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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
SANDI HORINE, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
CASE NO. 07-155
On Appeal from the Hamilton CountyCourt of Appeals, First AppellateDistrict
VINEYARD COMMUNITY CHURCH,et al.
Defendants-Appellees.
Court of AppealsAPPEAL NO. C-060097
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JURISDICTION
MARTIN MCHENRY (0022543)Haverkamp, Brinker, Rebold & Riehl Co., LPA5856 Glenway AvenueCincinnati, Ohio 45202(513) 922-3200(513) 922-8096 (facsimile)[email protected] for AppellantsSandi Horine and Greg Williams
DAVID K. MONTGOMERY (0040276)YVETTE R. SIMPSON (0078009)Keating Muething & Klekamp, PLLOne East Fourth Street, Suite 1400Cincinnati, Ohio 45202(513) 579-6574(513) 579-6457 (facsimile)[email protected]@kmklaw.comCounsel for Appellees,Vineyard Community Church, DavidWorkman, and John Handelsman
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. THIS CASE INVOLVES NO SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONAND IS NOT A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST ............................1
Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc. (1997), 124 Ohio App. 3d 24, 705N.E.2d 385 ...........................................................................................................................1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............................................................................................2
A. Statement of the Facts ........................................................................................................2
B. Procedural Posture .............................................................................................................4
III. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' PROPOSITIONS OFLAW ........................................................................................................................................4
Response To Aggellants' Proposition Of Law No. 1 and 2: The decisionsbelow were not based on "categorical notions" of ministerial status or anoverly broad construction of the ministerial exemption . .... ..........................................5
Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (C.A. 7, 2003) 320 F.3d 698 .................6
Combs v. Seatex Annual Conference of United Methodist Church (C.A.5, 1999)173 F.3d 343 ....................................................................................................................5, 6
E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. (C.A. D.C., 1996) 83 F.3d 455 .................................................6
Fabian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 96 S. Ct. 2372,49 L. Ed. 2d 151 ...............................................................................................................5, 6
Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church (1997)124 Ohio App. 3d at 29 ..............................6
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1979) 440 U.S. 490, 99 S. Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed. 2d 533 .......................................:....................................................................................6
Salzgaber v. First Christian Church (1989) 65 Ohio App. 3d 368, 583 N.E.2d1361 ......................................................................................................................................6
Starkman v. Evans (C.A. 5, 1999) 198 F.3d 173 .................................................................6
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese ofPeoria (C.A.7, 2006), 442 F.3d 1036 ...................................6
Response To Proposition Of Law No. 3: Where Subject Matter JurisdictionIs Being Challenged Pursuant To Rule 12(B)(1), No PresumptiveTruthfulness Attaches To The Plaintiff s Allegations ... .................................................8
Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, (1997) 124 Ohio App. 3d 24, 705 N.E.2d385 .....................................................................................:..................................................8
Montez v. Department ofNavy (C.A.4, 2004) 392 F.3d 147 ...............................................9
Southgate Development Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. (1976) 48Ohio St. 2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526 .........................................................................................8
Redmon v. U.S. (C.A.10, 1991) 934 F.2d 1151 ...................................................................9
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................9
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
Appellees, Vineyard Community Church, David Workman, and John Handelsman
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Church"), submit this memorandum in opposition to
Appellants' request for jurisdiction.
1. THIS CASE INVOLVES NO SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONAND IS NOT A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST.
Contrary to Appellants' arguments in their memorandum in support ofjurisdiction, this
case involves no substantial constitutional question and is not a case of public or great interest.
This is an ordinary employment case, brought by two acknowledged, certified ministers who are
attempting to renounce their ministerial status so they can challenge the Church's internal
disciplinary procedure in the civil court system. Appellants Sandi Horine and Greg Williams
worked as ministers at Appellee Vineyard Coniununity Church until their terminations in
November 2004. Their statuses as ministers was acknowledged by all parties long before this
case arose. They were certified by the State of Ohio as ministers and they claimed and received
a federal tax exemption available only to "ministers of the Gospel." Horine and Williams have
confirmed that the reasons presented for their termination were based in religious scripture, and
they are nonetheless asking the courts to weigh in on the validity of those religious reasons.
The trial court granted the Church's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed. Both courts correctly concluded that the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution strips civil courts ofjurisdiction over such ecclesiastical
controversies. The decisions of both lower courts were consistent with well-established
precedent, including Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc. (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 24,
705 N.E.2d 385 (concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction if even a non-employee parishioner
challenges a church's disciplinary.decision). In this case, acknowledged and certified ministers
are asking the courts to review intemal church discipline based on ecclesiastic principles.
