Berzin Alex - Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition

7/28/2019 Berzin Alex - Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition

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Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition:Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations

in Alternating Order

1 Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects

Historical Introduction

The Buddhist teachings on cognition theory and logic derive from the works of the

late fifth-century Indian master Dignaga and of Dharmakirti, the late-sixth century

disciple of his disciple. Dignaga wroteAn Anthology on Valid Cognition (Tshad-ma

kun-btus, Skt.Pramanasamuccaya); Dharmakirti defended it against non-Buddhist

Indian theories in his Commentary on Valid Cognition (Tshad-ma rnam-grel, Skt:

Pramanavarttika).

The various Indian schools of Buddhist tenets (grub-mtha) differ slightly in their

explanations of cognition. Dignaga is the source of the Sautrantika position.

Dharmakirti presented mostly the Sautrantika view, but frequently supplemented it

with the Chittamatra explanation. Some later masters interpreted Dharmakirti in the

light of Madhyamaka.

The Tibetan traditions take the Sautrantika explanation as a basis and then refine it

with the explanations of the more sophisticated tenet systems. Accordingly, we shall

look here at some points regarding the Sautrantika system of cognition and

supplement them with explanations from other systems when they significantly differ.

At first, the Tibetans emphasized study of Dignagas works alone, under the influence

of Atisha, the early eleventh-century Indian master from whom the Kadam tradition

derives. In the late eleventh-century, the Kadam master Ngog Lotsawa (rNgogs Lo-

tsa-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab) shifted the emphasis to the works of Dharmakirti, thus

establishing the new epistemology system (tshad-ma gsar-ma). The thirteenth-century

Kadam master Chapa (Phyva-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge), the founder of the Tibetan style

of debate and the study of collected topics (bsdus-grwa, "dura"), elaborated on the

new system. His interpretations are known as the Chapa-tradition (phyva-lugs).

Chapas contemporary, the Sakya master Sakya Pandita (Sa-skya Pandi-ta), refutedmany of Chapas interpretations of Dharmakirti, based on his study of Sanskrit and of

the works of Dharmakirti in their original language, with the Indian master Shakya

Shribhadra. His interpretations form the Sapan-tradition (sa-lugs).

Although all four Tibetan traditions claim as their authority Sakya Panditas

commentaries on cognition theory, the Gelug school follows more closely Chapas

interpretations. The Nyingma and Kagyu schools follow closely the mainstream

Sakya explanation of Sapans works. Therefore, we may roughly divide the Tibetan

explanations of cognition theory into the Gelug and the non-Gelug presentations.

Further, various Tibetan masters also explain differently many assertions of each of


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the four Indian schools of tenets. Their explanations also fall broadly into the two

divisions: Gelug and non-Gelug.

Neither Gelug nor non-Gelug, however, presents a uniform explanation of cognition

theory. Several masters within each camp have explained specific points slightly

differently in their commentaries. Here, as a foundation for more advanced study, weshall present an overview of the two general positions regarding the main points. For

each point, we shall present the assertions shared in common and then the two

positions in an alternating fashion. We shall use the explanations given primarily by

the late eighteenth-century master Akya Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-dzin dByangs-can

dga-bai blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This explanation accords with the

monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the sixteenth-century master Jetsun Chokyi-

gyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and

Ganden Jangtsey (dGa-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries. To represent the non-Gelug

position, we shall rely primarily on the explanations given by the fifteenth-century

Sakya master Gorampa (Go-ram bSod-nams seng-ge).

Cognitive Objects and Sensibilia

Cognitions (shes-pa) have numerous cognitive objects (yul) objects known in some

cognitive manner. Among them are sensibilia and commonsense objects.

Sensibilia are the forms of physical phenomena (gzugs) that, in one moment, occupy

an extended location (yul), and which are cognized by a sensory consciousness. As

objects well known in the philosophical treatises (bstan-bcos-la grags-pa), sensibilia

are thus the smallest spatial units of physical phenomena that are perceptible by the

senses in one moment.

Each "patch" of sensibilia occupies an extended location in the sense that it spatially

extends over a collection of "molecules" (dus-pai rdul-phran) specific to its class of

cognitive stimulator (skye-mched). Molecules, in turn, are aggregations of substantial

particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran).

There are four classes of sensibilia:

sights (patches of colored shapes),

smells,

tastes,

tactile or physical sensations.

Since sounds do not have spatial extension over a collection of molecules of similar

class (rigs-mthun), sounds are not included as sensibilia.

Commonsense Objects and Conventional Objects of Experience

What is a commonsense orange? Is it a sight that we see, a fragrance that we smell, a

flavor that we taste, or a tactile sensation that we feel when we hold one in our hands?


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As an object well known in the world (jig-rten-la grags-pa), a commonsense orange

is an item that extends over the locations of all four classes of sensibilia.

Moreover, although, as a nonstatic (mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) object, an orange

changes from moment to moment, a commonsense orange does not exist for just an

instant: it endures over time.

Commonsense objects are equivalent to conventional objects of experience (tha-

snyad spyod-yul) objects of ordinary experience to which the conventions of words

or concepts (rtog-pa) refer. Thus, commonsense objects have conventional identities

(rang-gi ngo-bo dzin-pa) in that they are distinguishable from each other, such as a

specific item being an orange and not a table.

Since certain items, such as a liquid, may be experienced as water by humans, pus by

clutching ghosts (hungry ghosts), and nectar by divine beings (gods), the qualification

needs to be added that commonsense objects have conventional identities established

as valid only in relation to certain groups of beings.

Knowable Phenomena and Comprehensible Objects

Knowable phenomena (shes-bya), also called comprehensible objects (gzhal-bya), are

cognitive objects that can be known by valid cognition (tshad-ma). They include all

existent objects or phenomena.

More specifically, knowable phenomena include

objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically characterized phenomena),

metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena).

Objective Entities and Metaphysical Entities General Characteristics

In the Sautrantika system, objective entities are truly existent (bden-par grub-pa,

real). In this system of tenets, truly existentmeans knowable to valid nonconceptual

cognition (rtog-med).

Note that

sensory cognition (dbang-shes) is always nonconceptual;

mental cognition (yid-shes) may be either nonconceptual or conceptual (rtog-

bcas);

conceptual cognition is always mental.

Nonconceptual cognition may also be bare cognition of reflexive awareness (rang-rig

mngon-sum) and yogic bare cognition (rnal-byor mngon-sum).


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Reflexive awareness (rang-rig, self-awareness) accompanies each moment of

cognition and takes the cognition that it accompanies as its object, allowing

later recollection (dran-shes) of it.

