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7/28/2019 Consti Cases Compiled
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/consti-cases-compiled 1/4
Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar
Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by
respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance
of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a
project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved
in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto
was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was
Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge
Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares
subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife
Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968
docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge
Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge
Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated
Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of
the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of
Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge
Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by
Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she
recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge
Asuncion be exonerated.
Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot
1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and
his engagement in business by joining a private corporation
during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an
"act unbecoming of a judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not
constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded
to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New CivilCode applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on
March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on
June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein
filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in
question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge
Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines,
Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not
with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code
of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has
no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent
Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3
of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection
with his judicial office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22
days after its incorporation realizing that their interest
contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar
1997]
Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of
People’sInitiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift
the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power
to directly proposeamendments to the Constitution. Subsequently
the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of
the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the
case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the
Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the
COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petitionrising the several arguments, such as the following:(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,
not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a
revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative.
The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is aself-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would
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constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus,
without implementing legislation the same cannot operate.
Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has
been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation
of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right to people’s initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it
would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political
dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However,
considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156;
3 Feb 1997]
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila HotelCorporation. In a close bidding held on
18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, aFilipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more thanthe bid of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winningbidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale
of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has beenidentified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy
of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinoswho believed in the nobility and sacredness
of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad
is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy
and is therefore null and void.
Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not
just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the
sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues
to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
centuryPhilippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that
GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILAPRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
63 PHIL 143
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara andthe respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7,
1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as
member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he
took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On
Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other
things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of theNational Assembly or that the election of said position be
nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on
Dec. 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly
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RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system
of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by
actual division in our Constitution that each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral and constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances and subject to the specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert anysuperiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination
of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy
involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and theElectoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting
wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between departmental powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of
the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government,
it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of
its authority, an independent organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon thelegislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislaturecannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole
judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests.
HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
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the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in
any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as
the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.