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Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral CampaignsAuthor(s): R. Sam Garrett, James A. Thurber, A. Lee Fritschler and David H. RosenbloomSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2006), pp. 228-240Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542676 .

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Essays on Refraiing Bureaucracy

R. Sam Garrett is an analyst in American

national government at the Congressional Research Service and a research fellow at

American University's Center for

Congressional and Presidential Studies

(CCPS). He received a doctorate in political science from American University's School

of Public Affairs in 2005. While researching and writing this article, he was a doctoral

candidate and assistant director for

research at CCPS.

E-mail: [email protected].

James A. Thurber is founder and director

of the Center for Congressional and

Presidential Studies and is distinguished

professor of government in the School of

Public Affairs, American University,

Washington, DC.


A. Lee Fritschler is a former vice

president of the Brookings Institution, former assistant secretary for postsecondary education in the U.S. Department of

Education, president emeritus of Dickinson

College, and a past president of ASPA. He is

now a professor in the School of Public

Policy at George Mason University, Fairfax,

Virginia. E-mail: [email protected].

David H. Rosenbloom is distinguished

professor of public administration at

American University in Washington, DC. His

scholarship focuses on public administration

and democratic constitutionalism.


R. Sam Garrett

Congressional Research Service James A. Thurber American University A. Lee Fritschler

George Mason University David H. Rosenbloom American University

Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral Campaigns

The literature on the implications of electoral "bureau-

cracy bashing"for public management is thin. This is

partly because of the difficulty of defining basic terms and measuring results in meaningful ways. Usingfocus group data, this article explores how seniorfederal man-

agers perceive campaign bureaucracy bashing and assess its consequences. The participants perceive that candidate-based bashing affectsfederal management on two levels: one emotional, the other programmatic. The emotional impact is pronounced, producingfrustration and

hostilityfrom senior managers towardpolitical candidates, political appointees, and the media. Senior

managers report that bashing adversely affects policy implementation through low morale, poor recruitment, and training and byfostering an environment of distrust toward bureaucracy. Grounded in a diverse literature

relating to public administration, the presidency, cam-

paigns and elections, andpolitical communication, this

inquiryfinds that senior managers confirm many of the

speculations these works raise about how bashing affects public employees andpublic policy.

n the past half-century, congressional and presidential campaigns have frequently raised criticisms of federal civil servants and agencies, that is,

the "federal government bureaucracy." Candidates have pledged to cut fraud, waste, abuse, and excessive

regulation and to reduce bureaucratic intrusiveness into business and everyday life. Bureaucracy and bureaucrat "bashing" are standard fare in campaign rhetoric. Yet there is no systematic knowledge about the impact of such attacks on senior federal managers and their perceptions of how the attacks affect broader

public management. The purpose of our research is to

gain a preliminary understanding of what impacts such campaign rhetoric may have. We examine what senior government managers think about bashing and its perceived consequences.

Political messages deriding government waste and abuse, high taxes, bureaucratic sloth, and overbearing regulations are not new. Nor is scholarly attention to the subject, although studies tying bashing to bureau-

cratic behavior are few. The existing literature argues that bashing places government institutions, especially Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) and the bureaucracy (Fishel 1985; Light 1999; Salamon and Lund 1984), in low esteem. Campaign- ing against government and its institutions are staples of modern electioneering at home and abroad (Hoagland 2003; Suleiman 2003). The overall environment of declining trust in government, low esteem for public institutions (Erber and Lau 1990; Flanigan and Zingale 2002), and negative campaigns (Ansola- behere and Iyengar 1995; Jamieson, Waldman, and Sherr 2000; Lau and Sigelman 2000; Thurber and Nelson 2000; Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000) creates a climate that allegedly engenders participa- tory problems ranging from low voter turnout and

political trust, public alienation, and apathy to declin-

ing civic engagement (Putnam 2000; Tolchin 1996; Wayne 2001).1 We extend this literature by focusing on the impact of bashing on the career federal

bureaucracy.

Anti-administrative criticisms were used by the nation's founders against King George III. Criticisms of government have continued from the founding to the administration of Andrew Jackson, through the

Progressive Era, the New Deal, and to the present. Recent public opinion and political behavior scholar-

ship establishes how potent political symbols, such as

government bashing, can be both for the general public and for the alleged targets. Previous scholarship has demonstrated that elected officials' bureaucracy bashing is pervasive among both presidents and members of Congress (Hall 2002; Hubbell 1991; Light 1999). Although casual observation dictates that Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign fostered bashing, scholarly evidence suggests that modern bashing extends at least to Jimmy Carter's 1976 cam-

paign (Light 1999). Bureaucracy bashing has also been a major theme of populist presidential cam-

paigns, such as those of George Wallace, Ross Perot, and Pat Buchanan. Critics admonish politicians for

using bashing to manipulate public opinion and

228 Public Administration Review * March April 2006



demonize career bureaucrats for political advantage (Goodsell 1985; Hubbell 1991; Light 1999).

Although several works describe how and why politicians bash the bureaucracy (Fishel 1985; Hall 2002; Hubbell 1991; Light 1999; Terry 1997), we know

virtually nothing about the reaction of career bureaucrats to election-campaign bashing, especially criticisms of the bureaucracy that are a prominent feature of presidential campaigns. This study seeks to reduce the knowledge gap. It advances our understanding of

bureaucracy bashing in two primary areas. First, we take an interdisciplinary approach by considering how a diverse literature enhances our understanding of

bureaucracy bashing. In doing so, we bring together literature on public administration, the presidency, campaigns and elections, and political communication. Second, we extend the existing literature by using focus group data to explore how members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and other top-level government managers (GS-15s) perceive bashing and how it affects their jobs, agencies, and public policy. We provide a baseline for understanding how senior

government managers perceive bashing's consequences for federal bureaucrats, their agencies, and programs.

