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Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition:Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations
in Alternating Order
1 Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects
Historical Introduction
The Buddhist teachings on cognition theory and logic derive from the works of the
late fifth-century Indian master Dignaga and of Dharmakirti, the late-sixth century
disciple of his disciple. Dignaga wroteAn Anthology on Valid Cognition (Tshad-ma
kun-btus, Skt.Pramanasamuccaya); Dharmakirti defended it against non-Buddhist
Indian theories in his Commentary on Valid Cognition (Tshad-ma rnam-grel, Skt:
Pramanavarttika).
The various Indian schools of Buddhist tenets (grub-mtha) differ slightly in their
explanations of cognition. Dignaga is the source of the Sautrantika position.
Dharmakirti presented mostly the Sautrantika view, but frequently supplemented it
with the Chittamatra explanation. Some later masters interpreted Dharmakirti in the
light of Madhyamaka.
The Tibetan traditions take the Sautrantika explanation as a basis and then refine it
with the explanations of the more sophisticated tenet systems. Accordingly, we shall
look here at some points regarding the Sautrantika system of cognition and
supplement them with explanations from other systems when they significantly differ.
At first, the Tibetans emphasized study of Dignagas works alone, under the influence
of Atisha, the early eleventh-century Indian master from whom the Kadam tradition
derives. In the late eleventh-century, the Kadam master Ngog Lotsawa (rNgogs Lo-
tsa-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab) shifted the emphasis to the works of Dharmakirti, thus
establishing the new epistemology system (tshad-ma gsar-ma). The thirteenth-century
Kadam master Chapa (Phyva-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge), the founder of the Tibetan style
of debate and the study of collected topics (bsdus-grwa, "dura"), elaborated on the
new system. His interpretations are known as the Chapa-tradition (phyva-lugs).
Chapas contemporary, the Sakya master Sakya Pandita (Sa-skya Pandi-ta), refutedmany of Chapas interpretations of Dharmakirti, based on his study of Sanskrit and of
the works of Dharmakirti in their original language, with the Indian master Shakya
Shribhadra. His interpretations form the Sapan-tradition (sa-lugs).
Although all four Tibetan traditions claim as their authority Sakya Panditas
commentaries on cognition theory, the Gelug school follows more closely Chapas
interpretations. The Nyingma and Kagyu schools follow closely the mainstream
Sakya explanation of Sapans works. Therefore, we may roughly divide the Tibetan
explanations of cognition theory into the Gelug and the non-Gelug presentations.
Further, various Tibetan masters also explain differently many assertions of each of
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the four Indian schools of tenets. Their explanations also fall broadly into the two
divisions: Gelug and non-Gelug.
Neither Gelug nor non-Gelug, however, presents a uniform explanation of cognition
theory. Several masters within each camp have explained specific points slightly
differently in their commentaries. Here, as a foundation for more advanced study, weshall present an overview of the two general positions regarding the main points. For
each point, we shall present the assertions shared in common and then the two
positions in an alternating fashion. We shall use the explanations given primarily by
the late eighteenth-century master Akya Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-dzin dByangs-can
dga-bai blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This explanation accords with the
monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the sixteenth-century master Jetsun Chokyi-
gyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and
Ganden Jangtsey (dGa-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries. To represent the non-Gelug
position, we shall rely primarily on the explanations given by the fifteenth-century
Sakya master Gorampa (Go-ram bSod-nams seng-ge).
Cognitive Objects and Sensibilia
Cognitions (shes-pa) have numerous cognitive objects (yul) objects known in some
cognitive manner. Among them are sensibilia and commonsense objects.
Sensibilia are the forms of physical phenomena (gzugs) that, in one moment, occupy
an extended location (yul), and which are cognized by a sensory consciousness. As
objects well known in the philosophical treatises (bstan-bcos-la grags-pa), sensibilia
are thus the smallest spatial units of physical phenomena that are perceptible by the
senses in one moment.
Each "patch" of sensibilia occupies an extended location in the sense that it spatially
extends over a collection of "molecules" (dus-pai rdul-phran) specific to its class of
cognitive stimulator (skye-mched). Molecules, in turn, are aggregations of substantial
particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran).
There are four classes of sensibilia:
sights (patches of colored shapes),
smells,
tastes,
tactile or physical sensations.
Since sounds do not have spatial extension over a collection of molecules of similar
class (rigs-mthun), sounds are not included as sensibilia.
Commonsense Objects and Conventional Objects of Experience
What is a commonsense orange? Is it a sight that we see, a fragrance that we smell, a
flavor that we taste, or a tactile sensation that we feel when we hold one in our hands?
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As an object well known in the world (jig-rten-la grags-pa), a commonsense orange
is an item that extends over the locations of all four classes of sensibilia.
Moreover, although, as a nonstatic (mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) object, an orange
changes from moment to moment, a commonsense orange does not exist for just an
instant: it endures over time.
Commonsense objects are equivalent to conventional objects of experience (tha-
snyad spyod-yul) objects of ordinary experience to which the conventions of words
or concepts (rtog-pa) refer. Thus, commonsense objects have conventional identities
(rang-gi ngo-bo dzin-pa) in that they are distinguishable from each other, such as a
specific item being an orange and not a table.
Since certain items, such as a liquid, may be experienced as water by humans, pus by
clutching ghosts (hungry ghosts), and nectar by divine beings (gods), the qualification
needs to be added that commonsense objects have conventional identities established
as valid only in relation to certain groups of beings.
Knowable Phenomena and Comprehensible Objects
Knowable phenomena (shes-bya), also called comprehensible objects (gzhal-bya), are
cognitive objects that can be known by valid cognition (tshad-ma). They include all
existent objects or phenomena.
More specifically, knowable phenomena include
objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically characterized phenomena),
metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena).
Objective Entities and Metaphysical Entities General Characteristics
In the Sautrantika system, objective entities are truly existent (bden-par grub-pa,
real). In this system of tenets, truly existentmeans knowable to valid nonconceptual
cognition (rtog-med).
Note that
sensory cognition (dbang-shes) is always nonconceptual;
mental cognition (yid-shes) may be either nonconceptual or conceptual (rtog-
bcas);
conceptual cognition is always mental.
Nonconceptual cognition may also be bare cognition of reflexive awareness (rang-rig
mngon-sum) and yogic bare cognition (rnal-byor mngon-sum).
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Reflexive awareness (rang-rig, self-awareness) accompanies each moment of
cognition and takes the cognition that it accompanies as its object, allowing
later recollection (dran-shes) of it.
