WHY REFORM FAILS – AND HOW TO MAKE IT WORK
Commitment to public administration reform in Swaziland and Morocco
Overview of presentation
• The ‘traditional’ model of reform: a (World Bank) critique
• Commitment as a response to reform failure: developing a model
• Applying the model in Swaziland and Morocco: the primacy of politics
• Building commitment in Swaziland and Morocco: idiosyncratic actions
• Implications for Public Administration Reform
The ‘traditional’ model of reformProblem? Bad administration
Cause? Ignorance and incapacity
Cure? Injection of knowledge (aka new PA model), with donor
support as the ‘syringe’
Success stories? South Africa, central Europe(?)
The problem with the ‘traditional’ model: World Bank analysis(Presenting) problem? Bad administration
Cause? Ignorance and incapacity
Cure? Injection of knowledge (aka new PA model), with donor support as the ‘syringe’
Outcome? * Weak, late implementation (40% of WB CSR projects)
* reinventing of the reform wheel
Explanation? ‘Political will’
Remedy? ‘Selectivity’
The problem with the Bank analysis• What is ‘political will’, and why is it
so often missing?• How will ‘jam tomorrow’
(selectivity) work if ‘jam by lunchtime’ (conditionality) failed?
• Risks disempowering aid agencies in relation to very poor countries
Importance of commitment (aka ‘political will’• Ubiquitous• Associated with development
project outcomes (including PAR)• Entered the mainstream policy
discourse• Led to calls for ‘selectivity’ in aid
allocation
Groping towards a solution: a model of commitment
ANTECEDENTS ELEMENTS OUTCOME
Political capacity - voluntarystrong political base - explicit leadership - challenging Implementation
Administrative capacity - publicunited reform team - irrevocableoverall capacity
Civil service reform in Swaziland
What will generate commitment?
Swaziland (not Switzerland!)• Landlocked, bordered by South Africa
and Mozambique• Fast-growing population of 900,000• 112th out of 174 countries on UN Human
Development Index (in 2000)• Lower middle-income country: stagnant
GDP of $1400• A monoethnic monarchy• Low donor and debt dependency
The failure of reform
• Swaziland the ‘graveyard of reform’: many reports, little implementation
Other explanations of failure• Money? – reform is cheap,
indebtedness is low
• Implementation? – hasn’t arisen
• Weak capacity? – yes, but interacts with political factors
Extent of commitment
Strong executive (ostensibly) voluntary public
x consensusx explicit and challenging programme x irrevocable action
Understanding commitment• ‘Dualism’ in government – so ‘strong
executive’ is split• Traditional side is pre-eminent• Patron-client relations in land tenure
and in civil service staffing• Consequent resistance to staffing
reform, with its implicit shift from ascriptive to achievement criteria (from ‘who you know’ to ‘what you know’!)
• Reform proposals serve to deflect criticism from the reform lobby
Prospects for reform in Swaziland• Status quo will continue: more stillborn
proposals• Indigenous political pressure will prompt
fundamental political change• Incremental approach: staffing reform
feasible because it is not a fundamental threat
• Restoring the independence of CSB would represent ‘irrevocable action’
Civil service reform in Morocco
What will generate commitment?
Outline of reform
• Multiparty democracy as per 1996 constitution
• Reform team established in Civil Service Ministry
• Good management charter• UNDP support as lead donor (yes!)
Outcome of reform (as of 2002)• Awareness-raising and exhortation• Initiatives taken by individual ministries
(e.g. performance appraisal)• Charter had low profile• Most ministries unaffected by reform• UNDP evaluation:
– the programme ‘seems a little timid to us … concrete results remain some way off’
– termination of support
Commitment in Morocco
• Political base: divided (see below)• Admin capacity: a curate’s egg (good
in parts)voluntarypublicexplicit challenging irrevocable
Understanding commitment• Awareness-raising has been necessary• Structural mistake of putting reform in
legalistic CS ministry• ‘Dualism’ in government: Palace and officials
committed, but nobody wants to jump first• ‘Timidity’ derives from ingrained preference
for: holding the ring; keeping options open; not putting heads above parapets …
• … which derives from national disposition to seek consensus (good!) and passiveness (attentisme – bad!)
Prospects for reform in Morocco• Reframe the problem in political,
not public administration terms• Draft keynote speech for king,
setting up South Africa/UK style ‘royal commission’
• Place commission Secretariat in PM’s office
• Continue awareness-raising and promoting ministry initiatives
Case study implications
• A definition of commitment helps to ‘read the signals’ of – and to predict! – government commitment to reform
• Identifying commitment requires political analysis
• Where commitment is absent, building commitment must take priority over ‘traditional PAR activities
Summary of presentation
• The ‘traditional’ model of reform: a (World Bank) critique
• Commitment as a response to reform failure: developing a model
• Applying the model in Swaziland and Morocco: the primacy of politics
• Building commitment in Swaziland and Morocco: idiosyncratic actions
• Implications for Public Administration Reform