Presented by Team 10-ACITY
Fanny DominguesPancho Daskalov Qiao Zhang
Natalie HatourIbrahim Olaitan Ashirbad Ghosh
Congressional Oversight Committee House Committee on Science and
Technology
Recommendations for NASA
Put safety of flights before meeting flight schedule
Managementstructure should be diverse
Management shouldpromote the timely flow of information across NASA flight centers
Questions
Findings
Insights Recommendations
‘QFIR’ Approach
Key Points
Ensuring:
Safety
Design reliability
Communication
“We will never forget them, nor the last time we saw them, this morning, as they prepared for the journey and waved goodbye and” ‘slipped the surly bonds of earth’ ‘to touch the face of God.’”
(President Ronald Reagan, NASA
“Remembering Challenger”)
Sources Used for Analysis
(2013, July 4). Challenger beyond the tragedy. MSNBC. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMGQad4ik5I
Edmondson, A. (2002). Group process in the Challenger launch decision (A-D). President and Fellows of Harvard College, distributed by Harvard
Business School Publishing.
Investigation of the Challenger accident: Report of the Committee on the Science and Technology, House of Representatives, 99th Congress,
2nd Session, 600 (1986). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO- CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf
(2012, August 2). NASA Challenger disaster. BBC. Retrieved fromhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=reM5fTo-6PI