Yogic bare cognition is of subtle impermanence or of an individual beings

lack of existing with an impossible identity (gang-zag-gi bdag-med,identitylessness of a person, selflessness of a person).

For the sake of simplicity, we shall restrict our discussion of nonconceptual cognition

here to only its sensory form. Thus, objective entities can be seen, heard, smelled,

tasted, or physically sensed.

Metaphysical entities are falsely existent (rdzun-par grub-pa, unreal), which means

imputedly existent (rtog-pas btags-tsam-gyis grub-pa). In the Sautrantika system,

imputedly existentmeans knowable to the valid conceptual cognition that imputes

them on the basis of objective entities. They cannot be known by nonconceptual

cognition. In other words, metaphysical entities cannot actually be seen or heard; theycan only be thought or imagined. Thus, although metaphysical entities exist, they are

not as "real" as objective entities are.

Gelug

Objective entities are truly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible (dngos-

su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition in other words, a mental aspect (rnam-pa)

resembling them can appear in a nonconceptual cognition of them. The mental aspect

that appears is simply a reflection of the object and of what it is.

This means that objective entities can be cognized without mental construction

meaning without adding anything to the object beyond its being the sum of

its parts and its holding its own essential nature as a "this" and not a "that"

(rang-gi ngo-bo dzin-pa).

The qualifierexplicitly needs to be added because metaphysical entities can be

implicitly apprehended (shugs-su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition.

Metaphysical entities are imputedly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible

only to valid conceptual cognition.

Explicit and implicit apprehension of an object will be explained in more detail

below.

Non-Gelug

Truly existent objects are knowable only to valid nonconceptual cognition. Imputedly

existent objects are knowable only to valid conceptual cognition.

Objective and Metaphysical Entities Specific Presentation

Gelug


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Objective entities include all nonstatic phenomena namely, those phenomena that

are capable of performing a function (don-byed nus-pa).

Nonstatic phenomena include:

forms of physical phenomena (gzugs), ways of being aware of something (shes-pa),

nonconcomitant affecting variables (ldan-min du-byed, nonassociated

compositional factors), such as impermanence.

Impermanence is the nonendurance of an item for a second moment.

Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. They include:

commonsense objects, such as oranges and tables,

their conventional identities as "this" and not "that,"

the sensibilia that comprise commonsense objects,

the molecules and moments over which the commonsense objects and their

sensibilia extend,

the moments over which commonsense sounds extend.

Dharmakirti specified objective entities as those phenomena that are determinate

(nges-pa) or unmixed (ma-dres-pa) in terms of spatial location (yul), temporallocation (dus), and essential nature as an individual (ngo-bo).

Spatially determinate means that the western portion of an object does not

exist in the east.

Temporally determinate means that something that exists in the morning has a

definite end, for instance when it ceases to exist in the evening.

Being individual by essential nature means that something is distinguishable

from other objects.

Thus, beingunmixedmeans being not mixed up with or indistinguishable fromsomething else.

Since these three criteria can apply both to nonstatic and static (rtag-pa, permanent)

phenomena, they cannot be intended as a strict definition of objective entities.

Dharmakirti used them only as criteria for refuting the non-Buddhist Nyaya view of

universals as indivisible entities inhering equally in all their instances.

Metaphysical entities include all static phenomena phenomena that do not change

from moment to moment namely, those phenomena that are incapable of performing

functions.

Static phenomena include:


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the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are

instances,

the absence of a vase imputed on a bare tabletop.

Non-Gelug

Objective entities arespecifically characterized phenomena. They include all

individual items (bye-brag).

Individual items, as Dharmakirti defined them, are those phenomena that are

determinate or unmixed in terms of spatial location, temporal location, and essential

nature as an individual.

Spatial location means situated in a specific perceptible unit of spatial

location.

Temporal location means situated in a specific unit (a moment) of temporal

location.

Being individual by essential nature means that the items do not require

mental construction from the synthesis of other items, such as spatial units of

different sensibilia, temporal parts, or other individual items resembling them.

Thus, being unmixedmeans not being mentally constructed from the synthesis

of other items.

Individual items include all nonstatic phenomena:

moments of forms of physical phenomena namely, moments of sensibilia

and of sound,

moments of ways of being aware of something,

moments of nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as impermanence.

Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. In this category,

individual items, then, refer only to:

moments of collections of perceptible units of specific types of sensibilia, suchas a collection of patches of colored shapes comprising a sight,

moments of the collections of molecules over which specific types of

sensibilia extend,

moments of sounds.

These are the only things that we actually see, hear, smell, taste, or physically sense.

Metaphysical entities aregenerally characterized phenomena. They include all

universals (spyi).


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Universals are those phenomena that are shared (thun-mong-ba) by other phenomena:

they "go together" (rjes-gro) with them. They do not have determinate spatial

locations, temporal locations, or essential natures as individual items. They are not

simply collections of individual items. Universals are mentally (conceptually)

constructed (spros-pa, fabricated) by a synthesis of individual items that are instances

of them, or by a synthesis of the spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal parts on whichthey are imputed.

Thus, universals include:

the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are

instances,

a commonsense orange, as a mental synthesis of the individual sensibilia of

sight, smell, taste, and physical sensation,

the sight of a commonsense orange (and not simply just a sight), as a mental

synthesis of a collection of patches of colored shapes,

a commonsense orange, as a mental synthesis of a succession of individual

moments of either of the above two universals,

a conventional identity as "an orange" imputed on any of the above three

universals.

Therefore, although commonsense objects exist, they are merely metaphysical

entities, not objectively real. They can be validly known only by the conceptual

cognition that mentally constructs and imputes them on the individual items of whichthey are a synthesis.

Involved Objects and Objects Existing as Cognitively Taken

The involved object(jug-yul, engaged object, object of application) of a cognition is

the main object with which a particular cognition involves itself (jug-pa, engages,

cognitively enters).

The involved object is equivalent to the object existing as cognitively taken (dzin-

stangs-kyi yul).

Gelug

The involved object in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition is a

commonsense object, for example a table, and those nonstatic features (yon-tan,

qualities) of the table with which the cognition is actually involved. It is not possible

for some feature of a commonsense object, such as the shape of a table, to be the

involved object of a cognition unless that cognition also takes as its involved object

the commonsense object of which that feature is a quality.

The nonstatic features may be:

sensibilia of the table, such as its sight or tactile sensation,


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the impermanence of the table,

the table as a table,

the table as an instance of the universal table.

