Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Brazil: A Dissenting Note 9

BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM AND BRAZIL: A DISSENTING NOTE

PAUL CAMMACK

I n L a t i n America a number o f m i l i t a r y regimes committed t o d e m o b i l i s i n g mass move- ments and e x t i n g u i s h i n g t h e t r a c e s o f p o p u l i s t o r r e f o r m i s t governments have emerged i n recen t years. The cases o f B r a z i l i n 1964, C h i l e and Uruguay i n 1973, and Argen t ina between 1966 and 1970, and a g a i n s i n c e 1976 - have t e s t e d t h e i n g e n u i t y o f s o c i a l sc ien - t i s t s a c t i v e l y concerned w i t h t h e area. The concept t h a t has come t o dominate d i scus - s ions o f t h e n a t u r e o f such regimes i s t h a t o f ' b u r e a u c r a t i c a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ' , w i t h B r a z i l seen as t h e ' p u r e s t ' case. However, t h e r e a r e some problems w i t h t h e concept. F i r s t l y t h i s r e f l e c t s u n n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t r i c t i v e assumptions w i t h regard t o t h e manner i n which such regimes m igh t seek t o move toward p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . Secondly con fus ion a r i s e s from an unwarranted t rea tmen t o f c o n j u n c t u r a l f e a t u r e s s p e c i f i c t o an e a r l y phase i n t h e es tab l i shmen t o f such regimes as more permanent t r a i t s o f a regime type. F i n a l l y t h e c l a i m s o f such regimes t o a c o n s i s t e n t commitment t o r a t i o n a l , bureau- c r a t i c , o r t e c h n o c r a t i c norms o f government tend t o be accepted a t f a c e va lue. I s h a l l ques t i on t h e adequacy o f t h e concept i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o B r a z i l , s u p p o r t i n g t h e argu- ment w i t h a b r i e f rev iew o f p o l i t i c a l re fo rm under t h e m i l i t a r y regime s i n c e 1964, and conc lud ing w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e f o r m package announced i n November 1981.

Origins and Characteristics of Bur,eaucratic Authoritarianism For O'Donnel l , w i t h whom t h e development o f t h e n o t i o n o f a new ' b u r e a u c r a t i c

a u t h o r i t a r i a n ' t y p e o f s t a t e i s most c l o s e l y assoc ia ted (O'Donnell , 1973, 1977, 1978, 1979), t he t o p i c " i s ' L a t i n American' o n l y i n a t r i v i a l sense; t h e p e r t i n e n t h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t i s p r o v i d e d by t h e p o l i t i c a l economy o f n a t i o n s t h a t were o r i g i n a l l y e x p o r t e r s o f p r imary m a t e r i a l s and were i n d u s t r i a l i s e d l a t e , b u t e x t e n s i v e l y , i n a p o s i t i o n o f dependency upon t h e g r e a t c e n t r e s o f w o r l d c a p i t a l i s m " (O'Donnel l , 1977, p .54) . I n p r a c t i c e though, d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s has been a p p l i e d o n l y t o t h e c o u n t r i e s mentioned above, and ( w i t h some m o d i f i c a t i o n s ) t o Mexico and Peru. As t h e above f o r m u l a t i o n sug- gests , i t depends s i g n i f i c a n t l y upon a p r i o r a n a l y s i s o f t h e process o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a - t i o n a f t e r 1930 and upon t h e a s s o c i a t e d p o l i t i c a l forms i n t h e c o u n t r i e s concerned. I n essence t h e argument i s t h a t delayed, dependent i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was c a r r i e d fo rward i n i t i a l l y by p o p u l i s t o r r e f o r m i s t c o a l i t i o n s . However, by t h e e a r l y 1960s f u r t h e r progress was made imposs ib le f i r s t l y by f a l t e r i n g economic growth as t h e phase o f indus- t r i a l i s a t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f consumer goods neared complet ion, and secondly by t h e growing i n t r a n s i g e n c e o f work ing c l a s s and lower m i d d l e c l a s s elements a t tached t o r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n s . F u r t h e r development r e q u i r e d t h e 'deepening ' o f indus- t r i a l i s a t i o n th rough domest ic manufacture of i n t e r m e d i a t e and c a p i t a l goods. Yet, t h e measures needed t o ach ieve i t - t h e adop t ion o f o r thodox economic p o l i c i e s and t h e a t t r a c t i o n o f f o re ig r? investment - could o n l y be a p p l i e d i f t h e popu la r s e c t o r s were defeated and demob i l i sed . The c r i s i s p r e c i p i t a t e d by these developments cou ld o n l y be resolved by t h e es tab l i shmen t o f a r e p r e s s i v e b u r e a u c r a t i c - a u t h o r i t a r i a n system based upon a c o a l i t i o n o f m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n technoc ra ts ( C o l l i e r , 1979). The f o l l o w i n g a r e the p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h i s t y p e o f s t a t e :

i ) i t s s o c i a l base i s drawn f rom t h e upper f r a c t i o n s o f a h i g h l y o l i g o p o l i s e d and t r a n s n a t i o n a l i s e d bourgeo is ie .

o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e s t r u c t u r e .

c o e r c i o n as w e l l as those whose aim i t i s t o achieve ' n o r m a l i s a t i o n ' o f t h e economy have a d e c i s i v e we igh t .

i v ) i t endeavours t o d e p o l i t i c i s e s o c i a l i ssues by d e a l i n g w i t h them i n terms o f t h e supposedly n e u t r a l and o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a o f t e c h n i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y .

i i ) I t corresponds t o and promotes an i n c r e a s i n g t r a n s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n

i i i ) I t s i n s t i t u t i o n s comprise o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n which s p e c i a l i s t s i n

10 Paul C m a c k

v)

v i )

I t excludes the p rev ious l y a c t i v e popular sectors from both p o l i t i c a l and economic p a r t i c i p a t i o n .

I t suppresses the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f popular democracy, and closes democratic channels of access t o government (O'Donnell 1979, pp.292-293).

Weaknesses of t he Concept I t i s immediately apparent t ha t the formulat ion o f the regime type c l i n g s very

c l o s e l y t o the cha rac te r i sa t i on of the conjuncture i n which i t i n i t i a l l y emerges. nature o f the successful c o a l i t i o n , i t s soc ia l bas is and the p o l i t i c a l and economic tasks i t sets i t s e l f a l l i n t e r - r e l a t e and possess a l o g i c a l u n i t y s o l e l y i n the l i g h t o f two fac to rs : the na ture o f the economic c r i s i s , and the e x i s t i n g h igh l eve l o f m o b i l i s a t i o n o f the popular sectors. The tasks a l l o c a t e d t o the bureaucra t ic a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t a t e a re so narrow and t r a n s i t i o n a l i n n a t u r e t h a t t h e y prov ide no c l u e as t o what the long- term nature o f the regime might be once the immediate c r i s i s has passed, and the renewal o f economic growth has broadened p o l i t i c a l opt ions. There i s no reason t o assume t h a t once those immediate problems have been overcome the na ture o f the r e s u l t i n g s t a t e must i r revocab ly be f i x e d along co-ord inates immanent i n the circumstances o f i t s b i r t h . Indeed, t o the extent t ha t the c r i s i s leading t o the emergence o f such regimes i s a t t r i - buted t o a s p e c i f i c stage o f development i n l a t e - i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g economies, i t i s l o g i - ca l t o assume tha t the p a r t i c u l a r combination o f circumstances w i l l no t be r e p l i c a t e d a t some f u t u r e stage. I n t h a t case, there a re no grounds f o r t ak ing the view t h a t bure'aucratic au tho r i t a r i an i sm i s more than a passing phase i n the evo lu t i on o f these reg i mes.

t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f these regimes. I t was the absence o f any recognizable process o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n by the e a r l y 1970s i n B r a z i l which led L inz t o argue t h a t i t repre- sented "an a u t h o r i t a r i a n s i t u a t i o n ra the r than an a u t h o r i t a r i a n regime" (L inz 1973, p.235). O'Donnell, t u rn ing recen t l y t o the quest ion o f poss ib le paths t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , has been forced t o admit t h a t h i s cha rac te r i za t i on of bureaucra t ic a u t h o r i t a r i a n regimes i s so narrow tha t i t ru les out any p o s s i b i l i t y o f l e g i t i m a t i o n w i t h i n the s t r i c t assump- t i o n s adopted. To t h i s end he exhaust ive ly i l l u s t r a t e s the p ropos i t i on tha t bureau- c r a t i c au tho r i t a r i an i sm "cannot but appear as t he t ransparent con junc t ion o f coerc ion and economic domination", and argues tha t the h igh p o l i t i c a l cos ts incurred i n imposing the regime make i t impossible f o r bureaucra t ic a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m t o l eg i t ima te i t s e l f (O'Donnell 1979, pp.286-99). Th is i s evidence o f weakness i n O'Donnel l 's fo rmula t ion o f the concept ra ther than i n the regimes themselves. The concept i s so c l o s e l y t i e d t o the except ional circumstances i n which the regimes emerge t h a t i t provides no bas is f o r r u l e once the immediate c r i s i s i s past , and devices such as a r b i t r a r y t e r r o r , evo- ca t ions o f the s t a t e o f anarchy which preceded the imp lan t ing o f the regime, and dark h i n t s o f cont inu ing subversive a c t i v i t y - begin t o lose t h e i r e f f i c a c y .

The

This judgment i s re in fo rced i f we t u r n t o the quest ion o f the l e g i t i m a t i o n and i n s t i -

The Consolidation of Power i n Brazil

eighteen years a f t e r i t s establ ishment i n 19641 We should begin by no t i ng tha t w i t h i n f l a t i o n h igher now than i t ever was under the prev ious government o f Goulart there was a temporary dec l i ne i n economic growth, and an i nc reas ing l y successful m o b i l i z a t i o n o f oppos i t ion took p lace both through p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and ext ra-par l iamentary organi - sat ions. I t i s thus not c l e a r t h a t the regime i s c u r r e n t l y ab le t o cope w i t h the tw in imperat ives o f economic normal iza t ion and p o l i t i c a l demobi l i sa t ion . This , however, i s no more than as aside. Ta lk o f r a t i o n a l i t y and technocracy no t wi thstanding, the most s t r i k i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the regime i s tha t at tempts t o conso l ida te power on a bas is o ther than coerc ion have centred upon an i nc reas ing l y e x p l i c i t commitment t o the exp lo i - t a t i o n o f the monopoly power o f the s t a t e i n key areas. P o l i t i c a l support has been won through the s e l e c t i v e and openly p a r t i s a n d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p u b l i c goods. e l i m i n a t i n g the systems o f patronage and c l i e n t e l i s m e x p l o i t e d i n the past by ' c o r r u p t ' c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c i a n s , the present regime has sought t o develop and p e r f e c t such systems, and t o t u r n them t o i t s own exc lus ive advantage. The regime then, was never more

What, then, are we t o make o f the present B r a z i l i a n regime, s t i l l su rv i v ing some

Far from

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Brazil: A Dissenting Note 11

than p a r t i a l l y ' b u r e a u c r a t i c ' . Moreover the most recent phase o f p o l i t i c a l re fo rm has suggested t h a t the t r e n d descr ibed below i s so pronounced t h a t an accura te c h a r a c t e r i - z a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e regime today must take due account o f it.;:

The Survival of Legislative Pol i t ics Since 1964 t h e m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s i n B r a z i l have shown themselves r e l u c t a n t t o

do away w i t h Congress a l t o g e t h e r , b u t even more r e l u c t a n t t o a l l o w i t e i t h e r t o p l a y any s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n government, or t o f a l l i n t o t h e hands o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n . The f i r s t m i l i t a r y p r e s i d e n t , Cas te lo Branco, purged Congress o f i t s more combat ive elements, p a r t i c u l a r l y those from t h e pro- labour PTB ( B r a z i l i a n Labour P a r t y ) , b u t a t t h e same t ime a l lowed e l e c t i o n s f o r s t a t e governors t o go ahead on schedule i n 1965 and 1966. A f t e r some debate on t h e course which should be f o l l o w e d t h e o l d p a r t i e s were d i s s o l v e d , and l e g i s l a t i o n was in t roduced which guaranteed t h a t o n l y two new p a r t i e s would be formed. r a t h e r than on a b a s i s which would have excluded them a l t o g e t h e r . As t h e more i d e o l o - g i c a l l y o r i e n t e d c l a s s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had been purged, t h e pro-government 'ARENA' (Nat iona l Renovation A l l i a n c e ) and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t t h e smal le r o p p o s i t i o n MDB

( B r a z i l i a n Democratic Movement) had t o draw on the more c o n s e r v a t i v e and ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' p o l i t i c i a n s o f t h e o l d PSD (Soc ia l Democratic Par ty )and UDN (Nat iona l Democratic Union) . 'ARENA' was, f rom t h e s t a r t , a broad c o a l i t i o n o f r i g h t - w i n g ideologues and o l d - s t y l e machine p o l i t i c i a n s . I n r e t r o s p e c t i t seems c l e a r t h a t Cas te lo Branco, committed t o the r e t e n t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e e l e c t i o n s , and aware t h a t he needed t o w in them a t a l l costs , and t h a t t h e harsh p o l i c i e s being imposed would n o t breed p o p u l a r i t y a t t h e p o l l s , was w i l l i n g t o make s u b s t a n t i a l compromises ( d e s p i t e t h e o f f i c i a l r h e t o r i c d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t ' p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s ' ) . munic ipa l l e v e l o f t h e mechanism o f t h e 'sublegenda' ( i n t r a - p a r t y l i s t ) which a l lowed d i f f e r e n t groups w i t h i n a s i n g l e p a r t y t o p resent t h e i r own l i s t s o f candidates f o r l o c a l o f f i c e . The p o s i t i o n s were then awarded t o t h e lead ing l i s t from the p a r t y w i t h theh ighes tcombined t o t a l of votes. I t meant t h a t the former p a r t i e s s imply passed, u n r e c o n s t i t u t e d , i n t o ARENA, and s u r v i v e d w i t h i n i t as organised f a c t i o n s . A t t h e same t ime, t h e system of s ta te -w ide multi-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s f o r e l e c t i o n s t o t h e Chamber o f Deput ies a l lowed a shar ing-out of seats among t h e f a c t i o n s i n accordance w i t h t h e i r r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h . I n the case o f B r a z i l , ( i n obvious c o n t r a s t t o t h a t o f C h i l e ) the break w i t h t h e former c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l regime was less than t o t a l .

degree o f l e g i t i m a t i o n through r e g u l a r n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s (he ld on schedule every f o u r years s i n c e 19661, i t has a t t h e same t i m e removed e x e c u t i v e p o s i t i o n s a t s t a t e and fed- e r a l l e v e l s and i n c e r t a i n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s from t h e sphere o f d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s . Sweep- ing l e g i s l a t i v e powers have been conferred upon the e x e c u t i v e through t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f decree laws, p r o h i b i t i o n s on congress ional i n i t i a t i v e s i n budget expend i tu re and upon the c r e a t i o n o f p u b l i c o f f i c e s , and through the establ ishment of t h e 'decurso de p r a z o ' ( g u i 1 l o t i n e ) , under which b i 11s in t roduced by the e x e c u t i v e automat i c a l l y become law i n t h i r t y days i f n o t cons idered by Congress i n t h a t per iod . The r e s u l t i s a d i v i - s i o n o f labour through which the o f f i c i a l p a r t y i s denied any r o l e i n p o l i c y f o r m a t i o n o r decis ion-making, b u t i s charged w i t h t h e t a s k o f winn ing e l e c t i o n s .

The new p a r t y system was formed, then, o u t o f t h e o l d Congress p o l i t i c i a n s ,

T h i s i s most c l e a r l y seen i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n a t

Whi le Congress has been r e t a i n e d s i n c e 1964 and t h e regime has cont inued to seek a

The

wake of the 1964 coup, the regime never broke e n t i r e l y w i t h them. r e f l e c t e d t h e genuine an imos i ty o f h a r d - l i n e army f a c t i o n s who never succeeded i n imposing t h e i r views e n t i r e l y upon t h e i r co l leagues. f o r the m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n t h a t was n o t expressed o v e r t l y i n c l a s s terms. Unfor tu - n a t e l y i t has been incorpora ted wholesale i n t o t h e model of b u r e a u c r a t i c a u t h o r i t a r i a n - ism, w i t h thorough ly mis lead ing consequences. An examinat ion of t h e chequered course o f ' p o l i t i c a l re fo rm' under successive m i l i t a r y p r e s i d e n t s does n o t suggest the e x i s t e n c e o f acoherent p r o j e c t aimed a t long- term i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f any k i n d . The regime has l i v e d from hand t o mouth, making ad hoc adjustments f r o m t ime t o t ime w i t h an eye o n l y t o ensur ing v i c t o r y i n the nex t e l e c t i o n . P r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e i n d i r e c t e l e c t i o n o f

Institutions Zisation of Rationa Z Authority? Despi te t h e v i o l e n t r h e t o r i c d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t ' p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s ' i n the

I n p a r t t h i s r h e t o r i c

I t a l s c f u r n i s h e d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n

12 PauI C m a c k

s t a t e governors have been introduced as piecemeal expedients from e l e c t i o n to e l e c t i o n , and have recen t l y been dropped. I n 1969 l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced to make the a l l oca - t i o n o f seats i n the Chamber of Deputies dependent upon the number o f reg i s te red vo ters ra the r than upon the t o t a l popu la t ion and i n 1977 the o l d system was re - ins ta ted , t o make the most o f government s t reng th i n the r u r a l areas. ( in t roduced a f t e r Congress had been c losed on a p r e t e x t ) i t was declared t h a t one- th i rd o f Senate seats would be f i l l e d by i n d i r e c t e lec t i on . This was intended t o ensure tha t 'ARENA' d i d not lose c o n t r o l of t he Senate i n 1978, and i t was repealed a f t e r the e lec- t i ons . I n the meantime the sublegenda had been extended t o cover Senate e l e c t i o n s i n 1975. The reforms of the mid-sevent ies came as a d i r e c t response t o the consequences o f the Garrastazu Medici Presidency 1969-74 i n which ' r a t i o n a l ' and ' t echnoc ra t i c ' norms had received most emphasis, and i n which c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c i a n s had been most mar- g ina l i sed . hands o f 'ARENA' , and imposed minor p o l i t i c i a n s and technocrats w i t h no p o l i t i c a l exper i - ence a t a l l . The r e s u l t was p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the r u l i n g groups o f several s ta tes , severe d i s a f f e c t i o n w i t h i n 'ARENA' , and t o t a l d i sa r ray among the governing c o a l i t i o n i n 1974. ment. I t clung on t o i t s m a j o r i t y i n the Chamber o f Deputies desp i te rece iv ing on ly 41 per cent o f the vo te ( the MDB received 38 per cent and 21 per cent o f ba1lots.were b lank or spo i l ed ) . 34 per cent o f the vote t o the 50 per cent won by the MDB. candidate had dr iven disappointed f a c t i o n s t o withdraw o r a l i g n w i t h the oppos i t ion .

I n the same package o f reforms

Medici took the se lec t i on of s t a t e governors f o r 1970 e n t i r e l y ou t o f t h e

The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s o f t h a t year were a h u m i l i a t i o n f o r the govern-

The government l o s t 16 o f the 22 Senate seats contested, t ak ing The need t o present a s i n g l e

The Expansion of Clientelism and Patronage

recent years, i t has become inc reas ing l y c l e a r t h a t the constant need t o b r i n g out the vote wh i l e o f f e r i n g no mod i f i ca t i ons i n p o l i c y goals has d r i ven the regime t o a number o f expedients intended t o maximise the p o l i t i c a l impact o f c l i e n t e l i s m and s t a t e patron- age. We have already seen how the sublegenda was introduced and extended bu t i n addi- t i o n , the cedula unica (a s i n g l e o f f i c i a l b a l l o t paper l i s t i n g a l l candidates) has been replaced by the cedula avulsa (a b a l l o t paper prov ided p r i v a t e l y by the candidate). The system operates ou ts ide c a p i t a l c i t i e s and towns w i t h over 100,000 inhab i tan ts , and a l lows r u r a l power ho lders considerable c o n t r o l over i n d i v i d u a l s who may s u f f e r from being seen t o vote against t h e i r wishes. Since 1974 the s e l e c t i o n o f candidates f o r governorships has been en t rus ted t o a g rea ter ex ten t t o ARENA, w i t h the e x p l i c i t in junc- t i o n i n 1978 tha t those chosen should be "good vote-winners". Radio and t e l e v i s i o n propaganda (a key fac to r i n the 1974 defeat ) has now been banned dur ing e l e c t i o n cam- paigns, throwing candidates back on t o more t r a d i t i o n a l means o f secur ing support .

I t i s i n the area o f l oca l po l i t ics ,however , that the r o l e o f government patronage has proved most s i g n i f i c a n t . Successful municipal government has always been dependent upon access t o s t a t e and federa l funds. Since 1964 the pa t te rns o f m u l t i p l e channels o f access and frequent changes o f regime which charac ter ised the e a r l i e r per iod have been replaced by monopoly c o n t r o l o f resources and increas ing cen t ra l i s a t i o n . For these and o ther reasons'ARENA' has always performed f a r b e t t e r a t munic ipa l than a t s t a t e o r federa l l eve l . i n t e r i o r , and performed very weakly i n l oca l e lec t i ons . Once i t began t o win more m u n i c i p a l i t i e s however, the regime began t o use i t s c o n t r o l o f resources t o tempt MDB

sw i tch ing t o the government on e l e c t i o n ) which reached subs tan t ia l p ropor t ions dur ing the 1970s. I n 1972'ARENA'won 3,341 prefectures, t o 466 f o r the MDB, and subsequently won over to i t s ranks as many as h a l f t o two- th i rds o f oppos i t i on p re fec ts i n a number o f s ta tes .

The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s o f 1978 were d isappo in t ing (ARENA'taking 40 per cent o f votes f o r the Chamber o f Deputies t o 39 per cent f o r the MDB, and l o s i n g the o v e r a l l Senate vote by 35 per cent t o 47 per cent) . favour of a m u l t i - p a r t y system intended t o s p l i t the oppos i t ion . created a s i t u a t i o n i n which the government i t s e l f could no t count upon a m a j o r i t y i n the lower house. Municipal e l e c t i o n s due i n 1980 were postponed u n t i l 1982 t o a l l ow

While there have been few signs o f a coherent p o l i t i c a l s t ra tegy o f any k i n d i n

I n the e a r l y years o f the regime the MDB was scarce ly organised i n the

v i c t o r s t o swi tch t o 'ARENPI. Hence the phenomenon o f "adesismo" (opposi t ion candidates

The two-party system has s ince been abol ished i n By l a t e 1981 t h i s had

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Brazil: A Dissenting Note 13

t ime f o r f u r t h e r re form, and a f t e r months o f d e l i b e r a t i o n the aovernment DroDosed i n I . I

November 1981 t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f a mandatory ' v o t o v i n c u l a d o ' ( p a r t y t i c k e t ) f o r c i n g e l e c t o r s t o vo te f o r candidates o f t h e same p a r t y a t l o c a l , s t a t e , and f e d e r a l l e v e l s . The idea was designed t o use the power o f t h e o f f i c i a l machine a t l o c a l l e v e l i n o r d e r t o manufacture m a j o r i t i e s throughout t h e system, and amply conf i rms t h e t r e n d toward o v e r t r e l i a n c e upon o f f i c i a l patronage as a source o f p o l i t i c a l support . However, i t a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s t h e ad hoc n a t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l reform under t h e regime: no sooner had i t been fo rced th rough Congress on t h e decurso de prazo than the government began t o have second thoughts about i t apparent ly f e a r i n g t h a t i t might b a c k f i r e and lose votes a t mun ic ipa l l e v e l r a t h e r than ga in them elsewhere.

Prospects f o r the Future

c r i s i s i n B r a z i l w i l l be. I n f l u e n t i a l vo ices w i t h i n t h e regime a r e s t i l l p ress ing f o r a renewed ons laught a g a i n s t the i n s t i t u t i o n s which have surv ived t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f au- t h o r i t a r i a n r u l e , and the fumbl ings o f t h e ' r e f o r m e r s ' can o n l y add t o the appeal o f a renewed p e r i o d o f repress ion . For t h e present , though, i t seems c l e a r t h a t i f a sounder bas is f o r t h e regime i s t o be found, i t w i l l be through t h e systemat ic harness ing o f the o p p o r t u n i t i e s p rov ided by c e n t r a l i s e d monopoly c o n t r o l over s t a t e resources t o b u i l d a p o l i t i c a l machine h e l d together by o f f i c i a l l y d i r e c t e d patronage. To da te the movement i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n has been an u n c e r t a i n and unco-ordinated one, t h e r e s u l t o f a number o f o p p o r t u n i s t i c s teps which a r e o n l y now beginning to take on something o f the appearance o f a conscious s t r a t e g y .

looked a number o f impor tant and i n c r e a s i n g l y c e n t r a l f e a t u r e s o f t h e B r a z i l i a n regime. Whatever t h e prospec ts f o r B r a z i l , i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t o d i s c o v e r t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r - t a i n a f f i n i t i e s between h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n regimes which deny o f f i c i a l p a r t i e s any r e a l r o l e i n government, and powerfu l p o l i t i c a l machines b u i l t on resources c o n t r o l l e d by t h e s t a t e , which organ ise e l e c t o r a l support t o s u s t a i n programmes w i t h o n l y m i n o r i t y appeal .

A t p resent i t i s by no means c l e a r what t h e outcome o f t h e develop ing p o l i t i c a l

To conclude, i t appears t h a t the model o f b u r e a u c r a t i c a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m has over-

Note f: The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s draw i n p a r t upon Paul Cammack, " C l i e n t e l i s m and M i l i t a r y Government i n B r a z i l " , i n C. Clapham (ed) , P r i v a t e Patronage and P u b l i c Power: C 1 i e n t e l ism i n the Modern S t a t e (London: Frances P i n t e r , 1982.)

References C o l l i e r , D. (1979), 'Overview o f the Bureaucra t ic A u t h o r i t a r i a n Model ' i n D. C o l l i e r (ed) , The New A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n L a t i n America (Pr ince ton : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press) .

L i n z , J. (1973), 'The Future of an A u t h o r i t a r i a n S i t u a t i o n o r t h e I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f an A u t h o r i t a r i a n Regime: t h e case o f B r a z i l ' i n A. Stepan (ed) , A u t h o r i t a r i a n B r a z i l (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press) .

O'Donnel l , G. (1973), Modern isat ion and Bureaucra t ic A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m : Studies i n South American P o l i t i c s (Berke ley: I n s t i t u t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a ) .

O'Donnell , G. (1977), 'Corporat ism and t h e Quest ion o f t h e Sta te ' i n James M. Ma l loy (ed) A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and Corporat ism i n L a t i n America ( P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h

Press).

O'Donnel l , G. (1978), ' R e f l e c t i o n s on t h e P a t t e r n s of Change i n t h e Bureaucra t ic A u t h o r i t a r i a n S t a t e ' , L a t i n American Research Review, Vo1.12, No. 1 , Winter .

O'Donnel l , G. (1979), 'Tensions i n the Bureaucra t ic A u t h o r i t a r i a n S t a t e and t h e Quest ion o f Democracy' i n D. C o l l i e r (ed) , The New A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n L a t i n America (Pr ince ton : U n i v e r s i t y Press).

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