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Sema vs COMELEC GR No 177597 July 16, 2008Facts:The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanaobut it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to createprovinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assemblycreated Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalitiesof the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only madeof Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should beretained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called ShariffKabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as toCotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1stdistrict). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district andthat votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was fromthere and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation ofa province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in theHOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuanbeing created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

Issue:(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 , delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power tocreate provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House ofRepresentatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

(3) In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid formaintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff KabunsuanProvince with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite thecreation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).Ruling:

(1) The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, whichprovides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or itsboundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local governmentcode and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directlyaffected.Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteriafixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of theConstitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Condelegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. Howeveits plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to creategovernment units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisioConstitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria establisheLocal Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the ConstitutionHowever, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provincesor municipalitiesUnder Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly theto create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the deleunder its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.27 In the prese

the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to createprovinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legbodies of the power to create mun icipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Articlethe Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another maSection 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a populationleast two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least onerepresentative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinanceappended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand sentitled in the immediately following election to a t least one Member x x x."

Clearly, a provin ce cannot be created witho ut a legislative district because it wil l

Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinanceappended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250

or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to cprovince, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power tcreate a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less th250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the cityspopulation reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to onerepresentative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or inherently invo lves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validdelegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legdistricts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

(2) Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to increasallowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative d

is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more thahundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected frlegislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the MetropolitanManila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and onbasis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shal


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elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral partiesor organizations.

x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fiftythousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make areapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.(Emphasis supplied)

Sect ion 5 (1), Art ic le VI of the Const i tut ion vests in Congress the pow er to increase,

throu gh a law, the allowable membership in th e House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)

empowers Congress to reapport ion legis lat ive dis t r ic ts . The power to reapport ion

legis lative dis t r ic ts necessar i ly inc ludes the pow er to create legis lat ive dis t r ic ts out of

ex is t ing ones. Congress exerc ises these powers through a law that Congress i tsel f

enacts , and not through a law that regional or local legis lative bodies enact . The

al lowable membership of the House of Representat ives can be increased, and new

legis lative dis t r ic ts of Congress can be created, only through a nat ional law passed by

Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held that the "power of redis t r ic t ing x x x is

tradi t ionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thu s is

vested exc lus ively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportionlegislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in itsallowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of

legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact sucha law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create orreapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferiorlegislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membershipof the superior legislative body.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly,to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "TheRegional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) Nationalelections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating tonational elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in nationalelections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is alwayselected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, aMember of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regionallegislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers

extend only to its regional territory.To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers tooperate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitutionwhich expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial

jurisdiction x x x."However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitutionmandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province ofShariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

(3) Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, serve as bases for the conclusion that the ProvinShariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the HoRepresentatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative dcomes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment."Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of tlegislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinccreated by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely bregional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but alsoCongress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislativdistrict. Thus, when a provin ce is created, a legislative district is created by operathe Const i tut ion because the Const i tut ion prov ides that " each prov ince shal l hav

least one representative" in the Hou se of Representatives. This does not detract f

the const i tut ional pr inc ip le that the power to create legislat ive dis t r ic ts belongs

exc lus ively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, exceptCongress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a provsuch legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short,an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation ofConstitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creationlegislative district.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan ucreation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of MaguinHowever, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census ta2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first ledistrict of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that "city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one represent

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM RegioAssembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of ArticleSection 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces andnecessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARegional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitutionmandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assemcannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress bthe legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction

provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by tARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.


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Mariano Jr. vs COMELEC GR No 189793 Apr. 7, 2010Facts:Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assailSections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a HighlyUrbanized City to be known as the City of Makati ). Another petition which contends theunconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer andconcerned citizen.Issue:

(1) Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makativiolating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and boundswith technical descriptions

(2) Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section

7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that the new citys acquisition of a new corporateexistence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive termsas allowed by the Constitution

(3) Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as thereapportionment cannot be made by a special law

Ruling:(2) Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of threeyears which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of Junenext following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House ofRepresentative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive

terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No.7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously servedby them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent JejomarBinay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide torun and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seekanother three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would notbe counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the politicalambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant canchallenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raisedat the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to thedetermination of the case itself.Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of manycontingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-electedin said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering thatthese contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen toan actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper

parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over whichthis Court has no jurisdiction.

(3)Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No.7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have atleast two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next nationalelections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall

be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emsupplied)They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionmcannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill anMakati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, wruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, sucthe charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composnot more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus wothe Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Conin enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Morto hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, withreview of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, wocreate an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be dlegislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations wdeprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty caadmit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sover

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of anothe r legislative district in Makati is not in accord wsection 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the populationMakati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, thawith a population ofat least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one represeEven granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thou(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum populationrequirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appenthe Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to m ore than two hufifty thou sand (250,000)shall be entitled to at least one congress ional representative.

Republic Act 7941:AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGHPARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR (Party List System Act)

Section 2. Declaration of party. The State shall promote proportional representation in theelection of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system ofregistered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, wwill enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors,organizations and parties, and who lack well -defined political constituencies but who coucontribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit theas a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the Sshall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadpossible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representativ

enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall providesimplest scheme possible.


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Bagong Bayani OFW vs COMELEC GR No 147589 June 26, 2001Facts:Two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issuedby the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved theparticipation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-listelections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-listsystem was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream politicalparties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.Issue:(1) Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there noother plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?(2) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

(3) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors andorganizations.(4) Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating OmnibusResolution No. 3785.Ruling:(2) In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Munaobjects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, likethe impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate inthe party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations."

