Zielonka Jan and Paolo Mancini 2011 - A Media Map of CEE Summary - Politicisation of the State

7/27/2019 Zielonka Jan and Paolo Mancini 2011 - A Media Map of CEE Summary - Politicisation of the State

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Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

An ERC Project based at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University ofOxford in collaboration with the Department of Media and Communications, The London School of

Economics and Political Science

http://mde.politics.ox.ac.uk/

Executive summary:

A media map of Central and Eastern Europe

Jan Zielonka and Paolo Mancini

Central and Eastern Europe is often seen as a fairly coherent

entity. Even the more sophisticated academic literature tends

to talk about a post-communist bloc or the new member-

states from Central and Eastern Europe. Our study has

certainly identified some notable similarities in the media

landscape across the entire region. However, before looking at

these similarities it is important to point out some striking

differences between the individual states and their media

scenes.

Important differences

The group of ten countries studied includes some post-Soviet

republics, some Balkan countries and some Central European

countries with closer historical ties to Western Europe.

Countries such as Poland or Hungary are fairly old nationstates, but their territory has shifted (and shrunk) over the

decades. Countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic

States have only recently emerged from larger federal units,and their national identity is still a sensitive question. In fact,

some of these nations contain sizable ethnic minorities with

only a weak loyalty to the countries in which they live.

Romania and Poland are relatively large in terms of territory

and population, while most of the other states in the group

are comparatively small.

Individual states have also experienced different patterns of

transition from communism to democracy and the free

market. In Poland and Hungary transition was eased by pacts

negotiated between the old and new elites at so-called roundtables. Transition in such countries as Czechoslovakia orRomania was far more abrupt, and violent in the Romanian

case. The speed and scope of constitutional reform across the

region has also differed, as did the speed and scope of the

market reforms introduced after the fall of communism.

Although all the countries initially experienced severe

economic recession, their economic performance has since

Our project aims to investigate

the often troublesome and

poorly understood relationship

between democracy and the

media in Central and Eastern

Europe. We take a novel

approach, focusing on the

quality of the media as afunction of the quality of

democracyand ask: what kind

of democracy is necessary for

the media to perform its

statutory functions?

This report contains the

findings of the projects firstyear, when we examined the

media landscape in Central

and Eastern Europe, focusing

on three key pillars:

1) Media ownership andcommercial pressures

2) Media regulation andpolitical pressures

3) Journalistic autonomy andprofessionalisation

The report is based on a review of the

secondary literature and interviews

conducted with domestic media experts,

regulators and professionals in all ten

countries under consideration (Bulgaria,

the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,

Slovakia and Slovenia).


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Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe SUMMARY 2011

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varied. Most notably, the 2008-10 economic

crisis generated a dramatic fall in the GDP of

such countries as Latvia, Hungary or Bulgaria,

while Poland and Slovenia managed to growin the same period. Today, Slovenias GDP percapita is nearly three times higher than

Romanias and twice as high as that of Latviaor Lithuania.

All these differences in political legacies and

economic fortunes could not but have an

impact on the various countries medialandscapes. For instance, the Latvian media

scene is essentially split into two: Latvian-

language media and Russian-language media.(Nearly 30 per cent of Latvias population isRussian). A similar situation does not exist in

largely mono-ethnic countries such as Poland,

the Czech Republic or Hungary. On average,

journalists earn around EUR 1,500 a month in

Slovenia, but only EUR 500 in Romania.

Regional media is only significant in the larger

countries of the region, such as Poland or

Romania. Internet use is well above the

European average in Estonia, Latvia andLithuania, but below average in Bulgaria and

Romania. Foreign investment in the print

media sector is high in Hungary and Estonia,

but relatively low in Slovenia or Lithuania.

Individual countries score differently on the

Freedom House index of media

independence. One could go on listing such

differences. Poland in particular seems to

defy most common patterns. Newspapers

such as Gazeta Wyborcza are moreprosperous than all other newspapers

throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Public service broadcasters in Poland have a

much higher average viewership rate than in

other countries in the region. Political and

business parallelism also seems to be less

pronounced in Poland, as well as in Slovenia,

than in the other new democracies in the

region.

Of course, diversity is only to be expected andany map of similarities and differences is

necessarily complex and constantly changing.

Division lines do not always correspond to the

old East-West divide, let alone such historical

divides as those generated by the Habsburg

and Ottoman legacies. However, the

differences we have identified vindicate our

chosen research strategy by showing that it is

important to begin the research with an in-

depth analysis of all ten individual cases

before venturing into common patterns and

similarities across the entire region. They also

suggest the need for caution in conducting

such comparative research and argue against

sweeping generalisations.

Striking similarities

All differences apart, our study has also

identified some striking similarities across the

region. Politicisation of the state is one such

distinctive, common feature across the whole

of Central and Eastern Europe. After the fall

of communism, the process of democracy

building went hand in hand with the process

of state reconstruction, or even state buildingin some cases. Some of the new democracies

such as Slovakia or Slovenia were new states,

but even more established states such as

Romania or Poland had to perform the

complex task of state renewal.

Depoliticisation of the communist state was

one of the key objectives of this renewal.

After all, the communist party controlled all

state structures prior to 1989. However, the

reform process took place against abackground of intense political struggle

between a plethora of new (and old) actors,

and with few rules governing their behaviour.

Instead of being the key arbiter and regulator

of this ongoing political struggle, the state has

become the object of this competition.

Political parties, business corporations,

organised interest groups and even individual

politicians and businessman have been trying

to conquer various state institutions andextract resources from them. States were


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unable to resist this pressure and became

effectively (re)politicised.

The process of state politicisation and its

implications for democracy has been well

described by such analysts as Ganev,Grzymala-Busse or Kopeck.

1They show that

administration and law in Central and Eastern

Europe are often shaped by the ad hoc needs

of political agents rather than by a

prioripolicy objectives which aim at providing

public goods. Legal enforcement favours

partisan political interests, whereas policy

favours resource extraction for private ends.

Such rent seeking can consist of jobs,

contracts or financial transfers. Politicalloyalty, rather than merit, is the criterion for

obtaining them. Actors are not treated as

equal, norms do not have universal

application and there is only a selective

accountability in such a politicised state.

Corruption may not be a norm, but it occurs

and it is tolerated. Informal networks and

rules are extremely important in such a

politicised state and they undermine formal

institutions and the rule of law. Statestructures appear weak, volatile and prone to

capture by political competitors.

Political parties have been the prime actors

behind this process of state politicisation.

Most of these parties were new, and they

were not particularly strong. They lacked

members, dynamic organisation and

traditional programmes: and so they needed

the media in order to connect to the volatile,

if not confused, electorate in the region. Thisgave the media powerful leverage over the

parties, but it also made the parties eager (or

even desperate) to control the media for their

own ends. The weakness of civil society

across the region has left the media relatively

free from public scrutiny, but it has also made

it easier for parties to colonise the media.The weakness of state structures has given

the public media a chance to extract material

resources from the state, while the privatemedia has benefitted from inadequate

regulation of their market. However, weak

states offer the media little protection against

political interference or business

manipulation.

All this has generated mixed views about therole of the media in the process of democratic

transition and consolidation. On the one

hand, the media has been very influential in

the process of state and democracy building.

Their leading role in fostering the ideas of

freedom has also been repeatedly

emphasised by persons interviewed by our

project. As one of them put it, all politicalforces agreed that media freedom is a

necessary element of democracy. On theother hand, however, the interviews have

also revealed that the media have often used

their influence for partisan political ends. As

one of our interviewees observed:

[t]here are many channels in Romaniathat have not been created for business

purposes, but are used as weapons. The

main objective is to control resources which

can be done in various ways, both

politically and economically. This is how

resources can be controlled and adversaries

destroyed. *+ The media are extensivelyused for the purpose of blackmailing.

This could not but affect their public standing

and legitimacy even though their partisanship

sometimes resulted from external pressuresrather than selfish internal calculations. Thedecrease in print press circulation and in the

number of newspaper outlets is probably also

a sign of public frustration with a politicisedmedia, regardless of all economic

considerations. (In this respect, the situation

appears particularly dramatic in Bulgaria,

Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.) The recent

retreat of several foreign investors from some

of the media markets in Central and Eastern

Europe, including established publishing

companies such as WAZ, Handelsblatt or

Bonnier, might have been primarily for

economic reasons, but some fear that

without the backing of a foreign-based


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The most striking example is the practice of

allocating state-owned company advertising

to individual media outlets along clientelistic

lines: the existence of such a practice was

revealed in our interviews in Slovakia,

Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. The fact that

many media owners assume various public

functions is also a manifestation of this

phenomenon. In business terms one should

keep in mind that the ten countries under

consideration are all relatively small and

weak media markets as compared to the

other states of Western Europe. This

represents another striking similarity across

Central and Eastern Europe. The observation

applies even to relatively large states such as

Poland or Romania. As one of our

interviewees put it, This is a big country witha small market. This is largely because theoverall economic potential of these states is

low: the total GDP of the new member states

(at market prices and current exchange rates)

is about five per cent of the GDP of the

remaining seventeen EU member states.

However, linguistic factors are also at play

here. Apart from the existing media trade

between the Czech Republic and Slovakia,

none of the countries under consideration

can export their media products beyond their

own borders in the way that the Belgians,

Austrians or Dutch can, let alone the Spanish,

French or British. (Because of the Hungarian

population in Romania and Slovakia, Hungary

may be a small complication here). Small

markets are more exposed to external shocks

than are large, and it is not surprising that themedia markets of such countries as Latvia and

Bulgaria have been devastated by successive

global economic crises. Small markets are also

easy targets for investors. In the first years

after the transition even small foreign

investors could conquer the Central and

Eastern European media market with limited

funds and at low risk. More recently, local

oligarchs have been able to buy up various

media companies and keep them going withno obvious economic gain. It is also easier for

political entrepreneurs to manipulate small

markets than it is large.

This leads us to another striking similarity in

the region: fuzzy ownership. The transition

from communism to market economyinvolved a huge transfer of property from the

public to the private sector. In most cases,

this transfer was not transparent let alone

fair. Many members of the communist

nomenklatura or even the secret services

benefitted from it. Many foreign investors

acquired property at bargain prices. Many

new owners took advantage of the weak legal

and tax systems to multiply their assets and

shift some of them to tax havens overseas.This general development has evidently

affected media ownership. Even now it is not

always clear who owns individual media

companies, as the media laws demanding full

ownership transparency are either non-

existent or difficult to enforce. Ownership

concentration is conspicuous and growing.

Local media moguls such as Irena Krasteva

and Krasimir Gergov (Bulgaria), Hans Luik

(Estonia), Andrejs Ekis (Latvia) and IvanKmotrik (Slovakia) are gaining prominence

across different media sectors, while

members of the local business elites like

Zdenk Bakala (Czech Republic), Gbor Szles(Hungary), Viesturs Koziols (Latvia) or Dinu

Patriciu (Romania) are purchasing media

outlets. As a result, newspapers and

television stations often tend to sell contentrather than advertising. In other words, theytry to influence the decision making process

within their states through the content of

their media production. Their policy is not to

generate profit from media production, but to

secure the profits of various other businesses

owned by them. As mentioned earlier, the

public sector has shrunk and fused with the

private across the region. On the one hand,

public television is largely dependent on

advertising revenues from the private sector,

and on the other, private television competes

with public in news making and opinion


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forming. There are no public press subsidies

in the countries under consideration, the only

exception to this rule being Slovenia.

Floating laws and procedures is another

striking regional feature. The transition fromcommunism to democracy involved the

installation of a new constitutional order,

followed by a fundamental reform of ordinary

laws and procedures. This was a complex and

at times chaotic process, which also affected

media regulation. For instance, the Bulgarian

1998 Radio and TV Broadcasting Law has

already been amended 28 times, and not just

at a technical level. As mentioned earlier, the

move from a controlled to a free media istaking place in the context of an intense

political struggle and volatile economy. The

EU accession process has not been politically

contested, but it has multiplied the intensity

of legal reform. European laws and

regulations have often been adopted under

time pressure with little parliamentary, let

alone public, debate. As a result national and

European laws are often poorly aligned or

even in some cases clash. For instance, wefound that in Romania the Protection of

Classified Information Act and the Law on the

Implementation of the European Directive on

the Re-Use of Public Information contain

different provisions; the former is

undermined by the more restrictive

provisions of the Romanian Penal Code; and

this in turn is poorly aligned with the Act on

Classified Information. As one of our

interviewees observed, The EuropeanDirective was somehow mechanically

adopted in Romania. No one took the effort

to see how it relates to Romanian regulation.One could cite similar examples in other

states across the region. The result is legal

uncertainty and regulatory chaos; and

ultimately, the assertion of informal rules

over formal ones.

In several of these countries, media

regulation falls short of normative standardsof free speech. For example, Polands Penal

Code stipulates that those insulting thePresident of the Republic are liable to up to

three years imprisonment, while Hungarysnew Media Constitution prescribes that

media content may not offend ordiscriminate against whether expressly orby implication persons, nations,communities, national, ethnic, linguistic and

other minorities or any majorityas well as any

church or religious groups (emphasisadded).

7Such regulatory frameworks may

have a chilling effect upon critical journalism.

The opaque imitation of external

models represents another striking feature in

the region. The states of Central and EasternEurope were under autocratic rule for many

decades, and even before the Soviet

conquest had very limited experience ofdemocracy. Moreover, major technological

innovations took place during the years of

captivity, to use their favourite expression.No wonder therefore that after the

democratic breakthrough much of the media

legislation adopted reflects solutions

borrowed from other countries. Differentstates have imported different models. For

instance, Estonia adopted many Scandinavian

regulations, while Hungary looked to

Germany or Austria. Common history and

culture is one of the factors determining

individual choices. The pattern of foreign

investment in the media sector was another

factor, because foreign owners promote

different models and practices. And of course,

individual states were asked to adjust to the

EU regulatory framework. The US has also

served as a model, despite geographic

distance and socio-political differences.

However, imported models have been put

into practice in very different environments

from those in which they originated. For

instance, many Central and Eastern European

states looked to the BBC model of public

broadcasting and even attempted toimplement it but with mixed results.Moreover, foreign models were usually


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adapted by local political and economic actors

engaged in heated negotiations over rights

and profits. The result was a rather obscure,

incomplete if not erroneous imitation of

external models.

A disoriented journalistic profession is

another striking feature in common. This

disorientation is chiefly the result of the fall of

communism and the assertion of democracy.

With a few notable exceptions, journalists

active under the former regime were either

incompetent, or politically discredited, or

both. They were frequently replaced by the

inexperienced, untrained or politically

partisan. Economic changes were often amixed blessing for the profession, as they

reduced journalistic job security without

necessarily promoting experience and

knowledge. Schools of journalism have

improved teaching standards, but have failed

to secure career opportunities for their

graduates. Professional associations of

journalists have few members, rudimentary

organisation and scarce financial resources.