According to all available authority, such matters are clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the civil
courts. In short, there is no "substantial constitutional question" involved in this case.
Moreover, this case - which is nothing more than an employment dispute between a
church and its ministers - is not of great public interest. While there may be many church
employees throughout the state, it is highly unlikely that any other acknowledged, certified
church ministers would attempt to renounce their status as ministers - as Horine and Williams
have attempted to do - for the sole purpose of involving the civil courts in a matter of intemal
church discipline. Appellant's contention that the court of appeals' decision "[endangers] church
employees throughout the state" defies logic.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
ht ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the trial
court considered the following undisputed evidence regarding the job functions performed by
Williams and Horine: Williams and Horine were employed by the Church as Associate Pastor
and Staff Development Director, respectively. (Af£ of Pl. Greg Williams ("Williams Af£") T.d.
21-¶1; Af£ of P1. Sandi Horine ("Horine Aff.") T.d. 20-¶1.) 1 Williams was Horine's direct
supervisor. As "Associate Pastor," Williams's job description required that he "provide
leadership, vision, values and direction; ensure spiritual health and growth of attendees, maintain
Biblical integrity among staff and leaders, supervise staff and direct the ministry areas toward the
fulfillment of the [Church's] Vision/Mission." (Af£ of David L. Workman ("Workman Aff")
t Appellees acknowledge that this Court has not yet received a copy of the Record on Appeal. Appellees have citedto the Record to inform the Court that Appellees have support for all factual statements contained herein.
2
T.d. 10-Ex.A.) Williams was also a member of a six-person Senior Leadership Team, a body
that developed and proposed ideas related to Church governance. (Workman Aff T.d. 10-¶3.)
Williams was licensed as a minister by the Church and by the State of Ohio. (See
httpi//serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/minister/index.html; Workman Aff. Td. 10-Exs. B, C.) In
addition, by taking the Internal Revenue Code's housing exemption in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, and 2004, Williams swore under penalty of perjury that he was a "minister of the gospel."
(See 26 C.F.R. 1.107-1(a); Transeript T.d. 28-14:6-11. Workman Aff. T.d. 10-Ex.D.)
Horine was employed by the Church as the Staff Development Director. As Staff
Development Director, Horine screened employment applications and conducted preliminary
interviews with applicants, (Horine Aff. T.d. 20-¶32) implementing the Church's General Hiring
Policy on a day-to-day basis. (Horine Aff. T.d. 20-¶¶14, 30; Workman Aff. T.d. 10-¶11) In this
capacity, Horine was responsible for implementing the Church's Statement of Faith and the Staff
Guiding Principles, a responsibility that included administration and facilitation of the Matthew
18 biblical reconciliation process that is central to the Church's value of Christian mediation as a
form of dispute resolution. (Id.) As such, the Church viewed Horine as being ultimately
responsible for the spiritual well-being of the entire staff. (Workman Aff. T.d. 10-¶7.) She
coordinated new employee orientation, which ended with prayer and consecration, and acted as
the spiritual gatekeeper for the Church as it related to new staff by implementing the Church's
Hiring Policy. (Workman Aff. T.d. 10-¶¶8, 11.)
Like Williams, Horine was licensed as a minister by the Church and by the State of Ohio,
(See http://serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/minister/index.html; Workman Aff. T.d. 10-Exs. G, H.)
Further, by taking the Intemal Revenue Code's housing exemption in 2004, she swore under
3
penalty of perrjury that she was a "minister of the gospel" at the time of her termination. (See 26
C.F.R. 1.107-1(a); Transcript T.d. 28-14:6-11; Workman Aff. T.d. 10-Ex. D.)
While the Complaint's causes of actions are titled "retaliation" and "violation of public policy,"
it is apparent from the allegations that Appellants are asking the civil courts to probe, analyze,
and assess the Church's religious values and doctrines. See e.g., Compl. T.d.2-I(¶13 (asking the
Court to assess the faimess of Biblical reconciliation), 24-28 (characterizing the Church's
thoughts and motives related to crafting discipline for internal Church matters).
B. Procedural Posture
Horine and Williams filed the underlying action in the Hamilton County Court of
Common Pleas claiming (1) retaliation on the basis of Horine and Williams' opposition to what
they believed was sex discrimination and (2) violation of public policy based on their
consultation with an attorney. The Church responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction; the case law is clear that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
strips civil courts of jurisdiction over ecclesiastical controversies. (Motion to Dismiss T.d. 9.)
The trial court heard oral argument by the parties, determined that it did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the dispute, and granted the motion to dismiss under both Rule 12(B)(1) and Rule
12(B)(6).