Yogic bare cognition is of subtle impermanence or of an individual beings
lack of existing with an impossible identity (gang-zag-gi bdag-med,identitylessness of a person, selflessness of a person).
For the sake of simplicity, we shall restrict our discussion of nonconceptual cognition
here to only its sensory form. Thus, objective entities can be seen, heard, smelled,
tasted, or physically sensed.
Metaphysical entities are falsely existent (rdzun-par grub-pa, unreal), which means
imputedly existent (rtog-pas btags-tsam-gyis grub-pa). In the Sautrantika system,
imputedly existentmeans knowable to the valid conceptual cognition that imputes
them on the basis of objective entities. They cannot be known by nonconceptual
cognition. In other words, metaphysical entities cannot actually be seen or heard; theycan only be thought or imagined. Thus, although metaphysical entities exist, they are
not as "real" as objective entities are.
Gelug
Objective entities are truly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible (dngos-
su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition in other words, a mental aspect (rnam-pa)
resembling them can appear in a nonconceptual cognition of them. The mental aspect
that appears is simply a reflection of the object and of what it is.
This means that objective entities can be cognized without mental construction
meaning without adding anything to the object beyond its being the sum of
its parts and its holding its own essential nature as a "this" and not a "that"
(rang-gi ngo-bo dzin-pa).
The qualifierexplicitly needs to be added because metaphysical entities can be
implicitly apprehended (shugs-su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition.
Metaphysical entities are imputedly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible
only to valid conceptual cognition.
Explicit and implicit apprehension of an object will be explained in more detail
below.
Non-Gelug
Truly existent objects are knowable only to valid nonconceptual cognition. Imputedly
existent objects are knowable only to valid conceptual cognition.
Objective and Metaphysical Entities Specific Presentation
Gelug
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Objective entities include all nonstatic phenomena namely, those phenomena that
are capable of performing a function (don-byed nus-pa).
Nonstatic phenomena include:
forms of physical phenomena (gzugs), ways of being aware of something (shes-pa),
nonconcomitant affecting variables (ldan-min du-byed, nonassociated
compositional factors), such as impermanence.
Impermanence is the nonendurance of an item for a second moment.
Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. They include:
commonsense objects, such as oranges and tables,
their conventional identities as "this" and not "that,"
the sensibilia that comprise commonsense objects,
the molecules and moments over which the commonsense objects and their
sensibilia extend,
the moments over which commonsense sounds extend.
Dharmakirti specified objective entities as those phenomena that are determinate
(nges-pa) or unmixed (ma-dres-pa) in terms of spatial location (yul), temporallocation (dus), and essential nature as an individual (ngo-bo).
Spatially determinate means that the western portion of an object does not
exist in the east.
Temporally determinate means that something that exists in the morning has a
definite end, for instance when it ceases to exist in the evening.
Being individual by essential nature means that something is distinguishable
from other objects.
Thus, beingunmixedmeans being not mixed up with or indistinguishable fromsomething else.
Since these three criteria can apply both to nonstatic and static (rtag-pa, permanent)
phenomena, they cannot be intended as a strict definition of objective entities.
Dharmakirti used them only as criteria for refuting the non-Buddhist Nyaya view of
universals as indivisible entities inhering equally in all their instances.
Metaphysical entities include all static phenomena phenomena that do not change
from moment to moment namely, those phenomena that are incapable of performing
functions.
Static phenomena include:
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the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are
instances,
the absence of a vase imputed on a bare tabletop.
Non-Gelug
Objective entities arespecifically characterized phenomena. They include all
individual items (bye-brag).
Individual items, as Dharmakirti defined them, are those phenomena that are
determinate or unmixed in terms of spatial location, temporal location, and essential
nature as an individual.
Spatial location means situated in a specific perceptible unit of spatial
location.
Temporal location means situated in a specific unit (a moment) of temporal
location.
Being individual by essential nature means that the items do not require
mental construction from the synthesis of other items, such as spatial units of
different sensibilia, temporal parts, or other individual items resembling them.
Thus, being unmixedmeans not being mentally constructed from the synthesis
of other items.
Individual items include all nonstatic phenomena:
moments of forms of physical phenomena namely, moments of sensibilia
and of sound,
moments of ways of being aware of something,
moments of nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as impermanence.
Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. In this category,
individual items, then, refer only to:
moments of collections of perceptible units of specific types of sensibilia, suchas a collection of patches of colored shapes comprising a sight,
moments of the collections of molecules over which specific types of
sensibilia extend,
moments of sounds.
These are the only things that we actually see, hear, smell, taste, or physically sense.
Metaphysical entities aregenerally characterized phenomena. They include all
universals (spyi).
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Universals are those phenomena that are shared (thun-mong-ba) by other phenomena:
they "go together" (rjes-gro) with them. They do not have determinate spatial
locations, temporal locations, or essential natures as individual items. They are not
simply collections of individual items. Universals are mentally (conceptually)
constructed (spros-pa, fabricated) by a synthesis of individual items that are instances
of them, or by a synthesis of the spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal parts on whichthey are imputed.
Thus, universals include:
the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are
instances,
a commonsense orange, as a mental synthesis of the individual sensibilia of
sight, smell, taste, and physical sensation,
the sight of a commonsense orange (and not simply just a sight), as a mental
synthesis of a collection of patches of colored shapes,
a commonsense orange, as a mental synthesis of a succession of individual
moments of either of the above two universals,
a conventional identity as "an orange" imputed on any of the above three
universals.
Therefore, although commonsense objects exist, they are merely metaphysical
entities, not objectively real. They can be validly known only by the conceptual
cognition that mentally constructs and imputes them on the individual items of whichthey are a synthesis.
Involved Objects and Objects Existing as Cognitively Taken
The involved object(jug-yul, engaged object, object of application) of a cognition is
the main object with which a particular cognition involves itself (jug-pa, engages,
cognitively enters).
The involved object is equivalent to the object existing as cognitively taken (dzin-
stangs-kyi yul).
Gelug
The involved object in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition is a
commonsense object, for example a table, and those nonstatic features (yon-tan,
qualities) of the table with which the cognition is actually involved. It is not possible
for some feature of a commonsense object, such as the shape of a table, to be the
involved object of a cognition unless that cognition also takes as its involved object
the commonsense object of which that feature is a quality.
The nonstatic features may be:
sensibilia of the table, such as its sight or tactile sensation,
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the impermanence of the table,
the table as a table,
the table as an instance of the universal table.
Thus, only objective entities are the involved objects of either nonconceptual or
conceptual cognition.
This statement, however, needs qualification.
