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Top-Secret-

DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Effect of the Czech Crisis onSoviet Military Capabilities in Europe

Top-Secret-Copy No. 234SR IM 69-8March 1969

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Approved for Release by CIADate AaGu_sr lobct

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDirectorate of Intelligence

14 March 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Effect of the Czech Crisis on Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe

Summary

The Soviet Union's capability for militaryinitiatives in the Central European region isprobably less at this point than it was before theCzechoslovak crisis. The decline has come aboutthrough the loss of Czechoslovakia's armed forcesas a compliant and capable adjunct to Kremlin strat-egy, and the failure of the Soviets so far to com-pensate for this loss.

Before the crisis, the Czech armed forces wereresponsible for operations against NATO on the leftflank of the Warsaw Pact forward line, at leastuntil Soviet reinforcements could be brought in fromthe Carpathian Military District.

Events of the past year, however, have largelynullified the value of the Czech forces for Sovietmilitary initiatives. Their reliability in suchsituations is doubtful and their combat effective-ness has been seriously eroded.

At the same time, Soviet forces in the westernUSSR slated to reinforce units opposing NATO'scentral region have been drawn down to provide anoccupation force which, as now constituted, contrib-utes little to Soviet offensive capabilities.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Researchand coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelli-gence and National Estimates.

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In the July-September 1968 period, the Sovietshad enhanced:their military posture in the CentralEuropean region through extensive mobilization ofreduced-strength divisions and forward deployment.This gain has proved to be temporary and has beenlargely dissipated by demobilization of troops andvehicles called up prior to the intervention, andby the return home of the bulk of the interventionforce.

Most of the 40,000 to 50,000 Soviet troops nowin Czechoslovakia appear to be in . specially organizedunits which are of less than divisional size and lacksome of the Combat and support elements normallyfound in Soviet divisions. The size, configuration,and deployment of these units indicate that the So-viets view the present troops primarily as an occu-pation force and not as part of their offensivecapability against NATO.

It is unlikely that the Kremlin foresaw a dimi-nution of the Warsaw Pact's military posture oppo-site NATO asa consequence of the intervention. So-viet leaders ;probably underestimated the difficultyof installing a pro-Soviet regime in Prague whichwould acquiesce in the establishment of a large So-viet military presence in Czechoslovakia and perhapseventually restore the reliability of the Czech armedforces.

Unwilling to install a puppet regime by force orto install an occupation authority, the Soviets havefound themselves entangled in a process of bargainingand pressure with the Dubcek regime. Although Czecho-slovak leverage is limited, the evidence suggests thatthe size and disposition of the Soviet forces has beenone of the areas in which Moscow has had to compromise.This same evidence also suggests that strategic con-cerns about the Warsaw Pact posture against NATO wereless important in precipitating the invasion than theUSSR's anxieties over the political implications ofCzechoslovakia's pre-August course.

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The Soviet Presence in Czechoslovakia

1. In the weeks following the Soviet inter-vention in Czechoslovakia, there were both politicaland military reasons to believe that the Sovietswould maintain large, combat-ready forces in thecountry for an extended period. The CzechoslovakArmy, it was reasoned, could no longer be countedupon to fulfill its role in Warsaw Pact war plansas a spearhead for initial offensive action againstthe central region of NATO.

2. The Soviets seemed to have a strong incen-tive to fill this vacuum by retaining as many aseight combat-ready divisions in Czechoslovakia, atleast until the Czechs again could be consideredreliable allies, and perhaps permanently. A numberof reports from Prague and other Eastern Europeancapitals supported this view, and the Soviets them-selves initially justified their intervention onthe grounds that Czechoslovakia could no longer becounted on to fulfill its Warsaw Pact commitments.

3. As it turned out, however, the Sovietsquickly abandoned this idea, if indeed they everheld it at all. By mid-October, they had begunwithdrawing most of the124.)Soviet and five EasternEuropean divisions which had made up the interven-tion force. By late November, only a small all-Soviet force--collectively called the Central Groupof Forces (CGF)--remained in Czechoslovakia. (Seeseries of maps on next two pages.)

4. Accumulating evidence on the size, config-uration, and deployment of the Soviet forces inCzechoslovakia suggests that they are intended--atleast for now--to be primarily an occupation forcerather than an operational force opposing NATO.