Thus, only objective entities are the involved objects of either nonconceptual or

conceptual cognition.

This statement, however, needs qualification.

Such metaphysical entities as the absence of a vase on the table are also

involved objects when implicitly apprehended by a sensory nonconceptual

cognition or a conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends a bare tabletop.

Such a metaphysical entity, however, is not the primary involved object of that

sensory or conceptual cognition.

Although such metaphysical entities as the universal table are not the involved

objects (either explicitly or implicitly apprehended) of a conceptual cognition

that takes a commonsense table as its involved object, nevertheless they are

the involved objects of the nonconceptual bare cognition of reflexive

awareness that accompanies that conceptual cognition.

Non-Gelug

The involved object in nonconceptual cognition is:

a moment of sensibilia,

or a moment of sound.

The involved objects in a conceptual cognition are:

a commonsense object, for example a table,

such metaphysical features of the table as:

the table as a table,

the table as an instance of the universal table,

the table as an instance of what the word table signifies.

Thus,

objective entities are the involved objects of only nonconceptual cognition,

metaphysical entities are the involved objects of only conceptual cognition.


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2 Distinctions in Terms of Ways of Cognizing

Decisive Determination and Apprehension of an Involved Object

Apprehension (rtogs-pa, understanding) decisively determines (nges-pa, ascertains)its involved object correctly by decisively cutting it from incorrect interpolations that

it is "that" (sgro-dogs bcad-pa). Thus, in correctly identifying its involved object, it

induces immediate certainty of that object, such that recollection of the involved

object can later occur.

Gelug

Both valid nonconceptual and valid conceptual cognitions apprehend their involved

objects, decisively determining them as "this."

In other words, when we apprehend a commonsense table by either validly seeing orthinking of it, we experience the table (the involved object) as a table and we can

correctly remember later that we experienced the table as a table. We do not

experience the table as an orange; nor do we validly remember that we experienced

the table as an orange.

This assertion follows from the facts that

both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions cognize commonsense objects,

valid cognition experiences commonsense objects as having their valid

conventional identities.

In an episode of nonconceptual cognition of an involved object, however, the last

moment is a nondetermining cognition of what appears (snang-la ma-nges-pa,

inattentive perception). An object still appears, but is no longer decisively determined

as "this" and not "that."

Except in the case of aryas total absorption (mnyam-bzhag) on voidness, any single

moment of nonconceptual cognition, by itself, is a nondetermining cognition of what

appears. This is because a single moment (one sixty-fifth of the time of a finger-snap)

is too short for decisively determining what appears. A sequence of moments of

nonconceptual cognition is required to establish apprehension and, thus, each moment

within the context of the sequence is considered an apprehension.

Decisive determination of an object does not entail cognition of a static universal

imputed on the involved object, such as a word or name (sgra) or a significance (don),

of which the object is an individual instance. Such imputation occurs exclusively in

conceptual cognition of an object.

Thus, when we bump into a table in the dark, although we experience the table as a

table, and not as an orange, we may not necessarily think the word table or think that

what we experienced is an instance of what the word table means. In other words, we

experience the item as a table, but may not necessarily know that it is a table.


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Non-Gelug

Nonconceptual cognition does not apprehend (identify) its involved object. It merely

cognitively takes hold of (dzin-pa) (reflects) its involved object.

Decisive determination (ascertainment) of an involved object, that it is "this" and not"that," occurs only with a conceptual cognition that immediately follows.

Consequently, nonconceptual mental cognition is a nondeterminating cognition of

what appears (inattentive perception). Only conceptual cognition apprehends its

involved object.

Obvious, Obscure, and Extremely Obscure Objects

An involved object is obvious (mngon-gyur-ba) if it can be cognized by valid sensory

nonconceptual cognition (dbang-mngon tshad-ma). Obvious objects may be any

objective entity, which is synonymous with any nonstatic phenomenon, any functional

phenomenon, and any truly existent phenomenon.

An involved object is obscure (lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized by a valid

inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma) that relies on a line of reasoning (rtags) or

on renown (grags). All inferential cognition is conceptual. Obscure objects may be

any validly knowable phenomena, which is synonymous with any objective or

metaphysical entity, any nonstatic or static phenomenon, any functional or

nonfunctional phenomenon, and any truly eixstent or imputedly existent phenomenon.

An involved object is extremely obscure (shin-tu lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized

by a valid inferential cognition that relies on conviction (yid-ches). Conviction, here,is that someone is a valid source of information (skyes-bu tshad-ma) and therefore

that any information that this person gives is correct. Extremely obscure objects may

also be any validly knowable phenomenon.

Gelug

For example, the presence of smoke (a commonsense object with spatial and temporal

extension) rising from the chimney of a house on a mountain is obvious because it can

be seen.

The presence of fire in the house on the mountain is obscure: it is not visible.Nevertheless, it can be validly known inferentially by relying on the line of reasoning,

"where there is smoke, there is fire."

The name of the person living in the house on the mountain is extremely obscure: it

cannot be known through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known

by relying on someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date

data bank and inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information

must be correct.

The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all objective entities. The only

difference is that the smoke is obvious, the fire is obscure, and the name of the personis extremely obscure.


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Non-Gelug

For example, in what is conventionally considered seeing smoke rising from the

chimney of a house on a mountain, moments of slightly different gray-colored shapes

are obvious, because they can be seen.

The presence of both smoke and fire is obscure: neither can be directly seen.

The presence of smoke can be validly known inferentially by relying on

renown that the application of the universalsmoke on a mental representation

of smoke mentally constructed from a succession of slightly different gray

shapes is a correct application of a term.

The presence of fire can be validly known by relying on a valid line of

reasoning, "where there is smoke, there is fire."

The name of the person living in the house is extremely obscure: it cannot be known

through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known by relying on

someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date data bank and

inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information must be correct.

Only the moments of slightly different gray-colored shapes are objective entities, and

they are obvious. The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all metaphysical

entities. The first two are obscure and the third is extremely obscure.

Clarity, Awareness, and Mental Activity (Mind)

In cognizing an involved object whether obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure a

cognition gives rise (char-ba,shar-ba) to a cognitive appearance (snang-ba) of

something simultaneously with cognitively engaging (jug-pa, cognitively involving

itself) with it.

Giving rise to a cognitive appearance of something simultaneously with cognitively

engaging with it are, respectively, the defining characteristics ofmaking something

cognitively clear(gsal, cognitively revealing something, clarity) and making an

awareness of something(rig, awareness).

The mere making of something cognitively clear and the mere making an awarenessof something (gsal-rig tsam) are, in turn, the defining characteristics ofmental

activity (sems, mind).

The word mere indicates that mental activity occurs without a "me" or a "mind"

existing as an independent entity, separate from the mental activity, and serving as the

agent that is making the activity happen. In fact, in any action, mental or physical,

there is no such thing as an agent existing as an unaffected (dus ma-byas, static,

permanent), monolithic (gcig, one), separa y independently of the action, either

making the action happen or observing it occur.

Making something cognitively clear does not require it being clear in the sense of itbeing in focus. The appearance of a blur may also cognitively arise.


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Making an awareness of something does not require the awareness being conscious.

Nor does it necessarily entail knowing the identity of what becomes cognitively

apparent. A cognition may be subconscious (bag-la nyal) and may lack cognitive

certainty (nges-pa).

Explicit and Implicit Apprehension

Gelug

Apprehension of an involved object, in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition,

may be

explicit apprehension (dngos-su rtogs-pa),

implicit apprehension (shugs-su rtogs-pa)

In explicit apprehension of an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved

object itself arises. Only obvious phenomena (nonstatic phenomena, objective

entities) may be explicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.

This is the case only with unenlightened beings.

In the case of Buddhas, obscure and extremely obscure objective entities may

also be explicitly apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness

(rnam-mkhyen).

Any phenomenon obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure; nonstatic or static;

objective or metaphysical may be explicitly apprehended by valid inferential(conceptual) cognition.

In implicit apprehension of an involved object, only a cognitive appearance of the

basis for imputation (gdags-gzhi) of the involved object arises, but not a cognitive

appearance of the involved object itself. Only metaphysical entities (static

phenomena) may be implicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.

In the case of ordinary beings, only some metaphysical entities may be

implicitly apprehended by any specific type of valid bare nonconceptual

cognition.

In the case of Buddhas, all metaphysical entities may be implicitly

apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness.

Either metaphysical or objective entities may be implicitly apprehended by valid

inferential cognition.

Consider the case of visual nonconceptual cognition. When explicitly apprehending

the sight of a bare tabletop, for example, the visual cognition simultaneously can

implicitly apprehend the absence of a vase on the tabletop.

Both the tabletop and the absence of the vase are the involved objects of the

visual cognition.


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However, only the bare tabletop appears.

The absence of a vase does not actually appear, but is decisively determined

by cutting off interpolations, for instance that there is an absence of an orange

there.

Non-Gelug

There is no such thing as implicit apprehension, either in nonconceptual or conceptual

cognition, in which a metaphysical entity is decisively determined without a cognitive

appearance of it arising. In decisively determining (apprehending) a metaphysical

entity as an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself

always arises.

This only occurs in conceptual cognition and does not bear the technical term

explicit apprehension.

3 Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects in Nonconceptual Cognition

The cognitive appearance to which nonconceptual or conceptual cognition gives rise

is called a mental aspect(rnam-pa). Let us initially restrict our examination to only

the mental aspects that arise in nonconceptual cognition. We shall analyze the case of

conceptual cognition in a later section.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, an external object (phyi-don) casts (gtod) a

mental aspect of itself on the sensory consciousness that cognizes it.

An external objectis one that exists prior to the cognition of it and functions

as the natal source (rdzas) of the mental aspect that arises in its cognition.

A natal source of something is what produces it, like the potters wheel for a

clay pot or an oven for a baked bread.

The mental aspect may be the mental semblance of a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,

or a physical sensation. It is a mental semblance, however, of only the objective

entities that the specific sense consciousness can cognize. Visual consciousness, for

example, cannot take on the mental aspect of a sound or a taste.

Moreover, in cognizing an external object, a cognition gives rise only to a mental

aspect resembling the external object. It does not give rise to the external object itself.

According to the Chittamatra (mind-only) tenet system, there are no such things as

external objects. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that arises

comes from the same natal source as the sensory consciousness of it namely, both


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come from the same karmic tendency (sa-bon, karmic seed) as their common natal

source.

According to the Vaibhashika system, sensory nonconceptual cognition directly

contacts and cognizes external objects, without giving rise to a mental aspect

resembling them.

Gelug

The external object that casts an impression on a sensory consciousness of it is a

commonsense object as an objective entity.

Consider the example of sensory nonconceptual cognition of a table, such as

seeing a table or feeling a table with our hands. Like a mental impression, the

mental aspect of a table that appears in the sensory cognition resembles the

external commonsense table in all the nonstatic features that are explicitly

apprehensible by the sensory consciousness that assumes that mental aspect.

Sensory nonconceptual cognition can explicitly apprehend only forms of physical

phenomena specific to it and nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as

impermanence. Although sensory nonconceptual cognition can implicitly apprehend

metaphysical entities such as the absence of a vase, it cannot assume the mental

aspect of them.

For example, in seeing a table, the table casts a mental aspect on the visual

consciousness that sees it. The mental aspect resembles not only the form and

color of the table, and the table itself, but also its impermanence, becausevisual consciousness can also "see" the impermanence of a table when it

collapses.

Visual cognition of a collapsing table may decisively determine either the

sight of the collapsing table or the impermanence of the table, depending on

what it decisively determines concerning its mental aspect. Only what the

cognition decisively determines of its mental aspect is the involved object of

that cognition.

Thus, not all the features or qualities of the mental aspect that appears in a

sensory cognition are necessarily its involved objects. Only those qualities that

the sensory cognition apprehends are its involved objects and only thosequalities are decisively determined. Others may be indecisively determined,

although they appear (snang-la ma-nges-pa). They are not involved objects

and are not apprehended.

A table without a vase on it casts on the visual consciousness that sees it the

mental aspect not only of a table but also of a table without a vase on it. The

visual cognition may explicitly apprehend the table and the colored shape of

the table. It may see a table without a vase on it even if it does not decisively

determine that there is no vase on it. If it decisively determines the absence of

a vase on the table without a vase on it, it apprehends that absence of a vase on

it only implicitly.

Non-Gelug


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The external object that casts an impression (a mental aspect) on sensory

consciousness of it is a moment of sensibilia, such as a moment of colored shapes, or

a moment of sound. Only such individual items are objective external entities.

According to a minority position within the non-Gelug camp, as represented

by the fifteenth-century Sakya master Shakya-chogden (gSer-mdog Pan-chenSha-kya mchog-ldan), the external object that casts a mental aspect here is a

moment merely of molecules. Only moments of molecules are objective

entities, not moments of sensibilia. Sensibilia are metaphysical entities.