Such metaphysical entities as the absence of a vase on the table are also
involved objects when implicitly apprehended by a sensory nonconceptual
cognition or a conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends a bare tabletop.
Such a metaphysical entity, however, is not the primary involved object of that
sensory or conceptual cognition.
Although such metaphysical entities as the universal table are not the involved
objects (either explicitly or implicitly apprehended) of a conceptual cognition
that takes a commonsense table as its involved object, nevertheless they are
the involved objects of the nonconceptual bare cognition of reflexive
awareness that accompanies that conceptual cognition.
Non-Gelug
The involved object in nonconceptual cognition is:
a moment of sensibilia,
or a moment of sound.
The involved objects in a conceptual cognition are:
a commonsense object, for example a table,
such metaphysical features of the table as:
the table as a table,
the table as an instance of the universal table,
the table as an instance of what the word table signifies.
Thus,
objective entities are the involved objects of only nonconceptual cognition,
metaphysical entities are the involved objects of only conceptual cognition.
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2 Distinctions in Terms of Ways of Cognizing
Decisive Determination and Apprehension of an Involved Object
Apprehension (rtogs-pa, understanding) decisively determines (nges-pa, ascertains)its involved object correctly by decisively cutting it from incorrect interpolations that
it is "that" (sgro-dogs bcad-pa). Thus, in correctly identifying its involved object, it
induces immediate certainty of that object, such that recollection of the involved
object can later occur.
Gelug
Both valid nonconceptual and valid conceptual cognitions apprehend their involved
objects, decisively determining them as "this."
In other words, when we apprehend a commonsense table by either validly seeing orthinking of it, we experience the table (the involved object) as a table and we can
correctly remember later that we experienced the table as a table. We do not
experience the table as an orange; nor do we validly remember that we experienced
the table as an orange.
This assertion follows from the facts that
both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions cognize commonsense objects,
valid cognition experiences commonsense objects as having their valid
conventional identities.
In an episode of nonconceptual cognition of an involved object, however, the last
moment is a nondetermining cognition of what appears (snang-la ma-nges-pa,
inattentive perception). An object still appears, but is no longer decisively determined
as "this" and not "that."
Except in the case of aryas total absorption (mnyam-bzhag) on voidness, any single
moment of nonconceptual cognition, by itself, is a nondetermining cognition of what
appears. This is because a single moment (one sixty-fifth of the time of a finger-snap)
is too short for decisively determining what appears. A sequence of moments of
nonconceptual cognition is required to establish apprehension and, thus, each moment
within the context of the sequence is considered an apprehension.
Decisive determination of an object does not entail cognition of a static universal
imputed on the involved object, such as a word or name (sgra) or a significance (don),
of which the object is an individual instance. Such imputation occurs exclusively in
conceptual cognition of an object.
Thus, when we bump into a table in the dark, although we experience the table as a
table, and not as an orange, we may not necessarily think the word table or think that
what we experienced is an instance of what the word table means. In other words, we
experience the item as a table, but may not necessarily know that it is a table.
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Non-Gelug
Nonconceptual cognition does not apprehend (identify) its involved object. It merely
cognitively takes hold of (dzin-pa) (reflects) its involved object.
Decisive determination (ascertainment) of an involved object, that it is "this" and not"that," occurs only with a conceptual cognition that immediately follows.
Consequently, nonconceptual mental cognition is a nondeterminating cognition of
what appears (inattentive perception). Only conceptual cognition apprehends its
involved object.
Obvious, Obscure, and Extremely Obscure Objects
An involved object is obvious (mngon-gyur-ba) if it can be cognized by valid sensory
nonconceptual cognition (dbang-mngon tshad-ma). Obvious objects may be any
objective entity, which is synonymous with any nonstatic phenomenon, any functional
phenomenon, and any truly existent phenomenon.
An involved object is obscure (lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized by a valid
inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma) that relies on a line of reasoning (rtags) or
on renown (grags). All inferential cognition is conceptual. Obscure objects may be
any validly knowable phenomena, which is synonymous with any objective or
metaphysical entity, any nonstatic or static phenomenon, any functional or
nonfunctional phenomenon, and any truly eixstent or imputedly existent phenomenon.
An involved object is extremely obscure (shin-tu lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized
by a valid inferential cognition that relies on conviction (yid-ches). Conviction, here,is that someone is a valid source of information (skyes-bu tshad-ma) and therefore
that any information that this person gives is correct. Extremely obscure objects may
also be any validly knowable phenomenon.
Gelug
For example, the presence of smoke (a commonsense object with spatial and temporal
extension) rising from the chimney of a house on a mountain is obvious because it can
be seen.
The presence of fire in the house on the mountain is obscure: it is not visible.Nevertheless, it can be validly known inferentially by relying on the line of reasoning,
"where there is smoke, there is fire."
The name of the person living in the house on the mountain is extremely obscure: it
cannot be known through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known
by relying on someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date
data bank and inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information
must be correct.
The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all objective entities. The only
difference is that the smoke is obvious, the fire is obscure, and the name of the personis extremely obscure.
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Non-Gelug
For example, in what is conventionally considered seeing smoke rising from the
chimney of a house on a mountain, moments of slightly different gray-colored shapes
are obvious, because they can be seen.
The presence of both smoke and fire is obscure: neither can be directly seen.
The presence of smoke can be validly known inferentially by relying on
renown that the application of the universalsmoke on a mental representation
of smoke mentally constructed from a succession of slightly different gray
shapes is a correct application of a term.
The presence of fire can be validly known by relying on a valid line of
reasoning, "where there is smoke, there is fire."
The name of the person living in the house is extremely obscure: it cannot be known
through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known by relying on
someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date data bank and
inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information must be correct.
Only the moments of slightly different gray-colored shapes are objective entities, and
they are obvious. The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all metaphysical
entities. The first two are obscure and the third is extremely obscure.
Clarity, Awareness, and Mental Activity (Mind)
In cognizing an involved object whether obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure a
cognition gives rise (char-ba,shar-ba) to a cognitive appearance (snang-ba) of
something simultaneously with cognitively engaging (jug-pa, cognitively involving
itself) with it.
Giving rise to a cognitive appearance of something simultaneously with cognitively
engaging with it are, respectively, the defining characteristics ofmaking something
cognitively clear(gsal, cognitively revealing something, clarity) and making an
awareness of something(rig, awareness).
The mere making of something cognitively clear and the mere making an awarenessof something (gsal-rig tsam) are, in turn, the defining characteristics ofmental
activity (sems, mind).
The word mere indicates that mental activity occurs without a "me" or a "mind"
existing as an independent entity, separate from the mental activity, and serving as the
agent that is making the activity happen. In fact, in any action, mental or physical,
there is no such thing as an agent existing as an unaffected (dus ma-byas, static,
permanent), monolithic (gcig, one), separa y independently of the action, either
making the action happen or observing it occur.
Making something cognitively clear does not require it being clear in the sense of itbeing in focus. The appearance of a blur may also cognitively arise.
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Making an awareness of something does not require the awareness being conscious.
Nor does it necessarily entail knowing the identity of what becomes cognitively
apparent. A cognition may be subconscious (bag-la nyal) and may lack cognitive
certainty (nges-pa).
Explicit and Implicit Apprehension
Gelug
Apprehension of an involved object, in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition,
may be
explicit apprehension (dngos-su rtogs-pa),
implicit apprehension (shugs-su rtogs-pa)
In explicit apprehension of an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved
object itself arises. Only obvious phenomena (nonstatic phenomena, objective
entities) may be explicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.
This is the case only with unenlightened beings.
In the case of Buddhas, obscure and extremely obscure objective entities may
also be explicitly apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness
(rnam-mkhyen).
Any phenomenon obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure; nonstatic or static;
objective or metaphysical may be explicitly apprehended by valid inferential(conceptual) cognition.
In implicit apprehension of an involved object, only a cognitive appearance of the
basis for imputation (gdags-gzhi) of the involved object arises, but not a cognitive
appearance of the involved object itself. Only metaphysical entities (static
phenomena) may be implicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.
In the case of ordinary beings, only some metaphysical entities may be
implicitly apprehended by any specific type of valid bare nonconceptual
cognition.
In the case of Buddhas, all metaphysical entities may be implicitly
apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness.
Either metaphysical or objective entities may be implicitly apprehended by valid
inferential cognition.
Consider the case of visual nonconceptual cognition. When explicitly apprehending
the sight of a bare tabletop, for example, the visual cognition simultaneously can
implicitly apprehend the absence of a vase on the tabletop.
Both the tabletop and the absence of the vase are the involved objects of the
visual cognition.
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However, only the bare tabletop appears.
The absence of a vase does not actually appear, but is decisively determined
by cutting off interpolations, for instance that there is an absence of an orange
there.
Non-Gelug
There is no such thing as implicit apprehension, either in nonconceptual or conceptual
cognition, in which a metaphysical entity is decisively determined without a cognitive
appearance of it arising. In decisively determining (apprehending) a metaphysical
entity as an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself
always arises.
This only occurs in conceptual cognition and does not bear the technical term
explicit apprehension.
3 Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition
Mental Aspects in Nonconceptual Cognition
The cognitive appearance to which nonconceptual or conceptual cognition gives rise
is called a mental aspect(rnam-pa). Let us initially restrict our examination to only
the mental aspects that arise in nonconceptual cognition. We shall analyze the case of
conceptual cognition in a later section.
In sensory nonconceptual cognition, an external object (phyi-don) casts (gtod) a
mental aspect of itself on the sensory consciousness that cognizes it.
An external objectis one that exists prior to the cognition of it and functions
as the natal source (rdzas) of the mental aspect that arises in its cognition.
A natal source of something is what produces it, like the potters wheel for a
clay pot or an oven for a baked bread.
The mental aspect may be the mental semblance of a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
or a physical sensation. It is a mental semblance, however, of only the objective
entities that the specific sense consciousness can cognize. Visual consciousness, for
example, cannot take on the mental aspect of a sound or a taste.
Moreover, in cognizing an external object, a cognition gives rise only to a mental
aspect resembling the external object. It does not give rise to the external object itself.
According to the Chittamatra (mind-only) tenet system, there are no such things as
external objects. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that arises
comes from the same natal source as the sensory consciousness of it namely, both
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come from the same karmic tendency (sa-bon, karmic seed) as their common natal
source.
According to the Vaibhashika system, sensory nonconceptual cognition directly
contacts and cognizes external objects, without giving rise to a mental aspect
resembling them.
Gelug
The external object that casts an impression on a sensory consciousness of it is a
commonsense object as an objective entity.
Consider the example of sensory nonconceptual cognition of a table, such as
seeing a table or feeling a table with our hands. Like a mental impression, the
mental aspect of a table that appears in the sensory cognition resembles the
external commonsense table in all the nonstatic features that are explicitly
apprehensible by the sensory consciousness that assumes that mental aspect.
Sensory nonconceptual cognition can explicitly apprehend only forms of physical
phenomena specific to it and nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as
impermanence. Although sensory nonconceptual cognition can implicitly apprehend
metaphysical entities such as the absence of a vase, it cannot assume the mental
aspect of them.
For example, in seeing a table, the table casts a mental aspect on the visual
consciousness that sees it. The mental aspect resembles not only the form and
color of the table, and the table itself, but also its impermanence, becausevisual consciousness can also "see" the impermanence of a table when it
collapses.
Visual cognition of a collapsing table may decisively determine either the
sight of the collapsing table or the impermanence of the table, depending on
what it decisively determines concerning its mental aspect. Only what the
cognition decisively determines of its mental aspect is the involved object of
that cognition.
Thus, not all the features or qualities of the mental aspect that appears in a
sensory cognition are necessarily its involved objects. Only those qualities that
the sensory cognition apprehends are its involved objects and only thosequalities are decisively determined. Others may be indecisively determined,
although they appear (snang-la ma-nges-pa). They are not involved objects
and are not apprehended.
A table without a vase on it casts on the visual consciousness that sees it the
mental aspect not only of a table but also of a table without a vase on it. The
visual cognition may explicitly apprehend the table and the colored shape of
the table. It may see a table without a vase on it even if it does not decisively
determine that there is no vase on it. If it decisively determines the absence of
a vase on the table without a vase on it, it apprehends that absence of a vase on
it only implicitly.
Non-Gelug
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The external object that casts an impression (a mental aspect) on sensory
consciousness of it is a moment of sensibilia, such as a moment of colored shapes, or
a moment of sound. Only such individual items are objective external entities.
According to a minority position within the non-Gelug camp, as represented
by the fifteenth-century Sakya master Shakya-chogden (gSer-mdog Pan-chenSha-kya mchog-ldan), the external object that casts a mental aspect here is a
moment merely of molecules. Only moments of molecules are objective
entities, not moments of sensibilia. Sensibilia are metaphysical entities.