5. The clearest evidence is the deploymentpattern of the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia.Units are strung out across the northern part ofthe country, with a few additional units in thesoutheast near the Hungarian border. The westernregion opposite West Germany and Austria remainsfree of Soviet troops, while Czech forces are still

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Motorized Tank

Rifle Division DivisionAirborneDivision

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Soviet forces are shown in red(-)Less than division strength* Elements of this division may

be among the LIrl units inTe) Czechoslovakia

Soviet-allied forces are shown in blackGeechaelookrdassiesraeialubynziniska.,

Army area

Map 1In early 7968 there were 26 Soviet combat

ready divisions in Eastern Europe--20 in EastGermany, 2 in Poland, and 4 in Hungary. Inaddition, 33 divisions of other Warsaw Pact coun-tries were disposed opposite the central region ofNATO. Of these divisions, 25 were at combat

'strength--6 East German, 11 Polish, and 8 Czech.Located in the four military districts of the west-ern USSR were 34 additional Soviet divisions, 14of which were at combat strength-3 in theBaltic, 4 in the Belorussian, and 7 in the Car-pathian Military Districts.

Map 2By mid-September 1968, at the peak of the

Czech intervention, some 29 Soviet and alliedEast European divisions were either in Czechoslo-vakia or near the Czechoslovak - East Germanborder and supporting the intervention. Theseincluded 8 from the Group of Soviet Forces inGermany, 1 from the Soviet forces in Poland, 3from the Soviet forces in Hungary, about 12from the western USSR, 4 Polish divisions, and Icomposite division made up of units from Bul-garia and Hungary. Some 13 understrength So-viet divisions in the western USSR were raised tocombat strength in July 1968 and at least 3 ofthese were used against Czechoslovakia.

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Map 3By early 1969 all of the ground forces in-

volved in the intervention except about 3 Sovietdivisions from the western USSR had been re-turned to their previous locations. The Sovietground elements remaining in Czechoslovak iaprobably consist of I virtually complete tankdivision and 3 Or possibly 4 combat units thatwould approximate 2 additional divisions if com-bined. The identification of all but 1 of thesecombat groupings is uncertain. With the possibleexception of 1 division from the Odessa MilitaryDistrict which may still have elements amongthose remaining in Czechoslovakia, all the under-strength Soviet divisions which had been mobil-ized in connection with the crisis had been de-mobilized by early 1969. A combat-ready Czechtank division was 'shifted from the Prague area tothe eastern part of the country and its currentstatus is uncertain.

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•in place there. This deployment appears designedfor two missions: to permit the quick applicationof force in major Czech cities, and to secure thelines of communication to East Germany, Poland, andHungary, from which additional Soviet troops couldbe introduced should the need arise.

6. The size and configuration of the Sovietunits in Czechoslovakia are difficult to judgeaccurately because of unresolved anomalies and con-tradictions

tai ld--v wand analyqls of -this.obutaiiimusawsarareekented-i-rr-ttre7Arrneer. The picturewhich emergeobfrom timis analysis, however, tends tosupport the thesis that the Soviet units in Czecho-slovakia are not now configured as a combat-readyforce capable of taking the offensive against NATO.

7. The Soviet ground. elements ipi„CmsAilovakiaprobably consist ofAefi=entalekLe- tank di- Igl-on andthree or Possibly four units of less than divisionalsize. These smaller units may be either speciallyorganized brigade-size units or stripped-down divi-sions. The entire force probably has 40,000 to50,000 meri. and, if assembled, would approximate threestandard Soviet divisions.

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12. Most of the units making up the CGF probablycame from the Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts.It is possible, however, that a few of the unidentifiedunits are elements left behind by Soviet divisions whichhave returned to East Germany or to the Baltic MilitaryDistrict.

13. The CGF has no tactical air army. In thisrespect, it is unlike other Soviet groups of forcesand military districts organized for tactical oper-ations. The only Soviet aircraft in Czechoslovakiaare some 75 interceptors--about two regiments.

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The Czech Armed Forces

14. Prior to the intervention, the Czech armedforces figured heavily in the Warsaw Pact's postureagainst NATO. With eight combat-ready divisions andsome 600 tactical aircraft, they were considered themost modern and effective military forces in the Pact,aside from 'Ithose of the USSR.

15. In the Pact's war plans, Czechoslovakia wasresponsible for providing one of the fronts whichwould conduct initial operations against NATO'scentral region until Soviet reinforcements could bemoved up from the western USSR. 1

themission of the Czech front at the outbreak of warwould be to launch an offensive through southernGermany and seize crossings over the Rhine.

16. In View of the continuing Czech defiance ofSoviet efforts to repress the liberalization impulseand the bitterness engendered by the intervention,the Soviets probably no longer consider the Czecharmed forces reliable elements in Soviet war planningfor initiatives against NATO.

17. There is, moreover, evidence that the combateffectiveness of the Czech forces at this time is ata low point because of personnel reductions, poormorale, and the removal of a combat-ready tank divi-sion from western Czechoslovakia to the eastern partof the country.

