8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
1/14
Nelson's Blood: Attitudes and Actions of the Royal Navy 1939-45Author(s): E. F. GueritzSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 3, The Second World War: Part 2(Jul., 1981), pp. 487-499Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260316.
Accessed: 21/09/2011 14:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Sage Publications, Ltd.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toJournal of
Contemporary History.
http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/260316?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/260316?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
2/14
Rear-Admiral
E.F. Gueritz
Nelson's
Blood:
Attitudes
and
Actions
of the
Royal
Navy
1939-45
On 1
August
1970
the issue
of
a
free
ration of
rum,
commonly
call-
ed Nelson's
Blood,
to
ratings
in
the
Royal Navy
was
discontinued,
and a
custom which had
originated
soon after the
capture
of
Jamaica in 1655 came to an end. Lord Nelson was no more
associated with rum than
any
of his
contemporaries,
and the
grisly
association
with
the
preservation
of his
body
is based
on
a
misunderstanding.'
The
significance
of the nickname
lies
in
the
ac-
ceptance
of
Nelson as
the embodiment of all
the
Royal
Navy's
traditions
whether
they originated
with him or
not. It is
ironical,
therefore,
that
some
of
Nelson's most
important
contributions to
naval
warfare
became
overlaid
in
the
Royal
Navy
by
a
heavy
layer
of Victorian orthodoxy and social prejudice, to the detriment of
British naval
operations
in
the
first
world war.
Some old
sailors
used to
say:
'If 'e knew
what was
done
in
'is name
'e'd be down
off
'is
pedestal
to
sort 'em out.' The
purpose
of
this
article is to
review
how
attitudes had
developed by
the
outbreak
of
the second
world
war,
and to
examine
very
briefly
some
examples
of how
actions
may
have
been affected.
It
seems
remarkable that a
nation
with
a
strong
maritime tradi-
tion should
produce
generations
of
naval officers
addicted to an
orthodoxy
quite
at variance with the character and
practice
of the
great
hero whose
memory they
venerated. It
was
for
change
in
this
attitude that
Vice-Admiral
Sir
George Tryon
strove,
and
literally
died
in
vain,
towards
the end of
the
nineteenth
century.
He had
/JoIrnal
of
('ontemporarv
listorv
(SAG(E,
I
ondon and
Beverly
Hills),
Vol. 16
(1981),
487-99
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
3/14
Journal
of Contemporary History
recognized
the baleful influence
of
orthodoxy
and blind
obedience,
and
sought
to
make his
subordinates
think for
themselves.2
The
performance
of the British fleets
in
the
North Sea
in
the
first
world
war bore
distressing testimony
to the wisdom of his
appreciation.
The
courage
and
seamanship
of the officers of those fleets are
not
in
question,
nor is
the
respect
which
they
had
for
their
Commander-in-Chief.
It was
this
virtue
which
became
the vice
when it
seemed
to be
accepted
that the Admiral was
omniscient,
and
that it would
be
presumptuous
to
give
him
information.
Failures at Jutland
were not confined
to
unwarrantable
silence.
There were also cases in which the Nelsonian injunction was ig-
nored that
'. . .
no
Captain
can do
very
wrong
if he
lays
his
ship
alongside
that
of an
enemy'.
There was no lack
of
courage
but
there was a
great
lack
of
initiative,
and
consequently
orthodoxy
triumphed
over
opportunity.
The
contrast
in the second
world war was most marked.
By
a
for-
tunate
chance,
certain men
of
genius
had
wrought
a
great
change.
One
can,
perhaps,
date this
phenomenon
from
the
departure
of
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes from the Mediterranean, and attribute its
development
to
the influence
of
Admiral
Sir
Ernle
Chatfield
(later
Admiral
of
the
Fleet Lord
Chatfield)
and
Admiral
Sir William
Fisher3
who
became
his successors
as
Commander-in-Chief.
Cer-
tainly
the restrictive
effects
of
voluminous
Fleet Orders
and tactical
instructions
were
quickly
dispelled,
training
was made
more
realistic,
and
a
proper
emphasis
was
laid on
training
for
night
fighting.4
Among
the subordinate
Flag
Officers
was Rear-Admiral
A.B.
Cunningham,
who held
the
appointment
of Rear-Admiral
Destroyers,
and himself
made
his name
as a
great
wartime
commander-in-chief
in
the
Mediterranean.