Since sensory nonconceptual cognition does not decisively determine anything about

its object, the mental aspect that appears to sensory nonconceptual cognition cannot

represent some nonstatic features that are its involved objects and some that are not its

involved objects. The entire mental aspect that appears in sensory nonconceptual

cognition represents the involved object.

The mental aspect (mental representation) in the cognition is the directlyinvolved object.

The external object (a moment of sensibilia or a moment of sound) is the

indirectly involved object. The difference between the two will be explained

below.

Level of Transparency of Mental Aspects

Gelug

The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity is

cognitively transparent. In other words, when nonconceptually cognizing the mental

aspect of an external objective entity such as a commonsense object, the mental aspect

does not veil the commonsense object. Rather, the sensory nonconceptual cognition

directly contacts the external commonsense object, albeit through the transparency of

a mental aspect.

Thus, in the sensory nonconceptual cognition of a commonsense object, the external

commonsense object actually appears through the totally transparent mental aspect

cast by it on the consciousness.

Non-Gelug

The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity,

such as a moment of an external patch of colored shape, is opaque. Only the mental

aspect appears in sensory nonconceptual cognition.

The mental aspect is directly cognized(dngos-su shes-pa) by the cognition.

The moment of the external patch of colored shape that casts a mental aspect

on the sensory consciousness of it is indirectly cognized(shugs-su shes-pa) by

that sensory cognition.


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This distinction derives from the non-Gelug literal assertion of the momentariness of

nonstatic phenomena. The moment of the external patch of colored shape that existed

as the direct cause (dngos-rgyu) of the sensory cognition of it has ceased to exist the

immediately following moment when the sensory cognition with the mental aspect

cast by it occurs. In this sense, the moment of the external patch of colored shape is

hidden (lkog na-mo) in the sensory cognition.

Being hidden in a cognition, however, is not equivalent to an involved object

being obscure. Obscure phenomena can only be validly known inferentially by

relying on a line of reasoning. The presence of a moment of an external patch

of colored shape that is cognized by a sensory cognition, however, is not

something that can only be inferred. The moment of an external patch of

colored shape is cognized nonconceptually by the sensory cognition, but only

indirectly.

Nor is the indirect cognition of a moment of an external patch of colored shape

a case of obscured cognition (lkog-gyur). Obscured cognition is cognition ofan involved object, but with minimal attention (yid-la byed-pa) focused on it.

Obscured cognition is obscured by a manifest cognition (mngon-gyur) that it

underlies, which focuses with attention on another involved object.

Consequently, there is only certainty that the manifest cognition has occurred,

but no certainty that the obscured cognition has occurred. Here, however, the

moment of an external patch of colored shape indirectly cognized by the

sensory nonconceptual cognition of it no longer exists when the sensory

nonconceptual cognition of it occurs the next moment. Therefore, the attention

in the cognition is focused only on the mental aspect (the directly involved

object of the cognition).

Focal Objects and Focal Aspects

Thefocal object(dmigs-yul) is the object on which a cognition focuses and which

serves as the focal condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the cognition. Focal objects exist prior

to the cognitions of them and have their own continuums different from those of the

cognitions of them. They are the external objective entities that cast mental aspects of

themselves on the consciousnesses that cognize them.

According to the Chittamatra system, although sensory nonconceptual cognitions

have involved objects, they do not have focal objects. They do not arise from the focalcondition of external objects existing independently of mental activity (mind).

Instead, sensory cognitions havefocal aspects (dmigs-rnam), which are the

mental aspects that sensory consciousnesses assume in cognizing their

involved objects.

The focal aspect in a sensory cognition arises from (is produced by) the same

natal source as the sensory consciousness of it namely, from the same

karmic tendency (sa-bon, karmic seed). It does not arise from (it is not

produced by) an external focal object as its natal source.

Gelug


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Only those features of focal objects (commonsense objects) that are decisively

determined by sensory nonconceptual cognitions of them are the involved objects of

those cognitions.

Non-Gelug

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the focal object of the cognition (a moment of

sensibilia) is only indirectly cognized. Nevertheless, the focal object, in its entirety, is

still an involved object of the cognition.

Appearing Objects and Cognitively Taken Objects in Nonconceptual

Cognition

The appearing object(snang-yul) is the direct object (dngos-yul) that arises in a

cognition, as if it were directly in front of the consciousness (blo-ngor). It is a mental

reflection (gzugs-brnyen) of a cognitive object.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object (mental reflection) is

equivalent to the mental aspect that appears. It is a reflection of an external objective

entity.

Gelug

The appearing object (the fully transparent mental aspect) in sensory nonconceptual

cognition is equivalent to the cognitions cognitively taken object(gzung-yul, held

object). It is a full transparency of an external commonsense object.

The appearing object here is not necessary equivalent, however, to the cognitions

involved object, which may be merely certain nonstatic features of the appearing

(cognitively taken) object.

Non-Gelug

The cognitively taken object of a cognition is defined as the external objective entity

that serves as the direct cause of the cognition.

Thus, in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the cognitively taken object is the

moment of external sensibilia that the cognition indirectly cognizes.

The appearing object (mental reflection) is only the directly cognized opaque

mental aspect of the cognitively taken object, and not the cognitively taken

external object itself.

Summary of Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition in Chart Form

Gelug

External Object Mental Aspect Metaphysical Entities


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Fully transparent reflection Partially transparent

reflection

Commonsense object,

Conventional identity,

Spatial & temporal parts

Commonsense object,

Conventional identity, Spatial

& temporal parts

An absence of

something

Appearing object Appearing object Does not appear

Cognitively taken object Assumes the full aspect of the

cognitively taken object

Focal object

Involved object (within the

domain of the appearing,

cognitively taken focal

object)

Involved object (within the

domain of the appearing,

cognitively taken focal object)

Involved object

Explicitly apprehended Implicitly apprehended

Decisively determined as

"this" commonsense object

Decisively determined as

"this" commonsense object

Decisively determined

as an absence of "this"

Non-Gelug


Opaque representation

A moment of sensibilia A moment of sensibilia Commonsense object,

Conventional identity,

An absence of something

Does not appear Appearing object Does not appear

Cognitively taken object Assumes the aspect of the

cognitively taken object

Focal object

Involved object Involved object Not involved

Indirectly cognized

(hidden)

Directly cognized Not cognized

Merely held,

Not decisively determined

as either a commonsense

object or "this"

commonsense object

Merely held,


as either a commonsense

object or "this"

commonsense object



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4 Objects in Conceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects and Appearing, Involved, Focal, and Cognitively TakenObjects in Conceptual Cognition

Conceptual cognition imputes (mentally labels) a metaphysical entity on the object

that the mental aspect it assumes resembles, and mixes and confuses the two.

