War and Peace
Shaping Politics in Reformation Germany after the Battle of Lepanto*
Stefan Hanß (Cambridge)
[…] l’Imp[er].re non farà alcuna risolutione ch[e] prima non si facci una dieta
Imperiale, per no[n] priuarsi dell’auisi che li dan[n]o i stato dell’Imperio ne’i
bisogni di guerra, talmente che s’entrasse in lega, et massime col Pappa, farebbe
mouere i uermi à questa natione, che dubitarebbe di peggio, di maniera ch[e] per
tutti i detti rispetti, la cosa si ne pascerà in discorsi et bone parolle […]
Comment of the Genoese diplomatic agente Georgi, Vienna, 7 November 1571,
Archivio di Stato di Genova, Archivio Segreto, 2525, m. 8, fol. 2r.
“As if any Christian leader could be neutral when the cause of Christ was at
stake. Yet neutral they were, many of them, most of them. […] in Germany as in
the Netherlands and in England they thought to serve Jesus Christ by hating his
sweet Mother…. The Emperor in Vienna—a weak, vacillating man, content to
buy peace from the Sultan.”
L. de Wohl, The Last Crusader: A Novel about Don John of Austria (San Francisco:
Ignatius, 2010 [1956]), 402 f.
Religion, Politics and History
This article challenges and reconsiders one of the most popular narratives of the
historiography of the Battle of Lepanto; that ever since the ‘Holy League’ of Spain,
Venice, Rome and several smaller Catholic principalities defeated the Ottomans in the
Ionian Sea in October 1571, historians assumed that the reason the Holy Roman Empire
did not support the league was a direct consequence of the Reformation. Strong
Protestant interests at court and in the territorial estates within the Empire, it has been
argued, prevented the Catholic monarch from joining the military campaign against the
Ottomans.1 However, I argue that this approach perpetuates an early modern Catholic
interpretation that established the narrative of a Christian victory over ‘infidels’ by
drawing parallels between Ottoman Muslims and German Lutherans.
Already in 1571, Italian diplomats residing at the Imperial Court ascribed the
emperor’s indecisiveness to the influence of Protestants. In this tradition, it has been
argued that the strong position of Protestant factions prevented the multiconfessional
Holy Roman Empire from joining the league. Yet, German, Latin, Italian and Spanish
archival sources document the negotiations leading up to an Imperial Diet that was to
decide whether the Empire would join the league against the Ottomans. Before the
decision-making process came to its end, however, Venice signed a peace treaty with the
Ottoman Empire that made the league collapse; and the question of imperial support
lost its political urgency. The reports of Imperial diplomats who travelled to Catholic,
Lutheran and Calvinist princes in the direct aftermath of the battle suggest that
reservations and enthusiasm for the treaty alike were shared across the confessional
divide. The lengthy process of political decision-making leading up to the Imperial Diet
demonstrates that Reformation Germany was engaged in pragmatic politics towards the
Ottomans that move beyond the paradigms of Türkenfurcht and Türkenhoffnung, based
on confessionalism. In that sense, this article is not another political history of the Battle
of Lepanto; rather, it aims to reveal the degree to which religious opinions in general,
and early modern confessional polemics in particular, shaped the political memory of
1
this battle. Thus, this article reflects on how religion in the past moulded the production
of history.2
External Perspectives: Attempts to Convince the Emperor
Soon after the formation of the ‘Holy League’ in May 1571, high-ranking Catholic clerics
and diplomats approached Emperor Maximilian II to join. Cardinal Marcantonio Amulio,
for instance, informed the Emperor about his hope that the maritime fleet’s success will
soon be duplicated by the actions of the Imperial forces. The Papal nuncio informed the
Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Veit von Dornberg, about the alliance. The Augsburg
Cardinal Otto von Waldburg asked Maximilian to grant the Papal legate Giovanni
Commendone special audiences for discussing the Empire’s possible contribution.3 Soon
after the Commendone’s arrival in Vienna, the legate as well as the Papal nuncio at the
Imperial court, Giovanni Delfino, intensified their efforts to entice the Emperor to join
the league by making use of ever more and ever longer audiences with him.4 Soon
thereafter rumours spread in Vienna, Prague, Brandenburg and Rome that Maximilian
was keen to support the league.5 In response to the many pro-league statements of
Habsburg residents abroad, the Emperor had indeed stated just a few weeks earlier that
2 HHStA, Ungarische Akten, Fasz. 97, Konv. A, 7r, Maximilian II to Adam von Dietrichstein, Prague, 30 January 1571; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, I, 109r, Veit von Dornberg, Habsburg ambassador in Venice, to the Imperial Court, Venice, 1 April 1570; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, III, Veit von Dornberg to the Imperial Court, Venice, 6 May 1571, 1r.
3 ASFi, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, 3110, 659r, Fabrizio Ferraro to Cosimo I de’ Medici, Milan, 30 January 1572; J. Rainer, Nuntius G. Delfino und Kardinallegat G. F. Commendone, 173-174 (Giovanni Delfino to Girolamo Rusticucci, Vienna, 21 November 1571, the audience took place on 20 November 1571); HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 92r-93v, Francisco de Mendoza to Maximilian II, Rome, 12 July 1572.
4 G. Khevenhüller-Metsch (ed.), Hans Khevenhüller an Kaiser Maximilian II. 1571-1574: Die geheime Korrespondenz des Kaiserlichen Botschafters am Königlich Spanischen Hof, vol. 1/1 (s.l.: s.n., s.a.) (HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 8, 20), 16v, Hans Khevenhüller to Maximilian II, Madrid, 26 November 1571 (HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 8, 2, 24r-27v).
the alliance was an “indispensable deed of universal Christendom” (gemaine
Christenhait hochnotwendigs werck).6
Still, in October 1571 Commendone himself informed Maximilian about the
victory of Lepanto by stating that only the Emperor’s support would enable the conquest
of Istanbul the following year. Commendone furthermore assumed that the Emperor’s
consent might also convince the Polish king to join the league, whose reservations were
ascribed to Protestant sympathies.7 The receipt of a Papal breve on Lepanto provided
another opportunity for Commendone to renew his pressure in early November which
was then reiterated by the local Venetian diplomat.8 Philipp II and Don John of Austria
likewise sent special envoys, Pietro Fassardo and Fernando de Mendoza, to Vienna to
advance the negotiations.9 In addition to all of this, the German Cardinal Waldburg
dispatched a letter from Rome, informing Maximilian that God had granted this
“Christian victory” against “Christendom’s entire common hereditary enemy”. As the
Emperor was a Christian monarch, the cardinal solicited that Maximilian may join this
5 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 12r-23v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 7 March 1572; ibid., 28r-35v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 19 March 1572; W. Schulze, Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16. Jahrhundert: Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung (Munich: Beck, 1978), 67-301; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 42-1; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 53-1; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München [hereafter BHStAM], Pfalz-Neuburg, Akten, 1967; P. Fuchs, “Philipp Ludwig,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, eds. Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 383.
6 Ibid., 28r-35v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 19 March 1572.
7 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 47r-50v, Wilhelm von Rosenberg to Maximilian II, s.l., 25 March 1572 (quote ibid, 48v); ibid., 1r-7v, John George of Brandenburg to Maximilian II, Cölln/ Berlin, 29 February 1572 (quote ibid., 2v-3v); ibid., 8r-11v, August of Saxony to Maximilian II, Dresden, 23 February 1572.
8 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.
9 R. Jordan, “Der Kurfürstentag zu Mühlhausen 1572,” Mühlhäuser Geschichtsblätter: Zeitschrift des Altertumsvereins für Mühlhausen i. Thür. und Umgegend 5 (1904/1905), 2; A. P. Luttenberger, Kurfürsten, Kaiser und Reich, 219-241; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 53r-56v, Johann Hegenmüller and Philipp von Winnenberg to Maximilian II, Heidelberg, 3 April 1572; HHStA, Reichsarchive, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 63, protocol. The Stadtarchiv Mühlhausen [hereafter StadtAMühlhausen], 10/G 26 Nr. 1 contains logistic documents regarding the administration of the college of electors (e.g. expenses for fish and beer).
“Christian ribbon/bond (Bandt)” amongst “all, or at least most, Christian potentates”.
The victory was celebrated in cities like Vienna, among others, as a result of God’s
benevolence. The cardinal continued that the Battle of Lepanto implied that it would
certainly be followed by further future victories against the Ottomans, which would
elevate the honour of the Emperor. “The occasion is convenient, the opportunity not
small.”10 Pope Pius V encouraged Cardinal Amulio to dispatch another letter to Vienna, in
which future imagined consequences were outlined in greater detail: After Lepanto, the
Emperor could conquer Hungary and further territories whilst the League would invade
the Levant, the Near East and Northern Africa.11
The Habsburg ambassador in Madrid, Hans Khevenhüller, informed Maximilian
that everyone at the Spanish court assumed the Emperor’s imminent accession to the
League, yet he warned against any hasty actions by the Emperor.12 Given the significant
10 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 12r-23v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 7 March 1572; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 3, 50r-61v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 15 March 1573; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 36r-43v, Lazarus Schwendi to Maximilian II, Kientzheim, 22 March 1572; ibid., 27r-30v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 4 March 1573; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 3, 64r-67v, Johann Hegenmüller to Maximilian II, Augsburg, 22 March 1573; ibid., 31r-38v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 4. March 1573; ibid., 39r-40v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 5 March 1573; ibid., 41r-42v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 5 March 1573; ibid., 68r-69v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 23 March 1573; ibid., 21r-26v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 4 March 1573.
11 My translation of the poem reads: “Venice, my true fatherland are thou!/ Moreover, Miss Betrayal is my mother!/ Of ungodly manner and bad honour,/ Of such a spite kin is my origin/ That neither anything noble nor anything honorable is mine/ As it becomes completely evident now./ First, I put the laudable Emperor/ In danger, when he has not been a daredevil for me,/ So that I carried the Turk in the sea/ On my back through my knavery./ At the beginning, I pretended to be the Turk’s enemy./ However, when it took me too much efforts and money/ I soon forgot what I had shown myself to be!/ After eschewing the Pope and Spain,/ With the Turk I signed a nefarious peace treaty/ Even though it annoyed entire Christianity./ Indeed, just like Venetian moneybags/ I offered disgrace and remained an archbetrayer!” The poem’s rime reproduces the word “betrayer”. GStA PK, I. HA, Geheimer Rat, Rep. 11 Auswärtige Beziehungen, Akten, Nr. 11253, 42r-45v: 45r, Roman and Venetian avvisi, 2 May and 5 May 1573; ibid., 46r-50v, Venetian avviso (via Vienna), 13 March 1574; ibid., 51r-52v, Venetian avviso, 22 October 1574.
12 HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Rom, Hofkorrespondenz, 5, Fasz. II, Cardinal Marcantonio Amulio to Maximilian II, Rome, 27 October 1571, 55v: Tutti i Principi Christiani sono quasi come membri d’un capo principale, e questo è l’Jmperatore; et non conuiene alla Jmperiale dignità, che li membri faccino la guerra senza il capo.
pressure that Cardinals Morone and Farnese, as well as Venetian observers, put on
Habsburg residents abroad, Maximilian received further letters from Rome and Venice
in which Habsburg diplomats called on the Emperor to act. Yet his response did not
communicate any positive decision; this caused utter astonishment amongst many
contemporaries, such as the Swiss nobleman Nicolaus Polweiler.13 The Emperor’s official
letter of congratulations to the Pope, however, shortly after Lepanto aroused further
hopes in Genoa, Madrid, Rome and Venice whose diplomats reassured each other in
mutual correspondence about the imminent intent of the Emperor to join the Holy
League.14
Internal Perspectives: Political Debates in the German lands
In their optimism, Italian and Spanish observers failed to understand that the Emperor’s
indecision was embedded in a complex political system of decision-making. When
receiving an ever-growing number of requests to join the League, Maximilian asked the
highest political authorities, as well as his closest counsellors, for advice. Responses
followed promptly. Archduke of Austria Charles II warned his brother against
expressing any commitment towards the members of the Holy League. The Empire’s
frontier fortifications and border troops were in a miserable state and the stability of the
alliance, he continued, was anything but clear. Archduke Ferdinand II shared this point
of view and pointed to the advanced age of the Pope as well as the Venetians’ general
interest in peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Ferdinand
emphasised the attitude of reluctant local authorities towards the Türkensteuern, the
13 B. Stollberg-Rilinger/ A. Krischer (eds.), Herstellung und Darstellung von Entscheidungen: Verfahren, Verwalten und Verhandeln in der Vormoderne (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010).
14 ASGe, Archivio Segreto, 2525, m. 8, first letter of the agente Georgi sent to Genoa, Vienna, 7 November 1571, 2r.
taxes which the German estates were obliged to pay in order to support the Emperor in
his – potential – combat with the Ottomans. Indeed, the Archduke of Further Austria had
very good reasons to draw the Emperor’s attention to this point. Although the Imperial
Diet in Regensburg in 1567 had doubled the tax, payments were still due when the
discussions about the Empire’s possible support of the league reached its peak in
1571/72. Entire villages still refused to pay the Türkensteuer, which had been due since
1557. Attempts at double taxation furthermore decreased the subjects’ willingness to
pay these dues. Circulating the payment demands within their territories took months,
even for political supporters of the taxes such as the Lutheran Count Palatine of
Neuburg.15
The most crucial objection to the Empire’s accession to the Holy League, however,
was the existing peace treaty between the Emperor and the Sultan. The latter’s interest
in maintaining this agreement became obvious when Selim II commanded the beylerbey
of Buda to prohibit any possible violations of this treaty in the Habsburg-Ottoman
frontier zone. The command, which was issued on 31 Shabʿān 979/ 18 January 1572,
was also dispatched to Vienna.16 Given the treaty’s validity, Archduke Charles
highlighted emphatically that military actions against the Ottomans would signify an
“offensive war” (offensiffkrieg).17 Ferdinand, however, explained that the many previous
15 HHStA, Ungarische Akten, Fasz. 97, Konv. A, 7r, Maximilian II to Adam von Dietrichstein, Prague, 30 January 1571; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, I, 109r, Veit von Dornberg, Habsburg ambassador in Venice, to the Imperial Court, Venice, 1 April 1570; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, III, Veit von Dornberg to the Imperial Court, Venice, 6 May 1571, 1r.
16 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 12r-23v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 7 March 1572; ibid., 28r-35v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 19 March 1572; W. Schulze, Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16. Jahrhundert: Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung (Munich: Beck, 1978), 67-301; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 42-1; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 53-1; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München [hereafter BHStAM], Pfalz-Neuburg, Akten, 1967; P. Fuchs, “Philipp Ludwig,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, eds. Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 383.
17 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.
border disputes might provide sufficient reasons for attacks, especially as the Holy
League’s victory indicated that God would support the war against the Ottomans. Yet
despite faith in God, a proper military plan was needed to put such ideas into practice.18
As the response of the Emperor’s military councillor strongly urged restraint, however,
such plans were soon abandoned. Lazarus Schwendi, the Austrian commander, had
outlined the very same objections as both archdukes did, and Schwendi furthermore
stated that the Ottomans might be defeated at sea but their position at land is surely
much stronger. He not only mentioned the considerable costs of such a military
campaign, but also indicated that there was bad morale among the soldiers and it was
not certain France and the Imperial estates would support such a campaign. The sheer
effort of preparation for a war against the Ottomans could not be kept secret and would
banish any hope for a victory. “According to all reason and experience”, he strongly
discouraged the Emperor from joining the League to fight the Ottomans.19
After Lepanto, Emperor Maximilian II also dispatched special envoys to the
electoral princes to discuss the possibility of joining the League. As one of the envoys,
the Bohemian magnate Wilhelm von Rosenberg presented the issue during several
audiences in Dresden in February 1572. August, Elector of Saxony, expressed the very
same concerns and hopes as many of his contemporaries did, to which he impored
18 My translation of the poem reads: “Venice, my true fatherland are thou!/ Moreover, Miss Betrayal is my mother!/ Of ungodly manner and bad honour,/ Of such a spite kin is my origin/ That neither anything noble nor anything honorable is mine/ As it becomes completely evident now./ First, I put the laudable Emperor/ In danger, when he has not been a daredevil for me,/ So that I carried the Turk in the sea/ On my back through my knavery./ At the beginning, I pretended to be the Turk’s enemy./ However, when it took me too much efforts and money/ I soon forgot what I had shown myself to be!/ After eschewing the Pope and Spain,/ With the Turk I signed a nefarious peace treaty/ Even though it annoyed entire Christianity./ Indeed, just like Venetian moneybags/ I offered disgrace and remained an archbetrayer!” The poem’s rime reproduces the word “betrayer”. GStA PK, I. HA, Geheimer Rat, Rep. 11 Auswärtige Beziehungen, Akten, Nr. 11253, 42r-45v: 45r, Roman and Venetian avvisi, 2 May and 5 May 1573; ibid., 46r-50v, Venetian avviso (via Vienna), 13 March 1574; ibid., 51r-52v, Venetian avviso, 22 October 1574.
19 ASGe, Archivio Segreto, 2525, m. 8, first letter of the agente Georgi sent to Genoa, Vienna, 7 November 1571, 2r.
Maximilliam to call for an Imperial Diet that might decide on the issue. On the one hand,
August hoped that other monarchs, such as those of France, England, Denmark, Poland,
Sweden and Scotland would join the Holy League. On the other, he hoped that such an
important question could be discussed in Consens by all members of the Empire, even
though Rosenberg informed him about Maximilian’s hope to decide on this matter
rather soon.20 Still, in the very same month, Rosenberg presented the issue during
various audiences in front of John George of Brandenburg who obviously felt
uncomfortable with the pressure that the envoy put on him. First, the Prince-elector,
who had only held this rank for a few months, wished to have one or two councillors
present during the audience, as his “bad memory” would impede him from making a
good political decision. Second, John George asked for a written enquiry, so Rosenberg
presented the Emperor’s instructions which, though issued for private purposes, had
been already revealed during the audience in Dresden. In Berlin, the Prince-elector
likewise responded and asked for an Imperial Diet to decide on a possible accession to
the League given the “current dangerous and evil times and events, in which much more
harmful mistrust, schism and discord prevails between Christian kings and potentates
than just and true trust and Christian unity”. Rosenberg hinted at the importance of time
as a factor: if the decision was not to be made soon after Lepanto, the Emperor might be
blamed for any possible bad consequences that followed. Yet his appeal was in vain,
even though the Prince-elector understood war against the Ottomans as a “Christian
deed”. The issue was so important that John George, just like August, wished it to be
discussed at an Imperial Diet.21 The Imperial councillor Johann Hegenmüller and the
President of the Aulic Council, Philipp von Winnenberg, both special envoys for
20 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.
21 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.
negotiating a possible accession to the Holy League, faced similar responses in audiences
with the Prince-electors of Cologne, Mainz, the Palatinate and Trier. The Archbishop-
Elector of Mainz understood the League’s victory at Lepanto as offering a chance of a
military success over the Ottomans, yet he also pointed to the difficulties that would
occur when fighting the Ottomans. Just like the Archbishop of Cologne, he pleaded that
the matter should be decided in the college of all electors. The Count Palatine even
refused to provide any direct response to the matter, stating that he would inform the
Emperor in due course.22
Thus, Maximilian received reserved responses across the confessional divide.
Even the Catholic Duke of Bavaria referred to these same strategic reservations and
asked the Emperor not to join the League.23 All electors wished the matter to be
discussed either amongst each other or at an Imperial Diet that would include the
imperial estates in the decision-making process. Such responses were not surprising, as
the possibility of supporting Venice in a war with the Ottoman Empire was already
discussed during the Imperial Diet at Speyer in 1570.24 Just a few weeks after the arrival
of the news of Lepanto in Vienna, Commendone informed Rome that the Emperor
expected to convene an Imperial Diet to decide the possibility of supporting the
League.25 This was exactly the position of the Lutheran prince-electors. Shortly after the
audiences in spring 1572, however, the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony agreed to
discuss the issue in the college of electors. When the Calvinist Count Palatine
Frederick III failed in his attempt to convince the Catholic Archchancellor of Mainz to
proceed in finding a resolution without the Lutheran electors of Saxony and
22
23
24
25
Brandenburg, Frederick III also gave his consent for a general college of all prince-
electors. Hegenmüller presented this result as a success in front of the Emperor, stating
that the estates usually follow the resolution of the electors.26 The councillors of the
electors then met in Mühlhausen, Thuringia, in July 1572. Here, it was again impossible
to come to a shared resolution in favour of or against the matter. Whilst Lutheran
Saxony and Catholic Trier openly argued in favour of joining the League, the Calvinist
Count Palatine was afraid that the money would be used to fight the Protestants instead
of the Ottomans. As a possible accession to the League that necessitated the estates’
decision about issues of financing, the prince-electors agreed to ask the Emperor to
convene an Imperial Diet.27
The Long-Drawn-Out Nature and Irrelevance of Political Decision-Making
When the maritime season, and thus the season of warfare, commenced again in early
1573, however, the Emperor had still not convened an Imperial Diet. On the contrary, in
light of the cross-confessional diffidence he even instructed Habsburg ambassadors
abroad, such as Adam von Dietrichstein in Spain, to respond firmly in front of foreign
monarchs who called on the Emperor to act.28 Since the League’s members continued to
approach him, Maximilian again asked the highest political figures in the German lands
to comment on the issue and the entire procedure of the previous year started again.
The fact that Maximilian sent at least three letters to Archduke Ferdinand, asking him to
comment on the question, demonstrates both the reluctance of the correspondent and
26
27
28
the significance that this correspondence obviously had on the Emperor.29 In their
responses, Charles, Ferdinand and the Duke of Bavaria emphasized that an Imperial Diet
should take place very soon, as the Emperor’s honour would be seriously damaged
otherwise. Whilst Charles and Albert V of Bavaria openly favoured supporting the
League and fighting the Ottomans, primarily because of rumours that Portugal was
willing to join the League, Ferdinand reminded the Emperor of circulating rumours that
Venice was negotiating with the Ottomans. He also pointed out the immense financial
burdens that such a war would cause the Holy Roman Empire.30
When the special envoys Rosenberg, Hegenmüller and Winnenberg confronted
the prince-electors with the question of a possible accession to the Holy League in 1573,
the Mühlhausen resolution of the previous year did not leave much scope for
interpretations and actions different to 1572. The Elector of Saxony and the archbishop
of Mainz, for instance, both reminded the Emperor’s envoys of the necessity to call an
Imperial Diet. In informal conversations, however, Hegenmüller was informed by the
archbishop about his wish to support the League. Yet, he had serious concerns whether
all the prince-electors and subjects would actually be willing to do so.31 Hegenmüller and
Winnenberg arrived in Heidelberg on 18 April 1573, staying overnight in a lodging
house with excellent wine. The following morning, they entered the castle to discuss the
question with the Count Palatine over lunch. As soon as they arrived, Frederick III
informed them of the fact that Venice had signed a separate peace treaty with the
Ottomans. In the meantime, the Calvinist Count Palatine informed the Emperor’s envoys,
that the son of the Venetian diplomatic resident in Istanbul had arrived in Venice to
report on the results of the negotiations with the Ottomans, and the papal and Spanish
29
30
31
residents had also been informed by the Doge. This new information obviously
undermined the envoys’ diplomatic mission. “For our part”, Hegenmüller states in the
letter which he dispatched to Vienna, “we didn’t say any further word about this.” When
returning to their rooms the very same day, the envoys found letters in which the Duke
of Bavaria confirmed the news.32
Such news rapidly spread all over the German lands. During the very same days,
for instance, the prince-elector of Brandenburg also received a Venetian newsletter
(Zeytung) that reported on the peace treaty. The local correspondent and news agent
was obviously so aghast that he added a satirical song which blamed the “betrayer”
Venice in a catchy rime:
Venedig mein Rechts Vater Landt bist du, V
Fraw verretereÿ ist mein muter d[ar]zu
Einer Gotlosen art vnnd schlechten ehr. E
Von solchem Argen schlecht khom Jch her.
Nix adelichs, noch Erbarlichs ist bei mir zwar R
Wie es dann gentzlichen Jetzt wirdt offenbar
Erstlichen den loblichen kheiser in gefahr, R
Jch gem gebracht, wo er mir zu witzig nit gwest wer
Damit Jch durch mein furgenohmen puben stuck E
Den Turcken in d[a]z Meer Luedt vf den ruck
Jm Anfangk Jch mich, als des Türck[en] feindt stelt T
Aber wie es mir wolt nehmen zuuil muhe vnd gelt,
Garbalt Jch vergaß, weß ich mich erzeigt hett T
Dem Bapst vnd Hispanien ich enthalt[en] thet
Ein schendlich[en] friedt ich mit dem Turcken beschloß E
32
Obs gleich die gantz Christenheit verdroß
Recht Alls ein pfeffer sack vnnd Venedig[er] R
Gab Jch Schandt vnnd bleib ein ertzverreter.33
Given such widely circulating news, Hegenmüller and Winnenberg hurried on with their
diplomatic mission. Neither the archbishop of Trier nor that of Cologne was informed
about the new political agreement when the Imperial envoys arrived. The clerics
therefore agreed to debate with the other Rhenish prince-electors about the possibility
of joining the League during the Probationstag in Mainz on 1 May 1573. When the
envoys briefly informed the archbishop of Trier about the rumours of a Venetian-
Ottoman peace treaty after that decision had been made, the Trier Landhofmeister von
Reiffenberg, who was present at the audience, replied furiously: “if this has happened, it
would be the most dishonourable thing that has ever happened in the history of
humankind.”34 When the rumours proved to be true, the issue of support, which has
been discussed by then for years, lost its political momentum.
Reassessing Historiographical Narratives: Catholic Views on Reformation
Germany
In the end, it was not solely the Emperor who decided about the Empire’s neutrality.
Catholic diplomats misunderstood the important role of political decision-making in
sixteenth-century Germany when repeatedly approaching Maximilian II in letters and
audiences. When praising the result of the battle as a Christian victory, they were
seeking the Emperor’s support by referring to his role as a Christian monarch. Knowing
33
34
about the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire as a “body with head and
limbs”,35 the Cardinals approached Maximilian as the “principal head” of all “Christian
princes” who should decide whether to join the Holy League or not.36 At the same time,
other Catholic diplomats were aware of this fact and tried to influence such processes of
decision-making by using Christian rhetoric to underline the importance of the Battle of
Lepanto.
Such post-Lepanto rhetoric, however, did not convince the Emperor, given the
“counter movement” (kegenbewegnus) that he faced when asking the most significant
political figures of the Empire for advice on whether or not joining the League would be
wise. Such reservations, in fact, did not rely on the confessional divide but rather
bridged the confessional diversity of Reformation Germany.37 Indeed, joy at the victory
was similarly shared across confessions. All across the Holy Roman Empire, Lutherans
and Catholics celebrated the result of the Battle of Lepanto in services, masses and
festival processions for weeks after the arrival of the news.38 Nevertheless, the Holy
Roman Empire did not support the Holy League. As outlined above, the main reason for
this was constitutional, for political decision-making in the Empire was processual in
character.39 Whilst protagonists initially interpreted the calling of a college of electors as
a consensus-building and time-saving solution, which would pre-define or even obviate
an Imperial Diet, it finally turned out to be a procedure which inhibited the Emperor’s
timely decision-making with respect to the Holy League. However, this procedure was
never consciously intended to cause delay. The Mühlhausen resolution codified the
35
36
37
38
39
electors’ position and thus prevented them from reacting in a more flexible and prompt
manner in the following months. Such processes of decision-making took a great deal of
time, yet they ensured the inclusion of various opinions and guaranteed that decisions
were based on a wide consensus. As a consequence, agents changed their points of view
throughout this process. Archduke Charles, for instance, first argued against and later in
favour of supporting the League. Above all, however, such points of view were not
primarily related to confessional identities. In Mühlhausen in 1572, for instance,
Lutheran Saxony and Catholic Trier argued for and the Calvinist Palatinate against
joining the League. In the Holy Roman Empire of the 1570s, thus, political decision-
making was a processual act that included Catholics, Lutherans and Reformed
Lutherans. The diverse confessional landscape, however, did not predefine political
positions when the accession to the Holy League was open to debate. On the contrary,
concrete military, strategic, diplomatic and internal concerns were shared across the
confessional divide; a fact, which prevented the Emperor, who indeed still had
reservations against the de Medici, to declare a clear position.40 The highly ritualised
processual character of the Holy Roman Empire’s culture of political decision-making,
however, made the necessity of coming to a decision itself obsolete after the Venetian-
Ottoman peace treaty had been signed in 1573. The issue of support was no longer
pressing as the league did not exist any longer.
Why then are explanations which refer to a Lutheran opposition to the Holy
League so prominent when discussing the Empire’s neutrality in this scenario?41
Historians of the Battle of Lepanto have often argued for this as they have usually only
consulted Italian or Spanish sources. When describing the responses to the battle in the
German lands, however, they simply adopted the most prominent topos of sixteenth-
40
41
century Catholic diplomats. Italian envoys faced the negotiations between Commendone
and Maximilian with considerable scepticism. A Genuese diplomat reported in
November 1571 that the Emperor, indeed, received the Papal legate quite often. Yet,
such audiences did not lead to more than “nice words”. Maximilian would probably only
decide on this issue after an Imperial Diet had taken place. The Genoese agent
considered this to be a precaution of the Emperor as the decision to support the Pope
“would set the worms [i. e. the Lutherans] of this nation in motion”.42 This observation,
however, was itself a confessional polemic as it drew an implicite parallel between
Lutherans and Ottomans for the sake of presenting Catholics as the true proponents of
the Christian faith. When the discursive dichotomies of ‘believers’ and ‘infidels’, which
labelled Lepanto as a ‘Christian victory’, did not match the realities they tried to
describe, contemporaries could refer to such topoi for explaining the neutrality of the
Holy Roman Empire as a result of ‘Protestant guilt’. Contemporaries described the
victory as la rotta which had broken the idea of the invincibility of the Ottomans.43 The
Genoese diplomat reflected this rhetoric when stating in a disillusioned manner: “But
who knows, what this victory did not shatter (rotto).”44 It is time to break the
unquestioned longevity of such interpretations in historiography and popular
imagination that ultimately rely on early modern confessional polemics. Indeed, such
explanations do not mirror the complexity of the past. Dissent was widespread amongst
Catholics and Protestants alike. As a consequence, confessional identities mattered less
than pragmatic politics towards the Ottomans.
42
43
44