With his enormous
ex-
perience
of
destroyers
(he
commanded
HMS
Scorpion
for
seven
years,
1910-18)
and
the
high
standards
which he
expected,
the
destroyer
flotillas
of the
Mediterranean
must have
been a
fine
school
for
initiative,
quick-thinking
and
team
work. There
is
no
doubt
that
by
1939 there
were
a number
of
very
experienced
com-
manding
officers
and first
lieutenants
in
destroyers.
This
was
just
as well, as it was upon them that fell the tremendous burdens of the
first
years
of
the
war. There
was a
heavy
toll
among
the
less
ex-
perienced
and
robust,
as was
evident
in the
RN
hospitals
of
the
time.
Destroyer
officers
tended
to be an
exclusive
professional
group,
contemptuous
of
their
brothers
in
big
ships
and
condescen-
ding,
to
put
it
politely,
to
newcomers
to
the 'boats'.5
Commander
488
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
4/14
Gueritz:
Nelson's Blood
Lord Louis Mountbatten
was
not
fully
accepted,
and
his
invention,
the Mountbatten
Station
Keeping Gear,
was scorned
by many
'old'
destroyer captains.
Coincidentally,
or so
it
seems,
the resurrected
spirit
of the Nelso-
nian 'band of
brothers'
not
only
brought
initiative
and
enterprise
back into naval
operations,
but also
a
new
sensibility
in the handl-
ing
of
men,
as
was
exemplified
in
the doctrine and
practice
pioneered
by
Commander Rorie O'Conor.
By
the outbreak
of
war,
for
example,
the attitude
adopted
towards
midshipmen
had
chang-
ed
considerably. They
were treated as
young
officers
rather than as
fugitives
from a
preparatory
school, and the
gunrooms
in which
they
lived ceased
to be run as
though
Doctor
Arnold had never
lived 6
There
may
have been
exceptions,
but
these
tended to
be in
battleships
where older ideas died hard. The
change
in attitude
may
have
been
due
in
some measure to
the
influence of the
Special
Entry
scheme.
Midshipmen
trained under
this
scheme were older when
they
went
to sea
and
had a
wider
educational
background.7
One
lesson of the
age
of
enlightenment
in
the 1930s was
the
emphasis
placed on enemy reporting: the overriding duty of reporting the
enemy,
his
strength
and his movements.
There
were,
however,
aspects
of
the
Royal
Navy's
character
which
had
escaped
reform. The
attitude
to
non-executive
officers,
Engineers
and
Paymasters,
was
considerably improved.
The dif-
ference
in
their uniforms was now
only
that
of
the distinctive
pur-
ple
and
white cloth between the
gold
rank
stripes
on the arms
or
shoulder
straps.
Nevertheless,
the
Seaman Branch retained its
privileged position
and certain
prerogatives
which
caused
ill-feeling
until
major
reforms were enacted
in
1955.
Regrettably,
this social
prejudice
extended to the
Reserves.
Officers and
ratings
who
joined
the
Royal
Naval Reserve
(RNR)
while
serving
in
the
Merchant
Navy
served for
short
periods
of
training
in HM
ships.
On
at least
two
occasions,
groups
of
officers were
accepted
for
transfer
from
the RNR to the RN.
It would be
gratifying
to
say
that the
public
spirit
of
the Reserves
and the welcome
accession
of
strength
represented
by
the transfers were
recognized
by
officers
in the fleet.
The politest term which can be used about the usual attitude is
'patronizing'.
Yet Merchant
Navy
officers
had
more
practical
sea
experience
by
the
nature
of
their
profession
than
RN
officers whose
sea-time was
restricted
by
fuel
economies.
(Shades
of
1980-81.)
Moreover,
the
attitude betokened
a
failure
to
appreciate
that
one of
the
main raisons
d'etre
of
a
navy
is the
care
of its
merchant fleet.
489
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
5/14
Journal
of
Contemporary History
Lack
of
understanding
of the
virtues and the
difficulties
of the
men
who manned the British
merchant
fleet was inexcusable after the
hard-won
lessons
of the first
Atlantic
war.
Some
progress
was
made
by
way
of official
training
in
Naval
Control of
Shipping just
before
the
war: the
Admiralty organization
for
such control
was
in-
comparably
better
than it had
been
in
1914 or
even 1916. The
underlying
cause
of inattention
to
the
Merchant
Navy
was the
failure
to
appreciate
that fleet
action was a means to
an
end,
and
not
an
end
in itself. Anti-submarine
warfare
training
was far more
a matter of fleet
protection
than of
convoy
escort work.