Since sensory nonconceptual cognition does not decisively determine anything about
its object, the mental aspect that appears to sensory nonconceptual cognition cannot
represent some nonstatic features that are its involved objects and some that are not its
involved objects. The entire mental aspect that appears in sensory nonconceptual
cognition represents the involved object.
The mental aspect (mental representation) in the cognition is the directlyinvolved object.
The external object (a moment of sensibilia or a moment of sound) is the
indirectly involved object. The difference between the two will be explained
below.
Level of Transparency of Mental Aspects
Gelug
The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity is
cognitively transparent. In other words, when nonconceptually cognizing the mental
aspect of an external objective entity such as a commonsense object, the mental aspect
does not veil the commonsense object. Rather, the sensory nonconceptual cognition
directly contacts the external commonsense object, albeit through the transparency of
a mental aspect.
Thus, in the sensory nonconceptual cognition of a commonsense object, the external
commonsense object actually appears through the totally transparent mental aspect
cast by it on the consciousness.
Non-Gelug
The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity,
such as a moment of an external patch of colored shape, is opaque. Only the mental
aspect appears in sensory nonconceptual cognition.
The mental aspect is directly cognized(dngos-su shes-pa) by the cognition.
The moment of the external patch of colored shape that casts a mental aspect
on the sensory consciousness of it is indirectly cognized(shugs-su shes-pa) by
that sensory cognition.
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This distinction derives from the non-Gelug literal assertion of the momentariness of
nonstatic phenomena. The moment of the external patch of colored shape that existed
as the direct cause (dngos-rgyu) of the sensory cognition of it has ceased to exist the
immediately following moment when the sensory cognition with the mental aspect
cast by it occurs. In this sense, the moment of the external patch of colored shape is
hidden (lkog na-mo) in the sensory cognition.
Being hidden in a cognition, however, is not equivalent to an involved object
being obscure. Obscure phenomena can only be validly known inferentially by
relying on a line of reasoning. The presence of a moment of an external patch
of colored shape that is cognized by a sensory cognition, however, is not
something that can only be inferred. The moment of an external patch of
colored shape is cognized nonconceptually by the sensory cognition, but only
indirectly.
Nor is the indirect cognition of a moment of an external patch of colored shape
a case of obscured cognition (lkog-gyur). Obscured cognition is cognition ofan involved object, but with minimal attention (yid-la byed-pa) focused on it.
Obscured cognition is obscured by a manifest cognition (mngon-gyur) that it
underlies, which focuses with attention on another involved object.
Consequently, there is only certainty that the manifest cognition has occurred,
but no certainty that the obscured cognition has occurred. Here, however, the
moment of an external patch of colored shape indirectly cognized by the
sensory nonconceptual cognition of it no longer exists when the sensory
nonconceptual cognition of it occurs the next moment. Therefore, the attention
in the cognition is focused only on the mental aspect (the directly involved
object of the cognition).
Focal Objects and Focal Aspects
Thefocal object(dmigs-yul) is the object on which a cognition focuses and which
serves as the focal condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the cognition. Focal objects exist prior
to the cognitions of them and have their own continuums different from those of the
cognitions of them. They are the external objective entities that cast mental aspects of
themselves on the consciousnesses that cognize them.
According to the Chittamatra system, although sensory nonconceptual cognitions
have involved objects, they do not have focal objects. They do not arise from the focalcondition of external objects existing independently of mental activity (mind).
Instead, sensory cognitions havefocal aspects (dmigs-rnam), which are the
mental aspects that sensory consciousnesses assume in cognizing their
involved objects.
The focal aspect in a sensory cognition arises from (is produced by) the same
natal source as the sensory consciousness of it namely, from the same
karmic tendency (sa-bon, karmic seed). It does not arise from (it is not
produced by) an external focal object as its natal source.
Gelug
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Only those features of focal objects (commonsense objects) that are decisively
determined by sensory nonconceptual cognitions of them are the involved objects of
those cognitions.
Non-Gelug
In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the focal object of the cognition (a moment of
sensibilia) is only indirectly cognized. Nevertheless, the focal object, in its entirety, is
still an involved object of the cognition.
Appearing Objects and Cognitively Taken Objects in Nonconceptual
Cognition
The appearing object(snang-yul) is the direct object (dngos-yul) that arises in a
cognition, as if it were directly in front of the consciousness (blo-ngor). It is a mental
reflection (gzugs-brnyen) of a cognitive object.
In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object (mental reflection) is
equivalent to the mental aspect that appears. It is a reflection of an external objective
entity.
Gelug
The appearing object (the fully transparent mental aspect) in sensory nonconceptual
cognition is equivalent to the cognitions cognitively taken object(gzung-yul, held
object). It is a full transparency of an external commonsense object.
The appearing object here is not necessary equivalent, however, to the cognitions
involved object, which may be merely certain nonstatic features of the appearing
(cognitively taken) object.
Non-Gelug
The cognitively taken object of a cognition is defined as the external objective entity
that serves as the direct cause of the cognition.
Thus, in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the cognitively taken object is the
moment of external sensibilia that the cognition indirectly cognizes.
The appearing object (mental reflection) is only the directly cognized opaque
mental aspect of the cognitively taken object, and not the cognitively taken
external object itself.
Summary of Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition in Chart Form
Gelug
External Object Mental Aspect Metaphysical Entities
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Fully transparent reflection Partially transparent
reflection
Commonsense object,
Conventional identity,
Spatial & temporal parts
Commonsense object,
Conventional identity, Spatial
& temporal parts
An absence of
something
Appearing object Appearing object Does not appear
Cognitively taken object Assumes the full aspect of the
cognitively taken object
Focal object
Involved object (within the
domain of the appearing,
cognitively taken focal
object)
Involved object (within the
domain of the appearing,
cognitively taken focal object)
Involved object
Explicitly apprehended Implicitly apprehended
Decisively determined as
"this" commonsense object
Decisively determined as
"this" commonsense object
Decisively determined
as an absence of "this"
Non-Gelug
External Object Mental Aspect Metaphysical Entities
Opaque representation
A moment of sensibilia A moment of sensibilia Commonsense object,
Conventional identity,
An absence of something
Does not appear Appearing object Does not appear
Cognitively taken object Assumes the aspect of the
cognitively taken object
Focal object
Involved object Involved object Not involved
Indirectly cognized
(hidden)
Directly cognized Not cognized
Merely held,
Not decisively determined
as either a commonsense
object or "this"
commonsense object
Merely held,
Not decisively determined
as either a commonsense
object or "this"
commonsense object
Not decisively determined
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4 Objects in Conceptual Cognition
Mental Aspects and Appearing, Involved, Focal, and Cognitively TakenObjects in Conceptual Cognition
Conceptual cognition imputes (mentally labels) a metaphysical entity on the object
that the mental aspect it assumes resembles, and mixes and confuses the two.
