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Team Guardian Affordable and portable drone protection Number of Consumers Spoken to: 10 Total Number of Consumers Spoken to: 10 Team Guardian is familiar with a wide variety of possible solutions to the problem and the relevant performance characteristics of existing commercial drone technology. Following a rigid scenario and requirements analysis we will be able to specify a counter system for the asymmetric warfare group that is portable, affordable and highly effective. We will develop a tailored countermeasure technology, and thus protect the military environment from commercial drone threat. Nick Danger George Tirebiter Clark Cable Ralph Spoilsport Communication / Computer Science / Veteran Product / Veteran / Chemistry Embedded systems / Electrical Engineering Systems Engineering / Mechatronics Project: Countering Asymmetric Drone Activities Sponsor: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Military Liaisons: John Cogbill and Scott Maytan

Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

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Page 1: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Team Guardian Affordable and portable drone protection

Number of Consumers Spoken to: 10Total Number of Consumers Spoken to: 10

Team Guardian is familiar with a wide variety of possible solutions to the problem and the relevant performance characteristics of existing commercial drone technology. Following a rigid scenario and requirements analysis we will be able to specify a

counter system for the asymmetric warfare group that is portable, affordable and highly effective. We will develop a tailored countermeasure technology, and thus

protect the military environment from commercial drone threat.

Nick DangerGeorge Tirebiter Clark Cable Ralph Spoilsport

Communication / Computer Science / Veteran

Product / Veteran / Chemistry

Embedded systems / Electrical

EngineeringSystems

Engineering / Mechatronics

Project: Countering Asymmetric Drone ActivitiesSponsor: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG)Military Liaisons: John Cogbill and Scott Maytan

Page 2: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Guardian: Effective, tailor-made drone protection

Nick Danger Ralph Spoilsport George Tirebiter Clark Cable

Academic ProgramPhD Electrical

Engineering 2017MBA 2017

MSc ChemistryMSc Electrical

Engineering 2017

MBA 2017MSc Mechanical

Engineering

LinkedInAlon’s profile Fabian’s profile Han's profile N/A

Subject Matter Expert?No

(Computer Science Engineer)

No(Chemistry/Process

engineer)

No(Electrical Engineer)

Yes(Systems Research on drone defense systems,

patent pending)

Role - How does your expertise fit the problem?

Communication Designer, Machine Learning, Electrical

Engineering

Hustler/Military veteranEmbedded systems, sensor technology,

prototyping of solutions

Systems Engineering using DoDAF, industry expertise,

overview of existing technologies

Page 3: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Guardian: 1st MVP

Deployment Scenario: 1.Shoot the drone down (Military)2.Interception/Skycatch3.Taking over command

Hypothesis: Our solution will operate in established military environment / Conflict zone.

Page 4: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Guardian: Customer Discovery

Hypothesis:• We are targeting military threats and civilian threats

Experiments:• Presenting deployment scenarios: Shooting down, interception, capturing, hacking, jamming

and spoofing

Results:• Regulatory solution may apply to both military and civilian environments • Shooting down is an option in military environment• Hacking is feasible for off-the-shelf drones.

Action:• Is Regulatory Solution (Mandatory GoHome Command) good enough?• Exploring hacking• Asking if shooting drone down solve the problem

Page 5: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Guardian: Mission Model Canvas

Requirements Engineering- Define top three scenarios of deployment

- Define performance limitations of current systemsSystem design- System and components engineering

- U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

- Ground forces

- Suppliers of radars for small flying objects

- Depending on solution: suppliers of system components for detection and counter measures

- Commercial drone manufacturers (e.g. DJI)

- Suppliers of Do-it-yourself drone kits

-FAA

- Primary: Ground forces operating within approximately 20 miles of adversaries (reach of today’s commercial drones)

- Secondary: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (budget, capability)

Countering Drone Threat:- Weaponized drones

-Swarm of drones

-Drone aided

-Reconnaissance

- Provide affordable and mobile drone protection

- Develop a hacking device

- Develop a shooting device

- Develop a intercepting device

Fixed:- System design & engineering

Variable:- Hardware costs

- Access to relevant ground forces to define relevant scenarios

- U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group to define relevant set of capabilities

- Need buy-in from U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

- Need implementation by ground forces

Beneficiaries

Mission AchievementMission Budget/Costs

Buy-In/Support

Deployment

Value PropositionKey Activities

Key Resources

Key Partners

Page 6: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Guardian: Value Proposition Canvas

Products& Services

Shooting

- Leverage existing technology

- Improve specific critical performance parameters either in counter measure depending on scenario

- Improving ease of use

Customer Jobs

Execute operation on the ground- Incomplete protection with

existing off-the-shelve systems - Non-flexible and only partially portable solutions, so protection only for camps

- No identification of

payload

Ground forces

Gains

Pains

Gain Creators

Pain Relievers

- Adequate solution to asymetric threat - Portable and flexible protection

- Reduce size, weight and power consumption of equipment

- Improve ergonomics of equipment

Page 7: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Guardian: Value Proposition Canvas

Products& Services

Shooting, Catching and

Hacking

- Leverage existing technology

- Understanding system constraints and required capabilities

Customer Jobs

Protect against asymmetric

threats- Expensive off-the-shelve equipment- Off-the-shelve equipment does not counter new threat sufficiently

U.S. Asymmetric Warfare Group

Gains

Pains

Gain Creators

Pain Relievers

- Less costs for systems- More capabilities tailored to commercial drones

- Reduce costs

- Develop tailored solution without the burden of promoting proprietary legacy systems

Page 8: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Appendix

Page 9: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Competitive Landscape (selection)De

tecti

onGovernmental

Research Labs/AcademiaCounter

measures

Regulation Syste

m Integ

rators

Enhance critical performance limitations of current systems in

detection / counter measures and partner with system integrators. Stand-alone is possible as well.

Import/purchase restrictions

Mandate defined software access points on component manufacturer

level

Restrict capabilities

It is important to note that our target is not necessarily to compete with the existing systems but rather enhance them with components that enable them to perform according to the threats at hand. A lot of technologies exist in the field, the challenge is to bring them together to form a cohesive system tailored to commercial drones. The limiting factors of today systems need to be tackled very specifically to allow for portability and affordability. The

dispersed nature of the threat needs to be accounted for.

Page 10: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

d

Portable search & track system

Attributes (worst case)

Rotary-wing aircraftm=2,5kg (incl. payload)v=17m/sØ=40cmHeight=7,5cm

System performance improves dynamically

• Single intruder wants to detonate explosive payload

• UAS is either controlled directly or navigates autonomously via GPS-waypoints

Direct effector (e.g. counter drone with net)

Portable indirect effector (e.g. HPEM, malware)

d

Potential high-level operational concept (OV-1)

Page 11: Guardian Week 1 H4D Stanford 2016

Navigation Payload

Control station Take-off / landing

Other system interfaces

Aircraft

Communication

Accessories

Transport

Potential access points for a selection of countermeasures (not at all

exhaustive)

GPS-spoofing, HPEM Kinetic countermeasures, Laser

Hindering use of payload without directly affecting

UAV itself (e.g. glare)

Jam or take over communication, software

vulnerabilities, HPEMLocating and

attacking control station