What Is Bashing? There is a considerable difference between substantive

bureaucracy bashing during campaigns and what Fishel calls "meaningless rhetoric" (1985, 10). Our findings reveal that both are forms of bashing, but the latter is

potentially far more damaging. Substantive bashing refers to bashing as a means to an end, such as criticiz-

ing bureaucrats as an example of why the U.S. Depart- ments of Education and Energy should be abolished.

Although this kind of bashing might be objectionable, it advances specific policy proposals. On the other hand, vague criticisms of bureaucracy, such as Ronald

Reagan's promise to get government "off people's backs" and Jimmy Carter's pledge to "restore the confidence of our people in this nation's governing institutions," can be interpreted as broad swipes at those working in

government (Fishel 1985, 9-10). Campaign promises of this variety are meaningless on two fronts. First, they are "functionally meaningless" (Fishel 1985, 10). Second, they are "programmatically meaningless" because they imply that there are blanket solutions to broad and genuine disagreements on government's role, such as what would amount to "getting government off the people's backs" (Fishel 1985, 10).

The connection between bashing and political symbolism is clear.

The conn Fishel argues that "code words and h n symbolic phrases" (1985, 10), such bashing and E as generic bureaucracy bashing, are i often essential in maintaining electoral coalitions. Despite political expediency, however, campaign rhetoric can have substantial negative

implications for those working in the federal bureau-

cracy. The recent Volcker Commission report (Na- tional Commission on the Public Service 2003), Light (1999), and others warn that bureaucracy bashing negatively affects the recruitment of high-potential young professionals, influences early retirements, and

encourages unnecessary delay in the implementation of

government programs because of risk avoidance by career civil servants. Nonetheless, establishing causal

relationships between bashing, management, and

programmatic outcomes is difficult. Although we do not attempt to establish a causal link between bashing, management, and policy outcomes, we generate theory that will facilitate future research.

Bashing the Bureaucracy: Existing Scholarship Other scholars provide excellent analyses of the content and history of bureaucracy bashing (Goodsell 1985; Hall 2002; Hubbell 1991; Light 1999). Paul

Light reveals distinct historical patterns in modern

campaign bashing. He identifies three federal bureau-

cracy-bashing milestones: the 1960, 1980, and 1992

presidential campaigns. From this perspective, the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign is a baseline in which bureaucracy was not a major campaign issue and Nixon actually expressed a strong belief in bureaucratic integrity, whereas Kennedy characterized

government as a tool for uplifting the nation. Reagan's 1980 emphasis on "government as a bastion of fraud, waste, and abuse" marked the first turning point in the negative campaign climate toward bureaucracy (Light 1999, 87). The third era emerged in 1992, when Bill Clinton seized an opportunity to reposition the Democratic Party toward the Democratic Leader-

ship Council and away from its popular image as

champions of big government.

The literature notes this trend toward increasingly hostile campaign characterizations of bureaucracy, including attacks on career bureaucrats and sympathetic appointees for "going native" and resisting fundamental

change (Gormley 1989, 5). Two "twin pillars"-and the natural tension between them-generated much of the negative sentiment toward modern bureaucracy during the 1980s and 1990s: accountability and discretion. "[B]ureaucratic discretion would be more tolerable if the bureaucracy had less authority; bureaucratic authority would be more tolerable if the bureau-

cracy had less discretion" (Gormley 1989, 7).

ec

spo Sc

Ronald Reagan's bureaucracy bashing has received the most

tion between scholarly attention. Reagan's

litical symbolism use of symbolism played a lear. major role in demonizing the

bureaucracy.2 Reagan used four

typologies to depict federal bureaucrats as loafers, incompetent buffoons, good ole boys, or tyrants

Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing 229



(Hubbell 1991).3 Although "loafers and incompetent buffoons are unlikely to do much damage to good governance beyond feeding a bit too long at the public trough," good ole boys are dangerous because many have their own policy agendas, and tyrants are worst of all because they "are likely to extend further the long hand of the federal government" (Hubbell 1991, 244).

Terry summarizes the perceived impact of Reagan's bashing: "The Reagan Administration's jihad against career civil servants caused a great deal of soul-

searching within the public administration community. There was a sense of urgency.... The perception was that decisive action was needed to counteract the immediate and long-term damage of Reagan's seem-

ingly endless assault on the bureaucracy" (1997, 2). Capitalizing on the dramatic effects of theatrical tech- nique (Terry 1997, 4), Reagan and his supporters evoked emotional responses from their audiences by likening the federal government to an "evil empire" (Hubbell 1991, 251). Reagan's ferocious criticism had not been seen since Progressive Era attacks on political machines (Rosen 1983), although episodes such as the McCarthy hearings also created uncomfortable cli- mates for bureaucrats. In fairness, however, Hubbell (1991) notes that bashing was common on both sides of the 1980 Carter-Reagan campaign. Even before the campaign, Jimmy Carter's 1978 Civil Service Reform Act was presented to the public largely as an easier way to motivate and fire bureaucrats (Hubbell 1991, 239).

Still, bureaucrat bashing grew substantially with Ron- ald Reagan, accelerated during Ross Perot's presidential campaign (which garnered 19 percent of the

popular vote in 1992), and continued with the 1994 Republican "Contract with America" campaign rhetoric in the House and Senate. In House floor statements, the negatively framed term "bureaucrat" was used much more frequently in the 101st through 104th Congresses than neutral or positively framed terms such as "government worker" or "public servant" (Hall 2002, 245). The term "bureaucrat" almost always carried a negative connotation. Yet "public servant" was always framed positively and reserved for describing either members of Congress or deceased federal employees (Hall 2002, 246). Like Reagan, conservative members of Congress frequently bashed bureaucracy in blanket "diatribe[s] against government" to create in-group solidarity among constitu- ents and out-group resentment of Washington bureaucrats (Hall 2002, 246-47).

... politicians use

ing to portray ti IL*.1 _r

However, candidates do not bash tlvely wnile under all circumstances-even public during the highly critical period beginning in the 1980s. Despite having strategic motives for bashing the bureaucracy, candidates also

230 Public Administration Review * MarchlApril 2006

am: c pr

sometimes praise the bureaucracy. Rhetorical choices often depend on the audience. "The composition of the audience is likely to make a crucial difference both to the kind of rhetoric speakers employ and to the

response" (Mendelberg and Oleske 2000, 173). Ron- ald Reagan complimented bureaucrats at civil service gatherings or when characterizing civilian Defense Department employees, who were essential to his fight against communism. For example, Reagan defended Pentagon bureaucrats even "when embarrassing dis- closures surfaced ... revealing the Department of Defense had paid for, among other things, toilet seats, hammers and coffee pots" (Hubbell 1991, 245).

Similarly, bashing might be justified. Bashing can contain programmatic substance (bashing as a means to a legitimate policy end). Particularly as a result of uncertain and short political tenures, new administrations face enormous pressures in implementing their policy agendas, which can be difficult even in well- meaning but entrenched bureaucracies (Heclo 1977; Salamon and Lund 1984). Aberbach and Rockman (1988) argue that in recent decades, presidents and members of Congress have grown increasingly frustrated by the bureaucracy's inability to respond to quickly changing policy agendas and multiple political pressures. Representing the American heroic ideal of rugged individualism (Hubbell 1990), elected officials "conclude that it is best to cut the operating agencies out of the action as much as possible (centralization) and, when that is not possible, to cut the careerists out of the sphere of potential influence while relying on increased layers of politically faithful appointees (politicization)" (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 608). This is particularly true of the Reagan administration

(Goldenberg 1984; Lynn 1984; Salamon and Lund 1984).

Even if bashing is only campaign rhetoric with little permanent policy impact (for example, proposals to abolish the Departments of Energy or Education did not succeed), bureaucrats are listening, and they report serious negative consequences from what they hear. Senior federal managers believe that bashing does affect policy implementation and management quality. Whatever the reasons for bashing the bureaucracy, our analysis demonstrates that it seriously affects civil servants and the way they perceive themselves, their agencies, programs, and supervisors.

Modern Bashing: message fram- Symbolism and Campaign

1 . Rhetoric lemselves pos- As Edelman (1988) notes, politi- xing blame for cians use message framing to oblems. portray themselves positively

while affixing blame for public problems: "Problems [result in the establishment of] authorities to deal with them, and the threats they



name are often personified as enemies. Leaders achieve and maintain their positions by focusing upon fash- ionable or feared problems and by emphasizing their differences from enemies whose past sins they publi- cize and exaggerate" (121). For our purposes, bureaucrats and bureaucracy may well be those problems and enemies. Message frames play powerful roles in influ-

encing public opinion about specific policies, individu-

als, and groups (Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling 1998).

Candidates are also adept at using message framing, symbolic politics, and earned and paid media to fuel the public belief that the bureaucracy is in crisis. Politi- cal elites create symbols through actions and rhetoric (Edelman 1964). Language is particularly important in

framing symbols and messages based on continuously reinforced predispositions, such as the ideological views that government is the problem, that the bureaucracy is too large, and that bureaucrats are lazy or incompetent (Goodsell 1985). For example, the freeloader frame, which is used to portray welfare recipients as

undeserving and lazy, also has ties to antibureaucratic themes.4 The freeloader frame "is closely associated in

contemporary national politics with the anti-big government agenda of recent Republican administrations" (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1061).

The media play a vital role in transmitting framed

messages. Politicians know that voters are most likely to remember brief, clear messages that are rich with

symbols. They also know that messages focusing on

negativity and harm-such as bashing-evoke more

powerful responses than messages which emphasize benefits or successes (Hansen 1985). These neatly packaged symbols fit in with the media's coverage priorities, which emphasize competition in elections (the "game schema") as opposed to substantive policy information (the "governing schema") (Patterson 1993; see also Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000). Goodsell laments that simplistic political framing and

journalists' emphasis on competition often combine to mass market an unflattering picture of bureaucracy:

[T]he bureaucratic horror story is usually short. Often not many details of the case are included, and those that are given stress the citizen's an-

guish or the incident's adverse effects. Certainly any extenuating circumstances or the government's side of the story are not covered. Journal- ists are perfectly aware that what arouses reader interest is the maligned citizen and the horrific outcome, not restrictions faced by bureaucrats in terms of rules with which they must live and workloads with which they must cope. (1985, 4)

Methodology We examine bashing as a common contemporary phenomenon and present data about how senior

government managers perceive bashing's impact. Our contribution helps to build theory and theoretical

generalizability (Yin 1994) on an unexplored topic.5 We do not claim firm causal linkages between bashing and policy outcomes. However, general patterns are

clearly evident, which we suggest lay a strong foundation for additional empirical research on the impact of bashing on public management and public policy. We assess federal bureaucrats' reactions to election-

campaign bashing through structured questions from four focus groups conducted in 2000 and 2001. The focus groups explored senior managers' reactions to various forms of campaign rhetoric, especially bash-

ing, and their perceptions of how bashing affects federal personnel and policy implementation.

The focus group discussion format was used to explore the potential impacts of campaign rhetoric and bash-

ing in-depth, and it is well suited to the kind of

exploratory research we engage in for this article

(Morgan 1997). 6 To provide field perspective, one session was held in Denver; all others were held in

Washington, DC. For the first two focus groups, a list of the names and business addresses of all current members of the SES, arranged by zip code, was obtained from the U.S. Office of Personnel Manage- ment (OPM) through a Freedom of Information Act

request. The other two focus groups relied on purposive ("snowball") sampling because of poor response to our initial selection method.7 Approximately 30 invitees per session were selected with a view toward

balancing policy specialties (e.g., defense, agriculture, etc.) and functions (e.g., personnel, budgeting, etc.). We consciously sought to include women and persons with Hispanic surnames among the invitees, although gender, racial, and ethnic demographics were not

explicitly solicited. All sessions included members of the SES or other top-level federal managers (GS-15s). In an effort to increase generalizability and examine

bashing over time, one of the Washington groups included retired senior managers. All other focus

groups included only current employees.8

Attendance ranged from 4 to 16 participants per session. In total, we received input from 31 current and former senior federal executives with service in at least 33 diverse federal agencies and departments. Field and headquarters assignments and agency differences helped ensure variation in the data. All participants had spent the bulk or all of their careers in the federal government, usually working in several agencies and positions. All participants were at least

middle-aged, given our focus on senior managers, although we did not explicitly solicit age. The length of federal government service ranged from about 20

years to more than 50, with most participants citing approximately 35 years of federal service.9 The variety of experience and free-flowing discussion helped guard against groupthink (anis 1982). Even in areas




exhibiting widespread agreement, we were encouraged by the extent to which participants debated each other and openly suggested new directions for the discussion.

Findings We found that bashing affects senior managers and

policy implementation on two levels: one emotional, the other related to public policy and program man-

agement. The distinction between bashing's emotional and policy consequences should not be overempha- sized. The picture that emerged from our focus groups is one in which the powerful symbolism bashing creates and its subsequent emotional impact foster a work environment that threatens effective policy implementation. Our findings suggest that the emotional and policy consequences resulting from bashing are, there- When asked abou fore, closely related. all impact, one s

According to our focus group said flatly, "It's According to our focus groupsaid f y, "Its

participants, bashing's most

powerful impact occurs at the emotional level. The emotional impact of bashing is pronounced, produc- ing frustration and even hostility from senior managers toward political candidates, political appointees, and the media. These emotional consequences are

long lasting and can constitute some of the most vivid experiences of senior managers' careers. Bashing also fosters low morale, which our participants said ulti-

mately affects policy implementation and program management. We found evidence that Reagan-era bashing produced uniquely troubling emotional con-

sequences for our participants and their colleagues.

The senior managers believed that bashing fosters

hostility and suspicion toward bureaucracy and bureaucrats, which strains effective working relationships between political appointees and careerists. Bashing also undermines government's public image, recruitment, and training. Focus group participants directly attributed antibureaucratic sentiment among politicians, political appointees, and the public to campaign bashing. Importantly, the senior managers also re-

ported that bashing directly influences agency policy decisions, especially during elections and transitions. However, we also found evidence that senior managers can recognize legitimate policy goals behind bash-

ing and sometimes independently distinguish between

bashing and more neutral policy rhetoric. This indicates that despite bashing's emotional toll, senior

managers can engage in rational analysis of the subject and their related experiences.

Symbolic Power: Bashing's Lasting Emotional Impact Regardless of demographics, the senior federal managers shared similar conceptions of what constitutes bashing. Participants cited examples ranging from


horror stories about specific incidents of alleged bureaucratic incompetence (session 1, 26) to more general messages presented by candidates that "government is the enemy" (session 3, 2). Regardless of the examples, senior managers' perceptions of what constitutes bashing most often boiled down to broad,

antigovernment statements that rarely offer specific criticisms or programmatically meaningful solutions.

However, the most striking finding from our analysis is how strongly senior federal managers felt about

bashing. Senior managers do internalize the powerful symbols surrounding bashing. Our participants exhibited no doubt that bashing exists and has been a

pervasive problem since at least the Carter administration. When asked about bashing's overall impact, one

senior manager said flatly, "It's

t bashing's over- devastating" (session 3, 1). Even participants who worked in senior manager ?enior manager technical specialties (e.g., the

devastating." Internal Revenue Service or the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion) and reported being relatively insulated from

bashing expressed concern over telling friends they work for government.10 One former technical

specialist said, "While we weren't that much affected

directly by [bashing], you really felt uneasy about

being federal employees. People would look at you as if you had cancer" (session 4, 43). Another long-time federal employee summed up this sentiment more

colorfully: "Bashing makes [federal employees] say, 'Don't tell my mother I'm working for the federal

government. She thinks I'm playing piano in a whore- house"' (session 4, 37).

Bashing and Bureaucracy's Poor Public Image Participants recognized that candidates bash to foster

public support for broad policy objectives. However,

they were particularly critical of bashing that does not cite particular programs or offer a full explanation of the policy-making process. Some senior managers said

they felt particularly demonized by congressional bashing that blames agencies for congressional policy mandates. According to one senior manager, bashing "gives [the public] the impression that the federal government has the authority and the power to do some-

thing that is pretty much a local matter. And then, when [the issue] doesn't change, it's [because] the federal government hasn't done its job" (session 1, 25).

It has been established in the literature that the media facilitate bashing because they transmit campaign messages to the public (Edelman 1988; Goodsell 1985; Patterson 1993). However, some participants also perceived that the media has an independent bashing role, especially through derogatory sound bites and regular investigative series on government waste, such as NBC's "Fleecing of America." Although



some of these stories expose legitimate bureaucratic

shortcomings, senior managers felt that the media

overplay bureaucracy's negative side. According to one focus group participant,

There are a lot of incidents ... where government shoots itself in the foot. [I]t's a little bit like the Rodney King incident, where it was terrible what happened, but [the media] played it so

many times you kind of thought it happened to [King] 100 times. Well, you take these incidents that the government does and you play them across 30 newspapers and 27 different TV sta- tions and all of a sudden [the public thinks] there's nothing but a lot of crooks in Washing- ton. Well, there are some, but not all. The media doesn't help. (session 4, 30)

This sentiment is consistent with Goodsell's (1985) argument that that the media unnecessarily concen- trate on bureaucratic shortcomings without adequate attention to bureaucrats' side of the story. This finding held across focus groups, with little consideration for more neutral positions conveying what is arguably a

legitimate media interest in responding to audience

preferences by highlighting controversy.