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be e lected through aparty-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointedout that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, anational party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party- l is t prov is ion was to openup the system, in order to give a chance to part ies that consis tent ly place thi rd or fourth in

congress ional dis t r ic t elect ions to win a seat in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this isto open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or partiesthat, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they werealways third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. Butthis way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not winindividually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose andobjectives of the party-list system."

(3)That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that anypolitical party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of

these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid downin the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fiftymembers, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance withthe number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,

and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registernational, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number ofrepresentatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after theratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representativesbe filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be providlaw, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the ConstitutionCommission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to o

people" in Congress.The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed wphrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be p rovided by law"; it was thus up to Congresssculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid outstatutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in thelection of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system ofregistered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, wwill enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,organizations and parties, and who lack well -defined political constituencies but who coucontribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit theas a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the Sshall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadpossible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representativenhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide

simplest scheme possible."

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by meathe Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of RepresentativeFilipino citizens,1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benenation as a whole.The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresentand "lack of well-defined constituencies.""Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a pa rticular district,because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength indistressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized andunderrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peafisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, vet

overseas workers, and professionals."However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized andunderrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organizatioparty must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituenciesmentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the pe rsons nominated by the party-list candidate-orgamust be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizationsparties."


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Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoralgroup, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again tothose with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only b y givingmore law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritablelawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, werepeat, is likewise clear: " to enable Fi l ip ino c i t izens belonging to m arginal ized andunderrepresented sectors , organizations and part ies, x x x, to become m embers of the Hous e of

Representatives."Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to itsexpress terms.

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list systemare enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization orcoalition for purposes of the party-list system b y filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire toparticipate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or acoalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform orprogram of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information asthe COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,overseas workers, and professionals."

Whi le the enumerat ion of marginal ized and underrepresented sectors is not exc lus ive, i t

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that no t al l sectors can be represented under the p arty-

l is t system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a

statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, thewords and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term ina statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "doesnot limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 Infact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in theelections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich ofForbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress thatthe party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertionof the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clearstatutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of theparty-list system.While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neithermarginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more

awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size ofone's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope,but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of theirconstituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblestsense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invitesthose marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those inthe underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during

the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this sociavehicle.Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district electionormally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House ofRepresentatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally con80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections andparty-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party- l is t prov is ion was to open up the system, 44 in oto enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representat ion in the

of Representat ives through the simplest scheme possib le. 45 Logic show s that the system

been opened to those who have never got ten a foothold wi th in i t -- those who cannot othe

win in regular elect ions and who th erefore need the "s implest scheme possib le" to do so.Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within itthose privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

(4)From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear pthe law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discuabove. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized andoverrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Conor the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or sguess it. What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whetherrespondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualificaparticipate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

Guidelines in Party-list Qualifications:First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized

underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- tits constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track recordit represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of itsmembership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate ta conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and theConstitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared stapolicy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectx to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualifiemerely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represeninterests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabonwhich is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that thereligious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, whenumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religiopurposes;(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;(3) It is a foreign party or organization;


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(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly throughthird parties for partisan election purposes;(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections forthe constituency in which it has registered."Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure tocomply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states thatthe party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented

sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A partyor an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entityfunded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party ororganization must be a group of citizens, organized by c itizens and operated by citizens. It mustbe independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of aparty-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective ofthe law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizationsto be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; i ts nominees mustlikewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-listrepresentative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, aresident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the

day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization whichhe seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is atleast twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more thanthirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attainsthe age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration ofhis term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized andunderrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, thenominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is tobetray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must

likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation thatwill benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committeeproceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particulardistrict x x x."

Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC 342 SCRA 244Facts:

On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the natelections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On J1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve parties aorganizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the pasystem.Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move fithe 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the SC to anCOMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so that each of them would have threparty-list reps.Issue:

(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

(2) Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of R7941 constitutional?

(3) How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?Ruling:

(1) The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Represereads as follows:

"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundrefifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressiveand those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered naregional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number ofrepresentatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the

ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representativesbe filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be providlaw, except the religious sector."

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant inarriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise " tweper centum of the tota l number of representat ives inc luding those under the party- l is t ."Wtranslate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

Number of district representatives .80 .20 = number of party-list representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as mayprovided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of partyseats.

The Constitution simply states that " [ t ]he party- l is t representat ives shal l co nst i tute twentycentum of the tota l number of representat ives inc luding those under the party- l is t. "

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equasimple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mecof the party-list system of representation. The Const i tut ion expl ic i t ly sets down o nly the percof the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-l ist representa


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In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,Congress declared therein a p ol icy to pro mote "prop ort ional representat ion" in the elect ion of

party-l ist representatives in order to enable Fil ipinos belongin g to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors to contr ibute legis lat ion that w ould benef i t them. It however deemed itnecessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtainat least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to aparty-list seat. Those garner ing more than this percentage could have "addi t ional seats inproport ion to thei r tota l number of votes."Furthermore, no winning party, organization orcoalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevantportion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total

votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That thosegarnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats inproportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, orcoalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),Art ic le VI of the Const i tut ion is not mandatory . I t merely prov ides a cei l ing for party- l is t seats in

Congress.

(2) The two percent threshold is consis tent not only wi th the intent of the framers of theConst i tut ion and the law, but wi th the very essence of "representat ion."Under arepublican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but isexercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, theelected persons must have the manda te of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in alegislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of smallgroups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a

threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressiveratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise andcrystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretationor circumvention

Banat vs COMELEC GR No 179271 April 21, 2009Facts:On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List RepresentativesProvided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07 -041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed itspetition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in thenational papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,

would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, toreconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 becausethe Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). Onthe same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.Issue:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of theConstitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seatconstitutional?4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list electnot, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?Ruling: