M.P. LYNCH

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL

PICKPOCKET

ABSTRACT. A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that

zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this pre-vailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could betransformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious.

Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think youare in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some importantpositions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our

own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefsabout our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject thelogical possibility of zombies.

A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zom-bies are logically possible. I will argue, via a thought experiment, thatif this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into azombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, Iam not certain that I am conscious.

Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psy-chology; I think you are in the same position. This means that wemust revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy ofmind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own con-sciousness. But I suggest that we should actually reject the logicalpossibility of zombies.

Others have worried that the logical possibility of zombies impliesthat you or I might be one (e.g., Dennett, 1991, see also Bayne 2001).The case of the phenomenal pickpocket shows us why we must takethis worry seriously.

1. There are several different senses of the word ‘‘consciousness’’. I amconcerned with the phenomenal sense. I am conscious in this way inthat there is something that it is like to be me. Accordingly, a mentalstate is conscious in this way when there is something it is like to be inthat mental state, when it has a particular qualitative feel or aspect. Ifwe assume for the sake of argument that I am conscious in this sensewhen I have some qualitatively conscious mental states, then

Synthese (2006) 149: 37–58 � Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-6241-3

(1) I am certain that I have qualitatively conscious mental states or experiences.

In saying that I am certain that I have at least some qualitativelyconscious mental states, I mean that I am able to justifiably rule out allpossibilities that I do not have conscious mental states.1 Alternatively,we might say that I know that I have such states in the strongest senseof ‘‘know’’, or that I am conclusively justified in believing that I havesuch states. Certainty is a much stronger epistemic category thanknowledge in the usual sense of ‘‘knowledge’’ – the sense in which wesay that we know that we have enoughmoney to pay the bill, or that weknow where our car is parked. Obviously, the same can be said for therelationship between certainty and mere justification; I have manyjustified beliefs that are not certain. So we should modify (1) a little toaccount for some small misgivings. For one thing, no one is certainthat they will be conscious in the future. You might even doubt thatyou were conscious yesterday (perhaps your memory has been al-tered). Further, you probably aren’t certain that every state of yourmind is conscious. So I’ll stipulate that (1) is equivalent to

(1a) I am certain that I have some qualitatively conscious mental states now.

Few things in life are certain. But for most people, (1) will beamong them, and requires no argument. But if arguments are needed,here are three. First, try to seriously consider the thought that

(C-): I am having no qualitatively conscious thoughts right now.

I would be surprised if you can do so. To consider (C-) requires aconscious thought with a distinctive qualitative feel (some of mystudents describe it as ‘making their head hurt’). Thus it is impossibleto consciously entertain that (C-) is true. To even consciously con-sider the thought that I am not conscious I must have at least oneconscious thought. Therefore, it seems as if I can rule out the pos-sibility that I am not conscious now simply by consciously wonderingwhether it is true. And that strongly suggests that (1) is true.

Not everyone may be convinced by this argument. Some, forexample, may not find (C-) to have a qualitative feel; if so, then perhapsI might unconsciously consider whether (C-) is true. Therefore, here isanother, and perhaps more intuitive route to the same conclusion. Onereason to think that a proposition is certain is that you can’t imaginethat it is false. I can’t imagine that I am having no conscious, phe-nomenal experience now. This is not only because imagining is a formof conscious thought, it is because imagining myself without any

M.P. LYNCH38

conscious experience is imagining nothing. It is similar to trying toimagine what it would be like to be dead (right now). This provides mewith another good reason for thinking (1) is true.

Finally, some might give a transcendental argument of sorts of (1).It seems to many that certainty of my own consciousness is a logicalpresupposition of any discussion of the subject (Chalmers, 1996, p.193; see also Strawson, 1994, p. 101–103). These philosophers believethat an appeal to my own first-person experiences is the conceptualstarting point of any investigation of consciousness. Such states ofmind act as the necessary ground on which to build third-personexplanations of consciousness. Without them, the ‘‘problem of con-sciousness’’ wouldn’t even make sense. From these facts we canreason in reverse, or transcendentally. Since the problem of con-sciousness does make sense, we must have at least some consciousexperience. This suggests, we might think, that (1) is true.

Appreciated individually, these arguments are perhaps not con-clusive. But taken together, they make (1) very plausible. Yet,together with some additional premises, I shall argue that if

(2) Zombies are logically possible

is true, then (1) must be false.In the sense of the term I am concerned with, a ‘‘zombie’’ is an

imaginary being which is a perfect physical duplicate of a humanbeing but which lacks phenomenal experience. This type of zombiehas received quite a bit of attention over the last decade.2 Except forthe fact that it completely lacks any qualia, my zombie ‘‘twin’’ wouldbe identical to me in every conceivable respect – e.g., functionally,psychologically, biologically and chemically (ibid., 94–95). We wouldboth react in the same way to stimuli, process information identicallyand even share all the same beliefs – at least in a minimal or func-tional sense of ‘‘belief ’’ according to which beliefs are not essentiallyqualitative. A minimal belief (as I’ll call it) is a functional state,understood in terms of its causal connections to the environment,behavior and other mental states. Many philosophers obviously takeminimal beliefs to be beliefs proper. Others demur. But followingChalmers, (1996,174) I’ll lay this issue aside, and use ‘‘minimalbeliefs’’ as a term for ‘‘whatever what is left of a belief after anyassociated phenomenal quality is subtracted’’.

Presumably, then, my zombie twin would share not only myminimal beliefs about the external environment; it would also sharemy minimal phenomenal beliefs, or the judgments I make about my

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 39

conscious experience. Phenomenal beliefs, like beliefs generally, canbe sorted into many different types. For the moment, we can dis-tinguish between basic and non-basic phenomenal beliefs.3 Basicphenomenal beliefs are beliefs about particular conscious experiencesand about particular kinds of conscious experiences. Examples in-clude my belief that the wine tastes fine, that the ache in my back ismuch sharper today than yesterday, and that hunger pangs can varyin their intensity. My zombie twin will have the same basic phe-nomenal beliefs that I have, but since he is not conscious, his will befalse, while mine (most likely) will be true. Non-basic phenomenalbeliefs, on the other hand, are beliefs about conscious experiences ingeneral. This includes the belief that I have some conscious mentalstates, but also peculiarly philosophical beliefs about consciousness,such as understanding the nature of consciousness is difficult. Myzombie twin will also have these beliefs. Some of his non-basic phe-nomenal beliefs – such as his belief that he is conscious – will clearlybe false, for their truth depends on the truth of his more basic phe-nomenal beliefs. Some others may not be true (such as his belief thatthere are conscious beings, or that consciousness is difficult toexplain).

Zombies of this sort seem naturally impossible, not to mentionimplausible. Claim (2) is that zombies are merely logically possible.We can say that a situation is logically possible just when it is notcontradictory. Since there appears to be no contradiction in some-thing that is otherwise identical to a normal adult human being nothaving any qualia, it would appear that zombies are logically possi-ble.4 This does not prove that zombies are logically possible. But itdoes make that claim very plausible, barring further argument.

Of course it is controversial what – if anything – the logical pos-sibility of zombies implies. Some philosophers see the possibility ofzombies as a threat to materialism; others do not. David Chalmers,for example, uses the logical possibility of zombies to argue thatconsciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical, and hencethe facts about consciousness are not reducible to physical facts – anyphysical facts. Materialist philosophers such as Owen Flanagan andTom Polger, on the other hand, find zombies useful fictions; they helpus test our intuitions about whether consciousness is essential forbeings with our behavioral and functional organization (Flanaganand Polger, 1995, p. 313). In any event, many (although certainly notall) philosophers of mind agree that zombies are logically possible inthe sense I’ve described.

M.P. LYNCH40

Considered just by themselves, claims (1) and (2) certainly appearconsistent. The fact that I could have a zombie twin, after all, doesnot itself imply that I could be a zombie, nor that I am not certainthat I am conscious. For that, one needs an argument.

The strategy appropriate for undermining claims to certainty isfamiliar from traditional skeptical arguments. The skeptic attemptsto make some possibility epistemically real for us by asking us toengage in a thought experiment, one designed to show that we mightbe radically mistaken in some of our beliefs in ways that we had notpreviously imagined. Once we appreciate that fact, the skeptic claims,we can no longer rule out the possibility that such mistakes arehappening now. In what follows, I will adopt this strategy in order toshow that if zombies are logically possible, then contrary to what Ibelieve, I can’t be certain that I have any phenomenally consciousmental states. Specifically, I will argue that

(3) It is logically possible that any particular basic phenomenal belief of mine is nottrue.

And moreover, I will claim that if (2) and (3) are true, then weshould also grant

(4) It is logically possible that all of my basic phenomenal beliefs are not true.

But if (4) is true, then so, I’ll argue, is:

(5) I cannot rule out the possibility that all of my basic phenomenal beliefs are not

true.

If (5), then (1) must be false. For if I cannot rule out the possibilitythat I am mistaken in all my basic phenomenal beliefs right now, thenit is possible that, despite what I believe about my conscious expe-riences, I have none, and thus am a zombie. And if I cannot rule outthe possibility that I am a zombie, then (1) is false; I cannot be certainthat I am conscious right now.5

2. Most of my beliefs about my conscious experiences are true; butit is now widely held, even by the most ardent qualiaphiles, that theycan be mistaken. This is opposed to traditional Cartesian conceptionsof epistemology, according to which my experiences provide conclu-sive support for phenomenal beliefs which are directly about thoseexperiences. On the Cartesian view, while I might be mistaken inbelieving that there is an apple on the table, I can’t be mistaken inbelieving that I seem to see an apple on the table – that I am having an‘‘apple on a table’’ experience.6My having that experience conclusively

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 41

justifies my believing that I am having it – it makes that belief certain.Strong Cartesian foundationalism of this sort is not much in favorthese days; contemporary epistemology finds it difficult to accept thatthe mind has infallible access to its own contents. It seems much moreplausible that inner experience provides defeasible evidence for a beliefthat has that experience as its content (Chalmers, 1996, p. 196–197).

As Chalmers remarks, beliefs about conscious experiences are notinfallible, ‘‘because beliefs about experiences lie at a distance fromexperiences, they can be formed for all sorts of reasons, and some-times unjustified beliefs will be formed. If one is distracted, forexample, one may make judgments about one’s experiences that arequite false’’ (ibid. p. 197). Thus, if I am distracted by our conversa-tion, I may mistakenly believe that the wine tastes fine when in fact ittastes terrible. And of course, distraction is not the only source ofpossible mistakes. Tasting several sweet things may lead me to form afalse expectation that the next taste will be sweet as well, and there-fore judge it to be so before realizing my mistake. An experience ofsomething extremely cold can be mistaken as an experience ofsomething hot. Lust can be mistaken for love and so on. And mis-classification is not the only sort of error I can make in my basicphenomenal believings. I can also falsely believe that I am having aqualitative conscious experience of a certain type when I am not infact having any conscious experience of that type at all. People withblindness denial, for instance, insist that they are having visualexperiences when it is overwhelmingly likely that they are not. Orconsider someone who has chronic pain in some part of her body whoforms a habitual belief that she has such pain. Suppose that she isgiven a shot of what she believes is a placebo but which in fact totallynumbs the part of the body where the pain is located. It seems per-fectly plausible that for a short time, she may continue to believe thatshe is experiencing pain in that part of her body even after she is notin fact experiencing anything in that area.7 So while the reasons mayvary, the facts suggest that our basic phenomenal judgments can andoften are mistaken.

These reflections strongly suggest that (3) is true – that any basicphenomenal belief of mine might not be true. We can bolster the caseeven further by considering what I’ll call the case of the phenomenalpickpocket. As some of us unfortunately know better than others,pickpockets first distract their victims and then lift their possessionswhile the victim’s attention is elsewhere. Now suppose that there is anall-powerful demon with tendencies toward kleptomania. This demon

M.P. LYNCH42

might pick our phenomenal pockets. Specifically, we can imagine thatthe demon can distract me from any particular conscious experiencethat I believe I am having, e.g., when tasting wine. The demon mightarrange for loud noises, or false expectations, or simply ensure that Ibecome wrapped up in philosophical argument. At the very instant Iam distracted, it removes that particular conscious experience (thetaste of the wine) from my mind but leaves the belief that I am havingthat experience intact. Further, it does not replace that experiencewith any other. This also could be done in a variety of ways. Forexample, the demon could prevent me from having an experience of xby fiddling with conditions very far ‘‘downstream’’ from conscious-ness. It might change the physical structure of the relevant objects, orfiddle with my neural processing, therefore removing my ability tohave the experience in question. More directly still, the demon maysimply eliminate or remove the qualia themselves. At the end of theday the exact method the demon employs is irrelevant. As withCartesian skepticism about the external world, we don’t need toknow how the demon accomplishes its task, just that it can. So post-pickpocketing, I will still believe that I am having the experience inquestion. Only now that belief is false, for I won’t be having thatexperience at all. Intuitively, my belief hasn’t changed; but its truth-value has. I just don’t notice that fact.

Beliefs about experiences that are formed while I am attending tothose experiences are less likely to be mistaken. Yet although this istrue, it in no way rules out the possibility of our phenomenal pick-pocket. For I can be wrong about my experiences even when I amattentively examining them. Consider the case of believing (based onfalse expectations) that you are experiencing heat when in truth youare experiencing extreme coldness. Or more damning, consider thatyou can have all sorts of false beliefs about your emotional experi-ences even when you are concentrating intently upon them. Reflectingsincerely on my own state of mind, I might believe that I am notangry at Jim or not in love with Sue even when I am indeed experi-encing both emotions (as Sue or John might attest). I can confuseemotional states for each other no matter how attentive I’m being.(Indeed, when it comes to emotional experiences, being too attentivesometimes seems to add to the confusion). I might confuse jealousyover a lover with concern for her welfare; I might confuse resentmentwith righteous indignation or I might confuse being appropriatelydetached with feeling nothing at all.

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 43

Second, my attention is hardly perfect. It is difficult to know whenI am truly attending to my experience and when I am not. I cansometimes drift off without noticing. Therefore, I can’t rule out thepossibility that I have drifted off – or been led off by our demon – evenwhen I believe I am attending to what I believe are red experiences. Inshort, attentiveness can only guarantee the truth of phenomenal be-liefs to the degree to which it is guaranteed itself. But we can be mis-attentive, and therefore can’t rule out the possibility that we are mis-attentive whenever we are examining our phenomenal beliefs.8

The case phenomenal pickpocket shows that (3) is extremelyplausible. It is logically possible that any one of my phenomenalbeliefs could be mistaken. Does it also show (4) – that all of myphenomenal beliefs could be mistaken? Some may point out that theycan no more imagine the demon removing all of my qualia – andtherefore becoming a zombie – than they can imagine being a zombie.To convince them, we need to provide a more detailed case.

I call this more detailed case the spectrum of experience-removal.Here, we imagine not that the demon steals a single phenomenalexperience, but that he deftly removes them one at a time, untilgradually all are gone. In this way the spectrum helps us to correctlyconceptualize turning into a zombie via phenomenal pickpocketing.At each point on that spectrum, as my experiences are graduallyremoved, I will continue to believe as I would have believed had thoseexperiences remained untouched (see Figure 1 below). So throughoutthe process, I will continue to not only retain my belief that e.g., thewine tastes fine, but I will also have the second-order belief that myexperience is roughly the same as it was a moment ago. From thatsecond-order standpoint, I simply won’t recognize any moment alongthe spectrum when my experience becomes suddenly different.Therefore, I will never detect a difference between any one point onthe spectrum of experience-removal from any other point; so I willnot detect a difference between being fully conscious and beingwithout any conscious experience whatsoever.

Figure 1. The spectrum of experience removal.

M.P. LYNCH44

Compare the case of an ordinary mistake in phenomenal belief –something that we’ve already assumed (for good reason) is possible.At time t1 I believe truly that I am experiencing heat. At t2, forplain old ordinary reasons, I am distracted. At t3 I judge that I amstill experiencing heat but am wrong, and do not notice the mistake.If this is possible (as we are assuming) then even if there is a dif-ference in what seems to be the case from one stage to the next,there can be no difference in my over-all or second-order point ofview between the three temporal stages. If there were a difference inmy second-order reflective stance I wouldn’t be making the mistake.My over-all point of view must remain the same – even and espe-cially in the first-personal sense – or the very idea of making amistake loses all sense whatsoever. Yet if we concede as much in theordinary case, then we must concede the same in the case of thephenomenal pickpocket. This is why it is clearly logically possiblethat all of my qualia are pickpocketed in succession until none areleft. For whether t1 and t2 are moments along the spectrum ofexperience-removal or simply the moments at which an ordinarymisjudgment occurs, my belief remains the same even as my expe-rience changes.

This is not to deny that there are differences between most or-dinary cases of phenomenal misjudgment and what happens duringthe spectrum. In most ordinary cases, we are having some kind ofqualitative experience (e.g., a particular visual experience) but mis-describing it as another visual experience. In the case of the phe-nomenal pickpocket, however, the evil demon is removing myconscious visual qualia but not putting anything – not even othervisual qualia – ‘‘in their place’’. While this is true, we need to keeptwo important facts in mind. First, as I pointed above, mis-classifi-cation is not the only form of error for phenomenal beliefs; it ispossible for someone to believe that she is having visual consciousexperiences when she is having no such experiences at all. Second,even if this weren’t the case, for our present philosophical purposes,the (alleged) dissimilarity between ordinary cases of phenomenalmisjudgment and the pick-pocket case is entirely irrelevant. Considermistakes in perceptual beliefs about the external world. It is true thatmost mistaken beliefs about the external world also involve confusingone sort of object for another. But in the traditional Cartesian demonscenario, this needn’t be the sort of ‘‘mistake’’ being made, since inthat scenario, there might not be any external objects at all – youmight simply be a mind floating in the void.9 The fact that this is not

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 45

the ordinary type of mistake we make in forming our beliefs aboutthe world is no objection to it’s being logically possible. The samepoint holds for phenomenal belief as well. It doesn’t matter whetherthis happens in ordinary mistakes over phenomenal beliefs or not. Itonly matters that it could happen.

The case of the phenomenal pickpocket shows that it is logicallypossible for any one of my phenomenal beliefs to be mistaken. Thespectrum of experience-removal shows that it is logically possible thatall of my phenomenal beliefs are mistaken. It helps us to understand,in short, how I might gradually become a zombie. It shows that if it ispossible to make an unnoticed mistake in one’s phenomenal beliefs,then it is possible to imagine a continual series of such mistakes dueto demonic intervention. If I can imagine the phenomenal pickpocketslowly stealing all of my qualia, then, prima facie, I can’t rule out thepossibility that this has already happened. If zombies are logicallypossible, then the above possibilities apparently imply that I am notcertain that I have some qualitatively conscious mental states afterall.10

3. So far, we’ve established at least a prima facie case for (5). Butsome will not be convinced. Accordingly, I’ll consider some reasonsfor thinking that we can rule out the possibility that all of my basicphenomenal beliefs are not true right now.

The first objection I’ll consider goes like this. The thought –experiment given in the last section is meant to show that (3) and (4)are true. But in order for (3) and (4) to be true, not only must zombiesbe logically possible; it must be logically possible that any particularphenomenal belief of mine be mistaken.11 Therefore, the objectioncontinues, we should reject this second assumption and accept that atleast some of my phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible – or incapable ofbeing false. If so, then I can rule out as impossible any scenario thatimplies otherwise. Consequently, I can still believe I am certain that Iam conscious without rejecting the logical possibility of zombies.

The problem with this line of objection is that it heads back in thedirection of a Cartesian epistemology of mind, according to whichwhile I can be wrong about what is the case, I can’t be wrong aboutwhat seems to be the case. As I noted above, however, there is con-siderable evidence, both empirical and otherwise, to think that theCartesian view is deeply flawed. It is far more plausible to believe thatthe connection between our basic phenomenal beliefs and our con-scious experiences is contingent; the fact that I believe that I amhaving some experience does not logically entail that I am having that

M.P. LYNCH46

experience. Accordingly, if this objection is going to fly, there must bea good argument for accepting the incorrigibility of our phenomenalbeliefs. I’ll discuss two.

First, one might claim that I am essentially such that I have at leastone qualitative mental state, and therefore, at least the belief that Ihave one phenomenal belief cannot be mistaken. This is unpersua-sive. Even my initial argument for the plausibility of (1) does notshow that I am essentially conscious. Its conclusion is not de re butde dicto: namely, that it is impossible that I consciously think that(C-) is true. Even if this is the case, it does not show that I amessentially conscious. In fact, it could not do so, since it is false that Iam essentially conscious. I am capable of going into a deep state ofunconsciousness during which I exist but have no qualitatively con-scious experiences at all. Arguably, this is just what happens duringperiods of deep sleep. Therefore, I am not essentially conscious in thephenomenal sense. Perhaps I am essentially capable of having at leastsome qualia. Yet my having this property would not prevent thedemon from pickpocketing all of my qualia now but returning themlater. For being capable of having at least some qualia is a propertythat could be had by my zombie twin as well.

Second, one might claim that while most phenomenal beliefs canbe false, some very special phenomenal beliefs can’t be. Chalmers hasmade this suggestion recently. These very special beliefs he calls directphenomenal beliefs. A direct phenomenal belief is formed out of directphenomenal concepts, the content of which is ‘‘partly constituted byan underlying phenomenal quality’’ (2003, p. 235). Thus a directphenomenal belief emerges when ‘‘a subject predicates the concept ofthe very experience responsible for constituting its content’’ (2003,p. 236). If I have a phenomenally red experience and attend to it,forming the direct phenomenal concept R, the belief this experience isR is a direct phenomenal belief.

According to Chalmers, this way of understanding phenomenalbeliefs underwrites a limited incorrigibility thesis. Namely, no directphenomenal belief can be false (2003, p. 242). This is a limitedincorrigibility thesis because the vast majority of phenomenal beliefs(such as the belief that I am in pain, for example) remain completelycorrigible in Chalmers’ view. Nonetheless, the incorrigibility of directphenomenal beliefs is true by definition, Chalmers suggests. Allegedcounterexamples ‘‘cannot truly be counterexamples’’ since the truthof the incorrigibility thesis is ‘‘guaranteed by the definition ofdirect phenomenal beliefs’’ (2003, p. 243). One can’t have a direct

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 47

phenomenal belief, in other words, unless one has successfully dem-onstrated a phenomenal experience.

I will not quibble over the definition of what is, after all, a bit oftechnical vocabulary. As Chalmers knows, the more importantmatter is whether there are such things as direct phenomenal beliefs.This to me seems a difficult question; I am not at all convinced thatthere are such things. Indeed, I cannot see how there could be, ifWittgenstein’s private language argument is at all persuasive. Luck-ily, however, we can put that thorny issue aside; for even if there aredirect phenomenal beliefs, and they are incorrigible, this would in noway undermine the case for either (3) or (4).

Here’s the point. Direct phenomenal concepts, Chalmers notes,‘‘are based in acts of attention to instances of phenomenal qualities.’’That is, they require attention to a quality for its formation (2003,p. 237). Such acts of attention he calls demonstrations. Yet asChalmers admits, demonstrations are not always successful. Indeed,there may be cases where I form a concept of an instance of a phe-nomenal quality but where that particular phenomenal quality is notin fact instantiated. Chalmers notes that one might attempt to dem-onstrate a particular phenomenal quality to your experience, say ahighly specific shade of phenomenal red, but be unsuccessful becauseyou fail to notice that the visual patch you are attending to is actuallya slightly dissimilar shade (ibid.). Our phenomenal pickpocket ofcourse, presents another possibility: that in a momentary lapse ofattention, you fail to note that the phenomenal quality you wereattempting to demonstrate is not instantiated because it has beenstolen by our demon friend.

Significantly, Chalmers handles such cases by saying that yourcorresponding belief is not a direct phenomenal belief but apseudo-direct phenomenal belief. Pseudo-direct phenomenal beliefs areformed by a pseudo-direct phenomenal concept, where a pseudo-direct phenomenal concept is grounded in an unsuccessful act ofdemonstration. Accordingly, they are either false or neither true norfalse – that is, they aren’t true. Thus on Chalmers’ view, a victim ofour pickpocket has no direct phenomenal beliefs, only pseudo-directphenomenal beliefs.

But here a natural worry arises: even if direct phenomenal beliefscan’t be false, how do I know I have any? How, in other words, can Irule out the possibility that while I have phenomenal beliefs, I have onlypseudo-direct phenomenal beliefs? Given the pickpocket possibility, itseems likely that I cannot. For it may be that whenever I form an

M.P. LYNCH48

intention to demonstrate a phenomenal quality, the demon distractsme and then removes the relevant instantiation of that quality,nonetheless leaving my pseudo-direct phenomenal belief about it in-tact. That belief would then be false, but I would be none the wiser.And if that can happen once, surely our powerful demon can ensure ithappens over and over again, even while he is also robbing me of allmy other experiences. If so, then I would eventually be left with onlyfalse indirect phenomenal beliefs and false pseudo-direct phenomenalbeliefs. Therefore, even if Chalmers is correct that I can have directphenomenal beliefs, I can’t rule out the possibility that I don’t havethem. So even if some sorts of direct phenomenal beliefs are incor-rigible, it does not follow that I have any of those beliefs. Accord-ingly, I can’t rule out the possibility that all of my phenomenal beliefsare not true. If so, then I can’t be certain that I am conscious.

The next line of objection is related to the first. As we’ve seen, onecan argue that in order to have phenomenal beliefs, I need phenomenalconcepts, and in order to have phenomenal concepts, I need to havephenomenal experiences, that is, experiences with a particular phe-nomenal quality. But if so, then one might argue that ML at the startof the spectrum of experience-removal and ML at the end of thatspectrum don’t share the same concepts, and therefore, don’t sharecorresponding beliefs with the same content. Accordingly, I can’tbelieve that my experience is the same as it was a moment ago. I cannotdo this, because in order to have a belief with that content I wouldhave to have an experience I do not have. Yet if I can’t have that sort ofbelief, then the pickpocket can’t steal my qualia without my noticing.

This objection is flawed in several ways. To begin with, even if Ican have the full-blooded phenomenal concept of a red experienceonly if I have at some point had a red experience, it doesn’t followthat I need to be having a red experience every time I employ thatconcept. Recently, blinded people can obviously continue to use theconcept red experience and entertain all sorts of propositions aboutthat sort of experience. And what holds for recently blinded personsholds for recently pick-pocketed persons. For a short time anyway,they will be able to form all the same beliefs they enjoyed prior tobeing robbed by our demon friend – including, e.g., the belief thateverything seems roughly the same now as it did a second ago and thebelief that they are conscious. And for all you know, you are amember of this group yourself. You may have been recentlypick-pocketed; and therefore might recently have become a zombie,and therefore, you cannot be certain that you are conscious.12

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 49

Onemight think that the problem is more pressing when it comes todirect phenomenal beliefs – supposing, again, that there are suchthings. Direct phenomenal beliefs, Chalmers tell us, are short in life-span, since the direct phenomenal concepts that compose them arelimited ‘‘to the lifetime of the experience that constitutes’’ thoseconcepts (2003, p. 240). Consequently, even if I were pickpocketed justa moment ago, I could no longer have direct phenomenal beliefs, butonly, as we noted above, what Chalmers’ calls pseudo-direct phe-nomenal beliefs. Yet as we’ve already seen, this fact (if it is a fact) hasno bearing on the pickpocket: for the pickpocket can as easily rob usof our direct phenomenal beliefs as he can steal the qualia that com-pose their content. And he can do so without our believing that he has.For as Chalmers admits, (ibid. p. 245) one can make a mistake aboutwhether one is having a direct phenomenal belief or a pseudo directphenomenal belief. Moreover, beliefs of the sort singled out in theabove objection (like, my experience is the same as it was a momentago) are not direct phenomenal beliefs at all, but second-order, indirectphenomenal beliefs employing standing or pre-existing phenomenalconcepts like ‘‘experience’’. And I will be able to employ such con-cepts, as we just noted, for at least some time after being pickpocketed.

These reflections remind us that the case of the phenomenalpickpocket does not compare you to your zombie twin but asks youto consider what your own situation might be like were you to be theunwitting victim of phenomenal pickpocketing. The question: ‘‘CouldI be a zombie?’’ is ambiguous. If it means, ‘‘Could I have always beena zombie?’’ then the answer perhaps is ‘‘no’’. But if it means ‘‘Could Ihave recently become a zombie via a quick but gradual removal of myphenomenal properties?’’ the answer seems to be yes – granting, thatis, that zombies are indeed logically possible.

Notice, by the way, that the same line of argument counters whatmight appear to be a simple refutation of the pickpocket argument.One might be inclined to argue that without at least some consciousexperience, I cannot even form a thought with the content that I amconscious. Given that I can form that thought, it follows that I havesome conscious experience and therefore that I am not a zombie. Butagain, this line of argument only works if we forget that one can retainmost phenomenal concepts long after losing the ability to have thephenomenal experience which helped constitute that concept. Just solong as I’ve had some conscious experience, I can form the belief that Iam conscious even when I am not. Furthermore, even if this was notso, this objection would still fail. For this line of reasoning assumes

M.P. LYNCH50

that we can know with certainty the contents of our own beliefs andother mental states. But of course, just as we can be skeptical aboutwhether my phenomenal beliefs are accurate, we can also be skepticalabout whether they have the content that we believe them to have.

I now turn to a third sort of objection. So far, we’ve seen that evenif a few very special phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, this by itselfdoes not entail that my phenomenal beliefs can’t all be false or at leastnot true. Significantly, Chalmers himself would seemingly grant thispoint, for in his view, the incorrigibility of my direct phenomenalbeliefs is separate from their epistemic status (2003, p. 252). Heaccepts that certainty requires ‘‘more’’ and that certainty about pinvolves ruling out all skeptical possibilities that not p (Ibid.).Nonetheless, he objects that the hypothesis that I could be a zombiebecause, he thinks, it assumes that my beliefs are the only or primarydeterminants of my epistemic situation:

From the first-person point of view, my zombie twin and I are very different: I have

experiences, and he does not. Because of that, I have evidence for my belief and hedoes not. Despite the fact that he says the same things I do, I know that I am not him(though you might not be sure) because of my direct first-person acquaintance with

my experiences. This may sound somewhat paradoxical at first, but really it is simplysaying the obvious: our experience of consciousness enables us to know that we areconscious (1996, p. 199).

So in Chalmers’ view, my phenomenal beliefs are justified by thevery fact of having the experiences those beliefs are about (1996,p. 196), that is, by acquaintance (2003, p. 250). Acquaintance,according to its advocates, is a primitive epistemic relation between asubject and the properties of a phenomenal experience: ‘‘whenever asubject has a phenomenal property, the subject is acquainted withthat phenomenal property’’ (ibid.). If so, then we might argue thateven if it is an abstract logical possibility that the phenomenalpickpocket steals my qualia, from within my actual epistemic situationI can still rule out the possibility that this has already happened.

What is the argument here? Well, the first part is clear enough. Itgoes like this:

My phenomenal beliefs are justified by acquaintance with phenomenal experiences(or properties). I am acquainted with some phenomenal experiences (or properties).

Therefore, the beliefs formed on the basis of such acquaintance are justified.

Many will quarrel with the first premise, since it is controversialwhether acquaintance can justify beliefs.13 I will not. For the pick-pocket scenario is completely consistent with the hypothesis that my

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 51

basic phenomenal beliefs about my conscious experience are justifiedby the mere fact that I am acquainted with those experiences. That is,there is nothing in the pickpocket scenario which prevents us fromadopting the following principle: Were I to be acquainted with myconscious experiences that acquaintance would justify or contribute tothe justification of my beliefs about my experiences. The issue at hand isnot whether acquaintance would justify my basic phenomenal beliefs.It is whether I can be certain that I have conscious experiences.

So let us turn to the second premise, which asserts that I amacquainted with some conscious experiences. It implies that I havesome conscious experiences. Since it so explicitly concerns the veryissue at hand, how can it be used in an argument for the conclusionthat I know that I am conscious? Here is one possibility. According toa strong externalist approach to epistemology, I do not have tojustifiedly believe that a belief is justified in order for that belief to bejustified.14 If so, then I don’t have to justifiedly believe that I amacquainted with my conscious experiences in order for my phenom-enal beliefs to be justified by acquaintance with conscious experi-ences. All that is required for the justification of my belief that I amhaving some conscious experience is that I be acquainted with thatexperience. If I am, then I am justified in believing that I am havingthat experience. And if I am justified in believing that I have con-scious experiences then, Chalmers reasons, I am justified in believingthat I am conscious.

Yet as noted, justification is one thing, certainty is another. Inorder to defeat the pickpocket argument, Chalmers needs an addi-tional claim: Namely, the justification by acquaintance my phenom-enal beliefs enjoy is strong enough to make some of those samephenomenal beliefs certain. As he says,

. . .acquaintance with a property enables one to eliminate all (a priori) epistemic

possibilities in which the property is absent. If so, then in the right cognitive back-ground (with sufficient attention, concept formation, lack of confusion and so on),the justification of a direct phenomenal belief P by acquaintance with a property will

sometimes enable a subject not just to know that P by the usual standards ofknowledge, but to eliminate all skeptical counterpossibilities in which P is false (2003,252-3).

Therefore, I can be certain that I have some conscious experiences.I want to stress again that I have not argued that the pickpocket

scenario proves that we are completely unjustified in believing that wehave at least some conscious mental states. Indeed, if ‘‘knowledge’’ is

M.P. LYNCH52

meant in a very weak sense, then we may even grant that, if I am infact acquainted with conscious experiences, then I know that I haveconscious experiences. But if we take knowledge to imply certainty –which we must do if it is meant to counter the problem raised by thephenomenal pickpocket – then it is clear that the above chain ofargument does not show that I am certain that I am conscious.

Here’s why. As Chalmers himself notes, in order for myacquaintance with an experience to be sufficiently robust to allow meto be certain in my direct phenomenal belief about that experience,the ‘‘cognitive background’’ conditions would have to be perfect. Inhis view, apparently, this is sufficient. Crucially, they just have to beperfect; I don’t even have to believe that they are. But while thisexternalist stance, while controversial, is perhaps sufficient when itcomes to prima facie justification, the standards for certainty areclearly much higher. As Bayne (2001, p. 415) has pointed out, oneneeds to engage in ‘‘doxastic ascent to meet the skeptic’s challenges’’.Even a tough-minded externalist like Alston holds that in seekingcertainty, as opposed to less demanding epistemic goals, one isintuitively seeking what Alston has called ‘‘full reflective assurance’’for one’s beliefs (1989, p. 334). This is why we say that when the issueis the certainty of p, one is obligated to rule out all the possibilitiesthat not-p. And intuitively, the process of ‘‘ruling a possibility out’’involves appealing to reasons – and conclusive reasons – for thinkingthose possibilities don’t obtain. It is not enough to note that if someof these possibilities don’t obtain, (e.g., if we have conscious experi-ences and are acquainted with them), then one may (justifiably) be-lieve that p. Certainty is not a matter of luck; one can only be certainthat p on the basis of premises that are themselves certain. That is thepoint of calling it ‘‘certainty’’. Prior to encountering the pickpocketscenario, I thought that it was certain that I am now having consciousexperiences. But now that the pickpocket scenario is raised, I cannotrule out the possibility that the demon has stolen all of my qualia.And since I cannot rule that possibility out, (1) is false. That is, it isno longer certain that I am having conscious mental experiences –whether or not I am merely justified in believing that I have them.4. The case of the phenomenal pickpocket places us in an uncom-fortable position. It does so because while we have good reason tobelieve (1) and (2), the above two sections show that I cannot com-pletely rule out the possibility that I have recently been turned into azombie. If so, then if (2) is true, (1) must be false. One of my initialclaims must be given up.

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 53

So perhaps we should go ahead and just give up (1) and admit thatwe are not certain that we are conscious. Maybe it really is all darkinside. Some might argue that indubitable certainty about anythingmay be impossible, even about this. Besides, ‘‘logical possibility’’ ishardly real possibility, let alone plausibility. So to admit the logicalpossibility of being a zombie is hardly worrying. Or at least it is nomore worrying than admitting the logical possibility of everyone elsebeing a zombie.

Doubtless there will be philosophers inclined in this direction. YetI am reluctant to join them myself. I think that giving up certaintyabout one’s own consciousness is quite a bit more worrying thangiving up certainty about someone else’s consciousness. I am inclinedto agree with those philosophers I mentioned at the outset who takecertainty of our own consciousness as the necessary bedrock whichallows us to even understand the subject.

Another option, if you can call it that, would be to embrace atruly radical Cartesian epistemology and hold that none of ourphenomenal judgments, basic or otherwise, can be mistaken. Thiswould be to claim, in effect, that any belief I have about my phe-nomenal experience – including the belief that I have phenomenalbeliefs – cannot be false. If a suitably strong version of this positionwere true, then perhaps we could be certain that we had notbeen pickpocketed. Yet such a view is not very plausible, to say theleast.

Thus we reach our final, and I suspect, best option; namely thatzombies are logically impossible. If we reject this assumption, then itis not logically possible for someone to be functionally and physicallyidentical to me and to have all my minimal phenomenal beliefs andnot be conscious. Therefore, since this description obviously appliesto myself, I can’t be as I am and not be conscious.

Yet some will wish for a more positive reason to believe thatzombies are logically impossible. They will hold that if one is going todeny that zombies are possible even with the support of the phe-nomenal pickpocket argument, you need to say something positiveand independent of the present considerations about why they are.Otherwise, one has simply a prima facie case for the impossibility ofzombies.

One such explanation for why zombies are impossible is this.15

Suppose we take it that for a state to be conscious is for it to be theobject of a higher-order mental state. This is the core of the so-calledHOT (higher-order thought) theory.16 Such theories come in different

M.P. LYNCH54

varieties and admit of numerous complexities, but for our purposes, Ionly want to consider the implications of taking the core idea of thehigher-order thought theory as a necessary truth. That is, assumethat in every possible world, any mental states, whether belief orexperience, is qualitatively conscious whenever it is the object of ahigher-order thought. If so, then necessarily, any being that hashigher-order thoughts about its mental life, true or false, has con-scious mental states. My zombie is physically and functionallyidentical to me. As a result he has my basic phenomenal beliefs. Yetcrucially, he also has my thoughts about those basic phenomenalbeliefs. His basic phenomenal beliefs will be false, as will many of thebeliefs he has about those basic phenomenal beliefs. Nonetheless, onthe higher-order thought theory I am imagining, some of his basicphenomenal beliefs would nonetheless be conscious, since they aretargets of higher-order thoughts (which needn’t be conscious ofcourse). It follows that my zombie would, impossibly, have somequalitatively conscious mental states; and so zombies would seemlogically impossible.17

Of course, the HOT theory is open to numerous objections evenwithout interpreting its core thesis so strongly. Yet, if zombies aretruly logically impossible, (not just nomologically impossible orsimply crazy-sounding) then something at least vaguely like it mustbe true. This is the important point. There must be a logical con-nection between our functional, physical or behavioral states of mindand our conscious states of mind. In short, if zombies are logicallyimpossible, then what Owen Flanagan calls ‘‘conscious inessential-ism’’, or the view that intelligent activities can be done withoutconscious accompaniments, is false (Flanagan, 1992, p. 5). Con-sciousness would be logically essential for the sorts of cognitivefunctioning we typically perform with conscious accompaniment.This is a surprising consequence.

The case of the phenomenal pickpocket confronts us with threeevils: Either admit that we are not certain that we are conscious,accept a truly radical Cartesian epistemology of consciousness, oradmit that zombies are logically impossible after all (and thus agreethat conscious inessentialism is ruled out). No matter which optionwe take to solve the problem, the case of the phenomenal pickpocketrequires us to revise or reject a widely held position in the philosophyof mind. Forced to choose, I reluctantly give up the possibility ofzombies. To me, this seems the least costly option; but I leave you toyour own accounting.18

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 55

NOTES

1 One might draw distinctions between these ‘‘definitions’’ of certainty but sincenothing in what follows hangs on it, I will use them interchangeably, preferring toremain neutral on various debates over the concept in technical epistemology. It

should be obvious, however, that none of these definitions make being certain apurely subjective feeling, of ‘‘confidence’’.2 Discussions of zombies go back at least to Kirk (1974). A recent sampling of the

literature includes Dennett (1991, 1995), Moody (1994), Flanagan and Polger (1995);Guzeldere (1995) and Chalmers (1996).3 Chalmers (1996, p. 176) has distinguished second-order and and third-order phe-nomenal beliefs; more recently, (2003) he has distinguished direct from indirect

phenomenal beliefs. We’ll discuss the latter distinction below. Bayne (2001, p. 415)briefly mentions a distinction between specific phenomenal beliefs and general ones.4 This does not entail that zombies are naturally or nomologically possible.5 The argument can be seen as a reductio, where we derive a contradiction from (1),(2) together with the following premises.i. (3)

ii. If (2) and (3) then (4)iii. If (4) then (5)iv. If(5) then �(1)From here, together with our assumptions of (1) and (2) we easily derive (1) and �(1)by standard logic.6 I take talk about what seems to be the case to be talk about one’s consciousexperience.7 She may have a sense of ‘‘numbness’’ in the area; but it is also possible (dependingon the drug) that she will not have any feeling ‘‘located’’ in that area at all.8 David Sanford has asked whether I could be mistaken about disjunctive phe-

nomenal beliefs, e.g., the belief that this tastes either like poor quality wine or likehigh octane gasoline. Well, for one thing, the stuff in question might not taste likeeither. Second, any complex and comparative phenomenal judgment takes time to

form. Even if that time is only a micro-second, our demon friend will be able to liftthe qualia associated with the either disjunct’s judgment before the complex judg-ment itself can be formed.9 Well, there would be the demon of course. But that doesn’t matter, since you

needn’t perceive the demon, obviously. The point is that not all mistakes in per-ception need to be confusions of one perceived object for another perceived object.10 Some may believe that zombies, while physically possible, are naturally or no-

mologically impossible. If they were, then zombies wouldn’t exist at worlds that havethe same natural laws as the actual world, even if they can exist at worlds that havethe same physical matter arranged the same way as it is in the actual world. Perhaps,

but note that this has no bearing on the present argument, any more than thephysical and natural impossibility of evil demons has any bearing on traditionalCartesian skepticism. That is, in both cases, we can understand the skeptical scenario

to be raising the possibility that the actual world is different than we believe it to be.11 If (2) is false, of course, it may still be that (3) is true. That is, even if zombies wereimpossible, it would still be possible that I might be radically mistaken about myconscious mental life. I just couldn’t be radically mistaken in the specific way

M.P. LYNCH56

required by the case of the phenomenal pickpocket. This is irrelevant to the present

problem, however. For if (2) and (3) are true, then the spectrum of experience-removal is possible, and its mere possibility is all we need for the argument. Thanksto Guven Guzeldere for helping me to get clear on this point.12 It might be protested that in order to believe that one is having a red experiencepost-pickpocketing (when one is not having any such experience) you would stillhave to access a memory of some paradigm red experience with its associated

qualitative properties. But someone who has traveled far enough on the spectrum ofexperience-removal will not have that memory (or will only have it in the minimalsense), and therefore, be unable to apply the relevant concepts and form the relevant

beliefs which the argument requires. In reply, I reject the premise that conceptapplication requires the use of qualitative memories, e.g., red images. As Wittgen-stein argued, In order to reapply the concept red-experience, one doesn’t need torecall to mind a red image with which one compares the new experience in question.

All one needs is the ability to sort red experiences from blue or green or orangeexperiences, etc.13 For instance, Chalmers takes it to imply that we have knowledge by acquaintance

of our conscious states – and that there is a ‘‘given’’ in experience which can directlyjustify our beliefs about it. At the very least, the possibility of non-doxastic justifiersof our beliefs has been the subject of a long standing debate.14 See, for instance, Alston’s classic discussions, ‘‘Level Confusions in Epistemology’’and ‘‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’’ (both in Alston, 1989).15 Dennett makes a similar point in his 1991, pp. 309–311.16 See, Rosenthal, (1996), for a recent statement of this sort of view. I do not pretend tobe defending or presenting Rosenthal’s actual view here. I ammerely suggesting that avery strong interpretation of HOT might rule out zombies as logically impossible.17 Of course, this argument still leaves open the possibility that my zombie has

almost none of the qualitative conscious states I enjoy; for only his false beliefsabout his conscious experiences (which my zombie doesn’t have) turn out to beconscious. Interestingly, Rosenthal (2000) argues that a higher-order thought

without its object is indistinguishable from the subjective point of view from ahigher-order thought with its accompanying object. If so, then this provides afurther reason to think that the conclusions of this paper are strongly supported by

HOT. Finally, note that HOT, even in the strong form discussed here, doesn’t ruleout the possibility of being radically mistaken about your phenomenal beliefs. Itwould rule out being mistaken in the way generated by the case of the phenomenalpickpocket. For if one is necessarily conscious just when one has higher-order

mental states, then our demon friend would have to remove my higher-ordermental states in order to steal my conscious experiences.18 Thanks to Tom Polger, Owen Flanagan, Adam Kovach, David Chalmers, David

Sanford, Guven Guzeldere, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

REFERENCES

Alston, W. P.: 1989, Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge,Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

ZOMBIES AND THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL PICKPOCKET 57

Bayne, T.: 2001, ‘Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments,’ Philos-

ophy and Phenomenological Research 62, 407–419.Chalmers, D.: 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory,Oxford University Press, New York.

Chalmers, D.: 2003, ‘The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief,’ in (eds.),Q. Smith and A. Jokic, Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. OxfordUniversity Press, New York.

Davidson, D.: 1985, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,’ in E. Lepore,(eds.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson,Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Dennett, D.: 1991, Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown and Co, Boston.Dennett, D.: 1995, ‘The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies,’ Journal ofConsciousness Studies 24, 322–326.

Flanagan, O.: 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Flanagan, O. and T. Polger: 1995, ‘Zombies and the Function of Consciousness.’Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(4), 313–321.

Guzeldere, G.: 1995, ‘Varieties of Zombiehood,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies,

2(4), 326–333.Horgan, T.: 1991. ‘Metaphysical Realism and Pyschologistic Semantics,’ Erkenntnis34, 297–322.

Kirk, R.: 1974, ‘Zombies vs. Materialists.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48,135–152.

Moody, T.: 1994, ‘Conversations with Zombies,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies

(2), 196–200.Polger, T.: 2001, ‘Zombies’ in M. Nani and M. Marraffa (eds.), A Field Guide to thePhilosophy of Mind, Societa Italiana Filosofia Analitica. (Annotated bibliographyforthcoming.)

Putnam, H.: 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cam-bridge.

Rosenthal, D.: 1996, ‘A Theory of Consciousness,’ in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and

G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, MIT Press Cambridge.Rosenthal, D.: 2000, ‘Consciousness and Metacognition’ in Sperber (ed.), Meta-representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Strawson, G.: 1994, Mental Reality, MIT Press Cambridge.Strawson, G.: ‘Real Materialism,’ in L. Antony and N. Hornsten (ed.), Chomsky andHis Critics, (forthcoming). Basil Blackwell, Cambridge.

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Connecticut101 Manchester Hall

344 Mansfield RoadStorrs, CT 06269-2054USA

E-mail: mplyn@conncoll.edu

M.P. LYNCH58