Especially because of widespread attention to bashing, senior managers firmly believed that bashing tarnishes

public opinions about bureaucracy and government. Even managers who suggested that bashing's overall

programmatic impact is minor over time agreed that

bashing hurts government's public image. The senior

managers argued that this negative image not only affects morale but also hinders recruitment, retention, and training. Participants reported being troubled by what they perceived as electoral campaigns based on

bashing, which provide incomplete or inaccurate information about the federal bureaucracy to a public that is "extraordinarily uninformed" (session 3, 2). Our participants said that because of this lack of information, bashing from campaigns fills the knowl-

edge gap with negative and incomplete information, which the public internalizes. If true, these patterns certainly fit the symbolic framing that Edelman (1964, 1988) and Sears (2001) describe, which depends on easily processed and simplified mental cues. They also explicitly support Goodsell's (1985, 4) claim-in some cases, even using the same lan-

guage-that bashing conveyed through the media

provides the public with sensationalized and sometimes incomplete accounts of what bureaucracy does and why.

Senior managers believed this low regard for government fosters problems in recruitment and retention. Participants perceived these difficulties for both front- line bureaucratic recruitment and lower-level political appointee recruitment. Several participants also

suggested that bashing leads to pay disparities between the public and private sectors or even between the civilian and military sectors, which likewise hinders the recruitment and retention of high-quality employees. According to a former federal lawyer,

I think part of the difficulty in keeping federal pay up to where it ought to be is this constant

bashing in campaign politics. So, we can't com-

pete anymore. When a first-year-out-of-law- school [job candidate] is supposed to work for $125,000 a year-now the federal government is never going to pay a first-year employee $125,000, but we used to get the cream of the

crop. And people would just beat our doors down to try to get a job at [agency name], but we're not

competitive anymore in salary. (session 4, 37)

Senior managers also believed that bashing hinders the recruitment and retention of competent political appointees. According to one participant (session 4, 38),

The negative campaigning impacts the quality of the political appointees. The administration comes in, tries to get people to leave the private sector to come to work, and you can get the

secretary of the treasury and the secretary of state, but when you start getting down to the lower levels, the answer is, "Do I want to come in to manage [a bunch] of old clunks, as have been described in the campaign rhetoric?" So, what you get are second- and third- and fourth- choice political appointees who are incompetent or totally believe everything they heard in the campaign. And that creates real problems for the careerists because they're dealing with people who really aren't so sharp.

Indeed, our focus group participants perceived a com-

plex mix of consequences from bashing that signifi- cantly affect relationships between political appointees and civil servants. These findings illuminate how the emotional impact senior managers feel from bashing carries over into specific workplace settings. They also foreshadow how senior managers perceive that the emotional fallout from bashing inhibits effective policy implementation.

The senior managers were particularly critical of bureaucrat bashing carrying over into civil service

supervision (by political appointees managing the

bureaucracy). Many of the examples our participants cited centered around the Reagan administration, which had created particularly noteworthy experiences for senior managers in all focus groups. Although the retirees were particularly critical of the Reagan administration, we found unusual disdain for Reagan- era bashing across focus groups and participant demographics. Carter- and Gingrich-era bashing




also received modest criticism across focus groups. One participant described the first meeting between

high-level careerists and new Reagan political appointees at a Department of Defense agency:

On one side of the room, clustered as if they were hunkered down against the Indians, were all the political appointees, not talking with any of us dirty careerists, who were sort of milling around the other side of the room waiting for the

meeting to convene. And that was very discon-

certing. It was the first time I ever saw a physical separation, at that level, of high-level people who were supposed to be setting policy for a government agency. And my impression from that was "what a waste," because it took a long while for that thaw to take place with the understanding of these people who came in from all parts of our

society with one concept [not trusting career bureaucrats]. It seemed to me that the federal-

government careerists were suspect because they were there in a prior administration, and that they couldn't be trusted. And as a consequence, it screwed up [the political appointees'] learning curve. It made it much more difficult for them to be effective in the roughly 18 months that they would traditionally serve in a job like that. (session 4, 20-21)

Although senior managers found bashing troubling at all times, Reagan-era bashing produced unusual resentment-and in some cases, at least passive resistance-among the senior managers, especially when they felt attacked by political appointees whom

they viewed as overly zealous in advancing antibureaucratic views. Senior managers believed that at least some political appointees' antibureaucratic attitudes are directly tied to campaign rhetoric. However, our senior managers also reported that extreme attitudes can mellow over time and that some firebrand political appointees eventually come to embrace career bureaucrats. One participant said of Reagan-era appointees,

I think a lot of the young people who came in as appointees and at the subcabinet-level jobs es- poused [campaign-like anti-bureaucracy rhetoric] or thought they had to espouse that because of the manner in which the campaign was conducted. I would hasten to add that once they learned, and the learning curve varied, but once they became aware that [they would] have to deal with [career bureaucrats], things became very productive in the second Reagan administration, but it took a while. (session 4, 21)

This finding is consistent with Lynn (1984), who argues that Reagan appointees were most successful when forging productive relationships with career


bureaucrats. However, other participants reported instances of political appointees demanding personal (not neutrally competent) loyalty from career bureaucrats. In addition, some Reagan-era political appointees who did forge positive relations with senior

managers were allegedly forced out because they had "gotten in bed with the careerists" (session 4, 27). To the extent that strained relationships exist because of

bashing, political appointees can, indeed, internalize Hubbell's (1991) "tyrant" and "good ole boy" conceptions of career bureaucrats and related criticisms

(Goldenberg 1984).

To summarize, senior mangers perceived a potent us- versus-them mentality exhibited by political appointees toward career bureaucrats. Participants believed that this mentality is directly related to campaign bashing. Although they were particularly critical of

Reagan-era bashing and appointees, participants reported similar phenomena in other administrations. For example, at least one subject reported that the Clinton administration had routinely reassigned senior managers who disagreed with the administration's policy positions. Senior managers were deeply troubled by what they perceived as overzealous politicization of supervision, which they believed stems directly from bashing. Most of all, however, the senior managers reported feeling demoralized and frustrated by wasted policy-making opportunities, which they believed result from poor careerist-appointee relationships forged by bashing.

Bashing and Public Policy As our focus group data indicate, senior managers believe that bashing creates an overall environment of suspicion and hostility toward bureaucracy. A senior

manager who had spent most of his career in the private sector expressed shock at discovering the "culture of survival" resulting from constant bureaucrat bashing, which he believed demoralizes employees to the point that they may not effectively manage programs because they are so concerned about job secu- rity (session 3, 1-2). Senior managers repeatedly said that bashing creates permanent and overwhelming negative mental frames and political symbols for career bureaucrats, which affects morale, recruitment, training, and overall work environment. We know less about how bashing affects public policy. One reason it is so difficult to identify direct causal links between bashing and policy outcomes is that bashing and new policy initiatives are interactive, and both occur frequently during election campaigns and transitions. These are times of great complexity and uncertainty even without bashing.

Our findings highlight these complexities. Many participants expressed frustration over lost productivity during election years as agencies avoid political controversy and political appointees leave



government. They also complained that bashing- because of its lack of substantive content-transmits inconsistent policy priorities, which makes policy implementation difficult for even the most well-

meaning civil servants. However, we nonetheless found evidence that senior managers base their policy decisions on what they hear during electoral cam-

paigns, including bashing. A few months before the 2000 elections, one senior manager reported, "I've been through meetings in the past week where we say, 'Don't put out anything sensitive during September and October.' I'm sure everyone's been through that" (session 1, 17). According to another senior manager, his agency had taken great pains to study Heritage Foundation policy recommendations that became part of Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign in

anticipation of his likely victory in the November elections.

When [Reagan] won, we actually went through [the Heritage reports] and we started saying, "OK, what is the Heritage Foundation saying about A, B, C and D because we've got to write transition papers." .. . [T]he reality hit when

they got elected. Ninety percent of the stuff that was in the Heritage [recommendations] never

got done, at least in my agency. But, you better believe that folks were thumbing through [the recommendations] left and right trying to deter- mine, "OK, what's the position going to be when the transition team walks in?" . . . I think that's the nature of the beast. (session 1, 18)

Although the data produce a rich and varied discussion, we found few systematic differences in how the senior managers conceptualized bashing and how they perceived its emotional and policy effects. With the

exception of a few variations, this consistency held across method of focus group selection, employment status, agency represented, field or Washington place- ment, and other demographic factors. We are encour-

aged by this finding because it suggests just the kind of theoretical generalizability we seek to achieve in this article.

Although we did not find substantial differences in how bashing or its impact is perceived among the

Washington and Denver groups, there was some variation. Field managers reported more insulation from bashing rhetoric, perhaps because they are more involved in program administration than their Wash- ington counterparts, although both groups reported substantial negative emotional effects from bashing. But field managers also reported potentially very serious physical or financial impacts when bashing does reach the field. For example, a manager from the Interior Department said that physical threats against Bureau of Land Management employees during dis- putes over Western land rights could be tied directly

to prolonged bureaucracy bashing. The impact from

bashing "went much further than a negative impact. It went to a very serious negative impact. We've actually had people shot at and offices burned" (session 1, 32). Although the manager was quick to point out that he does not believe bashing explicitly encouraged illegal actions, he does believe that bashing created an overall environment that established "tacit approval" for threats against bureaucrats (session 1, 33).

Field managers said they are more attuned to congressional bashing than the participants as a whole. Simi- larly, field managers believed that although presidential bashing is more influential (especially on an emotional level), Congress exerts the most programmatic influence, which may also be achieved through bashing (session 2, 5). Even congressional retirements were worrisome for our participants because they provide opportunities to curtail federal services in the district, especially against a backdrop in which campaign bash-

ing suggests that many government services are unnec-

essary and wasteful (session 2, 5).

However, senior managers acknowledged that cam-

paign rhetoric can contain substantive information about policy goals, even if the method of communication is regrettable. Indeed, they reported that, to the extent campaign rhetoric creates substantive policy debate, "We, as public administrators, and as bureaucrats, sort of tune into that dialogue during the cam-

paign [and] factor that into how to do our job, which is to do the work of government for citizens" (session 1, 4). Furthermore, some of our participants even defended the ideological program objectives of new administrations.

But substance is key to how senior managers interpret the frames and symbols politicians and appointees use when promoting bureaucratic change. Although the senior managers recognized that bashing can contain legitimate policy messages, they did not believe that advancing policy aims warrants bashing. For example,

When the Reagan administration came and [OPM director] Don Devine [came] in, it soon became apparent that there were policy differences [between appointees and careerists]. But, Don Devine didn't want anybody to interfere and he didn't trust all of these executives- careerists-to be making input. So, I think it was a combination of genuine policy differences- [the Reagan administration] wanted to go in different directions. I can respect that, but [not] the manner in which they did it [through bashing]. (session 4, 44)

Several participants reported instances of passive or even active policy resistance from career bureaucrats who believed that politicians and appointees were




unnecessarily isolating careerists through bashing. Importantly, these instances ranged from Carter's defense policy to Clinton's reinventing government standards, suggesting that resistance to what is perceived as overzealous bashing holds across administrations, agencies, and time.

Discussion Previous scholarship (Goodsell 1985; Hall 2002; Hubbell 1991; Light 1999) has demonstrated that bureaucracy bashing is pervasive and that it strongly influences political communication and public opinion about government (Edelman 1964, 1988; Fishel 1985; Goodsell 1985; Patterson 1993; Sears 2001). Our analysis demonstrates that bureaucracy bashing has serious consequences for senior federal managers and the government they serve. Focus group participants unanimously believed that pervasive bashing fosters substantial problems for government and its employees. They reported not only that bashing is

demoralizing, but also that it creates great animosity between careerists and the political appointees overseeing their work. Senior managers believed that these forces create a hostile environment toward bureaucracy, which ultimately impedes effective policy implementation. Senior managers also perceived a direct connection between campaign bash-

ing and recruitment, retention, and training difficulties for both career bureaucrats and low-level political appointees. They also argued that the media contribute to negative public opinion toward bureaucracy.

Participants were particularly critical of Reagan-era bashing and congressional bashing that criticizes bureaucracy without offering meaningful solutions or complete information. Although we found disdain for Reagan-era bashing across focus groups, retirees were particularly critical. At first, it is tempting to attribute the retirees' animosity toward Reagan-era bashing mainly to timing. Those who were nearing retirement during the Reagan era may be predisposed to be tired, bitter, or otherwise ingrained with anti-Reagan sentiment. These speculations might well be true. How- ever, these same managers were objective about other experiences with bashing under different circumstances, as they did when recognizing legitimate policy goals behind bashing or praising Clinton-era campaign rhetoric that criticized government but also empowered career bureaucrats through the reinven- tion movement. Hostility toward Reagan-era bashing occurred across focus groups, including those with current managers who would have been relatively junior employees during the Reagan era and thus insulated from other factors, such as retirement or burnout, which might otherwise be a reason for disdain for the Reagan administration. Therefore, it seems that something about Reagan-era bashing is, indeed, different.


Our analysis suggests that the difference in how senior managers react to bashing, regardless of messenger or administration, is communication. Senior managers object to and resent messages that attack bureaucracy in ways that unnecessarily criticize bureaucracy via messages that simplify information and play on emotional predispositions degrading government. These are precisely the kinds of message frames and symbols that politicians and campaign professionals know voters remember (Edelman 1964, 1988; Sears 2001; Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling 1998; Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000) and that the media believe the audience wants (Goodsell 1985; Patterson 1993). They are also the kind of"programmatically meaningless" rhetoric Fishel (1985) warns against. It seems that politicians and their appointees who engage in bashing do not realize the overwhelming extent to which career bureaucrats also internalize the negative frames and symbols transmitted in campaign messages.

The senior managers in our focus groups confirmed Hall's (2002) and Hubbell's (1991) propositions that recent bashing has become increasingly personalized and that the Reagan era ushered in a period of unusually harsh antigovernment rhetoric (Light 1999; Rosen 1983, 1986; Terry 1997). In citing bureaucratic resistance to such messages, the senior managers supported Heclo's (1977) argument that career bureaucrats have a power advantage over political appointees because of the former group's ability to resist political change. Our observations on Reagan-era bashing present an interesting extension to Heclo's conclusions about unity among political appointees. Heclo (1977) argues that one of the main reasons political appointees are so easily frustrated in their reform efforts is their lack of unity that agency and program loyalty automati- cally provide to career bureaucrats. Our focus group participants suggested that, especially during the Rea- gan administration, political appointees used disdain for the bureaucracy-exhibited through bashing-as the unifying factor political appointees normally lack. Although that unity did not necessarily produce unusual victories or renewed staying power for political appointees, our findings make it clear that senior civil servants feel and perceive an unusually negative impact from the Reagan-era unified political front.

However, the senior managers' perceptions only present one side of the story and might not represent reality. What senior managers perceive as bashing might be a new administration's way of pursuing a genuine policy agenda. Even if participants disagree with the means, there can be little doubt that at least some bashing has policy ends. Although all participants clearly believed that bashing is a problem, some might have overzealously attributed disagreeable policy agendas or career setbacks to bashing. Just as seemingly negative campaigns can convey important information about contrasting candidates (amieson,



Waldman, and Sherr 2000)-and as some of our

participants recognized-campaigns that criticize

bureaucracy can refocus bureaucratic priorities and foster beneficial reform (Salamon and Lund 1984).

Our analysis provides some additional insights. The literature suggests that Reagan-era bashing marked a new era in political communication about government (Hubbell 1991; Light 1999; Rosen 1983; Terry 1997). Senior managers displayed unusual hostility toward Reagan-era bashing and its alleged personnel aftermath (e.g., cutbacks and morale), which they associated with specific political appointees. Based on our findings, senior managers certainly seem to have internalized the negative frames politicians use to describe bureaucracy (Hall 2001; Hubbell 1991). However, Fishel (1985) argues that broad, Reagan- style bureaucratic condemnations are programmatically meaningless and hypothesizes that Reagan-era bashing had fewer policy consequences than bashing that occurred during other periods. Our focus group participants confirmed Fishel's proposition. This find-

ing suggests that senior managers display the most

animosity toward bashing that has the least impact on

tangible government outputs. Although the Reagan administration implemented major policy changes compared to the Carter administration, there is a

greater likelihood that the Clinton administration's cut of almost 400,000 federal jobs affected far more bureaucrats on a personal level. Or did it? Ironically, the focus group data suggest that senior managers internalized more negative sentiment from what they perceived as mean-spirited, disrespectful, programmatically meaningless Reagan-era bashing than the Clinton administration's programmatic cuts and reor-

ganization, which directly threatened federal jobs. Just as politicians and the media frame messages using emotional appeals and limited information (Edelman 1964, 1988; Hansen 1985; Sears 2001; Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling 1998), senior managers also appar- ently process bashing messages based more on emotion than on actual impact.

Most of all, our focus group discussions indicate a fundamental communication gap between politicians, appointees, and senior managers. The only constant thread running through these actors' communication is bashing, which, as the literature (Edelman 1964, 1988; Hansen 1985; Sears 2001; Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling 1998) demonstrates, is all too often depen- dent on emotionally damaging political symbols and

incomplete information. This suggests that both sides could benefit from a better understanding of each other's needs and motives. Politicians and appointees might do especially well to consider how they frame

messages to and about the bureaucracy. Our findings suggest that not only would more measured and com-

plete communication about bureaucracy enhance the civil service's morale, but also it could foster more

effective policy implementation and more productive working relationships between politicians, appointees, and career bureaucrats.

Conclusion In their focus group comments, senior managers stressed that they want to serve all political administrations and Congress competently and admirably. But messages matter. As the literature on framing and symbolic politics suggests (Edelman 1964, 1988; Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1991; Patterson 1993; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Sears 1988; Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling 1998), message framing affects how senior

managers interpret messages about their tasks and their worth. Although they applaud campaign rhetoric that sends clear and programmatically meaningful policy priorities and empowers civil servants, they reject inherently negative bashing that is devoid of substance. Previous scholarship (Fishel 1985; Goodsell 1985; Hall 2002; Hubbell 1991; Light 1999) de- scribes bureaucracy bashing and notes that bashing characterizes bureaucrats and bureaucracy negatively; we have extended these works by examining how

bashing actually affects civil servants and public policy. We have demonstrated that senior government managers do, indeed, internalize negative messages about themselves and their agencies. They believe that this environment hampers recruitment, retention, training, and important working relationships that ensure effective program management and policy implementation.

Election campaigns are a key part of American de- mocracy. The quality of those campaigns is characterized by negative attacks, low voter turnout, and

declining political trust on the part of citizens (Thurber and Nelson 2000). Added to the problems of the health of our civic culture is widespread citizen

ignorance of what the federal government does, which creates a receptive audience for bashing the government and its public managers. Many federal candidates listen to voter complaints about government and sensationalize the negative, further eroding public confidence. There is no penalty for bashing federal bureaucrats (except perhaps in the Washington, DC, area, where more than 350,000 federal employees live), but there are electoral benefits. This article has demonstrated that senior federal managers believe such campaign attacks have important emotional and

policy impacts and make it more difficult to manage the executive branch.

Acknowledgments This project would not have been possible without the support of many people and institutions. We are

especially grateful to the Improving Campaign Con- duct project, sponsored by The Pew Charitable Trusts, for financial support and to the American University Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies and




its research from 1997 to 2004. We thank the center's staff for their continued support.

Several people supported earlier phases of this project. We are very grateful to Dr. Albert C. Hyde for his

participation in two focus groups on which this research draws; to Dwight Ink, Donna Wolf, and the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) for their help in organizing focus groups; and to many NAPA fellows for their wisdom and help on this

project. We thank the U.S. Office of Personnel Man-

agement for quickly satisfying our Freedom of Infor- mation Act request for the names and work addresses of members of the Senior Executive Service. We thank the focus group participants for their candor and

participation and the anonymous reviewers and a

previous ASPA conference audience for their invalu- able comments.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-

gress, or any other institution with which the authors are affiliated.

Notes 1. Operationalizing negative campaigns is controver-

sial. Jamieson, Waldman, and Sherr (2000) found

that seemingly negative campaigns may actually offer valuable contrasts between candidates.

Similarly, Kahn and Kenney (2000) found that

negative campaigns can enhance voter

knowledge. 2. Terry (1997) refers to the "theater metaphor"

rather than to "symbolism." 3. All terms are Hubbell's own.

4. Gamson and Lasch (1983) identify the freeloader

frame in their discussion of elite attitudes on

welfare policy. 5. On statistical versus theoretical generalizability,

see Yin (1994, 30-31). Our findings are theoreti-

cally generalizable in that they explore an un-

charted phenomenon, which provides a

foundation for theory building and future statisti-

cal testing. 6. Prior to the focus groups, we also held informal,

exploratory discussions with two groups of retired

senior federal managers in Washington, DC.

Although we do not include the findings from

these sessions in the data presented in this paper,

they served as valuable tools to identify prelimi-

nary concepts. We are encouraged by similarities

in the content of these discussions and the

findings we present here. Each session was tape recorded and transcribed to preserve accuracy and

emotion (Rubin and Rubin 1995; Edin 1991). The moderators kept the discussion structured yet free flowing, allowing participants to bring up important insights and interact among themselves

238 Public Administration Review * March IApril 2006

(Gamson 1992). The wide variety of federal

experience in the group and among the modera-

tors also facilitated a particularly conversational

tone (Rubin and Rubin 1995, 130-31; Adler and

Adler 1987). Using practitioners as data sources

minimizes the need to validate their positions

(especially because they deal primarily with

personal reactions rather than objective facts)

(Hammersley 1992). 7. Although our sampling method is inappropriate

for statistical generalizability, randomness is not

essential in the kind of theory building we engage in here (Yin 1994). On purposive or "snowball"

sampling, see Agresti and Finlay (1997). On

sample selection and focus group research, see

Morgan (1997) and Yin (1994). The focus group method also offers the advantage of facilitating a

large amount of data gathering in a relatively short time (Morgan 1997). Focus group partici-

pants were guaranteed confidentiality in an effort

to ensure open discussion and reduce risk of

personal harm from publication (Sieber 1992). Each session lasted two to three hours.

8. Sessions 1 and 3 refer to the first two Washington sessions with current SES members and GS-15

managers. Session 2 refers to the Denver session

with current SES members and GS-15 managers. Session 4 refers to the final Washington session

held with a group of retired SES members and

GS-15 managers. Transcript and note page numbers appear after the session numbers in the

in-text citations.

9. This excludes one participant who recently entered

government as a senior manager. This individual's

tenure was less than two years. 10. Technical specialists' insulation from heated

political conflict is consistent with McCubbins,

Noll, and Weingast's (1987) findings with

respect to Congress's oversight of technical

functions.

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Call for Papers With generous support from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, PAR will release in 2006 a special issue on collaborative management. For purposes of this issue, collaborative

management is defined as the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organiza- tions. Where traditional administration relied primarily on organizational structure to

shape administrative action, collaborative management is more fluid, thus requiring managers to shift from structure to process for leverage. Thus, the needed skill set of

public managers has changed to one that heavily emphasizes negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and collaborative problem solving.

For more information on this special issue of PAR, or if you wish to submit an article for consideration, contact David Lampe, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center, 303-352-3873.