The work of
Chatfield,
Fisher,
Cunningham
and others bore
fruit
in
the first
hard
years
of
the second world
war.
Single
ships
or
squadrons flung
themselves at the
enemy
with
little
regard
for the
prospect
of success but with
complete
certainty
about the
path
of
duty.
There are
examples
in
plenty:
the
Battle of the
River Plate
in
December
1939,
the forlorn
hopes
of
destroyers
such as Gloworm
and Acasta
in
the
Norwegian
campaign,
the
sacrificial action of the
armed merchant-cruiser Jervis
Bay
which saved
Convoy
HX
84.
Or, one can add the actions against the battleship Bismarck in June
1941
(not
least
the
excellent
reporting by
HM
ships
Norfolk
and
Suffolk)
and
the classic
defence
of
Convoy
JW 51 B
by
a handful
of
destroyers
and smaller
escorts,
pitted
against
a
battle-cruiser
and a
heavy
cruiser
in December 1942.
Any
appearance
of
reluctance
to
engage
brought
censure,
just
or
unjust.
A
shadow
fell
across the
good
name
of HMS
Newcastle,
a Town Class
cruiser,
next
on
the
patrol
line
in
Northern
Waters,
when
the
armed merchant-cruiser
Rawalpindi
was sunk
by
the battle-cruisers Scharnhorst
and
Gneisnau
in
the autumn
of
1939.
A
high-powered
Board of
Inquiry
sat
in
Gibraltar
in
December
1940,
under the
presidency
of
Admiral
of the Fleet the
Earl
of Cork and
Orrery,
to examine
the
conduct of
Vice-Admiral
Sir
James
Somerville
in
his action
with
Italian forces
off
Cape Spartivento,
Sardinia.
The treatment of Admiral
Sir
Dudley
North,
as
Flag
Officer
Gibraltar,
when a
French
squadron
passed
unmolested
through
the
straits,
remains a blot
on the Ad-
miralty's
record.s
The
execution
of an Admiral
'pour
encourager
les autres' may be desirable, sometimes essential, even if the execu-
tion
has,
in modern
times,
been
metaphorical
rather
than literal.
Nothing
but harm
is
likely
to result
from
an evident
injustice
to a
subordinate
in order to cloak
the
shortcomings
of a
superior.9
It
has
been
suggested
that the First
Sea Lord should have done
more
to
restrain
the Prime
Minister
from
interfering
in the
operational
490
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
6/14
Gueritz:
Nelson's Blood
conduct of the fleet.
Men
such as Admirals
Cunningham
and
Somerville needed no
urging
to use
their
ships effectively.
It
is
recorded that
Admiral
Cunningham
'could
hardly forgive
him
[Churchill]
for some of the
insulting
telegrams
he received
from
time to
time'.10
Captain
Stephen
Roskill,
with his close
personal
knowledge
of
Admiral
Pound,
has examined this
question
in
the
book
already quoted,"
and it has
been
an area of
dispute
between
him
and that other eminent
scholar,
the late
Professor
Arthur
Marder.
Great attention has been
paid by well-qualified
observers
and authoritative writers to the
question
of
Admiral
Pound's
health12and opinions differ about its significance. Discussion often
centres
upon
the
Admiralty's
actions
during
the
passage
of
the
Convoy PQ
17
to Russia. It is not
intended
to
rehearse the
sequence
of
events
or
argue
once
again
the
rights
and
wrongs
of
the First
Sea
Lord's
decision to scatter the
convoy
except
in
one
respect.
Con-
voys
in
the
Mediterranean were
escorted
by heavy
ships
and were
subjected
to
attack
by
surface
forces,
as well as
by
aircraft and
sub-
marines.
They
were
fought through
at
great
cost,
and the same
can
be said of the Arctic convoys with the added comment that the
weather
frequently
was
appalling.
In
the Arctic
deployments, heavy
surface escorts
were
stationed
in
close
or
distant
covering positions.
In
the
case
of
Convoy PQ
17,
a
particular
threat
was
posed
by
the
German
battleship
Tirpitz.
It
seems
strange
that,
instead of
seeking
to
bring
that
enemy
to
action with our own
heavy
forces,
the Ad-
miralty's
actions
were
diametrically
the
opposite.
If
it
were decided
to avoid
risks of air
attack on
surface forces
by
limiting
their
move-
ment to
the
east,
this would
be
understandable,
if
contrary
to
the
best
traditions of
eliminating
the
surface
threat
in
battle.
In
any
case,
the
order to scatter
seems
wholly
inappropriate.