Therefore, conceptual cognition is deceptive cognition (khrul-shes).

Of the two items confused with each other, one is the appearing object.

The other simply appears (snang).

Gelug

For the sake of simplicity, we shall omit from the Gelug description of conceptual

cognition in the remainder of this article the presentation of inferential cognition and

other types of conceptual cognition in which a line of reasoning or some other

metaphysical entity is explicitly apprehended.

As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspectof a conceptual cognition is

a fully transparent semblance of the external objective entity (commonsense object)

that serves as the focal object of the cognition.

Thus, both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions havefocal objects.

In conceptual cognition, however, the focal object does not need to be present

at the time and location of the cognition involving it, as in the case of a

remembrance of seeing the bare tabletop yesterday.

As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the nonstatic features of the focal object and

of the fully transparent mental aspect resembling it in conceptual cognition are the

explicitly apprehended involved objects.

Such static features (metaphysical entities) as the absence of a vase on the bare

tabletop may be implicitly apprehended involved objects of the conceptual

cognition of a bare tabletop, in which case the conceptual cognition does notassume the mental aspect of the absence of a vase there.

The fully transparent mental aspect of the external commonsense object that

conceptual cognition about that commonsense object assumes is what appears in the

conceptual cognition.

The appearing object in a conceptual cognition is a metaphysical entity (a static

phenomenon) namely, an idea (snang-ba, "mental image," concept) about

something.


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Ideas about objective entities are static universals imputed on the objective

entities for instance, ideas about commonsense objects imputed on external

commonsense objects.

Ideas about commonsense objects are not only themselves static universals,

they are mental reflections of static universals.

Mental reflections (ideas) about commonsense objects are semitransparent.

Thus, semitransparent mental reflections about commonsense objects, as the

appearing objects of conceptual cognitions, are different from the fully

transparent mental aspects of the commonsense objects that appear (arise) in

the conceptual cognition.

What appears (arises) in a conceptual cognition may be the mental aspect of, for

instance, any form of external physical phenomenon a sight, sound, smell, taste, or

physical sensation.

Such forms do not appear vividly through the fully transparent mental aspect.

They appear only in a partially veiled manner, because the appearing object is

actually a semitransparent idea imputed on them and with which they are

mixed and confused.

For example, when visualizing an orange, the mental aspect of an external

commonsense orange appears and is confused with the idea of the static

universal orange that we imagine we are cognizing.

Thus, mental reflections and mental aspects are not equivalent terms.

Mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena and their contents are

exclusively nonstatic external commonsense objects.

Mental reflections may be either nonstatic or static, and their contents may be

either nonstatic or static.

In nonconceptual cognition, mental reflections are nonstatic and their contents

are nonstatic external commonsense objects. Thus, they are equivalent to the

mental aspects of the cognition.

In conceptual cognition, mental reflections are static ideas and their contentsare static ideas.

The appearing objects of conceptual cognitions (static ideas) are also theircognitively

taken objects.

Thus, in both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions, the appearing objects

are equivalent to the cognitively taken objects.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, both are external commonsense objects

(objective entities).

In conceptual cognition, both are static ideas (metaphysical entities).


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Non-Gelug

The appearing objectof a cognition, whether nonconceptual or conceptual, is

equivalent to the mental aspectthat a cognition assumes. Thus, mental aspect and

mental reflection are equivalent terms.

As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that conceptual cognition

assumes, and which is the appearing object of that cognition, is an opaque mental

representation (reflection) of something.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object is an opaque mental

representation of an objective entity (a moment of external sensibilia).

In conceptual cognition, the appearing object is an opaque mental

representation (reflection) of a metaphysical entity for example, a

commonsense object.

As a metaphysical entity, a commonsense object, then, is actually just an idea

of a commonsense object.

Unlike sensory nonconceptual cognition, which indirectly cognizes external objective

entities (moments of sensibilia), conceptual cognition does not cognize external

objective entities at all.

Thus, conceptual cognition does not have afocal object.

Conceptual cognition does not have indirect cognition of anything.

The opaque mental aspect (reflection, representation) of a metaphysical entity (acommonsense object) in a conceptual cognition is itsfocal aspect. The metaphysical

entity that it reflects and represents is the involved objectof the conceptual cognition.

The idea of a commonsense object, reflected by an opaque mental aspect that

represents the idea, is imputed on the mental representation, and both mixed and

confused with it.

The mental aspect (reflection, representation) of the idea is the appearing

object.

The idea itself is not the appearing object; however, it is what appears (arises)

in the conceptual cognition.

The idea that appears partially veils the appearing object (the mental

representation of the idea).

In conceptual cognition, then, ideas are not the appearing objects, although they

appear. As static universals imputed on the mental aspects that reflect and represent

them, ideas are merely confused with the aspects.

In imagining an orange, for example, a mental representation of a

commonsense orange is confused with the idea of a commonsense orange. In

our minds, we cognize a mental aspect that represents a commonsense orange

and confuse it to be a commonsense orange, which is merely a concept.


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Since mental aspects and mental reflections (representations) are equivalent terms,

Therefore, just as mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena, mental

reflections are also exclusively nonstatic phenomena, whether in

nonconceptual or conceptual cognition.

Thus, mental representations in conceptual cognition are themselves nonstaticindividual items, although they reflect and represent static universals as their

contents.

Since cognitively taken objects are defined as the direct causes of the cognitions of

them and since conceptual cognitions do not have external objective entities present

as their direct causes, conceptual cognitions do not have cognitively taken objects.

Thus, appearing objects are not synonymous with cognitively taken objects.

Universals in Reference to Conventional Objects

In the most general terms, a universal (spyi) is a phenomenon shared in common by

the individuals (bye-brag) on which it is imputed.

Among universals, we may differentiate:

universals in reference to conventional objects,

universals in reference to language.

In reference to conventional objects, there are three main types of universals:

1. collection universals (tshogs-spyi),

2. kind universals (rigs-spyi),

3. object universals (don-spyi).

(1) Collection universals are wholes imputed on spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal

parts. Consider the example of "a table." "A table," as a whole item, can be imputed

on

a collection of patches of colored shapes, a collection of tactile sensations of variously shaped surfaces,

a collection of the previous two collections,

a collection of legs and a flat surface,

a collection of molecules,

a collection of moments of any or all of the previous collections.