Often the organisational framework ofjournalism is fragmented. There is not one

journalists association but several; andsometimes these associations are even

political rivals as they are divided along

ideological lines (this is the case in Hungary,

for example). Journalists in Central and

Eastern Europe are not only poorly paid in

comparison to their Western European

colleagues; they also operate in a less stable

and coherent regulatory framework, and face

more direct pressures from politicians and

owners. As Karol Jakubowicz observes in the

context of Poland, the volatile situation inthe press market (with many publications

being launched and soon going out of

business) leads to high fluctuation and

insecurity on the journalistic labor market.8No wonder therefore that they often fail to

rise to the ethical and professional standards

expected from journalists in academic

textbooks.

Blurred professional identity is another

common feature across Central and Eastern

Europe. So far, it has proved difficult for

journalists to develop a strong and clear

professional identity in the constantly

changing political, economic and social

environment of the post-communist region.

Journalists diffuse and frequentlyoverlapping social roles have generated

confusion and lack of coherence. Ongoing

legal and regulatory reforms have created

uncertainty and a lack of security. The

professional status of journalists is still poorly

defined in the region. For instance,

journalists rights in terms of sourceconfidentiality or access to information are

unclear. Employers are seldom able or willing

to guarantee their journalists a proper legal

defence when cases go to trial. Journalistic

salaries are relatively low in most cases and

are often variable. For instance, in most of

the countries studied royalties based on the

authors rights represent a significant butfloating part of journalistic income. Codes of

ethics do exist, but are often not unanimously

recognised by professional journalistic bodies.

(A case in point is Estonia, where there is not

one but two separate Ethics Commissions

that receive complaints about journalism

from the public, and these Ethics

Commissions to some extent act as rivals in

the public arena). The overlap between

journalism and other professional activities,

such as PR, appears to be widespread and

frequent. Indeed, in many Central and Eastern

European countries the majority of studentjournalists end up in PR. Forms of recruitment

do not seem to be properly defined and

stable, and frequently depend on networks of

family or friends. Nor is professional

education reflected in the recruitment

process in any significant way.


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Bajomi-Lzr, Pter, Vclav ttka and Mikls Sksd (forthcoming): Public-service television in theEuropean Union countries: old issues, new challenges in the east and the west. In ManuelPippis and Natascha Just (eds.): Trends in Communication Policy Research: New Methods,

Theories, and Subjects. Bristol: Intellect.

Council of Europe (2010): European Audiovisual Observatory:Yearbook 2009. Film, Television and

Video in Europe. 15th

edition, Vol 2: Trends in European Television. Strasbourg: European

Audiovisual Observatory.

Ganev, Venelin (2005): Postcommunism as an episode of state-building: a reversed Tillyan

perspective. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38.4: 425-445.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna (2003): Political competition and the politicization of the state in East and

Central Europe. Comparative Political Studies 36.10: 1123-1147.

Hallin, Daniel C. and Paolo Mancini (2004): Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media andPolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jakubowicz, Karol (2003): Change in the Polish media: how far to go yet? In David L. Paletz and

Karol Jakubowicz (eds.): Business as Usual. Continuity and Change in Central and Eastern

Europe. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Kopeck, Petr (2006): Political parties and the state in post-communist Europe: the nature of

symbiosis.Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 22.3: 251-273.

McCargo, Duncan (forthcoming); Partisan polyvalence: characterizing the political role of Asian

media. In Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (eds.): Comparing Media Systems Beyond the

Western World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sparks, Colin (2000): Media theory after the fall of European communism: why the old models from

East and West wont do anymore. In James Curran and Myung-Jin Park (eds.): De-Westernizing Media Studies. London: Routledge, pp. 35-49.

1See, e.g., Ganev 2005, Grzymala-Busse 2003,

Kopeck 2006.

2Hallin and Mancini 2004:26ff.

3 Bajomi-Lzr, ttka and Sksd forthcoming.4

Council of Europe 2010.

5Sparks 2000: 42.

6Duncan McCargo forthcoming.

7Art. 17. 2. of Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom

of the Press and the Fundamental Rules on Media

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8Jakubowicz 2003: 206.

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Zielonka Jan and Paolo Mancini 2011 - A Media Map of CEE Summary - Politicisation of the State