Such an
order was
surely
intended for
use
in
the broad
oceans
against
an
im-
mediate surface
threat,
and
not
in
an area
where
air
and
submarine
threats
were
equally
real and
dangerous
to
unescorted
merchant
ships.
To
withdraw
all
protection
seems
incomprehensible,
par-
ticularly
as this
was
the action of
a
distant
command
headquarters
bypassing
three
levels of
command: the
Commander-in-Chief,
Home Fleet, the Cruiser Force Commander, and the Escort Force
Commander.
What
these men
needed was
the
best
possible
infor-
mation
and
the
freedom
to
respond
to
the
circumstances with
which
they
were
confronted,
not
in
an
office,
but
on
the
bridge.
The
Board
Room in
the
Admiralty
building
has a
weather
gauge,
a
relic of
the
eighteenth
century.
Its
sole
purpose
was
to
remind
those
491
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
7/14
Journal
of Contemporary History
sitting
at the
table
that
it was
on
'storm-tossed
ships'
that
success
or failure
would
depend.
The disastrous
material
consequences
of
the
order to scatter
are recorded.
The losses which
might
have been
inflicted
by
the
Tirpitz
could
have been as
bad,
although
other
ex-
perience
does
not
support
such
a
proposition.
What is
unquestion-
ed
is the moral
impact
of the withdrawal
of the escort
forces.
Perhaps
the wounds
have healed
by
now,
but
the
damage
done to
relations
between
the
Royal
Navy
and the men
of its merchant
fleet,
and between
the
Royal Navy
and the United
States
Navy,
was
deep
and
lasting.
The
accepted
standard
was voiced
by
Admiral
Cunningham in his famous affirmation: 'It takes three years to
build
a
ship
but
three hundred
to build
a tradition'.
This
was
his
view
during
the
days
of
the evacuation
from
Greece,
the
defence
of
Crete,
and
finally
the evacuation
of
Imperial
forces from
the island
in the
spring
of
1941.
He declared:
'Whatever
the
risks,
whatever
our
losses,
the
remaining
ships
of the
fleet would
make an
all-out
effort
to
bring
away
the
army',
and
'We
cannot let
the
army
down'.'3
Stories
of
that
period
can
be a source
of
pride
for officers
and men of the Royal Navy following, as they do, upon the
catalogue
of
similar
experience
in
the
Norwegian
campaign,
at
Dunkirk
and
elsewhere
in France.
The
attitude
which
they
fostered
was
again
patronizing,
that
of a
competent
and
self-righteous
elder
brother
towards
his
junior
who
was
frequently
in some
sort
of
scrape,
and
had
to be
picked
up,
dusted
down
with
generous
affec-
tion and
sent
on
his
way.
They
held
a
sneaking
regard
for
the
soldiers'
courage
and
endurance
coupled
with
tolerance
for
his
un-
familiarity
with
shipboard
life,
and
readiness
to share such
com-
forts
as
there
were.
As
one
period
ended,
so
another
was
well
under
way.
Only
the
British
would
set
up
an
Expeditionary
Force
Head-
quarters
immediately
after
the
precipitate
withdrawal
from
a
disastrous
continental
venture.
This
headquarters
was
established
at
Largs
on
the
west
coast
of Scotland.
Commando
units
were
rais-
ed,
and
amphibious
training
started
not
only
for
commandos,
but
also
for
selected
formations
of
the
army proper.
It has been
said
that it was possible to identify units which had been trained in am-
phibious
operations
by
the fact
that
their
officers
and
men had
lost
their
child-like
faith
in the
Royal
Navy
The cause
of this loss
of
faith
was
the
natural
consequence
of
familiarity
with
ships,
boats
and
their
watery
environment,
and
also
the effect
of the
realization
that even
sailors
sometimes
make
mistakes
The
most
ordinary
492
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
8/14
Gueritz: Nelson's Blood
mistakes were
those of
navigation.
The aids to
navigation
in
small
craft were
primitive
and were
not
helped by
the close
proximity
to
compasses
of
steel
helmets
and other metal
objects.
The crews with
whom the
soldiers
trained were
themselves under
training.
The
system by
which
the officers
and men were channelled
into
Com-
bined
Operations
reflected
another unreformed attitude of the
pre-
war
navy.
This
was,
once
more,
a failure to
appreciate
the
true role
of
a
navy.
Viscount
Grey
of Fallodon
remarked that the
army
is
a
projectile
to be fired
by
the
navy.'4
It
seems, however,
that the
Royal Navy,
at
least,
neglected
to
carry
out battle
practice
with that
particular weapon stystem
Naval vessels
frequently
acted as
troop transports
in
emergency:
the
County
Class cruisers
were built with room
for
a battalion to be
carried for short
periods.'5
However,
little
money
was laid out for
the
development,
let alone the
production,
of the
specialized
vessels
needed for
modern
landing
operations.
It has been said that the
capture
of
Diego
Suarez
in
Madagascar
in
May
1942 was the first
successful British Combined
Operation
since
Quebec
in
1759. This
is probably unfair, but in most respects the provisions for landing
operations
in
1940 were little better than those
available
at
Aboukir
Bay
in
1801. Power boats
had
replaced
some
ship's
oared
boats,
but
many
of
the boats were less suitable
for
the
purpose
than
those
available to
Abercromby's
men. Even the
Royal
Marines
gave
visi-
ble
evidence
of
the low
priority
which was
accorded
to their
per
ter-
ram task. The
smartness
with
which the
Royal
Marines could adorn
a
ceremonial
occasion,
with blue
uniform,
white
helmets and
pipe-
clayed belts,
was
in
strange
contrast to their
appearance
when
land-
ing
for
field exercises. For
these their khaki
uniform,
obviously
dragged
from the bottom of
kitbags,
would
hardly
have done credit
to their
forebears
in
the trenches on the
Somme some
twenty years
before.
Nor were the
Royal
Marines
given
their
natural
place
as
the
first
units of the new
Special
Service
group. Army
Commandos
were
formed,
while
Royal
Marine
battalions
remained
brigaded
as
infantry
until 1942.
Thereafter,
Royal
Marines Commandos
were
formed,
and the
balance
of
the men
available
manned
landing
craft
flotillas and special support landing units. Thus the Royal Marines
joined, very
properly,
the
Royal Navy's
effort
to
project power
ashore.
The
manning
of the naval
components
of
Combined
Operations
can
be
summarized as
follows.
Some
enthusiastic and
experienced
yachtsmen,
pre-war
members of
the
Royal
Naval Volunteer
493
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
9/14
Journal
of Contemporary History
Reserve
(RNVR),
formed the
cadre
which
provided
leadership
and
skill. The bulk of the officers were appointed (selected would be
too
strong
a
word)
from the
mass
production
line of the
training
establishment,
HMS
King
Alfred.
Ratings
were
drafted from New
Entry
establishments
and
from the Patrol
Service,
which was based
on the
peacetime
fishing
fleet.
The
senior
element
was
generally
found
from retired
officers who were recalled to
service
and were
found
employment
in
the mushroom
growth
of
landing
craft bases.
The
organization
quickly
passed
from the
hands of a senior
Royal
Marines
officer,
General
Sir Alan
Bourne,
into
those of
Admiral of
the Fleet Sir
Roger
Keyes.
It was not a
happy
arrangement.
The
navy
was not
disposed
to
look
with
great
favour
upon
the
eccentric
activities
of what
promised
to be
a
most
irregular,
if
not
piratical,
crew.
Admiral
Keyes
was
not the
person
to oil wheels or
to
smooth
ruffled
feathers,
and some
of his
appointees
were worlds
apart
from the
modern
navy,
let alone
from its
brand-new
striking
force.
Some
officers
from the General
Service
of
the
Royal
Navy
volunteered
for
Special
Service,
and
were
appointed
to Combined
Operations. Many of these appointments were of comparatively
short duration.
The
Royal Navy's
appointing system
rolled
on
its
accustomed
way, presuming
with
complete
confidence
that
the war
was
only
a
break
in
the
ordered
pattern
of the
Royal Navy's
life.
Career
planning
must continue
without
thought
of the
possibility
that it
might
be as well
to hatch
defeat
of
the
Axis before
counting
the chickens
of
post-war
appointments
and
promotions.
It is
hardly
credible
that
an
experienced
senior
beachmaster,
recovering
from
wounds received
ashore
in
Normandy,
was
told:
'to
stop fooling
around
with
this Combined
Operations
business
and
get
down
to
some
regular
sailoring'.'6
At that
time,
the Walcheren
operation
had
not
yet
taken
place,
and
peace
in
Europe
was
eight
months
away.
The
war
against
Japan
was
at its
height
with
amphibious
operations
pending
in
South
East
Asia
and
continuing
in
the
Pacific.
In
spite
of
this,
career
planning
took
precedence
over
the
use
of
knowledge
and
experience.
This
same
spirit
motivated
the
Royal
Navy's
approach
to
temporary
promotions
and
the award
of
acting rank. Such benefits were dealt out lavishly among the ranks
of
RNVR
officers,
whose
temporarily
inflated
status
would
not
complicate
the
reversion
to
peacetime
promotion
patterns.
This
unruffled
confidence
in ultimate
victory
was not an
affectation,
but
sprang
from an
inborn
sense
of
invincibility.
Disasters
there
might
be,
setbacks,
reverses,
critical
struggles
for existence
but,
in the
494
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
10/14
Gueritz:
Nelson's Blood
end,
the
Empire
and
its navies
would
emerge
triumphant.
The
same
spirit was perceptible in operation orders which sent ships into
night
action
against
superior
forces
concluding
with the
injunction
that
'ships
are
to return
to
harbour at
0900'.
However such
confidence
may
be
described,
whether
as
op-
timism,
arrogance
or steadfast
faith,
it had
its
price-tag.
There is
the
difficulty
of
encompassing
the
possibility
of
innovation.
As
Field
Marshal
Kesselring
remarked in his memoirs:
'Since then
I
have
often observed
this
instinctive
rejection
of an innovation
that
has not
broken
down
prejudice.
It is remarkable
how
strongly
the
vis inertiae
is able
to exert
influence on
the best
intelligence."7
Be-
tween the wars
the
impact
of air
power
on
naval
strategy
and tactics
had
yet
to be
appreciated
fully
in
the
Royal
Navy.
It
is
true
that the
pusillanimous
attitude
adopted
towards
Italy
in 1935 stemmed
partly
from assessments
of the
vulnerability
to air attack
of the
British Mediterranean
Fleet.
However,
it seems that more
energy
and verbal ammunition
was
expended
in
Whitehall warfare
be-
tween
the
navy
and the
Royal
Air
Force than ever went
into the
provision of effective air defence of the fleet, although Admiral
Fisher declared
in
1936 that
great
strides had been
made.
Chatfield,
by
then
First Sea
Lord,
stated that:
'My personal
view trends
strongly
in
the direction that attack
of
ships
at sea
by
aircraft
will
be unremunerative
in a few
years."'
Although
the
battle
for the
control of the Fleet
Air Arm
involved so much bloodshed
in
Whitehall,
that
arm of the service
with
its carriers had not achieved
its
rightful
eminence
in
the
Royal Navy's thinking.
The
big gun
and
the battleship still held sway, but the distinguished naval writer,
Commander Russell
Grenfell,
ventured
to
suggest
in
1937: 'When
certain
warships
had become
so
large
and
expensive
that there is an
inevitable
tendency
to
keep
them
in
cotton
wool,
and when increas-
ing
numbers of other
warships
have to be devoted to their
protec-
tion
there
are,
perhaps, grounds
for
thinking
that these
particular
vessels have
outgrown
their usefulness.'"
At
about the same
time,
Admiral Yamamoto
in
Japan
was
recorded
as
saying:
These
ships
are like elaborate
religious
scrolls which old
people
hang
up
in
their
homes..
..
Military
people
always carry
history around with
them
in the
shape
of old
campaigns. They carry
obsolete
weapons
like swords and it is
a
long
time
before
they
have
become
purely
ornamental. These
battleships
will
be as useful
in
modern warfare as a Samurai ssword.2"
Both in
Japan
and
in
the United
States,
the
power
of the aircraft
495
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
11/14
Journal
of
Contemporary
History
carrier was
appreciated
to
greater
effect
than in
Britain,
notably
in
the
provision
of
up-to-date
aircraft for
the
embarked
squadrons.
The lack of direct naval
responsibility
for
procurement
is blamed
for the
poor
equipment
of
the Fleet
Air
Arm,
but what sacrifices
did
the
Royal
Navy
offer
to make in
those
days
of
penurious
budgets
for defence?
Later,
there was
a lack
of
industrial resources
to meet all rearmament
needs,
and time was
running
out
by
the
time the
navy regained
full control of the
Fleet
Air Arm in
1937.
Nor was the
personnel
problem straightforward.
By
transfers from
the
Royal
Air
Force,
promotions
from
the lower deck
and the use
of rating pilots, some progress was made in building up resources.
A
bigger
step
was the
introduction of
the Air Branch
Entry
by
which officers
were recruited
expressly
for
flying
duties.
They
were
distinguished
by
the
addition
of
the
letter
A in
the surl
of
their
rank
stripes,
and were
restricted
in the duties
expected
of
them.
Resources
were
increased
by
the creation of an
Air Branch
in the
RNVR.
Two threads
are
distinguishable
in
the
Royal
Navy's
attitudes
towards the new influence
on naval warfare.
The first is the
reluc-
tance to
recognize
that the
battleship
was
being supplanted
as
the
core of
a modern
fleet
by
the aircraft
carrier. This led
to some
mishandling
of
the
available
carriers
and
the
consequent
un-
necessary
and
tragic
losses.
For
example,
the
sinking
of
HMS
Courageous
was the
result of her
misemployment
in
anti-submarine
operations.
HMS
Glorious
was detached
from
the forces
operating
off
Norway
in
1940
to return
to
Scapa
Flow
in
readiness
for a
court-martial.
This
was
a
deplorable
reason
for
depriving
the Allied
forces of her
services,
and for
imperilling
a most valuable fleet unit.
She
was sunk
by
the battle-cruisers
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisnau
while on
passage.2'
The
employment
of
a
balanced
force
with a full
range
of
air and
surface elements
came
to be
accepted
in
1940,
almost
unconscious-
ly,
with
the
operations
of Force
H
based
on Gibraltar.
This
force,
presumably
inheriting
its
designation
from
one
of
the
lettered
hun-
ting
groups
of
the 1939
period,
was
an
exemplar
of the
well-
practised co-operative action which became commonplace in
carrier
task
groups
in the
Pacific
war and
thereafter.
It
is
in-
teresting
to
reflect
on the
fact
that the
commander
of
this successful
pioneering
venture,
Vice-Admiral
Sir James
Somerville,
had,
in
fact,
been
invalided
from the
service before
the
war. He
might
well
have adhered
to conservative
opinions,
but
he
was,
on the
contrary,
496
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
12/14
Gueritz:
Nelson's Blood
a most
lively personality
with
a
great
gift
of
leadership.
This
stood
him in
good
stead when he
personally dragged
the
men of
the
Eastern Fleet out
of
a
slough
of
low morale
in
the summer
of
1942.
The
gift
of
appeal
to
all
ranks and
specializations
was a
key
factor
in a
navy
whose
main
striking power
was
increasingly
dependent
upon
the skill and
courage
of
young
men,
many
of whom
had
no
real naval
background.
The carrier aircrews were
irked
by
tradi-
tional
routines and
ceremonial,
disciplined
in
their own
profession,
but
unimpressed
by
the
rigid
attitudes
and conventions of the 'Fish-
heads'
(seamen
officers)
who ran their
floating
airfields. Needless
to say, the Fish-heads were scandalized by the demoralizing
behaviour of
some
of the aircrew
in
the
squadrons
which
embark-
ed. To an
extent,
specializations
and
sub-specializations
within a
service
need their
special
ethos,
some
feeling
of
elitist
separation.
This
must
apply particularly
to airmen
and
submariners,
who need
an extra
element
of
self-discipline
and
professional
responsibility.
The
dilution
in
the aircrew ranks
increased
inevitably
with
heavy
casualties and
great
expansion
of
the
air
arm. With the
dilution,
the
separation between the 'establishment' of the regular navy and its
wartime reinforcements increased.
Long-service
officers and
ratings
were
called 'the caretakers'
by
their
'hostilities-only' ship-
mates,
and this term was not confined to
any particular
branch
of
the service. The
second
thread in
the
Royal Navy's
attitudes
related, therefore,
to the
difficulty
of
moulding
the
strength
of
tradition and
customary
discipline
with
the vital force of en-
thusiasm
and new
skills,
the delicate
balance
between
stifling
orthodoxy
and
ineffective amateurism. Problems
could,
and
did,
occur
in
any
ship
or
force,
but
in
carriers,
living
conditions
brought
everyone
into close
propinquity
and,
at the
same
time,
the
flying
task set the
aircrew
apart
from
their
messmates. With
good
leader-
ship
at
many
levels a fine
rapport
could
be achieved. The
results
of
carrier
co-operation
were a
source of
pride
and
self-perpetuating
ef-
ficiency
of
operations.
In
landing
craft
bases and
assault
forces,
great
care
had
to be
exercised.
Living
and
working
conditions
were
often
rough
and
ready,
basic
training
had been
sketchy,
and the
leavening of RN officers and ratings was lightly sprinkled. For the
Normandy
invasion a
larger
framework of
organization
was
ap-
plied
to
direct the
training,
to
oversee and
execute
administration,
and to
fit
squadrons
and
flotillas
into
the
great pattern
of the
assault
and
build-up.
These
squadrons
and
flotillas were
a vital
weapon
in
the
armoury
of
Allied
sea
power.
Their
crews
and the
497
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
13/14
Journal
of Contemporary History
associated beach
parties
were
very largely
RNVR
and
hostilities-
only
officers
and
ratings.
It
would have been
easy
for
them to have
degenerated
into an
ill-kempt
and
incompetent
rabble
without
sym-
pathetic support
and
guidance
from those with more
experience
and
training.
Lord Nelson would have
delighted
in
the
offensive action which
landing
craft crews achieved. He would
have
revelled
in
the dash
and
courage
of Fleet
Air Arm
crews and would
certainly
have en-
joyed
their
respect.
His
humanity
would have
recognized
and en-
couraged
the enthusiasm
of reservists
of
all kinds. He would have
commended the fighting spirit of Cunningham and the sacrifice
made
by
his band
of brothers
off Greece and Crete. He
would have
turned a deaf ear
to the
interference
of the
Admiralty.
He
might
not have seen
plainly
that the defence
of
shipping
and the
projec-
tion of
power
ashore
are
truly
naval
roles,
not distractions from the
pursuit
of the fleet action.
As to how he himself
might
have
per-
formed as a
Whitehall
warrior,
Lord Nelson's encounter
with the
Duke of
Wellington
in
Whitehall one month before
the Battle
of
Trafalgar was hardly promising
Notes
1. Nelson's
body
was
transported
to
England
after
Trafalgar
in
a cask
of
brandy
(not
rum).
2. Richard
Hough,
Admirals
in Collision
(l1ondon
1959).
3.
Admiral
Fisher
died
suddenly
in
1937
while
serving
as
Commander-in-(hief
Portsmouth.
4. Rear-Admiral
Royer
Dick,
who
was
Chief
of Staff to
Sir
Andrew
Cun-
ningham,
has
told the
writer that at
the Battle
of
Matapan
he remarked
that Chat-
field's
emphasis
on
night fighting
was
being
rewarded.
5. The
word 'boat'
was
formerly
used
colloquially
to describe
passenger
ships,
thus: 'P&O
boat'.
It was a solecism
to
apply
the
term to
warships
but,
confusingly,
jargon
in the
Royal Navy
used
'boats'
for submarines
and
collectively
for
destroyers,
thus 'I served in the Boats
up
the Straits (of Gibraltar)'.
6.
Captain
O'Conor was
killed
while
commanding
HMS
Neptune
in
1941.
His
main
published
work was
Running
a
Ship
on
Ten
Coniiiiandmnents.
7.
Special
Entry
cadets
joined
from their
secondary
schools
by
competitive
ex-
amination
from
171/2-18
years
of
age.
8.
Those
two
regrettable
affairs are
magisterially
examined
by
Captain
Roskill
in Churchill
and
the Admirals
(London
1977), chapter
II.
498
8/11/2019 Nelson's Blood Attitudes and Actions
14/14
Gueritz:
Nelson's Blood
9. The
quotation originated
from Voltaire's Candide and relates to the
execu-
tion of Admiral The Hon. Sir John
Byng
in
1757.
10. Captain S.W.C. Pack, RN, Cunningham (Iondon 1974), 126.
11.
Roskill,
op.
cit.,
Appendix.
12.
For
example,
Dr
Hugh
L'Etang,
The
Pathology
of
Leadership
and
Fit
to
Lead?
13.
Pack,
op.
cit.,
177.
14.
Viscount
Grey
of
Fallodon,
Fisher
Memoirs.
15.
The writer travelled in
a
County
Class
cruiser
carrying
500 survivors and 200
prisoners
in
addition to
her
complement.
16.
Words
spoken
to
the writer
in
September
1944.
17.
Kesse ring,
Memoirs
(Iondon 1953),
17.
18. (. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy (London 1979), 152.
19.
Russell
Grenfell,
The
Art
of
the
Admiral,
244.
20. John
Deane
Potter,
Admiral
of
the
Pacific
-
The
Life
of
Yalmamoto
Ion-
don
1965),
30.
21.
Till,
op.
cit.,
176.
Rear-Admiral Gueritz
is Director
and
Editor-in-Chief of the
Royal
United
Services Institute for
Defence Studies.
He is
also President of
the
Society
for
Nautical
Research and
sets naval
questions
for
the tele-
vision
series,
Mastermind.
499