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Regulation, Competition and Independence in a Certification Society: Financial Reports vs.
Baseball CardsKarim Jamal and Shyam SunderResearch Institute for Economics and Business
Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, JAPANJanuary 25, 2008
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Summary
Economic consequences of mandatory audit remain controversial
Cross market analyses can yield limited but useful insights Exploration of audit certification in the broader context of
certification activities in the economy Extent and nature of certification services
– Ubiquity of certification and conflicts of interest– Fineness of certification reports (2-100)
Field study of unregulated market for certification of baseball cards– Twenty three Certification firms– Market values Cross Sellers and strict grading service yields
higher returns to its buyers (no race to the bottom) Implications for auditing: How important are independence
and absence of conflict of interest in certification?
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Regulatory Attempts to Improve Auditing
Seven decades of regulation under the SEC – regulation and audit failures
Major changes in regulation in 2002 (SOX) to promote auditor independence (and Quality?)
Controversy over whether these reforms improve auditing (Kinney et al., 2004)
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Extent of Certification Services
In 1996, US Government documented 93,000 national standards developed by 80 government and 604 private agencies (Jamal and Sunder 2006)
National and international standards cover virtually all aspects of the economy (Jamal and Sunder 2006)
To what extent are standards accompanied by availability of services to certify compliance?
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The Audit Society
“Audit explosion” in society (Power 1994): education, healthcare, government supported activities
Demand for audit fueled by political demands for accountability and control (Power 1999)
U.S. audit firms attempted to expand and re-label their “assurance” services into other sectors of the economy in the 1990s (Elliott 1998)
Retail customer as the new client for services Audit firms failed in attempt to expand into e-commerce
assurance market: could not compete with the business models of BBB Online and TRUSTe (Jamal, Maier and Sunder 2003)
Attempt to empirically assess the extent of availability of certification services in private sector
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Sample Selection
Selected a sample of 817 items sold online and offline during June 12-July 25, 2004– 400 items from eBay.com (online)– 358 items from BLS Producer Price Index– 59 items from BLS Consumer Price Index
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Availability of Certification Services by Type
Expert opinion about compliance with formal written standards (91%)
Expert opinion in absence of formal standards (7%)
Ratings given by lay people (no standards) 1% Popularity/activity meters (best-seller lists for
books, music, films, TV, etc.) 0.5% Total: 99.5% have some kind of certificate All four kinds of certification available for 40%
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Table 1: Certification Services for Products Sold Online and Offline in the US
PANEL A EBay(N=400)
PPI/CPI (N=417)
Total (N= 817)
% of Total (817)
Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards 344 399 743 91%Expert Opinions Without Written Standards 45 14 59 7%Lay People Ratings 5 3 8 1%Meter 3 0 3 0.5%No Certification / Rating 3 1 4 0.5%
Panel B: Detailed Breakdown of Certification Activities
All Certification Available (Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards, Expert Opinions Without Written Standards, Lay People Ratings, and Meters)
221 101
322 40%
Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards only 4 110 114 14%Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards, Lay People Ratings and Meter
33 57 90 11%
Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards and Expert Opinions Without Written Standards
47 34 81 10%
Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards, Expert Opinions Without Written Standards, and Lay People Ratings
17 34 51 6%
Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards, and Meter 8 28 36 4%Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards, Expert Opinions Without Written Standards, and Meter
11 15 26 3%
Expert Opinions Based on Written Standards, and Lay People Ratings
3 20 23 3%
All other combinations 56 18 74 9%
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Extent of Certification
Results support for Power’s characterization of ours as a “audit society”
AICPA failed in its attempt to fill what they thought were empty spaces in the market for assurance services
Power (1994) studies the public sector, and attributed “audit explosion” to political forces
But certification is also ubiquitous for private goods
Demand for certification for private goods likely to be driven by broader economic forces
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Data Obtained from One Official Partner of eBay (XYZ)
128 experts Offer opinions on 1,850 separate items $9.95 fee for basic service $29.95 for enhanced service Experts do not follow any written standards Opinions do not reference any written standards Provides descriptions of experts (accreditation
by professional institutes, education, related business, relevant experience): two examples
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Self-Assessment of XYZ’s Experts
128 experts as of July 12, 2004 39% had formal accreditation from a
professional body 25% formal relevant educational
credentials 79% ran a business in the products for
which they provided certification Only 9% reported themselves to be
hobbyists
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Table 2: Qualifications of Experts Providing Opinions on XYZ Website
Accreditation Education Business Hobby 1. Art and Antiquities (n=14) 64% 50% 71% 7% 2. Books, Maps, Manuscripts (n=5) 20% 20% 80% 20% 3. Clocks, Watches and Timepieces (n=4) 25% 25% 100% 0% 4. Clothing, Linens, Rugs and Quilts (n=6) 33% 17% 100% 0% 5. Coins, Stamps, Numismatics (n=7) 29% 14% 100% 0% 6. Electronics (n=3) 33% 0% 67% 33% 7. Famous People (n=4) 25% 0% 100% 0% 8. Furniture and Accessories (n=8) 50% 0% 75% 13% 9. Glass (n=5) 40% 20% 100% 0% 10. Guns, Knives and Swords (n=5) 60% 0% 100% 0% 11. Jewelry (n=6) 50% 33% 83% 0% 12. Knick Knacks and Collectibles (n=7) 14% 28% 86% 0% 13. Music (n=4) 25% 25% 75% 0% 14. Nature’s Treasures (n=1) 0% 100% 100% 0% 15. Photography, Cameras, Projectors (n=3) 33% 67% 67% 33% 16. Porcelain, Ceramic and Pottery (n=10) 50% 20% 60% 20% 17. Silver (n=7) 43% 29% 71% 14% 18. Sports (n=6) 17% 17% 67% 33% 19. Tools, Kitchenware & Equipment (n=3) 33% 0% 100% 0% 20. Toys, Dolls, Games (n=9) 44% 11% 78% 0% 21. Transportation (n=4) 25% 25% 25% 25% 22. Wine (n=2) 50% 50% 50% 0% 23. General Appraisers (other) (n=6) 33% 67% 83% 17% Total (n=128) 50 (39%) 32 (25%) 101(79%) 12 (9%)
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Implications for Auditing
Possibility of conflict of interest (from trade in the relevant good or service) appears to be pervasive (norm) in certification services in general (79%); it is not confined to auditing
Unacceptability of advisory services to audit clients in a regulated market (Francis 2004) contrasts sharply with this data from unregulated domains
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Fineness of Ratings/Certification
Auditor reports are essentially pass/fail (with some additional qualification)
Auditor gains a broad understanding of the quality of internal controls, governance, accounting policies, estimates, and disclosure, and future prospects of business
The coarse pass/fail grading does not attempt to convey this additional information to the client
Would a “finer” report be more informative to users?
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Available Model
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2005): In general, an optimal grading scheme should have an intermediate level of fineness– Coarse reports have less information and do not
motivate the reporting agent to exert more effort– Fine reports magnify the consequences of
measurement errors– Intermediate grading scale may be optimal
Grading scheme should create a small elite grade Absolute grading schemes dominate relative
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Data on the Fineness of Government Standards
Visited websites of 80 departments of the federal government that set standards (Toth 1996)
Were able to access standards of 64 (80%) of these agencies
53/64 (83%) set minimum requirements (pass/fail only)
11/64 (17%) use finer grading (e.g., AAA beef) DG: Most federal agencies use absolute
standards, but do not set elite grades or use intermediate fineness scales (FDA is an exception)
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Greater Variability in Fineness of Scales in Private Standards
Pass/fail (e.g., UL) Multiple seals (TRUSTe for e-commerce privacy 10-100 point rating scales (baseball cards,
Consumer Reports on cars) Often characterized by competition among rival
standards and scales Rating scales as a dimension of competition
among services (Jin, Cato and List 2004)
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Market for Baseball Card Certification Services
Jin, Cato and List (2004)– Dominant player is PSA: 1991, 10-point scale with 1 point
increments, not graded on curve, 10% cards get 10 (no super elite grade)
– BGS: 1999, 10-point scale with ½ point inc., numerical and qualitative labels (mint), sub-grades for corners, centering, surface, edges; 0.1% cards get 10, publishes grade distribution on-line; three brands of service (BVG, BGS, and BCCG)
– SGC: 1999, smaller market share, 100-point scale (confusion, conversion table to 10-point scale)
– 20 other smaller players (Table 3), largely consistent with DG predictions (no curve, intermediate fineness, super elite)
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Table 3: Sports Card Grading Services (Summer 2004)
Name Year Founded
Scale Categories
Grading Cost
Guarantee
Cross-seller
Feature
1. Accugrade (ASA)
1988 13 $5-15 No No Invented 10-point scale + First online rating agency
2. Professional Sports Authentication(PSA)
1991 10 $9-50 Yes Yes
Membership Fee ($99 – get 6 cards graded free) + Largest Market Share
3. KSA 1996 14 $12-19
No No Canadian
4. American Authentication (AAI)
1996 10 $12-22
No No 5 card minimum per order
5. Finest Grading (FGS)
1997 14 $5-25 No Yes
Value PricingCard Shows
6. Map Industries 1998 14 $8 No No Free Shipping
7. Beckett Grading Service (BGS) –Vintage Grading (BVG)–Collectors Club (BCCG)
1999 19 $8-25$9-26
$5
Yes Yes
Price guide + provide sub-grades for centering, corners, edges, and surface
8. Sportscard Guaranty (SGC)
1999 18 $7- 50 No Yes
Started with 100-point scale
9. The Final Authority (TFA)
1999 19 $5-13 Yes No Value Pricing
10. Collection Monster (CM)
1999 19 $10 No Yes
Government Grading
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Comparison with the Market for Audit Services
Only binary pass/fail reports, little further detail permitted
If the purpose of SOX is to convey information about internal controls, will switch from pass/fail to graded report on IC, governance, quality of accounting estimates and accounting policy choices give better value to investors?
The current system suppresses the detailed knowledge gained by the auditor; more consistent with govt. not private markets
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Value of Certification in Sports Card Market
Prospective sellers of sports cards can hire a certification agency to grade and certify their merchandise before selling
Independence and audit quality are difficult to observe in the audit market
Baseball card market includes pure and multi-service certifiers, allows a cleaner measure of “audit quality” in grading strictness, observation of an unregulated market and dimensions of competition (e.g., value pricing, computer grading, multiple experts grading the same card, letting customers choose their own grade)
Anxiety about race-to-the-bottom and independence in accounting (Dye and Sunder 2001)
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Data for Assessing the Value of Certification Services
321,045 cards traded on eBay during August 19-September 3, 2004
Partitioned cards by decades of origin, single-rookie, graded/ungraded (Table 4)
Randomly selected 1,000 rookie and 1,000 singles cards from graded cards
Market shares of six major firms (Table 5) in the sample of graded cards (PSA 78 in singles, 39 rookie; BGS 6 singles, 34 rookie) Tables 5A, B
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Table 4: Baseball Card Certification Services(Baseball Cards Traded on eBay, N=321,045)
Singles (272,399 cards) Rookies (48,646 cards)
Issue Date
Graded
UnGraded
Total %Graded
Graded
UnGraded
Total
%Graded
Pre1930s 1,935 2,933 4,868 40% ---- ---- ---- ----
1930s 1,376 1,689 3,065 45% ---- ---- ---- ----
1940s 417 1,448 1,865 22% 20 218 238 8%
1950s 6,160 22,869 29,029 21% 59 606 665 9%
1960s 7,291 28,007 35,298 21% 161 750 911 18%
1970s 6,858 14,171 21,029 33% 303 1,221 1,524
20%
1980s 3,692 8,533 12,225 30% 5,470 6,378 11,848
46%
1990s 2,693 25,163 27,856 10% 3,669 9,578 13,247
28%
2000s 1,356 135,808 137,164
1% 2,608 17,605 20,213
13%
Total 31,778 240,621 272,399
11% 12,290 36,356 48,646
25%
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Assessing Strictness of Grading
Jin, Cato and List (2005) gave the same 212 cards to PSA, BGS and SGC online and to three offline dealers
Average scores: 8.5 for BGS and two dealers; 8.7 for PSA and one dealer, and 8.9 for SGC (BGS tighter cut-offs, precise); Table 5C
Tables 5A and B: empirical frequencies in our sample (self-selection bias): BVG’s premium service stands out (GAI, SGC)
Becket’s value brand (BCCG) is lower priced, also has relaxed standards
GEM gives the top grade of 10 to 73% percent of the singles cards
In rookie Table 5B: roughly similar results Is the market able to adjust itself for differences in grading?