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A whole is a universal because it can be imputed on any of the above collections of

parts.

Because collection universals extend over time, they are also called vertical

universals (gong-mai spyi).

(2)Kind universals are the type of phenomenon that a specific individual item is an

instance of, such as "a table" imputed on a specific instance of something having legs

and a flat surface.

Similar items of varying design and individual items of the same design may

be instances of the kind universal table.

In other words, a kind universal specifies the conventional identity of

something.

Because kind universals extend over instances of them, they are also called horizontal

universals (thad-kai spyi).

(3) Object universals are the concepts (ideas) of commonsense objects used when

thinking of, imagining (visualizing), or remembering commonsense objects.

Gelug

A universal is defined as an individual set, category, or whole imputed on a collection

of subsets, individual members of a set, individual instances of a category, or

individual parts.

There are two ontological types of universals:

1. universals that are functional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba),

2. universals that are nonfunctional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba ma-yin-pa).

Functional phenomena (dngos-po) are synonymous with nonstatic phenomena.

Nonfunctional phenomena (dngos-med) are synonymous with static phenomena.

(1) Let us call universals that are functional phenomena "nonstatic universals"

(nonstatic abstractions). They may be cognized either nonconceptually or

conceptually. They include:

collection universals,

kind universals.

Since collection and kind universals are nonstatic phenomena, they appear in sensory

nonconceptual cognition as part of the focal objects (equivalent to the mental aspects,

appearing objects, and cognitively taken objects). When ascertained, they may also be

the involved objects explicitly apprehended by the sensory nonconceptual cognition

of them.


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Thus, when we see a collection of parts, we also see the whole that they comprise and

the type of phenomenon that the whole is (its conventional identity). For example,

when we see the legs and flat surface of a table or the shape and color of a table, these

parts simultaneously also appear as a whole item and as a table.

(2) We shall call universals that are nonfunctional phenomena "static universals"(static abstractions). They are cognized only conceptually. They include:

object universals.

Non-Gelug

A universal is defined as a mentally constructed synthesis (spros-pa, mental

fabrication) of individual items.

All universals are nonfunctional (static) phenomena.

Collection and kind universals are subcategories of object universals.

Because collection universals and kind universals are static phenomena, they do not

appear in sensory nonconceptual cognition. They appear only in conceptual cognition.

This is consistent with the assertion that sensory nonconceptual cognition does not

decisively determine its object as a "this" or a "that."

Consider the example of seeing something.

In moment one (the moment immediately preceding the moment when theseeing of something actually takes place), a moment of an external patch of

colored shape occurs. This external objective entity is the indirectly cognized

focal object and cognitively taken object of the seeing.

In moment two (the moment when the seeing actually occurs), a mental aspect

representing the previous moment of the patch of colored shape arises. The

previous moment of the patch of colored shape no longer exists. This

"internal" objective entity is the directly cognized appearing object and the

involved object. The mental representation appears merely as a patch of

colored shape. It does not appear as a whole commonsense object, let alone

one that is an instance of "this" or "that" for example as "a table."

In moment three (the moment of conceptual cognition immediately following

the nonconceptual seeing), a mental representation of a whole commonsense

item with the conventional identity a table occurs, as a mental synthesis. The

mental representation is the appearing object of the conceptual cognition of

the table. The metaphysical entity table that it represents is the involved

object.

Cognizing a sentence as a whole (based on hearing the sound of only one consonant

or vowel at a time) and cognizing the motion of something (based on seeing some

item in only one position and location at a time) are similarly conceptual processes.


25/31

Some non-Gelug scholars, such as Shakya-chogden, assert that the mental aspects that

appear in visual nonconceptual cognition are mental representations of only a moment

of a collection of molecules. The cognitive appearance of even shapes and colors

occurs only in conceptual cognition.

Conceptual Cognition with Object Universals

Gelug

Object universals are the semitransparent appearing objects in conceptual cognition

that appear to be objects, but are merely superimposed on and confused with cognitive

appearances of involved objects (external objective entities).

Consider the example of the nonverbal conceptual cognition of a form of physical

phenomenon, such as thinking of the sight, smell, taste, or physical sensation of an

external commonsense object, such as an orange.

An appearance arises of:

a specific set of sensibilia of the external commonsense object,

the nonstatic collection universal of the sensibilia constituting a whole object,

the nonstatic kind universal of the sense data constituting "this" kind of object,

and not "that" kind an orange, not an apple.

The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the

specific set of sensibilia, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognitionassumes.

The semitransparent appearing object (idea) with which the totally transparent mental

aspect is mixed is an object universal, as in the case of imagining or remembering an

orange, without associating the word orange with what mentally appears.

In the case of imagining an orange, an appearance of a specific commonsense

orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of that orange and is mixed

with the semitransparent object universal oranges in general, which the

appearance is taken to represent.

In the case of remembering a specific commonsense orange, an appearance of

that orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of the orange and is

mixed with the semitransparent object universal a specific "public" orange. A

specific public orange is one that anyone could have seen from any angle

when we saw that specific commonsense orange. The appearance of the

specific commonsense orange may also be mixed with the semitransparent

object universal the specific commonsense orange whether seen, smelled,

tasted, or touched.

Non-Gelug


26/31

Object universals appear in conceptual cognitions in which the appearing objects are

opaque mental representations of commonsense objects. They are superimposed on

and confused with the involved objects (the metaphysical commonsense objects that

are reflected as the contents of the mental representations).

Consider once more the nonverbal conceptual cognition of the sight of an orange.This may occur immediately after seeing a moment of an external spherical patch of

orange color, or later imagining or remembering a commonsense orange.

An opaque mental aspect representing a commonsense orange appears. This mental

representation is the appearing object. A moment of a specific external spherical patch

of orange color is not even indirectly cognized.

The mental aspect that appears is confused with the object universals imputed on it.

The mentally fabricated and projected object universals with which the mental

reflection (of a commonsense orange) is identified are:

a whole object with temporal continuity,

a "real" commonsense orange,

either oranges in general or a specific "public" orange visible to anyone.

Universals in Reference to Language

In reference to language, there are two main types of universals:

term universals (sgra-spyi, audio ideas), meaning universals (don-spyi, meaningful ideas).

Term universals are universals adopted as conventions (tha-snyad) in a particular

language by the members of a specific society. As words themselves, such as "table,"

and not the sounds of words (which are kind universals), they are universals also in

the sense that they are imputable on sounds made in a variety of voices, pitches,

volumes, and pronunciations. Term universals by themselves do not have any

meanings associated with them.

Meaning universals are the meanings or significance of sounds or of written

representations of sounds. Meanings do not exist inherently within sounds or withintheir written representations, but are merely conventions coined, assigned to sounds or

to their written representations, and used as universals by the members of a specific

society. The same sound can mean "to," "too," or "two" in English or "you" in

mispronounced French. The same written representation of a sound, for instance

"bear," can mean "a large furry mammal" or "to endure something." Moreover, each

person in a particular society may assign a slightly different meaning to a specific

word, but still use that meaning as a universal when thinking that word.

Meaning universals are logical isolates (ldog-pa, distinguishers). The meaning "x" of

a particular communicative sound (word) is what remains upon the logical isolation

(elimination) of all "non-x" meanings. This formulation follows from the assertion

that a meaning "x" does not exist inherently within a sound.


27/31

Further, the logical isolation of a meaning universal is not a deliberate mental

procedure that directly excludes all "non-x" meanings. The conceptual process of

thinking with logical isolates occurs naturally, based on holding the dualistic view

that logically divides all phenomena into "x" and "non-x."

Gelug

In verbal conceptual cognition, a cognitive appearance of the sound of a conventional

word (an objective entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed

may be:

merely a term universal, as in the case of thinking the word voidness without

having any idea of what it means,

both a term universal and a meaning universal, as in the case of thinking the

word voidness together with a meaning associated with the word, even if that

meaning is inaccurate.

In preverbal conceptual cognition, an appearance of a form of physical phenomenon,

such as a mental sight, sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation, may arise. The idea

with which it is mixed is:

merely a meaning universal, as in the case of a preverbal baby conceiving of

someone as its mother when it misses her and cries. Although the baby does

not yet know the word mother, it conceives of the meaning of the term

universal mother. This meaning universal is fit (rung) to be applied to the term

universal motherwhen the baby learns the word mother.

Non-Gelug

In verbal conceptual thinking, a cognitive appearance of a conventional word (a

metaphysical entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed

includes both:

a term universal and

a meaning universal.

Conceptual thought related to language does not occur with only a term universal or

only a meaning universal. It always occurs with a combination of the two.

Conceptual Cognition with Meaning Universals

Gelug

Consider the example of verbally thinking orange.

An appearance arises of:


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the sounds of the vowels and consonants audible during the sequence of

moments required to hear the sound of the entire word orange,

the nonstatic collection universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonants

constituting a whole word,

the nonstatic kind universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonantsconstituting the sound of "this" word, and not "that" word the sound of

"orange," not of "arrange."

The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the

specific set of sounds, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognition

assumes.

The semitransparent appearing objects (ideas) imputed on the totally transparent

mental aspect that appears and with which the mental aspect is mixed and confused

are:

the term universal orange, as an actual word,

the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.

Non-Gelug

In the example of verbally thinking orange, the appearing object is:

an opaque mental representation of the sound of the word orange (a

metaphysical entity).

This appearing object is mixed and confused with the following universals (ideas) that

are imputed on it and which appear:

the term universal orange, as an actual word,

the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies, which is equivalent

to the object universal a commonsense orange.

Conceptualized Objects

Conceptualized objects (zhen-yul, conceived objects, implied objects) are, literally,the objects on which concepts or ideas cling. They are phenomena exclusively of

conceptual cognition. Nonconceptual cognition does not have conceptualized objects.

Gelug

Consider further the conceptual cognition that verbally thinks orange, analyzed in the

previous section.

If the conceptual cognition apprehends only the sound of the word orange, the

external sound of the commonsense word orange is the involved object.


29/31

The appearing objects are the semitransparent ideas of the term universal orange and

of the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.

The conceptualized object of the term universal is the external sound of the

commonsense word orange (the involved object). The conceptualized object of the

meaning universal is the external commonsense orange.

In the case of the conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends the bare tabletop

and implicitly apprehends the absence of a vase there, both the external bare tabletop

and the external absence of a vase there are the conceptualized objects.

Non-Gelug

In the conceptual cognition of verbally thinking orange, analyzed in the previous

section, the appearing object is an opaque mental representation of the sound of the

entire word orange.

The term universal orange and the meaning/object universal of what the word orange

signifies appear (arise in the cognition) as the involved objects.

Since verbal conceptual cognition always involves both term and meaning/object

universals, such cognition always has two conceptualized objects:

the object conceptualized as a signifier (zhen-pai brjod-byed),

the conceptualized object signified (zhen-pai brjod-bya).

They must be differentiated from

the object that is the actual signifier (dngos-kyi brjod-byed),

the object actually signified (dngos-kyi brjod-bya).

The object that is the actual signifierof the commonsense orange is the term universal

orange (the involved object, a conventional word). The objects conceptualized as the

signifiers of the commonsense orange are the external momentary sounds of vowels

and consonants, as heard one by one.

The object actually signifiedby the mental representation of a commonsense orange isthe meaning/object universal of a commonsense orange (the involved object). The

conceptualized object signifiedis a moment of external sensibilia, such as a spherical

patch of orange color.

Summary of Conceptual Cognition in Chart Form

Gelug



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Fully transparent

Partially

transparent

reflection

Commonsense object,

Conventional identity,Spatial & temporal

parts

Commonsense object

Conventional identity,Spatial & temporal

parts

Term universals,

meaning andobject universals

An absence of

something

Appears, Partly veiled Appears, Partly veiled Appearing object Does not

appear

Cognitively taken

object

Focal object

Involved object Involved object Involved object of

only the reflexiveawareness of the

conceptual

cognition

Involved

object

Explicitly apprehended Implicitly

apprehended only

by reflexive

awareness

Implicitly

apprehended


as an instance of these

universals


as an instance of these

universals

Decisively

determined

implicitly byreflexive

awareness as

"these" universals

Decisively

determined as

an absence of"this"

Conceptualized object Mistaken for the

conceptualized

object

Non-Gelug

External Object Mental Aspect

(= Focal Aspect)

Metaphysical Entities

Opaque

A moment of sensibilia Nonstatic representation

of a commonsense

object

Commonsense object

(as an object universal),

Term & meaning universals

Does not appear Appearing object,

Partly veiled

Appears


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No cognitively taken

object

No focal object

Not involved Involved object

Decisively determined as an

instance of "these" universals

Object conceptualized as

the signifier and

conceptualized object

signified

Object that is the actual

signifier and object actually

signified, mistaken for the

object conceptualized as the

signifier and the concep-

tualized object signified

Documents

Berzin Alex - Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition