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Communicating throughout Katrina: Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on
Crisis CommunicationAuthor(s): James L. Garnett and Alexander KouzminSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 67, Special Issue on Administrative Failure in theWake of Hurricane Katrina (Dec., 2007), pp. 171-188Published by: Wileyon behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4624695.
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Part
ll-The
Future:
Hindsight,
Foresight,
nd
Rear-View
Mirror
olitics
James L.
Garnett
Rutgers
University-Camden
Alexander Kouzmin
University
of South Australiaand
Southern
Cross
University
Communicating throughout
Katrina:
Competing
and
ComplementaryConceptualLenseson
CrisisCommunication
James
L.
Garnett
s
a
professor
f
public
olicy
nd dministration
t
Rutgers
University-Camden.
e s
heauthorf
Communicating
or
Results
n
Government,
coeditorf heHandbookfAdministrative
Communication,
nd o-authorfrecent
PAR
rticlesncommunication.is ther
researchnterestsncludedministrative
reform
nd
eorganization
nd risis
management.
E-mail:
AlexanderKouzmin s an
adjunct
professor
n
management
t he
University
of
South ustraliand outhernross
University-Tweed
old oast
ampus.
e
is
also
visitingrofessor
t he
University
of
Plymouth.
e s he
author,oauthor,
r
editor
f
many
ooks
nadministrativend
organizational
ssues nd heauthorr
coauthorf morehan 50
peer-reviewed
articles.es he
ounding
oeditorf he
Journalf
Contingencies
ndCrisis
Management
E-mail: [email protected]
Hurricane Katrina was as much a communication
disaster
as it was a natural and bureaucraticdisaster.
Communication
gaps,
missed
signals, information
technology ailures,
administrative
buffering,
turf
battles,
and deliberate and unintentional
misinterpre-
tations delayedand handicappedboth the recognition
of
the
crisis that Katrina
posed
and the
response
o its
devastation. This
essay
views
crisis
communication
through
our conceptual
lenses:
(1)
crisis communica-
tion as
interpersonal nfluence,
(2)
crisis communica-
tion as media
relations,
(3)
crisis communication as
technology
showcase,
and
(4) crisis
communication
as
interorganizational
networking.
A
conceptual
rame-
work is
presented
that
compares
hese lenses with
regard
to
agency, transparency, echnology,
and
chronology.
The
planning, response,
and
recovery
tages
of
the Hurricane
Katrina disaster are
viewed
through
these
communica-
tion
conceptual
lenses,
illustrating key acets of
each
perspectiveand adding to our deepening understanding
of
the events.
Many
of
the
problems
we
have
identified
can
be
categorized
as
"information
aps"-or
at least
problems
with
information-related
mplications,
or
failures
to act
decisively
because
information
was
sketchy
at best. Better
information
would have
been
an
optimal
weapon against
Katrina.
Infor-
mation sent to the
rightpeople
at the
rightplace
at
the
right
time.
Information
moved within
agen-
cies,
across
departments,
and between
jurisdictions
ofgovernment
as
well.
Seamlessly. ecurely.
Efficiently
.. One would think we could share
informationby
now. But Katrina
again proved
we cannot.
-U.S.
House
Select
Bipartisan
Committee
With
the
floodwalls
gashed
and
hemorrhaging
billions
ofgallons of
waterinto the
city,
it was
only
a matter
of
a
few
hours
on
Monday before
he
communications
citywide began
to
fail...
Communication was
about to become he
biggest
problem of
the
catastrophe.
-Christopher Cooper
and Robert
Block,
Disaster:
Hurricane Katrina and the Failure
of
Homeland
Security
Truthbecamea
casualty,
news
organizations
hat
werepatting their own backs n early September
were
publishingprotracted
mea
culpas
by
the
end
of
the month.
-Matt
Welch,
"They
Shoot
Helicopters,
Don't
They?"
urricaneKatrinawas and
continues
o
be as
much
a communication
crisis as
a
natural
disaster
or
governmental
fiasco. Massive
failures with the
operability
and
interoperability
of
communications
technology
have been
documented,
as
have bureaucraticand
personal squabbles
that
pre-
vented or delayed effective preparedness, response, and
recovery
(Cooper
and
Block
2006;
U.S. House
2006).
Likewise,
the
news
media
were both a
part
of
the
solution and a
part
of the
problem
at
different times.
To
put
this in
perspective,
a
growing
body
of
scholar-
ship
attests
to the crucial roles
that communication
plays
in
successful
crisis
management (Berge
1990;
Comfort
1994;
Coombs
1999, 2006;
Garnett
1992;
Hale,
Dulek,
and Hale
2005;
Lagadec
1987;
Lerbinger
1980;
Mitroff and Pearson
1993;
Scanlon et al.
1985;
Sturges
1994).
According
to
Pijnenburg
and Van
Duin,
"Indeed,
most of the
time crisis situations
turn
out
to
be,
to
a
large
extent,
information
and commu-
nication crises"
1991, 70).
Katrina follows suit, as the
quotations
at
the
beginning
of
this
essay
reinforce.
This
essay
addresses crisis
communication
by identify-
ing
and
describing
four
conceptual
lenses that
are
explicit
in
crises and
in
the
scholarly
literatureand
by
applying
them
to
the Katrina crisis.
The four
lenses
are
(1)
crisis
communication
as
interpersonal
influ-
ence,
(2)
crisis
communication as
media
relations,
(3)
crisis
communication
as
technology
showcase,
and
(4)
crisis
communication
as
interorganizational
network-
ing.
We first
discuss the theoretical
foundation for
Communicating hroughout Katrina 171
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applying
multiple
paradigms
r
conceptual
enses.
Next,
we examine he
conceptual
hrustand
key
themesof each
ens,
discussing
he focal
actors,
goals,
communication
mode,
key
issues,
and
strengths
nd
limitations
of
each
ens,
illustrated
through
Katrina
events.Each ens is also
compared
with
respect
o the
four variables f
agency,
ransparency,
echnology,
nd
chronology,
gain
with
application
o Katrina.We
then trace he
dynamics
vident
n
these
enses,
ob-
serving
how some lensesmask he valueand contribu-
tions of other enses.We conclude
by
discussing
he
implications
or crisis
communication
nd
manage-
ment within the contextof
Katrina.
Conceptual
Lenseson CrisisCommunication
Burrell nd
Morgan
1979)
lay
the
conceptual
ounda-
tion
for
multiperspectivehinking
with
their
pathbreak-
ing
work
on
paradigm
iversity.
he
ntellectual alue
of
applying aradigmatically
iversemodels
or
lenses o
the sameset of eventsor
phenomena
as beendemon-
strated
Allison
1971;
Burrell nd
Morgan
1979;
Garnett
1980;Ritzer 001;Steinbruner974).Multipleper-
spectives
avealsobeen utilized
ffectively
n crisis
management
esearch
Bovens
nd
't Hart
1996;
Jarman
nd Kouzmin
1991;
Kouzmin nd
Jarman
1989;
Lalonde
004; Rosenthal,
t
Hart,
and Kouzmin
1991).
Our article
ollows his
tradition
f
employing
multiperspectivehinking
o enabledifferent
insights.
Scholarly
ttention o communications a
key
element
in
successful
risis
management
has focused
on
different
mphases
over ime and different isci-
plines.
Froman extensive
eview
of thescholarlyiteraturen the
fields
of crisis
management,
mer-
gency
and
disaster
management,
communication,
ontingency,
and
strategic lanning
we
have
identifiedour
major
onceptual
enses
through
which
scholars
ave
examined
risis
ommunication ndthat
have
helped
shape
research nd
understanding. igure
depicts
hese
our enses:
1)
crisis ommunication s
interpersonal
nfluence,
2)
crisis ommunication
s
media
relations,
3)
crisis ommunication
s technol-
ogy
showcase,
4)
and crisis
ommunication
s inter-
organizational
etworking.
Figure compares
hese enses
n
termsof
four dimen-
sions-agency,
transparency,
hronology,
nd
technol-
ogy-as
well
as a
set of
properties.
orour
purposes,
agency
s the extent
to which
focal actors ake the initiative
or
crisis
communication,
hat
is,
they
act
proactively
ather
han
reactively
Bovens
and 'tHart
1996;
Rosenthal
nd Kouzmin
1997).
Transparency
s the
degree
to which
the
actors
and actions
described
y
a
conceptual
ensare
transparent,
hat
is,
visible o external
takeholders
utsidethat lens. Tech-
nology
ndicates he
comparative
evel of communica-
tions
technology
hat
predominates
n
each ens.
Chronology
howsthe
progression
f
scholarly
mpha-
sison the four ensesovertime. Those
higher
on chro-
nology
received ttentionearlier.
We discuss
hese
enses
n
orderof
chronology, tarting
with the first
cholarly
mphasis
nd
proceeding
o the
most recent. t
should
be
kept
n
mind thatthese
enses
arenot
totallymutually
xclusive
nd
fallshortof the
strict
definition
f a
typology
Tiryakian
968).
Con-
siderable
overlapping
nd
blending
f
types
exists
n
actual risis
management
perations.
or
example,
communications
technology
i
a the
technology
how-
case
can
aid
(or nhibit)
nterorganizational
ooperation
in crisis
response
nd
recovery.
hese
enses,however,
convey
different
onceptual mphases
hatenabledif-
ferent
insights
with
implications
or
crisis
heory
and
praxis.
To
explicate
hese
conceptual
enses,
we use
them to viewcommunicatingnvolvingHurricane
Katrina,
he most
devastating
atural
isaster
n
U.S.
history.By
looking
attheseevents
hrough
ach
per-
spective,
we
aim
to add to our overall
understanding
f
the
events hat
occurred
ndthelenses hemselves.
Crisis
Communications
Interpersonal
nfluence
Before he invention
of
telephones,
adios,
or
even
movable
type,
crisiscommunication ccurred
by
word
of
mouth-neighbor
to
neigh-
bor,
or individual o
groups,
uch
as
those
engaged
n
rescue fforts.
Knowledge
f the volcanic
erup-
tions of Thera ca. 1470 BCE)
andVesuvius
79 CE),
the Athens
plague
430 BCE),
and
other
ancientdisasters
omes
from
limitedhistorical ccounts
or
archeological
ecords.
We
gain
the
image,
however,
f
peoplewarning
heir
neighbors
bout the
calamity
t
hand
or those
remaining
omforting
achother face
to face.
During
the Great
Fireof London
n
1666,
King
Charles
I
"joined
he
firefighters
nd
was to be
seen 'smoke-
grimed
and
ash-covered,
andling
pade
and
bucket,
his lacedcoat
wet
and
filthy'"
Kingston
and Lambert
1979,
105).
Doubtless,
he shouted
ordersorexhortations, s wasroyal
prerogative.
The crisiscommunication
s
interpersonal
nfluence
lens,
the earliest
mphasis
n termsof
practice
nd
scholarship,
s
recognizable
oday
in
terms
of the
interpersonal
dynamics
of
presidents,
over-
nors,
mayors,
hief
executive
officers,
heir
top
advisors,
nd
other actors
nvolved
n crisis.
The
growing
use
of crisis
com-
mand
centersand
the
political
...we
have dentified
our
majorconceptual
enses
hrough
which scholars
haveexamined
crisiscommunication....
The crisis
communication
s
interpersonal
nfluence,
he
earliest
mphasis
n termsof
practice
nd
scholarship,
s
recognizable
oday....
172 PublicAdministration Review
*
December 2007 * Special Issue
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imperative
f
leadership
eing
visible
n
these com-
mand
centersdemonstratehe
ongoing
mportance
f
the
interpersonal
nfluence
ens. While
massmedia
and
high-tech
communications re
increasingly eing
used
by
government
nd
corporate
eaders,
much
communication
surrounding
riseseven
today
s
face
to
face,oral,
and
interpersonal
Comfort
and Cahill
1988),
whetherat
the scene of the crisisor
in
a com-
mand
or
operations
enter
within the crisis eam.
A
typical
cenario
n
this
perspective
would
have
key
leaders
interacting
with a
range
of
advisors,
ncluding
police
and
fire
chiefs,
healthand mentalhealth
ex-
perts,
media
consultants,
echnical
specialists
terror-
ism
experts,
hemical
specialists,
tc.),
and others.The
types
of
advisorswould
depend
on the natureof
the
crisis o be confronted.Thecrisiscommunication s
interpersonal
nfluence
perspective
ocuses
on
how
individuals nteractwith other ndividuals-whether
they
are
decision
makers,
neighbors,
olleagues,
r
helpingprofessionals-before,during,
and aftera
crisis.While suchinterpersonalommunication c-
curswithin
organizational
r even societal
contexts,
the
primary
hrustof
this
perspective
s
relating
at
this
most basic evel rather han
communicating hrough
media,
echnology,
r
interorganizationalinkages.
The
communication
goals
areto directaction
through
orders
or
instructions,
nformcrisisdecision
makers,
and
set the tone for
handling
he crisis.
During
Hurricane
Katrina,
nterpersonal
ommunica-
tion
among op
officials
nd
theiraides
ailed o meet
these
key
goals.
President
George
W BushandVice
President
Dick
Cheney
were
away
rom
the White
House and distractedwith other ssueswhen Katrina
struck.
They
werenot
fully
engaged gentsduring
he
firstcrucial
days.Secretary
f
Homeland
Security
MichaelChertoffwas
preoccupied
ith antiterrorism
goals
andwas absent
during
ome of the
key
meetings
on Katrina.He and Michael
Brown,
director f the
Federal
EmergencyManagement gency
FEMA),
had
a strained
relationship
efore,
during,
and
after hat
disaster.
or
days
during
he heat of
response,
Brown
was isolated
n Baton
Rouge
and
stopped
answering
calls rom heDepartment f HomelandSecurity.
Secretary
hertoff nd
his
"battlefield
ommander,"
High
Agency
Low
High
Interpersonal
Influence Media Relations
High
Focal
actors:
Leaders,
advisers,
top
teams,
survivors Focal actors:
Spin
doctors,
commentators
Dominantcommunicationmode: Face to face Dominantcommunicationmode:
Mass
media
Key
functions:Direct
action,
inform decision
Key
functions:Promoteand
protect
makers,
set
tone,
console and
counsel
organizational eputation
nd
interests,
disseminatenews, gainmarket hare
Key
issues:
Perspective,
accountability, Key
issues:
Credibility,authenticity
T
groupthink
groupthink
Strengths:
Reach,
visibility
C
a
Strengths:Proximity,
relevance
Limitations:
Distortion,sensationalism,
ack
h
n
Limitations:Lack
of
overall perspective
of
overall perspective
r
s O
p
n
Interorganizational
Networking
Technology
Showcase
a o
r
Focal
actors:
Boundary
brokers,
organizational
eaders Focal actors:
Cybergeeks,
echnocrats
I
e o
n
Dominant
communicationmode:
Boundary panning
Dominant
communicationmode:
IT
networking
g
c
Functions:Allocate
resources,
coordinateaction
Functions:
Demonstrateand validate
y
y technology,
disseminate nformation
Key
issues:
Intelligence,
competition, Key
issues:
Accessibility,
overload,
"wickedness"
technological
failure,
unk,
e-governance,
democratic
governance
versus
security
Strengths:
Cooperative
action
Strengths:Speed, uniformity
Limitations:Turf
boundariesand
battles,
bureau-
Limitations:
Technological
failure,
political blaming,
time,
and
stalemate,
ack of
communicative
redundancy,
echno
stress,
Low
overall
perspective
vulnerability
and
marginalization,
ack of
Low
overall
perspective
Low
High
Technology
Figure Conceptual
enses
or
Understanding
risis
ommunication
Communicating hroughout Katrina 173
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Director
Brown,
ommunicated
briefly
nd
perfuncto-
rily,
having
ittle
quality
ime
together.
According
o
the U.S.
House
Bipartisan
electCommittee
on Ka-
trina
2006,
2),
"These wo
key
players'
ailure o
com-
municate
s
evidenceof the
profounddysfunction
hen
existing
between
DHS andFEMA
leadership."
hese
andother
top
federal
fficials
ailed o ask
many
of the
probing
questions
bout
preparation
nd
response
actionsand failed o
communicate he
proper
one for
handling
he
crisis.
Much of the
public
one
communi-
cated
by
federal
fficials
was one of
"being
n
control"
rather han
showingappropriate
ngagement.
One
key
goal
of the
interpersonal
nfluence ens
in-
volves
directing
preparedness
nd
response.
n this
regard,
t is
linkedwith
the
command
and control-
oriented
rational/centralized
approach
o crisisman-
agement Caplow
1976;
Garnett
1992;
Perry
1985;
't
Hart,
Rosenthal,
nd
Kouzmin
1993).
The
image
here
is of the
top
leader
orderly
onferring
with
key
aides
in
the
crisis
command
centerand
giving
orders or
response perationso police,fire,health,and other
workers
n
the
field that
implement
a
rational,
om-
prehensive lan
for
emergency
management.
A
grow-
ing
amount of
scholarship
as
emphasized
hat
this
rational deal s
more
myth
than
reality
Kouzmin
and
Jarman
1989;Rosenthal,Charles,
nd 't Hart
1989;
Rosenthal,
t
Hart,
and
Kouzmin
1991;
Schneider
2005;
't
Hart,
Rosenthal,
nd Kouzmin
1993).
More
typical,
according
o this
polycentric
ineof scholar-
ship,
is
the
involvement f
multiple,
often
conflicting
actors
amid the chaos
hat crisis
inevitably
brings.
A
key
issuewith the
interpersonal
nfluence
ens is
howcrisismanagers cquire nduseinformation o
make
decisionsand the
dynamics
of crisis
decision
processes.
Much of the
scholarly
ttention n
the crisis
decision
contexthasfocusedon
groupthink,
r "the
tendency
or
premature
nd extreme oncurrence
seeking
within a
decision
group"
't
Hart and Kroon
1997,
102).
After
analyzing
ecision
making
n a
numberof
crisis
contexts,
ncluding
he
PearlHarbor
attack,
Bay
of
Pigs
invasion,
and
Watergate,
Janis
(1972,
1982,
1989)
concluded that
faulty
decision
making
was the
result
of
too much
group
cohesion
and facilitation rather than too little.
This
finding
is
counterintuitive to
prior
(and
still
most)
scholarship
on
group
dynamics
and
goes
too often unheeded
today by
contemporary practitioners
and
scholars who
advocate cohesive
groups
('t
Hart
and Kroon
1997).
Groupthink
is still a controversial
subject
afterconsid-
erable
scholarship
that has
critiqued
Janis's
original
groupthink
theory
and framed new theories
('t
Hart
and Kroon
1997;
Kowart
2001).
From this
wide-ranging
literature,
some
important
findings
emerge.
The
dysfunctional
decision
making
characteristic of
groupthink
is
connected
with
insula-
tion from other information and
advice,
feelings
of
groupsuperiority
ndeven
infallibility,
xcessive
group oyalty
and cohesion
combinedwith
insecurity
by
individual
members,
dominance
by
a
promotional
leaderwho
promotes
a
position
andoutcome
rather
than
remaining
neutral
acilitator,
n
organizational
culture hat
promotes
eam
oyalty
over
ndependence,
shortdeadlines
nd
high
stress,
he influence
of
prior
failures,
nd
group
willingness
and even
eagerness
to
accepthigh-risk,
venreckless ourses
of
action,
ignoring
cautionary
nformation
nd
possible
moral
complications"
't
Hart and Kroon
1997, 122;
seealso
Schafer nd Crichlow
2002).
FEMA
director
Brown's
isolation
physical
nd
administrative),
isoverconfi-
dence,
andhis failure
o widen his
decisioncircle
are
indicativeof the
groupthink
hat
occurred
during
Katrina.But
the decision
dysfunctions
ardly
topped
there:
They
extended o information
bias n
the
Homeland
Security
Operations
Center
(HSOC),
the
New Orleans'
mayor's
ffice,
and
elsewhere.The
ex-
cessive
oyalty
within
decision-making camps"
nd
the
distrustof officials
and
personnel
rom
the
outside
alsodistorteddecisionmaking.
Katrina lso
spotlighted
he less
rational,
more
chaotic
flavor
of the
interpersonal
nfluence
ens.
Because
storm
damage
liminated
orhinderedmuch
available
communication
technology, nterpersonal
ow-tech
communication
ccurred
n
unexpected
ituations.
"The nformation
acuum n the
Superdome
was
especially
angerous.
Cell
phones
didn't
work,
the
arena's
ublic
address
ystem
wouldn't un on
genera-
tor
power,
and the law enforcement n
hand
was
reduced o
talking
o the
20,000
evacuees
using
bull-
horns
and
a
lot of
legwork"
Welch
2005,
16).
In
another nstance,Mississippiocal
governments ept
contactwith
the state
capitalby
running
cars
back
and forthto
relay
nformation n
response perations.
In termsof
our matrix
dimensions,
he
interpersonal
influence ensrates
high
in
agency
becauseactors n
this lenstend to
be
proactively
nvolvedwith
the
crisis-whether on
the scene or behind the scenes
n
a
command
post.
In
either
case,
actors
and actions
n
this
perspective
tend to have
higher
visibility
because
of their central and dramatic nature. This
lens
rates
high
on
chronology,
as it is the
oldest lens
in
practice
and in
scholarly
emphasis,
but low on
technology
because the dominant
media are face to face
and
telephone,
even
though
some
higher-technology
com-
munications media are
increasingly
utilized.
Because
presidents, mayors,
governors,
and other actors
associ-
ated with the
interpersonal
influence lens are so
prom-
inent,
newsworthy,
and
visible,
this lens rates
higher
in
transparency
than some
other lenses. These
focal
actors, advisors, consultants,
and others involved
in
small "crisis
councils" often reduce
transparency
n
favor of
secrecy,especially
for certain kinds of
crises,
such as those
dealing
with terrorism
and
national
security.
The
magnitude
of death and destruction
and
174 Public Administration Review
*
December 2007
*
Special Issue
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6/19
the
uproar
verthe
handling
of HurricaneKatrina
resulted
n
several ntensiveofficial
investigations,
widespread
media
scrutiny,
nd
participant
atharsis,
all of
which
served o
penetrate
much
of
the
secrecy
that
might
otherwisehaveoccurred.
This
extra cru-
tiny
will neverclose all the information
gaps
about
what
happened
or
failed o
happen.
Crisis
Communicationas Media Relations
This
conceptual
ens focuses
primarily
n the roles
that media
relations,
particularly sing
the massnews
media,
play
n the
varying tages
and
aspects
of crises
and
crisis
management.
The
essenceof this lens is
captured
by
an article
itle,
"Wehave a Problem ..
Call the
Press "
(Berry
1999).
In this
lens,
crisesare
seen
substantially
s mediaevents ecauseof
the
mass
media's
endency
o treatcrisesand
disasters
s
dis-
creteevents nstead
of
periodic
or even
anticipated
occurrences
ithin
technological,
olitical,
ecological,
or
economic
systems
Smith 1992).
Prominent ctors n this lensareeithercommentators
and observers
who
report
on crises or
news
organiza-
tions or
spin
doctors
who
represent
he
organizations
involved
n the
crisis o
the news
media
reporting
t.
Interplay
etween hesesets of actorsand
among
their
counterparts
n
public
nformation nd
media
orms
the
essence
of
mediarelations.
Key
communication
functions n this lens for news
commentators nd observers re
to
disseminatenformation bout
the
crisis;
"frame"he crisis
or
viewers, isteners,
r
readers;
nd
gain
market hare
within
the
newsindustry.Keyfunctions or
government,
usiness,
or
other
spin
doctorsare
to
protect
and
promote
heir
organization's
reputation
nd interests.
Katrina,
oted the
top
news
story
of
2005
by
the
Associated
Press,
howcased
broad
range
of media
actorsat their
best and worst.
The
mediarelations
perspective
lso
has
multiple
strains.One
focus
of
this researchnvolveswhere
citizensobtain
crisis-relevant
nformation.
While mass
mediaare
generally
he most cited
sourceof informa-
tion
aboutdisasterswithin
the
disaster
ommunity
itself(Wenger, ames,andFaupel1980), theirroles
reflect
significant
ariations.
Burkhart
1991),
synthe-
sizing
considerable esearch n
media n
crisis,
con-
cludes hat
massmedia
roles
varyby
the
phase
of the
crisis.Massmediatend to
devote
mostof their
atten-
tion
to the
preparedness/warning
nd
responsephases,
whichhave
highest
dramaand
newsworthiness.
Most
of
the
crisis-relevant
edia
nformation
hat citizens
receiveoccurs
immediately
efore,
during,
and imme-
diately
after he
crisis.The
massmediaare
ound to
be
most
useful
n
conveying
and
amplifying
lerts rom
official ources
Burkhart
991;
Comfortand Cahill
1988;
Drabek
1986;
Perry
1985),
providing
nforma-
tion andinstructions o
help
citizens
prepare
or
the
crisis
Burkhart 991),
and
providing
news
during
he
acute
crisis
responsephase
about the crisisand its
impacts
Burkhart
991;
Horsley
and Barker
002;
NationalResearchCouncil
1980).
Whilemuch
responsible
nd even heroic
journalism
occurred
during
Katrina,
oo often
themassmedia
failed o disseminate ccurate nformation.This false
informationhindered fforts
at
evacuation, escue,
aid,
and
security.
Because f the crisis
mentality
hat
prevails,
specially
uring
he immediate
response
phase,
he
typical
media role
of
independent
ritical
monitor
s often
forgone
Burkhart
991;
Massing
2002;
Nacos and
Torres-Reyna
007)
and
may
even
result
n
media-spread
umors
Scanlon1979).
On
September
,
72
hoursafterHurricane
Katrina
ripped
hrough
New
Orleans,
he As-
sociated
Press
news
wire
flashed
a
nightmare
f
a story:"Hurricane vacuationHaltedAmid
Gunfire .. ShotsAre Firedat
Military
Helicop-
ter."The article lew across he
globe
via at least
150
news
outlets,
from
Indiato
Turkey
o
Spain.
Within 24
hourscommentators
n
every
major
Americannews networkhad
helped
turn
the
helicopter niper
mage
nto the
disaster's
enduring
ymbol
of
dysfunc-
tional urbanites oo
depraved
to
be saved .. But the basic
premise
of the article hat
introduced he New
Orleans
helicopter
niper
o a
global
audiencewasdeadwrong, ust
like
so
many
other
widely
disseminated
Katrina
night-
mares.
No
7-year-old ape
victim with a
slit throatwas ever
ound,
even
though
the
atrocity
was
reported
n
scoresof
newspapers.
he Convention
Centerwas not
stacked
with
30-40
dead bodiesnorwas
the
Superdome
live-in
morgue.
Welch
2005,
16)
Because f
media
coverage
f
the
helicopter
umor,
some rescue
ffortswere
abandoned
r
delayed.
The
rumor
about bodiesat the
convention
center
prompted hediversion f a mortuaryunit fromother
collections
neededto maintain
public
health.The
vacuumof reliable
nformation
spawned
umors
hat
weretoo
oftencirculated
y
news media
without
careful
erification.Rumors
wereeven
spreadby
the
public
officials
responsible
or
handling
he
crisis:
Mayor
Nagin
and his
police
chief
Eddie Com-
pass
contributed
n this
score.For
days,
the two
men
had been
delivering
anciful
descriptions
o
the
press
of the
Superdome
nd the
city
at
large.
Nagin
had
spoken
of the
"animalistic"
tateof
Key
functions for
government,
business,
or
other
spin
doctors
are to
protect
and
promote
their
organization'sreputation
and interests.
Communicating hroughout Katrina 175
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8/11/2019 Garnett Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication
8/19
Katrina'sictims
still
endure
a
month after he
storm-also has
gripped
many
reporters
who want
to
stay
on
the
story
ndefinitely"
Johnson
2005).
This
strong
dentity
with the
people
nvolved n
Katrina
produced
ome
first-rate
journalism
ut also
may
have
affected
objectivity.
ournalistic
xcessoverthe
Super-
dome is a case
n
point.
Another trainof the crisismedia iterature oncen-
trates
on
the media's ole
n
enhancing
or
destroying
personal
r
organizationaleputation.
Because
ew
stakeholders iew
crisis-handling erformance
irst-
hand,
most stakeholders
orm
their
judgments
through
he mass
media.
Few
people
outside
New
York
City
remember
hat
MayorRudolph
Giuliani
was
plagued
with
personal
nd
political
problems
before he
9/11
attacks nd was on
nobody's
ist for
man of the
year.
The
media
images
of
Mayor
Giuliani
and PresidentBush
responding
o that crisis
did
much
to boost their
reputations.
Likewise,
handling
a crisis
badly
can ruin one's
personal eputation
nd
political
fortune,asPhiladelphiaMayorWilsonGoodediscov-
ered
following
he
1985
MOVE confrontation
(Nagel
1991).
Media
coverage
f Katrina
learly
damaged
PresidentBush's
reputation.
One
indicator
of
this is
that more critical
artoonswererun about President
Bushthan
any
other
figure
n
the disaster
(Kelly-
Romanoand
Westgate
007).
Homeland
ecurity
secretary
Chertoffand FEMA
directorBrownalso
received ritical
coverage
CNN 2005).
To
put
their
bossesand
their
organization
n better
media
light,
Department
f
Homeland
Security
mployees
were
told
by
e-mailto "dowhatever
hey
could
to
makethe
department
ook
good.
What
this meantaboveall was
making ure hat,wheneverhepresswasaround, he
Homeland
Security
gencies
were
clearly
n a
leading
role.
Complicating
heir
task,
though,
was
the
fact
that otherfederal
departments
werealso
seeking
o
present
a
high profile
o the TV cameras"
(Cooper
and Block
2006,
232).
Indicative f the
research
n
maintaining
eputation
s
the
emphasis
n the
consequences
f different
risis
communication
strategies
including
denial,
stalling,
deflection/blaming, aggression/counterattack,
forming
alliances,
ingratiation,
and
acceptance
(Sturges
1994;
Ray
1999;
Booth
2000;
Coombs
2006).
The blame
game
started with
heavy
criticism of FEMA and the
feds
(CNN
2005;
Cooper
and Block
2006).
To
take
heat
off
the
federal failures over
Katrina,
the White
House
attempted
the
deflection/blaming
strategy.
"Administration officials
began talking
less about what
President Bush
had
called the
'unacceptable'
federal
response
in
Katrina
and more
about what local offi-
cials
might
have
done to
aggravate
the
problems"
(Cooper
and Block
2006,
235).
Later
on,
after
receiv-
ing pushback
from
Governor
Blanco
and other Gulf
officials,
the
Bush
administration
backed off
from its
blaming strategy.
Partly
because t
rates
higher
n both
visibility
and
technology,
hemedia
relations
ens has
received
he
most
scholarly
ttentionof
the four
perspectives
d-
dressedhere.The mediahave
greater
ccess o
diverse
publics
and,
by
their
very
nature,
an even
self-
promote
heirrole
during
crises.
Visibility
and
reach
are
clearly
he
strengths
f the massmedia.
Because
this lens was also one of
the first o
gain
the
attention
of
researchers,
t hasbeenable
to
gain
momentum
and critical
mass
(see,
e.g.,
Barton
1993;
Benthall
1993;
Berge
1990;
Burkhart
991;
Nacos
2005;
Nacos
and
Torres-Reyna
007;
Scanlon
1980;
Smith
1992).
The
degree
of
agency ypical
within the
media
relations ensis lower
han that of the
interpersonal
influenceor
interorganizational
etworking
enses.
Mediarelations till
plays
moreof anobservation
ole
on the
reporting
ide
and,
all
too
often,
on the
public
relations ide as well.
A
trend oward
greater
gency
within
the mediarelations ens is
apparent,
owever,
as
both
mediaand
organizational
ctors akemore
initiativewithin the
crisis
communication ontext.
Somereportersndcamera perators venrescued
people
during
Katrina.
Media
figures
uch as
Ander-
son
Cooper
weremore than
observers t
times.
In-
creased
agency
within the
mediarelations ens
can
produce
more
probing ournalism
r
more sensation-
alized
reporting,
s with the
Superdome
r
convention
center
coverage.
n either
case,
heightenedagency
during
crises
runs the risk
of
violating
normsof
"objective"
eporting.
While
the mass
media
play
some vitalroles n crisis
management,
we
argue
hat research ttentionhas
exceeded he
actualcontribution f the
massmedia
and left otherperspectivesnderresearchedndun-
derreported,
hus
masking
he
natureand
potential
of
other enses.
The
mass
mediado not
typically
play
the
key
communication oles n
preventing
crisis,
mobi-
lizing
crisis
response,
r
achieving ong-term ecovery.
The mass
mediacan raise
he salienceof
emergency
management
n
the
policy
arena
Burkhart 991),
but
their
nattentiveness
o
longer-range
mitigation
and
recovery
ssues
essens his
contribution. n
addition,
the mass
media's
tendency
to
be
highly
critical
of
government
response
to
emergencies
as
"nearly
nevi-
table
failure" s
clearly
overstatedand
counterproduc-
tive
(Schneider
1992),
the
colossal
governmental
failures in Katrina
notwithstanding.
The mass media
are
also of
limited value in
notifying
the
families
of
victims
and
helping
rehabilitate
survivors
(Hodgkinson
and Stewart
1991;
Myer
2001;
Pijnenburg
and
van
Duin
1991;
Raphael
1986).
Crisis
Communicationas
Technology
Showcase
The
technology
showcase
perspective
emphasizes
the
application
of
communications
technologies,
usually
advanced
technologies,
for
communicating
before,
during,
and after
crises.
Crises
become
opportunities
to
showcase the
capabilities
of
advanced,
virtual
Communicating hroughout Katrina 177
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communications
hardware nd software.
Key
actors
in
this lens
are
the
cybergeeks
who are conversant
with communications
echnologies
and
can
apply
them
and
the administrativeechnocratswho
super-
vise them
(Jarman
1993;
Kouzmin,
Jarman,
and
Rosenthal
1995).
Increasingly
nvolvedwithin the
technology
showcase
ens are consultants
who
supply
expertise
on an
outsourcing
basis
that
gov-
ernmentsand businesses
are
increasingly
ess able
to
provide
(Korac-Kakabadse,
akabadse,
nd
Kouzmin
2002).
Attention ends to
focus on the
capacities
f the tech-
nologies
nvolved,
whether
hey
were
appliedappro-
priately,
nd the results
of
their
use.
Illustrative
f
scholarship
n communication
technologies
ncludes
research n
the
use
of CitizensBandradio
Drabek
et al.
1979;
Drabek
t al.
1981),
interactive talk
adio"
(Kouzmin,
Leivesley,
nd Carr
1997),
telecommuni-
cationsnetworks
Chartrand
985;
Giuffrida
1985;
Wrobel
1993),
geographic
nd
spatial
nformation
systems Jarman 993;Newkirk1993;Newsomeand
Mitrani
1993),
decision
support
ystems
Booth
1993;
Mitroff
1994; Torrieri,Concilio,
and
Nijkamp
2002),
and
e-mail,
chat
rooms,
and Web
sites
(Fischer
1999).
These
technologies
havebeen
applied
o a
numberof
crisis
types, ncludingearthquake
nd
volcano
detection
and
behavior,
il
spill tracking,
disease
epidemiology,
vacuation
tracking,
orest
ire
detection,
errorist
ynamics
modeling,
and emer-
gency response
monitoring.
The
principal
nstrumentalunction
within the
technology
showcase
ens is to
apply
communica-
tions technologyforbettercrisishandling, particu-
larly
disseminating
nformation
relating
o
mitigation,
preparedness,
arning,
response,
recov-
ery,
or
learning.
In
many
crisis
situations,
communi-
cations
technologies
are the
only
feasible
way
to
disseminate
nformation
o those
on the
scene
and
to those
managing
and
responding
o
the
crisis.
Earlier
applications
of
technology
concentrated
n
establishing
inks outside
the
disasterarea
Drabek
1986;
Pijnenburg
and
Van Duin
1991)
and
among
agents
involved in
crisis
handling
(Drabek
et al.
1979;
Pijnenburg
and
Van Duin
1991).
This
linkage
can be invaluable
in
directing
citizen
and
emergency
personnel
actions within the disaster area and coor-
dinating responses
from
outside.
A
more current
application
of communications
technology
is aimed
at
detecting
actual
or
potential
disasters.
Remote
sensing
technology
has been used
to
detect
forest
fires,
earthquakes,
hurricanes,
and
other
types
of
natural disasters.
At
its most
effective,
communica-
tions
technologies
allow for
more
rapid
and
more
uniform
communication
with
the actors
who need
the information.
Certainly,
remote-sensing
technolo-
gies
can send
warnings
from isolated
areas
where
it
would be
infeasible
to have staffed
stations or even
regularmonitoring.
A combinationof seismic
alert,
geographic
nformation
ystems
or
locating
response
and
recovery
needs and
efforts,
oss
estimation,
and
other forms
of communications
technologies
used
after
the
1994
Northridge
earthquake
n
California
considerably
hortened he time
required
o
imple-
ment
federal,
tate,
and
emergency
esponses
(Comfort1994).
A
corollary
unction,
but one that often seems to
take
precedence,
s
demonstrating
he
efficacy
of the
technologies
themselves.The
emphasis
on "show-
casing"
a
new
communications
technology
can be
expected
because t
has to
gain
acceptance
before
it
can
be
used
to benefit either those actors
applying
the
technology
or thosewho have invested
n the
technology
(Newsome
and
Mitrani
1993).
If
com-
munications
technologies
or
specific
products
come
underfire as
being
unreliable
or
outmoded,
show-
casing again
becomes
important.
In
promoting
new
or threatened
communications
echnologies,
advo-
catesmaybe temptedto oversell hem as "techno-
fixes."
Some
of the
technology
perspectiveattempts
to
combat
the
technofix
mentality
that
is so
appeal-
ing
to
many
citizens and
public
officials
(e.g.,
Newkirk
1993;
Korac-Kakabadse, akabadse,
nd
Kouzmin
1998),
while other works fostersuch a
mentality
by
making
overly
ambitious
claims for
technological
performance.
Despite
the lure of a
technofix,
some
scholarsof crisis
management
rec-
ognize
the limited role
of communications
echnol-
ogy
for crisis
management.
These imitationsfocus
on overreliance
n
technology
when other
commu-
nications media would
be useful
complements-
andprobablymoreappropriate-and the failureof
technology
to work under
the conditions
encountered.
As with the
9/11
terrorist
ttacks,
he Katrina atas-
trophe
showcased
he
vulnerabilities
f communica-
tions
technology.
While
some successes
ccurred,
much
of the communications
nfrastructureas made
useless
by
water,
winds,
or
mismanagement.
andline
and cellular
telephone
service was
virtually
nonexis-
tent
for
days
because
of
flooding, power
outages,
and
even
theft of
equipment.
The
emergency
911
system
was also down
in
13
counties
(U.S.
House
2006).
Attempts
to
get
these
systems
back online were de-
layed by
fuel
shortages,
conflicting
demands
for re-
sources,
and
lack of communication
itself.
Citizens
largely
lacked
means
of
communicating pleas
for
help
except
in
person.
The
toppling
of cell
towers,
cutting
of
fiber-optic
cables,
and
other
devastation
also frus-
trated
relief efforts.
Technology
failures also
hampered
the
response
and
rescue
efforts.
The House
Bipartisan
Select
Committee concluded
that
"Destruction
to
communications
capability
hindered command
and
control and
severely
limited situational
awareness"
(2006,
166).
178 Public Administration Review
*
December 2007
*
Special Issue
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10/19
Some failure
o utilizecommunications
technologies
had human
rather
han natural auses.
Despite
FEMA's
promises
fter he
Hur-
ricane
Pam
exercise,
ederal
om-
munications
equipment
was
scarce
during
he
earlydays
of
the Katrina
esponse.
Some
promised
units never
material-
ized,
and
FEMA
kept
its
high-
techmobile communications
truck"RedOctober"
afely
n Baton
Rouge
for
several
days
after
he storm
hit
instead
of
placing
t near
city
hall,
which would
haveenabled
bettercommunication
capacity
n New Orleans tself.This mobile unit could
have
helped
ederal, tate,
and
city
officials
tay
n the
communication
oop (Cooper
and Block
2006).
The
lack
of
interoperability
f communications
echnolo-
gies
used
by
federal, tate, ocal,
and
nongovernmental
organizations
lso
hampered
he
response
nd
the
identification
f resources
U.S.
House
2006).
In
some
cases,
agencies
ould
not even communicate
with theirownpersonneln differentocations,much
less across
organizations.
At
the
time Katrina
it,
the Homeland
Security
Op-
erationsCenter
HSOC)
had
a
budget
of
$70
million,
a staffof
300
assigned
rom
45
government gencies,
and
high-techcomputers,
monitors,
and other
equip-
ment,
making
t the
largest
24/7
operations
enter
n
the nation.
However,
HSOC head
MatthewBroderick
brought
a
military
ntelligencebackground
hatin-
sistedon detailed nformationwith
multiple
verifica-
tions,
thus
filtering
out some of the
key
intelligence
about evee
breaches,
he number
of
people
at the
conventioncenter,and othersituations.Suchkey
informationwas therefore
ot
reported
o
Secretary
Chertoffand the White House
as
accurately
r
as
timely
as needed
despite
he abundance f communi-
cations
technology.
For
example,
a
FEMA
report
estimating
he numberof flooded
homes,
the
product
of
cross-hatching
ensusdata
with
remote-sensing
imagery,
ailed
o
convinceBroderick nd the HSOC
of the
severity
f
flooding (Cooper
and Block
2006).
Satellite
photos
from the National
Geospatial
ntel-
ligenceAgency
also
could
not
help
the
HSOC con-
nect the
dots.
Likewise,
he fabled
"CEO COM
LINK,"
high-tech
ystem
or
connecting op
officials
with thechief executiveofficers f Fortune100 com-
panies,
remainedunutilized
by
Secretary
Chertoff
and
HSOC
director
Broderick
t
key
times
during
Katrina.
Other
nformation,
nexplicably,
urvived
Broderick'sarrow ilter
and
influenced
his
thinking
andfederalaction-or inaction:
Late
Monday
afternoon,
the
[CNN]
network
aired a
report
from New
Orleans. The focus of
the
video
snippet
was a scene on
Bourbon
Street,
near the
highest point
in
the
city,
where
people
"seemed to be
having
a
good
time,"
Broderick
aid.
"The
one data
point
that
I
really
had,
personally,
isually,
was the celebration
n
the streets
of New
Orleans
..
and
they
came
up
with the
word 'we
dodged
the
bullet,"'
Broderick
aid.
"So
that'sa
pretty
good
indicator
right
there."
(Cooper
and
Block
2006,
151)
Ironically,
ne form of
technology
hat worked
during
the
response
o Katrinawas text
messaging
rom
cell
phones.
TheAssociation f
CommunityOrganiza-
tions
for ReformNow
(ACORN)
used text
messaging
to
send
messages equesting
elp
around
he
country
and received 00
replies.
ACORN set
up
a
message
board
on
its Web
site that
allowed
people
to contact
one
another
Rathke
nd Laboistre
006).
This s an-
other nstance n which communications
technology
aided
interorganizational
inking.
Because
adio,
which had
proven
effective
n
previous
loods
(Drabek
et al. 1979),wasamongthe fewtechnologiesunc-
tioning,
the Salvation
Army,
Red
Cross,
and
govern-
ment
agenciesdeployed
amateur adio
operators
o
send and receive
ital
messages.
For
example,
n Mis-
sissippi,
FEMA
stationedamateur
adio
operators
n
evacuation
enters,
hospitals,
and
emergencymanage-
ment
posts
to
aid communication
U.S.
House
2006,
177).
Radio inks coordinated
through
heNational
Communication
System
were nvaluable
or
rescue
and reliefefforts.
The
Internet
also
contributed
reatly
o
the rescue
and
recovery
fforts.At some evacuation
enters,
people
could searchWeb sitesto findmissing amilymem-
bers.New Orleansnative
and Yahoo
hief
executive
officerDavid Filo
developed
a metasearch
engine
that
concurrently
earched ll sites created
o
find
missing
persons.
The
Web
also
facilitated
fund-raising
or
recovery.
Yahoo ink forKatrina eliefraised
$26
million
during
ts first
day
(Webster
006).
Many
corporations
nd
nonprofitorganizations
inked
to
the
Red Crossor other relief
agencies
on their
Web
sites. Mishra
2006)
foundthat
51
percent
of the Best
100 GlobalBrand
corporations
ad Katrina inks on
theirWeb sitesand
that
86
percent
of
those
compa-
nies also
contributed o Katrina elief.
In
our matrix
ramework,
he
technology
howcaseens
rates oweron
both
agency
and
transparency.
hile
technocrats,
ybergeeks,
onsultants,
nd
other
ens
actorsdo
get
involved
n
crises,
hat
nvolvements not
as
intenseor directas thatof
actorswithin the
interper-
sonal and
interorganizational
enses. The more
remote,
sidelines roles of
the HSOC and the
Red October
communications
unit illustrate this for Katrina.The
role of
communications
technology
has
generally
been
to
facilitate flows of information
from which crisis
decisions are
made,
while
it is
interpersonal,
face-to-face
Communicating hroughout Katrina 179
Somefailure o
utilize
communications
echnologies
had
human rather
han
natural auses.
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11/19
communicating
hat
eads o thesecritical
ecisions
nd
the
implementation
ctions hat result
Korac-Boisvert
and Kouzmin
1994;Rosenthal,
Charles,
nd 't Hart
1989).
The
technology
howcaseens s lower n
trans-
parency
ecause
muchof the
actionoccursout of
sight
and often
beyond
he technical
understanding
f both
citizens
and
public
officials.This
creates n
accountabil-
ity
problem
hat s
magnified
when the
technical
pro-
fessionalswho
apply
he
technologies
nd
the
technical
professionals
ho
monitor hem are
increasingly
ut-
sourced onsultants.Who
in
the
public
domain s
able
to
keep
hese
consultants ccountable?
Downsizing
n
the
public
sectorhas
greatly
educed
he
numberof
professional
pecialists
ithin
government
ho can
competently
versee uch
technologicallyomplex
applications.
hiskind of
organizational
norexia as
left the
public
ectorvulnerableo
technical
incompe-
tence,
mismanagement,
nd
fraud
concerning
ommu-
nicationshardwarend software
applications.
Excessively
ownsized, ean,
"anorexic"
organizations
aremore at riskof immediate ailuresbecause hey
lack
buffering.Buffering
with extra
layers,
esources,
and
competencies elpsprotect
an
organization's
ore
technology
rom critical
nvironmental
isturbances
(Thompson
1967).
Without
buffering, rganizations
aremorevulnerable o
crises.Whencrises
occur,
coordinated ction s
crucial,
but it tends to
be more
nonroutine
n
overly
ean
organizations
han n
buff-
ered
organizations
Perrow 967).
Anorexic
organiza-
tions lack
both the resources ndthe
operating
routines o
cope effectively
with
crises.The "survivor's
syndrome"xperienced y manyemployees
eft
in
downsized
organizations ompounds
his
problem,
as
theseemployees reoftenalreadyhell-shocked nd
havea lowermorale
and senseof trust.The
significant
cuts
in
FEMA's
budget,
staff,
reputation,
nd leader-
ship
greatly
educed he
agency'sapacity
o
cope
with
a disaster f Katrina's
magnitude.
DirectorBrown
testifiedbefore he House SelectCommittee hat
FEMA
had
been
understaffed nd
underfunded,
ad
undergone
brain
drain,
and had become"emaciated"
(U.S.
House
2006,
13).
The
technology
ens is
among
the most
recentand has
captured
much
interest.
t can
provide
ssential
sup-
port
for the
interpersonal,
media,
and
interorganiza-
tional ensesbut tendsto be not as
integral
o crisis
handling
as those enses.The amountof
scholarly
nd
practitioner
ttention t
has received
appears
o be
more
related o its
high-techappeal
and
potential
rather hanto itsactualcontributiono crisis
handling.
CrisisCommunicationas
Interorganizational
Networking
The crisiscommunication s
interorganizational
et-
workingperspective
ocuseson
written,oral,
and
electronic ommunication
amonggovernment gen-
cies,
businesses,
olice
and fire
departments,
escue
units,
hospitals,
elief
agencies,
and otherofficialand
unofficial
organizations
nvolved
n
different
stages
of
the crisis.While
some
illustrations f
this
perspective
are
hardly
new
(e.g.,
Drabeket al.
1981;
Dynes
1978),
the
interorganizational
etworking
ens
tends
to be
newerand less
emphasized
n
scholarship
n
crisis
communication
han the other
perspectives.Key
actors
n this lens are
the
leaders f the
respective
organizations
nd other
boundary
brokers f
organiza-
tions
like those
previously
isted. But
interorganiza-
tional
networking
lso
occurswithin
increasingly
utilizedcrisis eams
comprising
arying
ombinations
of
emergency
management ersonnel,
health
special-
ists,
scientific
experts,
and others.
Interorganizational
networking
lso occurs
among
these
teams
and
through
heir nteractionswith other
networks n-
volved
n
the crisis
Comfort
1994,
1997a;
Comfort
and Cahill
1988; Comfort,
Ko,
and
Zagorecki
004;
Rosenthal,
t
Hart,
and
Kouzmin
1991).
The centralgoalsareto allocate esources ndcoordi-
nate action.
Agenciesrepresented
n the
networkhave
much of the
expertise, quipment,
and other
tangible
resources-and often the
official
authority-to
re-
spond
to a
crisis.
Allocating
resourcesor crisisre-
sponse
nvolves nformation
sharing
and
often
negotiation
Rosenthal,
t
Hart,
and Kouzmin
1991;
Wise
2002).
Coordinating
risis
operations
within the
interorganizational
ens is
viewed
ess
as a
centralized
command tructure
issuing
orders
o
operatives
n
the
field
than
as a
complexprocess
of
multipleorganiza-
tions within
multiple
networks
debating
options,
exchanging
nformation,
nd
negotiating
which ac-
tions to take.Having he rightorganizationsn the
relevantnetworks nd
ensuring
ontinuous
communi-
cationflowswithin and
among
these
networkshave
been shown to
be
crucial o effective
risis
handling
(Comfort
and Cahill
1988;
Garnett
1992;
Rosenthal
and Kouzmin
1997;
Wise
2002).
Network
stability
has been linkedto crisis
management
ffectiveness.
Communication
low can
be
uncontrolled,
ometimes
reducing
network
ffectiveness,
nd
more communi-
cationvolume
does
not
necessarily
qual mproved
communication,
specially
f
it lacks
order
Drabek
et al.
1981).
During
Katrina,
he lackof a
working
commandand
control
systemplaced
extra
dependence
n
interorga-
nizational
networking
o share nformation nd
coop-
erate
on
preparedness,
esponse,
nd
recovery.
Anotherof the
tragedies
f Katrina amewhen inter-
organizational
etworking
ailed
o rise to the occa-
sion. Federal
agencies
were
too
seldom
on the same
page-even agencies
within the same
department,
such as
FEMA
and
the HSOC. Partof this stemmed
from
technological
ailure,but,
as discussed
arlier,
t
also stemmed
rom
differences
n
organizational
ul-
ture
and
lack of trust hat surfaced
eforeKatrina
ad
180 Public Administration Review
*
December 2007 * Special Issue
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12/19
even
formed.
The
feds
and Louisiana uthorities ften
squabbled
federal
elations
with
Mississippi
were
better),
and
municipalities
wereoftenleft to
go
their
own
way,
as
they
did
in
evacuating
eople
outside
New Orleanson their
own
timetables nstead
of ac-
cording
o the
approved lan.
Eventhe U.S. Coast
Guard,
often
given
high
marks or its
rescue
opera-
tions,
slipped
on
interorganizational
ooperation.
According
o
Cooper
and
Block,
"Throughout
he
disaster,
tateandfederal
agencies
worked
ndepen-
dently,
under
heirown
initiative,
ometimes
at cross-
purposes.
The Coast Guardwasone of the worst
offenders:
FEMA
officials
would later
ay
the
agency
[CoastGuard]
did
almost
nothing
to
keep
other
units
up
to
speed
on
its
activities"
2006, 230).
Several
dvantages
f
interorganizationaletworking
for
handling
criseshavebeen noted. Because f the
multiple
sets of actorswith
multipleorganizational
perspectives
nd
interests,
heriskof the
faulty,
ingle-
minded decision
making
hat
is characteristicf
groupthinks reduced Rosenthal,tHart,andKouz-
min
1991).
Relianceon
interorganizational
etworks
canalsomakecrisiscommunicationmore
open.
By
involving
moreactors-even more sets
of
actors-in
crisis
handling,
he
ability
o
keep
a
tight
lid on crisis
deliberations nd interactions
ecomesmore
problem-
atic.
If
some
organizations
ail to
perform
as
expected
within the networks-whether
intentionally
r unin-
tentionally-other
organizational
ctors
end
to ar-
ticulatedissatisfactionither o the
offending
organization,
o the mass
media,
or
both.
Thus,
mul-
tiple organizational
ctors
can
serve
as
checksand
balanceswithin the crisis
management
rocess,
both
in termsof performancendaccountability/transpar-
ency.
Because f these
strengths, nterorganizational
networking
as been found to be more
appropriate
or
tackling
"wicked"
problems
Harmon
and
Mayer
1986),
that
is,
problems
o
complex
and
messy
hat
theydefy permanent
olutionsand
require emporary
resolution.
During
Katrina,
ther
players
teppedup
to
the
plate.
State-to-state
cooperationhelped
illsome of the void
left
by
federal naction
(U.S.
Senate
2006).
Texas ent
significant
evelsof
emergency esponders, upplies,
and
equipment
o Louisiana nd
promptlypaved
he
way
forevacuees n Houston'sAstrodomeandother
places.
Florida,
with its
highly developed
mergency
management
apability eared specially
owardhur-
ricanes,
helpedMississippi
n
similar
ways.
Rescue
and
relief
personnel, upplies,
and
equipment
also
poured
in
from other
states
and
localities,
and
businesses
nd
voluntary rganizations
lso
helped.
The
role of Wal-
Mart
as
a
logistical upplier
of
water,
generators,
nd
otherneeded
tems has been
recognized,
n
addition
to the
invaluable
elp
received rom
churches,
ivic
organizations,
ndotherefforts.
Operation
Brother's
Keeper,
or
example,
used several
hundred hurches o
evacuate
parishioners,
many
of
whom
may
havebeen
left behind.Much of this
help,
though
valiant,
acked
the
integration
nd coordination
expected
of interor-
ganizational
etworks.
Key
imitationsof the
interorganizationaletworking
perspective
ave also been noted.
With so
many
orga-
nizational ctors
n
multiple
organizational
ets
or
networks,
he
probability
f information
slippage
or
blockage
s increased
Garnett
andKouzmin
1999;
Rosenthal,
t
Hart,
and Kouzmin
1991).
Unless
net-
work channelsare
planned
horoughly-and
perhaps
creatively-withholding
of
information
by
one
orga-
nizationcan
cause
disruption
n the
communication
flow
among
othernetworks r
singleorganizations
that need to act on the basisof thatinformation.The
tendency
or information
o
become
distortedas it
passes hroughmultiple
evelsandunitshas also been
documented
Downs
1967;
Garnett
1992).
In
addition o
disruptions
r distortions
n
informa-
tion flow,anotherkeyissueforinternational risis
handling
nvolves rust.
According
o Comfortand
Cahill,
"In
environments f
high
uncertainty,
his
quality
of
interpersonal
rust s essential
or
collective
action.
Building
hat trust
n
a
multiorganizational
operating
nvironment s
a
complexprocess,
perhaps
the most difficult ask n
creating
n
emergency
man-
agement
ystem"
1988, 184).
Differences
n
values,
allegiance,
nd even
language
e.g.,
jargon)
can com-
plicate
communication
among
civilian,
paramilitary,
and
military
organizations;
outine
and
emergency
response rganizations;
ndeven thecentral
head-
quarters
nd local units of the same
organization
(Garnettand Kouzmin1999; Rosenthal,tHart,and
Kouzmin
1991).
During
a
crisis,
uch
differences ave
"been
known to
trigger
onflicts
between
communal
and official
relief
effortsas well as
true
bureaucratic
battlesbetween he
good
Samaritans
f various om-
peting
rescueand relief
organizations"
Rosenthal
nd
Kouzmin
1997,
6).
Key
problems
within this lens
includethe
tendency
for
organizationalompetition
and
the
maintenance
of
intelligence
n the
face of sometimes
dysfunctional
competition.
Dysfunctional
ompetitionamong orga-
nizationsarises
becauseof
competinggoals
(Lewis
1988;RomzekandDubnick
1987)
or
organizational
rivalries
Rosenthal
nd
Kouzmin
1997).
Interorgani-
zationaldistrustand
rivalry
bounded
among
Katrina
actors.
Some
officials
withinFEMA
considered ocal
emergencymanagers
o
be
unsophisticated
nd even
called
hem
"goobers,"
ften
treating
hem with
dis-
dain
or
indifference
(Cooper
and Block
2006,
73).
In
the
other
direction,
Louisiana
overnor
Kathleen
Babineaux
Blanco
and
ot