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Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982

(En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by

respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance

of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a

project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved

in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto

was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was

Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge

Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares

subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to

1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who

later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife

Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses

Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot

1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.

wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968

docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge

Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge

Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated

Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of 

the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule

XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of 

Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of 

Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge

Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by

Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she

recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge

Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot

1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and

his engagement in business by joining a private corporation

during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an

"act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not

constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded

to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New CivilCode applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the

property during the pendency of the litigation involving the

property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on

March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on

June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein

filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in

question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge

Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the

plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who

earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the

finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the

US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines,

Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been

abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the

political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not

with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,

unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new

sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that

continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code

of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has

no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent

Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3

of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which

respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection

with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the

commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22

days after its incorporation realizing that their interest

contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar

1997]

Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of 

People’sInitiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),

filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift

the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He

based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,

which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power

to directly proposeamendments to the Constitution. Subsequently

the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of 

the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the

case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,

Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law

Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as

intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the

Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the

COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander

Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the

Delfin petitionrising the several arguments, such as the following:(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend

the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by

Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The

people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,

not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a

revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative.

The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is aself-executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the

conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,

considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the

conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would

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constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus,

without implementing legislation the same cannot operate.

Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the

people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its

implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which

prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct

of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has

been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be

delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation

of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot

validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the

exercise of the right to people’s initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it

would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the

synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal

access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political

dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However,

considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of 

whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has

become academic.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156;

3 Feb 1997]

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government

Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50

dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding

30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of 

respondent Manila HotelCorporation. In a close bidding held on

18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:

petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, aFilipino corporation,

which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at

P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-

Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of 

shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more thanthe bid of 

petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winningbidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary

contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by

Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS

has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale

of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and

consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court

on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the

1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has beenidentified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a

historical monument which reflects the vibrancy

of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier

generation of Filipinoswho believed in the nobility and sacredness

of independence and its power and capacity to release the full

potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has

become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues

that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the

ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by

respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled

corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of 

the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national

economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad

is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy

and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not

 just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the

sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues

to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth

centuryPhilippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple

meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of 

the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the

clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the

elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and

protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that

GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILAPRINCE HOTEL

CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of 

the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter

to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and

deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

63 PHIL 143

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara andthe respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor

were candidates voted for the position of members of the

National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7,

1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as

member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he

took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,

which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On

Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a

"Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other

things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of theNational Assembly or that the election of said position be

nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a

resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on

Dec. 9.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive

 jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the

merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the

Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the

Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy

upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without

or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of 

the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner

notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by

resolution of the National Assembly

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RULING:

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system

of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by

actual division in our Constitution that each department of the

government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its

 jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not

follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept

separate and that the Constitution intended them to be

absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The

Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and

balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various

departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only

constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the

proper allocation of powers between the several departments

and among the integral and constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking

perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the

power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,

that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty

however limited, has established a republican government

intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a

system of checks and balances and subject to the specific

limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the

 judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to

allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert anysuperiority over the other departments; it does not in reality

nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the

solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to

determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution

and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights

which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in

truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"

which properly is the power of judicial review under the

Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases

and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional

question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the

presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not

only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the

Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination

of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and

 justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in

the executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy

involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature

between the National Assembly on the one hand, and theElectoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral

Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting

wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is

beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the

people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The

Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the

government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority

under the fundamental law between departmental powers and

agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the

 judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the

subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of 

determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional

grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the

members of the National Assembly."

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy

certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were

cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the

powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters

pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an

independent and impartial tribunal.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested

with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of 

the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.

Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government,

it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of 

its authority, an independent organ.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of 

members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete

and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.

The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is

an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National

Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon thelegislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time

within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules

necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge

all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of 

members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by

necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral

Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for

the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last

day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the

National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,

confirming the election of the petitioner to the National

Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither

does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative

practice of confirmation of the election of members of the

legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was

still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislaturecannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the

authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole

 judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said

election protests.

HELD:

The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise

of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of 

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the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he

election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the

resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in

any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election,

returns, and qualifications of the members of the National

Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as

the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.