Therefore, conceptual cognition is deceptive cognition (khrul-shes).
Of the two items confused with each other, one is the appearing object.
The other simply appears (snang).
Gelug
For the sake of simplicity, we shall omit from the Gelug description of conceptual
cognition in the remainder of this article the presentation of inferential cognition and
other types of conceptual cognition in which a line of reasoning or some other
metaphysical entity is explicitly apprehended.
As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspectof a conceptual cognition is
a fully transparent semblance of the external objective entity (commonsense object)
that serves as the focal object of the cognition.
Thus, both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions havefocal objects.
In conceptual cognition, however, the focal object does not need to be present
at the time and location of the cognition involving it, as in the case of a
remembrance of seeing the bare tabletop yesterday.
As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the nonstatic features of the focal object and
of the fully transparent mental aspect resembling it in conceptual cognition are the
explicitly apprehended involved objects.
Such static features (metaphysical entities) as the absence of a vase on the bare
tabletop may be implicitly apprehended involved objects of the conceptual
cognition of a bare tabletop, in which case the conceptual cognition does notassume the mental aspect of the absence of a vase there.
The fully transparent mental aspect of the external commonsense object that
conceptual cognition about that commonsense object assumes is what appears in the
conceptual cognition.
The appearing object in a conceptual cognition is a metaphysical entity (a static
phenomenon) namely, an idea (snang-ba, "mental image," concept) about
something.
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Ideas about objective entities are static universals imputed on the objective
entities for instance, ideas about commonsense objects imputed on external
commonsense objects.
Ideas about commonsense objects are not only themselves static universals,
they are mental reflections of static universals.
Mental reflections (ideas) about commonsense objects are semitransparent.
Thus, semitransparent mental reflections about commonsense objects, as the
appearing objects of conceptual cognitions, are different from the fully
transparent mental aspects of the commonsense objects that appear (arise) in
the conceptual cognition.
What appears (arises) in a conceptual cognition may be the mental aspect of, for
instance, any form of external physical phenomenon a sight, sound, smell, taste, or
physical sensation.
Such forms do not appear vividly through the fully transparent mental aspect.
They appear only in a partially veiled manner, because the appearing object is
actually a semitransparent idea imputed on them and with which they are
mixed and confused.
For example, when visualizing an orange, the mental aspect of an external
commonsense orange appears and is confused with the idea of the static
universal orange that we imagine we are cognizing.
Thus, mental reflections and mental aspects are not equivalent terms.
Mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena and their contents are
exclusively nonstatic external commonsense objects.
Mental reflections may be either nonstatic or static, and their contents may be
either nonstatic or static.
In nonconceptual cognition, mental reflections are nonstatic and their contents
are nonstatic external commonsense objects. Thus, they are equivalent to the
mental aspects of the cognition.
In conceptual cognition, mental reflections are static ideas and their contentsare static ideas.
The appearing objects of conceptual cognitions (static ideas) are also theircognitively
taken objects.
Thus, in both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions, the appearing objects
are equivalent to the cognitively taken objects.
In sensory nonconceptual cognition, both are external commonsense objects
(objective entities).
In conceptual cognition, both are static ideas (metaphysical entities).
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Non-Gelug
The appearing objectof a cognition, whether nonconceptual or conceptual, is
equivalent to the mental aspectthat a cognition assumes. Thus, mental aspect and
mental reflection are equivalent terms.
As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that conceptual cognition
assumes, and which is the appearing object of that cognition, is an opaque mental
representation (reflection) of something.
In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object is an opaque mental
representation of an objective entity (a moment of external sensibilia).
In conceptual cognition, the appearing object is an opaque mental
representation (reflection) of a metaphysical entity for example, a
commonsense object.
As a metaphysical entity, a commonsense object, then, is actually just an idea
of a commonsense object.
Unlike sensory nonconceptual cognition, which indirectly cognizes external objective
entities (moments of sensibilia), conceptual cognition does not cognize external
objective entities at all.
Thus, conceptual cognition does not have afocal object.
Conceptual cognition does not have indirect cognition of anything.
The opaque mental aspect (reflection, representation) of a metaphysical entity (acommonsense object) in a conceptual cognition is itsfocal aspect. The metaphysical
entity that it reflects and represents is the involved objectof the conceptual cognition.
The idea of a commonsense object, reflected by an opaque mental aspect that
represents the idea, is imputed on the mental representation, and both mixed and
confused with it.
The mental aspect (reflection, representation) of the idea is the appearing
object.
The idea itself is not the appearing object; however, it is what appears (arises)
in the conceptual cognition.
The idea that appears partially veils the appearing object (the mental
representation of the idea).
In conceptual cognition, then, ideas are not the appearing objects, although they
appear. As static universals imputed on the mental aspects that reflect and represent
them, ideas are merely confused with the aspects.
In imagining an orange, for example, a mental representation of a
commonsense orange is confused with the idea of a commonsense orange. In
our minds, we cognize a mental aspect that represents a commonsense orange
and confuse it to be a commonsense orange, which is merely a concept.
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Since mental aspects and mental reflections (representations) are equivalent terms,
Therefore, just as mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena, mental
reflections are also exclusively nonstatic phenomena, whether in
nonconceptual or conceptual cognition.
Thus, mental representations in conceptual cognition are themselves nonstaticindividual items, although they reflect and represent static universals as their
contents.
Since cognitively taken objects are defined as the direct causes of the cognitions of
them and since conceptual cognitions do not have external objective entities present
as their direct causes, conceptual cognitions do not have cognitively taken objects.
Thus, appearing objects are not synonymous with cognitively taken objects.
Universals in Reference to Conventional Objects
In the most general terms, a universal (spyi) is a phenomenon shared in common by
the individuals (bye-brag) on which it is imputed.
Among universals, we may differentiate:
universals in reference to conventional objects,
universals in reference to language.
In reference to conventional objects, there are three main types of universals:
1. collection universals (tshogs-spyi),
2. kind universals (rigs-spyi),
3. object universals (don-spyi).
(1) Collection universals are wholes imputed on spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal
parts. Consider the example of "a table." "A table," as a whole item, can be imputed
on
a collection of patches of colored shapes, a collection of tactile sensations of variously shaped surfaces,
a collection of the previous two collections,
a collection of legs and a flat surface,
a collection of molecules,
a collection of moments of any or all of the previous collections.
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A whole is a universal because it can be imputed on any of the above collections of
parts.
Because collection universals extend over time, they are also called vertical
universals (gong-mai spyi).
(2)Kind universals are the type of phenomenon that a specific individual item is an
instance of, such as "a table" imputed on a specific instance of something having legs
and a flat surface.
Similar items of varying design and individual items of the same design may
be instances of the kind universal table.
In other words, a kind universal specifies the conventional identity of
something.
Because kind universals extend over instances of them, they are also called horizontal
universals (thad-kai spyi).
(3) Object universals are the concepts (ideas) of commonsense objects used when
thinking of, imagining (visualizing), or remembering commonsense objects.
Gelug
A universal is defined as an individual set, category, or whole imputed on a collection
of subsets, individual members of a set, individual instances of a category, or
individual parts.
There are two ontological types of universals:
1. universals that are functional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba),
2. universals that are nonfunctional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba ma-yin-pa).
Functional phenomena (dngos-po) are synonymous with nonstatic phenomena.
Nonfunctional phenomena (dngos-med) are synonymous with static phenomena.
(1) Let us call universals that are functional phenomena "nonstatic universals"
(nonstatic abstractions). They may be cognized either nonconceptually or
conceptually. They include:
collection universals,
kind universals.
Since collection and kind universals are nonstatic phenomena, they appear in sensory
nonconceptual cognition as part of the focal objects (equivalent to the mental aspects,
appearing objects, and cognitively taken objects). When ascertained, they may also be
the involved objects explicitly apprehended by the sensory nonconceptual cognition
of them.
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Thus, when we see a collection of parts, we also see the whole that they comprise and
the type of phenomenon that the whole is (its conventional identity). For example,
when we see the legs and flat surface of a table or the shape and color of a table, these
parts simultaneously also appear as a whole item and as a table.
(2) We shall call universals that are nonfunctional phenomena "static universals"(static abstractions). They are cognized only conceptually. They include:
object universals.
Non-Gelug
A universal is defined as a mentally constructed synthesis (spros-pa, mental
fabrication) of individual items.
All universals are nonfunctional (static) phenomena.
Collection and kind universals are subcategories of object universals.
Because collection universals and kind universals are static phenomena, they do not
appear in sensory nonconceptual cognition. They appear only in conceptual cognition.
This is consistent with the assertion that sensory nonconceptual cognition does not
decisively determine its object as a "this" or a "that."
Consider the example of seeing something.
In moment one (the moment immediately preceding the moment when theseeing of something actually takes place), a moment of an external patch of
colored shape occurs. This external objective entity is the indirectly cognized
focal object and cognitively taken object of the seeing.
In moment two (the moment when the seeing actually occurs), a mental aspect
representing the previous moment of the patch of colored shape arises. The
previous moment of the patch of colored shape no longer exists. This
"internal" objective entity is the directly cognized appearing object and the
involved object. The mental representation appears merely as a patch of
colored shape. It does not appear as a whole commonsense object, let alone
one that is an instance of "this" or "that" for example as "a table."
In moment three (the moment of conceptual cognition immediately following
the nonconceptual seeing), a mental representation of a whole commonsense
item with the conventional identity a table occurs, as a mental synthesis. The
mental representation is the appearing object of the conceptual cognition of
the table. The metaphysical entity table that it represents is the involved
object.
Cognizing a sentence as a whole (based on hearing the sound of only one consonant
or vowel at a time) and cognizing the motion of something (based on seeing some
item in only one position and location at a time) are similarly conceptual processes.
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Some non-Gelug scholars, such as Shakya-chogden, assert that the mental aspects that
appear in visual nonconceptual cognition are mental representations of only a moment
of a collection of molecules. The cognitive appearance of even shapes and colors
occurs only in conceptual cognition.
Conceptual Cognition with Object Universals
Gelug
Object universals are the semitransparent appearing objects in conceptual cognition
that appear to be objects, but are merely superimposed on and confused with cognitive
appearances of involved objects (external objective entities).
Consider the example of the nonverbal conceptual cognition of a form of physical
phenomenon, such as thinking of the sight, smell, taste, or physical sensation of an
external commonsense object, such as an orange.
An appearance arises of:
a specific set of sensibilia of the external commonsense object,
the nonstatic collection universal of the sensibilia constituting a whole object,
the nonstatic kind universal of the sense data constituting "this" kind of object,
and not "that" kind an orange, not an apple.
The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the
specific set of sensibilia, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognitionassumes.
The semitransparent appearing object (idea) with which the totally transparent mental
aspect is mixed is an object universal, as in the case of imagining or remembering an
orange, without associating the word orange with what mentally appears.
In the case of imagining an orange, an appearance of a specific commonsense
orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of that orange and is mixed
with the semitransparent object universal oranges in general, which the
appearance is taken to represent.
In the case of remembering a specific commonsense orange, an appearance of
that orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of the orange and is
mixed with the semitransparent object universal a specific "public" orange. A
specific public orange is one that anyone could have seen from any angle
when we saw that specific commonsense orange. The appearance of the
specific commonsense orange may also be mixed with the semitransparent
object universal the specific commonsense orange whether seen, smelled,
tasted, or touched.
Non-Gelug
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Object universals appear in conceptual cognitions in which the appearing objects are
opaque mental representations of commonsense objects. They are superimposed on
and confused with the involved objects (the metaphysical commonsense objects that
are reflected as the contents of the mental representations).
Consider once more the nonverbal conceptual cognition of the sight of an orange.This may occur immediately after seeing a moment of an external spherical patch of
orange color, or later imagining or remembering a commonsense orange.
An opaque mental aspect representing a commonsense orange appears. This mental
representation is the appearing object. A moment of a specific external spherical patch
of orange color is not even indirectly cognized.
The mental aspect that appears is confused with the object universals imputed on it.
The mentally fabricated and projected object universals with which the mental
reflection (of a commonsense orange) is identified are:
a whole object with temporal continuity,
a "real" commonsense orange,
either oranges in general or a specific "public" orange visible to anyone.
Universals in Reference to Language
In reference to language, there are two main types of universals:
term universals (sgra-spyi, audio ideas), meaning universals (don-spyi, meaningful ideas).
Term universals are universals adopted as conventions (tha-snyad) in a particular
language by the members of a specific society. As words themselves, such as "table,"
and not the sounds of words (which are kind universals), they are universals also in
the sense that they are imputable on sounds made in a variety of voices, pitches,
volumes, and pronunciations. Term universals by themselves do not have any
meanings associated with them.
Meaning universals are the meanings or significance of sounds or of written
representations of sounds. Meanings do not exist inherently within sounds or withintheir written representations, but are merely conventions coined, assigned to sounds or
to their written representations, and used as universals by the members of a specific
society. The same sound can mean "to," "too," or "two" in English or "you" in
mispronounced French. The same written representation of a sound, for instance
"bear," can mean "a large furry mammal" or "to endure something." Moreover, each
person in a particular society may assign a slightly different meaning to a specific
word, but still use that meaning as a universal when thinking that word.
Meaning universals are logical isolates (ldog-pa, distinguishers). The meaning "x" of
a particular communicative sound (word) is what remains upon the logical isolation
(elimination) of all "non-x" meanings. This formulation follows from the assertion
that a meaning "x" does not exist inherently within a sound.
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Further, the logical isolation of a meaning universal is not a deliberate mental
procedure that directly excludes all "non-x" meanings. The conceptual process of
thinking with logical isolates occurs naturally, based on holding the dualistic view
that logically divides all phenomena into "x" and "non-x."
Gelug
In verbal conceptual cognition, a cognitive appearance of the sound of a conventional
word (an objective entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed
may be:
merely a term universal, as in the case of thinking the word voidness without
having any idea of what it means,
both a term universal and a meaning universal, as in the case of thinking the
word voidness together with a meaning associated with the word, even if that
meaning is inaccurate.
In preverbal conceptual cognition, an appearance of a form of physical phenomenon,
such as a mental sight, sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation, may arise. The idea
with which it is mixed is:
merely a meaning universal, as in the case of a preverbal baby conceiving of
someone as its mother when it misses her and cries. Although the baby does
not yet know the word mother, it conceives of the meaning of the term
universal mother. This meaning universal is fit (rung) to be applied to the term
universal motherwhen the baby learns the word mother.
Non-Gelug
In verbal conceptual thinking, a cognitive appearance of a conventional word (a
metaphysical entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed
includes both:
a term universal and
a meaning universal.
Conceptual thought related to language does not occur with only a term universal or
only a meaning universal. It always occurs with a combination of the two.
Conceptual Cognition with Meaning Universals
Gelug
Consider the example of verbally thinking orange.
An appearance arises of:
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the sounds of the vowels and consonants audible during the sequence of
moments required to hear the sound of the entire word orange,
the nonstatic collection universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonants
constituting a whole word,
the nonstatic kind universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonantsconstituting the sound of "this" word, and not "that" word the sound of
"orange," not of "arrange."
The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the
specific set of sounds, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognition
assumes.
The semitransparent appearing objects (ideas) imputed on the totally transparent
mental aspect that appears and with which the mental aspect is mixed and confused
are:
the term universal orange, as an actual word,
the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.
Non-Gelug
In the example of verbally thinking orange, the appearing object is:
an opaque mental representation of the sound of the word orange (a
metaphysical entity).
This appearing object is mixed and confused with the following universals (ideas) that
are imputed on it and which appear:
the term universal orange, as an actual word,
the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies, which is equivalent
to the object universal a commonsense orange.
Conceptualized Objects
Conceptualized objects (zhen-yul, conceived objects, implied objects) are, literally,the objects on which concepts or ideas cling. They are phenomena exclusively of
conceptual cognition. Nonconceptual cognition does not have conceptualized objects.
Gelug
Consider further the conceptual cognition that verbally thinks orange, analyzed in the
previous section.
If the conceptual cognition apprehends only the sound of the word orange, the
external sound of the commonsense word orange is the involved object.
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The appearing objects are the semitransparent ideas of the term universal orange and
of the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.
The conceptualized object of the term universal is the external sound of the
commonsense word orange (the involved object). The conceptualized object of the
meaning universal is the external commonsense orange.
In the case of the conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends the bare tabletop
and implicitly apprehends the absence of a vase there, both the external bare tabletop
and the external absence of a vase there are the conceptualized objects.
Non-Gelug
In the conceptual cognition of verbally thinking orange, analyzed in the previous
section, the appearing object is an opaque mental representation of the sound of the
entire word orange.
The term universal orange and the meaning/object universal of what the word orange
signifies appear (arise in the cognition) as the involved objects.
Since verbal conceptual cognition always involves both term and meaning/object
universals, such cognition always has two conceptualized objects:
the object conceptualized as a signifier (zhen-pai brjod-byed),
the conceptualized object signified (zhen-pai brjod-bya).
They must be differentiated from
the object that is the actual signifier (dngos-kyi brjod-byed),
the object actually signified (dngos-kyi brjod-bya).
The object that is the actual signifierof the commonsense orange is the term universal
orange (the involved object, a conventional word). The objects conceptualized as the
signifiers of the commonsense orange are the external momentary sounds of vowels
and consonants, as heard one by one.
The object actually signifiedby the mental representation of a commonsense orange isthe meaning/object universal of a commonsense orange (the involved object). The
conceptualized object signifiedis a moment of external sensibilia, such as a spherical
patch of orange color.
Summary of Conceptual Cognition in Chart Form
Gelug
External Object Mental Aspect Metaphysical Entities
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Fully transparent
Partially
transparent
reflection
Commonsense object,
Conventional identity,Spatial & temporal
parts
Commonsense object
Conventional identity,Spatial & temporal
parts
Term universals,
meaning andobject universals
An absence of
something
Appears, Partly veiled Appears, Partly veiled Appearing object Does not
appear
Cognitively taken
object
Focal object
Involved object Involved object Involved object of
only the reflexiveawareness of the
conceptual
cognition
Involved
object
Explicitly apprehended Implicitly
apprehended only
by reflexive
awareness
Implicitly
apprehended
Decisively determined
as an instance of these
universals
Decisively determined
as an instance of these
universals
Decisively
determined
implicitly byreflexive
awareness as
"these" universals
Decisively
determined as
an absence of"this"
Conceptualized object Mistaken for the
conceptualized
object
Non-Gelug
External Object Mental Aspect
(= Focal Aspect)
Metaphysical Entities
Opaque
A moment of sensibilia Nonstatic representation
of a commonsense
object
Commonsense object
(as an object universal),
Term & meaning universals
Does not appear Appearing object,
Partly veiled
Appears
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No cognitively taken
object
No focal object
Not involved Involved object
Decisively determined as an
instance of "these" universals
Object conceptualized as
the signifier and
conceptualized object
signified
Object that is the actual
signifier and object actually
signified, mistaken for the
object conceptualized as the
signifier and the concep-
tualized object signified