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Table 5C: Frequency of Grades Given by 3rd Party Certification Services in Field Experiment (Source: Jin et al., 2005, Table 2)
Grade
3rd Party
Grader
Total No. of Cards
10 9.5 9 8.5 8 7.5 7 6.5 6 5.5 5 4.5 4 Average Score
PSA 212 11 134 66 1 0 0 0 8.7 BGS 212 0 0 40 124 43 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 SGC 212 13 134 49 11 3 2 0 0 0 0 8.9 Kevin 212 0 1 40 129 37 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 Rick 212 0 11 57 92 45 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 8.5 Rodney 212 0 1 120 62 25 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 8.7 Total 24 13 525 456 227 15 8 0 3 0 0 0 1 8.6
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Table 5A: Frequency of Grades Given by 3rd Party Certification Services(For a Sample of 1,000 Graded Single Baseball Cards)
Grade
3rd Party Grader
Market Share %
10 9.5 9.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.0 5.0 < 5
Total Average Score
PSA 78.1 69 1 149 0 283 0 129 61 33 56 781 7.5
BGS 3.2 0 11 10 7 1 0 0 1 0 2 32 8.5
BCCG 1.8 9 0 8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 9.3
BVG 1.1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 4 11 5.1
GEM 1.1 8 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 11 9.5
GEM-E 0.3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9.7
SGC 5.3 2 0 3 2 7 4 6 8 12 9 53 6.1
GAI 4.6 0 1 3 3 12 3 8 5 4 7 46 6.6
PGS 1.5 0 0 6 2 6 0 0 1 0 0 15 8.3
Other 3.0 13 3 4 0 2 2 3 1 1 1 30 8.7
Total 100 102 18 185 14 314 9 146 81 52 79 1000
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Table 5A: Frequency of Grades Given by 3rd Party Certification Services(For a Sample of 1,000 Graded Rookie Baseball Cards)
Grade
3rd Party Grader
Market Share %
10 9.5 9.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.0 5.0 < 5 Total Average Score
PSA 36.8 105 0 159 0 80 0 17 4 2 1 368 8.9
BGS 22.7 1 85 73 37 13 14 1 1 1 1 227 8.9
BCCG 10.4 87 0 16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 104 9.8
BVG 0.9 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 3 9 5.3
GEM 11.6 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 116 10.0
GEM-E 4.2 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 10.0
SGC 2.9 4 0 13 6 4 1 1 0 0 0 29 8.8
GAI 2.3 2 9 8 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 23 9.1
PGS 1.6 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 10.0
Other 6.6 33 2 20 8 2 0 0 0 1 0 66 9.4
Total 100% 406 96 289 55 100 16 19 8 6 5 1000
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Pricing and Value of Baseball Card Certification Services
PSA charged a $99 membership fee (dropped recently) Table 3: Price varies ($2-50), extra for faster turnaround For each graded card in the sample, we located an un-
graded card matched by player, maker, year of issue, single-rookie
For unrated cards, we gathered price estimates from Beckett Baseball Card Monthly Guide (August 2004, Issue #234 online)
For rated cards, we recorded player, year, maker, grader, grade, buyer reputation, seller reputation, number of bids, and selling price
Table 6: Gross and net returns on baseball card grading services provided by six major service providers
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Table 6: Average Returns to Grading of Rookie Cards (by Grader and Decade of Issue)
Rater Number of Cards
Gross Return%
Net Return%
2000+ Gr. =10%
1990’s Gr.=10%
1980’s Gr.= 10%
2000+ Gr.=9%
1990’s Gr.= 9%
1980’s Gr.=9%
1970’s Gr.= 9%
BGS 227 264 46 333 ----- ----- 44 86 176 -----
GAI 23 198 92 185 ----- ----- 55 124 128 -----
SGC 29 125 4 303 ----- 201 (27) (65) (1) -----
PSA 368 238 (2 ) 25 47 178 (50) (53) (5) 683
BCCG 104 112 (14) (15) (11) (3) (68) (72) (25) 20
GEM 116 80.6 (23) 154 (38) (24) ----- ----- ----- -----
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Returns to Certification
Rater Gross Return Net Return
BGS 264% 46%
GAI 198% 92%
SGC 125% 4%
PSA 238% (2%)
BCCG 112% (14%)
GEM 80.6% (23%)
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Table 7: Regression AnalysisRi = 1+ 1Yeari + 2Gradei + 3GPSAi + 4GBGSi + 5GBecketti
+6GGAIi + 7GGEMi + 8GSGCi + ei
Regression (990)df, R2 = 0.1747, p < 0.001. (Adjusted R2 = 0.168)
Coefficient Std Error T Statistic
Intercept 108.68 12.60 8.63 ***
Year -0.058 0.006 -8.97 ***
Grade 0.72 0.06 12.65 ***
GPSA 0.37 0.16 2.22**
GBGS 1.12 0.18 6.25***
GECKETT -0.18 0.19 -0.98
GGAI 1.21 0.31 3.87 ***
GGEM -0.73 0.18 -3.97***
GSGC 0.48 0.28 1.68**** p <0.001 ** p < 0.01* p < 0.05
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Regression Analysis
Table 7: Year, grade and identity of grader have a significant effect on net return from the certification service
Certification service is more valuable for older cards (selection effect?)
The returns are ranked by strictness of grading scales, negative for the lenient graders
Easy grade of 10 from GEM does no good for the value of the card
No race to the bottom Beckett able to provide different brands of service, and
market is able to differentiate among them without getting confused
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Problems of Cross-Market Inference
Baseball cards are physical objects of substantive interest; financial reports are symbolic representations of entities which are of substantive interest
In both cases, willingness to pay for certifiers’ expertise
Buyers rely on knowledge and reputation Certifiers compete for fee revenues Certifiers choose portfolio of services to offer
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Back to Auditing
Regulatory objectives of auditing (quality of certification, independence, etc.)
In baseball card market 17/23 offer only certification services but six (including all major) players offer related services (pricing guides, dealers, magazines, shows) as well as handle other collectibles
Cross-sellers dominate the market and are able to collect premium price for their service, yielding positive net returns to their clients
Independence appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient condition for high quality service in this certification market
Why?
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Skepticism about Deregulation
Will a deregulated market for auditing function properly (race to the bottom, Dye and Sunder)?
Industry expert auditors command higher fees and restrain abnormal accruals (Francis et al. 2005, 2006)
Recent policy changes (PCAOB) have gone in the other direction
Lenient graders generate negative returns to their clients Jamal, Maier and Sunder (2003) on market for privacy seals
in e-commerce dominated by higher quality Does cross-selling of services promote or inhibit grade
inflation? Antle et al. 1997; Dopuch 7 King 1991, Abdel-Khalik 1990; Simunic 1984; Zhang 2005; Antle & Demski 1991.
What are the real reasons for poor enforcement of GAAP by audit firms?
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Concluding Remarks
Evidence on ubiquity of certification Certification by government agencies is mostly
binary (pass/fail) Private certification has finer scale Field study of baseball card grading market
– Dominated by cross sellers (conflict of interest)– Multiple dimensions of competition– No race to the bottom
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Open Questions
Will the tough auditors win or lose? Are Independent auditors tough auditors? Precision of grading – Significant? Should
auditors issue more nuanced reports? Does it pay to get audited (vs. reputation,
warranty and disclosure) Will de-regulated audit market lead to
quality differentiation?