18. In September 1968, the Czech government an-nounced a change in conscription procedures: Pre-viously all eligible males were called up in theautumn. In 1968, however, "only a majority" werecalled up in the autumn, with "the rest" to be calledin April 19,69. Nothing was said about extending theterm of those conscripts due for release, and theyprobably wOre discharged on schedule. If so, the •net result would be a decline of about 20 percent intotal personnel strength. /

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19. The effectiveness of the Czech armed forcesis further eroded by a low state of morale. Observa-tions indicate that the Czech militaryhas been seriously demoralized by the ambiguity ofits situation.

20. Another indicator of a declining role for theCzech army was the removal of the Czech 13th TankDivision from its garrison north of Prague intoeastern Czechoslovakia to make room for the Sovietoccupation forces. The current personnel strengthof this division is unknown, but its removal to arear area previously occupied only by low-strengthCzech units suggests that it may no longer be main-tained in a ready status.

The Soviet Demobilization

21. In preparing for the intervention, the So-viets carried out their largest mobilization sinceWorld War II. About 130,000 reservists and 15,000to 20,000 civilian vehicles were called up, mainlybetween mid-July and early August 1968. They wereused to fill out some 13 Category II divisions* andbring them up to combat strength, to complete thesupport elements of the five reduced-strength fieldarmies which were involved, and to establish therear services organization required to support theforward deployment and invasion.

22. These additional forces probably have beenalmost entirely demobilized. The release of somepersonnel and vehicles began by late October, asthe 11th Guards Army, which had moved up to the EastGerman - Czechoslovak border region to backstop theintervention force, returned to its home base in theBaltic Military District. Analysis

also indicates that at least one-divisionof the 14th Army in the Odessa Military District was

* A Category II division requires an additional4,000 to 5,000 men and 600 to 1,000 wheeled vehiclesto reach combat strength.

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demobilized;by late January. This army's three Cate-gory II divisions had been brought to combat strengthin July and!August, and one of them--the 48th MotorizedRifle Division from Bolgrad--participated in the inter-vention. Elements of this division were still absentfrom their garrison in late January and are probablystill in Czechoslovakia.

23. The148th Motorized Rifle Division was tempo-rarily replaced at its home garrison in Bolgrad byan unidentified tank division, possibly from the KievMilitary District. This tank division--which evidentlyhad been mobilized from Category II status--was biv-ouacked in the Bolgrad training area It was no longer there in late De-

cember, andpresumably it had returned to its normalstation anddemobilized. Aside from the participa-tion by th&48th Division in the intervention, themaintenanceof the 14th Army at full combat strengthduring the autumn of 1968 was probably intended tokeep pressure on Rumania and Yugoslavia.

24. At least one Category II division of the 13thArmy in the Carpathian Military District was evi-dently still mobilized in early December, but analy-sis indicates that thisdivision subsequently reverted to a reduced-strength

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status.

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25. One;other army--the 5th Guards Tank Army inthe Belorussian Military District--was also mobilizedprior to the intervention, its three Cate-gory II divisions'

have remained in their home garrisons and that theiractivity is normal. It is likely that this armyalso has demobilized.

Present Caplabilities

26. Taking all these developments into consider-ation, it is concluded that the Soviet and WarsawPact capability for military initiatives againstNATO has decreased from what it was prior to thecrisis buildup.

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•27. The Soviets almost certainly cannot count

on Czechoslovakia's eight divisions as a compliantforce ready to carry out any action directed by theKremlin. With probably only one full division andthree or four units of less than divisional size,the Soviet forces remaining in Czechoslovakia fallshort of filling this breach, particularly sincethey appear to be configured and deployed primarilyfor occupation duty. And the demobilization of theSoviet units in the USSR which were built up tosupport the intervention, coupled with the fact thatsome units are still in Czechoslovakia, leaves So-viet forces in the western USSR with somewhat lesscapability for reinforcement in Central Europe thanthey had before the intervention.

28. It is unlikely that the Kremlin foresaw adiminution of the Warsaw Pact's military postureopposite NATO as a consequence of the intervention.Soviet leaders probably underestimated the difficultyof installing a pro-Soviet regime in Prague whichwould acquiesce in the establishment of a large So-viet military presence in Czechoslovakia and perhapseventually restore the reliability of the Czech armedforces.

29. Unwilling to install a puppet regime by forceor to install an occupation authority, the Sovietshave found themselves entangled in a process of bar-gaining and pressure with the Dubcek regime. AlthoughCzechoslovak leverage is limited, the evidence suggeststhat the size and disposition of the Soviet forceshas been one of the areas in which Moscow has had tocompromise. This same evidence also suggests thatstrategic concerns about the Warsaw Pact postureagainst NATO were less important in precipitatingthe invasion than the USSR's anxieties over thepolitical implications of Czechoslovakia's pre-August course.

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