China and Russia and its economy is not necessarily debilitated by these sanctions to the point of

abandoning its nuclear aspirations. Iran also continues to claim that its nuclear program is for

IAF 400 Ryan 46

peaceful energy purposes only, as is within its right under the NPT. The relatively recent

timeline of these sanctions means that the long­term effects on Iran’s economy have not been

realized and the mounting pressure on the government will continue to affect the security

decisions of Iran.

Although both nuclear programs were under economic assault in order to cripple the

ability of the governments to continue financing their nuclear endeavors, both Pakistan and Iran

have been able to develop infrastructure to support their programs. In addition to the facilities

noted above in Iran and the CHASNUPP facilities in Pakistan, both nations have the

technological capacity to deliver nuclear weapons through missile programs. The ranges of their

missiles are limited, but the technological capacity to deliver nuclear weapons is an important

consideration to note in an analysis of the nuclear programs of both countries and the prospect of

technology­sharing between nations. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is an international

organization that works to investigate nuclear programs and create policy recommendations.

According to the NTI:

The Shaheen solid­fueled MRBM and Ghauri liquid­fueled MRBM series missiles serve as the flagships of Pakistan's current missile deployments. Capable of striking most of India, the Shaheen series missiles are of Chinese M­11 and M­18 lineage, whereas the Ghauri series missiles were built from North Korean Nodong designs. Pakistan more recently unveiled the Babur cruise missile, with mobile land­based launch capabilities, and the Ra'ad cruise missile, with air­based launch capabilities. Analysts believe Pakistan is actively pursuing sea­based and air­based launch platforms for the Babur cruise missile. (“Iran”)

Pakistan’s missile system is bolstered by international agreements to develop missile technology

as opposed to developing its own missile defense/delivery system due to the associated costs

with such a project. Similarly, Iran’s own program relies on international assistance. The NTI

states that Iran’s missile program is two­fold; “Iran's ballistic missile program has developed

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along two parallel tracks: (1) liquid propellant engines based on imported Soviet and North

Korean missiles; and (2) solid­propellant motors based on solid­propellant rocket artillery”

(“Pakistan”). Estimates from both Pakistan and Iran claim that both countries are seeking to

acquire Musudan missile technology, allowing their reach to extend into the intermediate range,

though these reports have not been verified. Iran has demonstrated its technological capabilities

through its space program, completing three successful launches between 2009 and 2012.

Delivery systems are crucial components of a substantial nuclear weapons program, and thus, it

is important to note that the existence and the desire to improve cruise missile systems in both

countries reflects the latent industrial capacity to proliferate.

These various economic indicators of proliferation, though inherently qualitative, do

indicate a propensity to proliferate. The budgetary practices of both Pakistan and Iran are,

admittedly, obscure, and it is difficult to find budget reports regarding the fiscal appropriation of

funds for the various projects involved in a nuclear program. However, the shared experiences of

the two neighbors does affirm the relative importance of economic factors of proliferation noted

above. Both nations have demonstrated their financial commitments to their nuclear programs;

Iran is in a better economic situation to support its nuclear program than Pakistan was when it

first tested its nuclear weaponry. Bhutto once stated that “if India acquires nuclear status,

Pakistan will have to follow suit even if it entails eating grass,” reflecting the intense

commitment to the nuclear program regardless of economic hardship that the country would

have to face in order to achieve its goals (Ahmed 59). Iran’s similar commitment indicates that

economic factors will not limit Iran in achieving its foreign policy goals, though Matthew

Kroenig’s assertion regarding the necessity to engage in nuclear assistance will likely

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characterize the future of Iran’s nuclear program.

4.3 The Social Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation; Religion

As aforementioned, the common trait between Pakistan and Iran is their shared Islamic

traditions that underpin the countries’ historical origins in the modern system of states. However,

because Pakistan possesses a Sunni majority and Iran is predominantly Shia, the notion of an

Islamic Bomb is not uniform. The theological underpinnings of each country are also different,

and the histories of the two alter the impact of religion on society, and subsequently, the impact

of religion on nuclear policies. The social aspect of nuclear proliferation is, from a constructivist

perspective, the internal qualities that prompt a nation to place value on a nuclear program.

The historical context of the state of Indian­Pakistani relations is rooted in the Partition

of India after the British Empire ceded colonial power over the subcontinent in the mid 20th

century and demonstrates the importance of the Hindu­Muslim dynamic. During the period of

colonization and imperialism, the British Empire maintained control of the Indian subcontinent,

which included Hindu and Muslim areas. The struggle for independence from the British Empire

was initially waged by both Hindus and Muslims together. Ultimately, Muslims demanded a

separate homeland that would protect the interests of Muslims because the Indian National

Congress (INC), which stood for a unified India, was predominantly Hindu. “The Muslims felt

that they did not even have the basic security of life and honor” and that the Hindu majority

treated them unfairly and were unrepresented within the Indian government (Amin 17). The

All­India Muslim League (AIML) demanded a resolution to the issue, resolving to push for the

partition of India that would result in the creation of Pakistan. The INC asserted that they were

secular and represented all Indians regardless of religion, but they failed to appease the demands

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of the AIML. The AIML proposed the Two Nation theory, which called for the division of the

population into Hindu and Muslim regions. The separation of India was not amenable to the

Hindus and was “immediately opposed by many Hindus who saw it as a vivisection of ‘mother’

India” (Amin 21). Out of fear of possible civil war in India, Britain agreed to the Partition in

what was called the Mountbatten Plan, and a separate Pakistan was created on the 15th of

August, 1947 (Ganguly and Kapur 10). Britain allowed the princely states to determine their own

allegiances to either Pakistan or India, which, in the case of provinces like Jahoor, Punjab, and

East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, resulted in conflict, as well Kashmir, an area still in

contention today. Thus, the creation of Pakistan was rooted in religious differences with India,

but the evolution of the nuclear issue has been linked with security, not religion, following the

Partition. Religion has only been significant insofar as Pakistan is the only Muslim nation with

nuclear weapons technology, but religion was not a direct factor in prompting nuclearization

during the 1970s and 1980s.

Unlike Pakistan, whose political institutions are fairly secular though the government

does espouse the principles of Islam, Iran’s post­revolutionary politics are direct reflections of

the Islamism upon which the Revolution was founded. Indeed, the emphasis of the Revolution

being Islamic and the creation of the Supreme Leader to lead the nation on religious matters is an

integral part of Iranian identity. “Regime elites compete among themselves for power; yet, they

are all dependent on the maintenance of the Islamist system for their positions” and the

proclamation of a religious identity is an important aspect of Iranian foreign policy, specifically

in reference to anti­Westernism (Sherrill 41). Nationalism and Islam are intrinsically linked in

Iran, as evidenced by the opening articles of its constitution. “Domestically, the regime seeks to

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buttress eroding support by emphasizing its Islamist character and by equating nuclear

technology with nationalist pride,” extolling the value of the nuclear program as a means of

securing energy needs as well as possibly developing a nuclear deterrent (Sherrill 44). Iran’s

inward­looking concerns for the maintenance of its Islamic principles differentiate the social

aspect of constructivism in nuclear proliferation from Pakistan.

Alireza Forghani, former governor of the Kish Province in Iran, elaborates on the

political significance of an Islamic bomb in Iran. His editorial on the right of Iran to acquire

nuclear weapons is an example of the opinion of the political elite, and though he does not write

as a representative of the government, the widespread publication of his work does demonstrate

common sentiments held throughout the government. He argues that “all Islamic countries have

Islamic blood” and that “the Islamic world should rise up and shout that ‘a nuclear bomb is our

right to wake America and Israel up!’” (Forghani). Forghani notes that the United States is the

only nation that has used nuclear weapons and that Pakistan is the only Muslim nation with

nuclear capabilities that other nations could use as viable deterrents. The emphasis on Syria,

Lebanon, and Iran as nations that have acted out of concern for Islamic interests reflects the

importance of the religious aspect in Forghani’s premise. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khamenei

issued an oral fatwa, or religious ruling, that forbade nuclear weapons due to their inconsistency

with the teachings of Islam.

“Because Shiite religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdom of the faithful, Iran

is sometimes portrayed as an irrational state” whose nuclear aspirations will fall in accordance

with these views (Eisenstadt and Khalaji x). However, as Eisenstadt explains in his treatment of

Islam in Iran with regards to nuclear weapons, Iran cannot be completely irrational as a state

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because the spread of revolutionary Islam would end with the extinction of the Republic in the

event of a nuclear conflict (2). As such, Ayatollah Khamenei clarified this point of the fatwa:

There is a difference between nuclear technology and a nuclear weapon [...]We do not have the motivation to pursue nuclear weapons. We have not and will not go after them. We do not need a nuclear bomb. If we defeated our enemy so far, it was not with nuclear bombs. [...] When such a bomb is dropped somewhere, it would kill both guilty and innocent, armed individuals, young children, babies, and oppressed human beings. A science used for this end and a country in possession of such a weapon and its development would be led to this point which we do not approve [of ]; we do not like such change. (Eisenstadt and Khalaji 14)

Nevertheless, the indications that Iran has worked to develop methods of enriching uranium with

Russian assistance contradict these statements. The relationship between religion and nuclear

weapons in Iran is unclear, but the significance of Islam in Iran will remain a strong trend in

Iranian nuclear discourse unlike in Pakistan, where the nuclear option is not necessarily

predicated on the status of the country as the only nuclear Muslim nation.

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V. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The statement of facts regarding the three dimensions of proliferation raises two

questions that must be answered instead of the four originally asked. The first question that must

be considered is whether or not Iran is actually developing nuclear weapons. Iran’s government

has vehemently denied that it has nuclear weapons or is aspiring to develop nuclear weapons

technology. As stated in the data analysis, Iran’s stated nuclear policy is that the country is

seeking to acquire nuclear technology for the purposes of clean, sustainable energy to drive the

nation’s growing infrastructure and development. However, the existence of various nuclear

reactors, such as the plant at Natanz, do not rely on enriched uranium for their operation, and the

use of such fissile material is an indication that Iran is stockpiling uranium for the purposes of

weapon development. Unlike Pakistan, there is no major security imperative necessitating the

immediate creation of a nuclear weapon in Iran, so there is little rush in the republic devoting a

vast amount of resources to the creation of an Iranian bomb. The suggestive nature of Iran’s

clandestine program and the continued defiance of sanctions from the international community

contributes to the realist understanding that Iran is “guilty until proven innocent” with regards to

its nuclear program as the IAEA has had limited success in monitoring the nuclear program.

With this in mind, it is with a relative amount of certainty that the conclusion can be made that

Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons.

If the assumption that Iran is seeking to create or acquire nuclear weapons is correct, then

the second question that follows that conclusion is whether or not Iran will actually use their

nuclear arsenal. Advocates for action against Iran’s nuclear program cite Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad's inflammatory rhetoric against the United States and Israel as evidence that Iran

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will use nuclear weapons if given the opportunity to develop those capabilities. However,

Ahmadinejad does not possess direct power over security concerns as President ­ rather,

Ayatollah Khamenei does as Supreme Ruler, and his rhetoric has been less worrisome than that

of his colleague. The irrationality of a single leader does not necessarily imply the irrationality of

a state as a whole, especially considering the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the

notion of the tradition of non­use of nuclear weapons since their first and only uses in Japan. The

doctrine of mutually­assured destruction (MAD) has proven to be a stabilizing component of

nuclear policy, particularly during the Cold War, and the tradition of non­use that has emerged

regarding nuclear weapons is not likely to disappear in the coming decades. Similarly, the

militant aspect of Iran’s government has been called into question, and the fanatic Islamicism

that defines the Iranian political system is seen as an unstable element that will allow non­state

actors to gain access to Iranian nuclear facilities to use weapons. In Pakistan, the National

Command Authority currently oversees the security of all Pakistani weapons complexes and

have worked to assure the global community that they are well­protected. Under the NCA,

Pakistan’s protection system features a policy called “C4I2SR”, signifying “command, control,

communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance”; these

efforts were developed with assistance from the U.S. in a control structure that would protect

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and ensure the U.S.’s interests in keeping terrorists from acquiring

nuclear weapons (Kerr/Nitkin 12 Pak FAS source). Compartmentalization of Pakistan’s

nuclear weapons also contributes to the protection of these assets and hinders non­state actors,

generally without adequate means of fully infiltrating such facilities, from acquiring and using

such weapons for extremist purposes. In the event that Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, it will

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be unlikely that non­state actors will be able to use such weapons; one concern of Pakistan’s

program was the ability of terrorist or militant factions to gain access to its nuclear weapons, but

the program has been secure for over three decades.

In addition to the unwarranted domestic concerns of Iran, its security environment is not

necessarily insecure. Although Iran does have a history of conflict with Iraq, the ousting of

Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the fall of the Baathist regime has alleviated Iran of its primary

security concern. The role of Israel and the U.S. in Iranian foreign policy, while important in a

rhetorical sense, does not constitute an ongoing conflict between Iran and the West. Pakistan’s

history with India has been marked with more uncertainty and conflict than Iran, and given

Pakistan and India’s refusal to engage in nuclear war despite the prevalence of conventional war,

an important precedent in the region has been set. A nuclear weapon might allow Iran to engage

in more aggressive foreign policy, as the existence of weapons in Pakistan allowed vis­à­vis

India, but the prevailing success of nuclear optimism suggests that Iran will not use its nuclear

weapons. The similar concerns that affected Pakistan affect Iran, and Pakistan’s example as a

Muslim nation that has not allowed fundamentalism to prompt it to act irrationally presents Iran

with a model upon which to base its nuclear policy of the future. Brinksmanship and aggression

might occur in the region as Iran seeks to solidify its position of power, but those actions are far

different than using nuclear weapons to assert dominance. Therefore, after comparing the

similarities and differences between Pakistan and Iran, it can be concluded based on the

information available that Iran will act like Pakistan and will not become an aggressive nuclear

state.

Given the ongoing nature of Iran’s nuclear program, it is difficult to ascertain its full

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extent. However, indications by various intelligence agencies mentioned throughout this paper

allude to the imminency of critical developments in Iran, but the claims of this paper are

speculative. Similarly, the difficulty in finding evidence to support the various proliferation

variables, such as the domestic determinants of proliferation in both countries, leaves a

possibility for future research. Limitations of this paper include a lack of access to confidential or

security­sensitive documents regarding the status of the nuclear programs of both countries and

the difficulty in finding primary sources from both on the domestic role of the nuclear program.

This paper was also limited in the application of statistical analyses due to the qualitative nature

of the speculative claims. It was difficult to find figures regarding the budgets of both countries

as the nuclear programs have remained fairly secretive, so in the absence of concrete data,

implications of the actions and policies of both Pakistan and Iran must suggest the importance of

the trends explained above. In the future, research should seek to quantify the various

proliferation variables associated with Pakistan and Iran in an attempt to link different areas of

proliferation variables, as this paper sought to do qualitatively. However, until Iran performs a

nuclear weapons test and the yield confirms their status as a NWS, future research in this area of

security studies will remain composed of predictive hypotheses.

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VII. APPENDIX

7.1 Acronyms CTBT: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty FMCT: Fissile Material Cut­Off Treaty IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction NPT: Non­Proliferation Treaty NNWS: Non­nuclear Weapon State NWFZ: Nuclear­weapons Free Zone NWS: Nuclear Weapon State WMD: Weapon of Mass Destruction 7.2 Figures for Section 4.1.1

Figure 4.1.1.A ­ Nuclear Support of Pakistan and India

Figure 4.1.1.B ­ Regional and International Actors in Iranian Balances of Power

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7.3 Figures for Section 4.2

Figure 4.2.A ­ The GDP of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Figure 4.2.B ­ The GDP of the Islamic Republic of Iran

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Table 4.2.A

Sanction Description Text

United States Executive Order 12957 ­ 15 March 1995 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the

Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources

http://www.treasury.gov/resource­center/sanctions/Documen

ts/12957.pdf

United States Executive Order 12959 ­ 6 May 1995 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran

http://www.treasury.gov/resource­center/sanctions/Documen

ts/12959.pdf

United States Executive Order 13382 ­ 28 June 2005 Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferators and Their Supporters

http://www.treasury.gov/resource­center/sanctions/Programs

/Documents/wmd.pdf

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 ­ 31 July 2006 SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS IRAN

SUSPEND URANIUM ENRICHMENT BY 31 AUGUST, OR FACE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 ­ 23 December 2006 SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON

IRAN FOR FAILURE TO HALT URANIUM ENRICHMENT

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 ­ 24 March 2007 SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS

AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 ­ 3 March 2008 SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS

RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, INCREASES VIGILANCE OVER IRANIAN BANKS, HAS STATES INSPECT CARGO

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835 ­ 27 September 2008 SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS EARLIER

RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN’S URANIUM ENRICHMENT, CALLS ON COUNTRY TO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS ‘FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY’

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 ­ 9 June 2010 SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES ADDITIONAL

SANCTIONS ON IRAN

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm

United States Executive Order 13553 ­ 28 September 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to

Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions

http://www.treasury.gov/resource­center/sanctions/Documen

ts/13553.pdf

United States Executive Order 13574 ­ 23 May 2011 Concerning Further Sanctions on Iran

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/2011/05/23/executive­order­concerning­furth

er­sanctions­iran

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984 ­ 9 June 2011 SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES EXPERT

PANEL HELPING TO MONITOR SANCTIONS ON IRAN TO CONTINUE WORK UNTIL JUNE 2012

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10276.doc.htm

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United States Executive Order 13590 ­ 21 November 2011 Iran Sanctions

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/2011/11/21/executive­order­13590­iran­sanct

ions

European Union Council Regulation No. 267/2012 ­ 23 March 2012 COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23

March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010

http://eur­lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:088:0001:0112:EN:P

DF

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2049 ­ 7 June 2012 SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS MANDATE OF

EXPERT PANEL MONITORING IRAN SANCTIONS UNTIL JULY 2013

https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10666.doc.ht

m