Horine and Williams appealed the decision of the trial court. After reviewing briefs
submitted by both Appellants and the Church, the First District Court of Appeals conducted a
hearing on the merits. On December 15, 2006, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. See First District Court of Appeals Opinion, dated December 15, 2006 ("Ct. App.
P ")
4
III. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
Appellants' Proposition Of Law No. 1.: The "MinisterialException" Must Be Strictly Construed And Limited To ExtendNo Further Than Is Necessary To Avoid Violating The FirstAmendment.
Annellants' Proposition of Law No. 2: A-Decision To Dismiss AComplaint Based On The Ministerial Exception, A Decision ThatIs Itself Based On Categorical Notions Of "Minister" Status UsedFor Other Purposes, Must Be Reversed.
Response To Appellants' Proposition Of Law No. 1 and 2: The decisions belowwere not based on "categorical notions" of ministerial status or an overly broadconstruction of the ministerial exemption.
Appellants contend that their case was dismissed based on "categorical notions of their
status as ministers" and/ or an overly broad construction of the ministerial exemption. Nothing
could be further from the truth. The court of appeals speoifically noted that all relevant factors
had been considered, including Williams and Horine's "actual duties within the church, as well
as their licensing as ministers with both the church and the state, and their utilization of
ministerial tax exemptions." Ct. App. Op. 116. Moreover, based on the record below, it is clear
that their claims would be barred by the First Amendment regardless of how narrowly the
exemption was construed.
Initially, it must be remembered that the "ministerial exemption" at issue here is rooted in
the First Amendment excessive entanglement principles that have been annunciated by federal
courts for years. See Fabian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, (1976), 426 U.S. 696, 96 S. Ct.
2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151; see also Combs v. Seatex Annual Conference of United Methodist Church
(C.A.5, 1999), 173 F.3d 343. Contrary to Appellants' suggestion, it is not a narrow
administrative or regulatory exception. It is a constitutionally mandated principle that strips the
civil courts of jurisdiction over religious controversies: "The Supreme Court of the United States
has established the general rule that religious controversies are not a proper subject of civil court
inquiry, and that civil courts must accept ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds
them." Salzgaber v. First Christian Church (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 368, 371, 583 N.E.2d 1361,
1363 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696). The jurisdictional bar preserves the "fundamental
proposition that churches should be able to `decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine."' Combs, 173 F.3d at 349
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. (C.A. D.C., 1996), 83 F.3d 455, 462).
Over the years, the exemption has been extended to church employees who would not
traditionally be considered "ministers" and who perform functions far less religious in nature
than those performed by Williams and Horine. See e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago (C.A. 7, 2003), 320 F.3d 698, 704 (claims of church's press secretary barred by the
ministerial exemption); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese ofRaleigh (C.A. 4, 2000), 213 F.3d
795, 804 (claims of part-time music teacher and director of music barred); Starkrnan v. Evans
(C.A. 5, 1999), 198 F.3d 173 (choir director's claims barred).
In Howard, the First District Court of Appeals held that "all matters of the propriety of
internal church discipline ... whether taken against a clergyman or a church member, are beyond
the jurisdiction of secular courts." 124 Ohio App.3d at 29. In that case a parishioner was
attempting to litigate an issue of internal church discipline in the civil courts. As in this case, the
trial court granted the church's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and the court of
appeals affirmed. The Howard decision is consistent with the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, which recognize that, in an employment dispute, "[I]t is not only the conclusions
that may be reached ... which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but
also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions." (emphasis added) Tomic,
supra , at *6 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1979), 440 U.S. 490, 502, 99 S. Ct.
6
1313, 59 L. Ed. 2d 533, where the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act could not be
applied to lay teachers in Catholic schools).
In this case, the trial court and court of appeals carefully considered the undisputed facts
and easily and correctly determined that consideration of appellants' claims were barred by the
First Amendment. Any contention that the decision was based on categorical notions of
ministerial status is refuted by the court of appeals' decision. Indeed, the court of appeals could
not have been clearer on this point:
We agree with Horine and Williams that the church's "internalcharacterization" of them as "ministers" was not dispositive oftheir status for purposes of application of the ministerial exception.On the other hand, we find somewhat disingenuous their argumentthat they were not ministers of the church. From the reading of theTrial Court's decision, it is clear that the Trial Court did not relysolely on the church's labeling of Horine and Williams. Instead ofmaking its detennination that Horine and Williams were ministers,the Trial Court considered their actual duties within the church, aswell as their licensing as ministers with both the church and thestate, and the utilization of ministerial tax exemptions.
Ct. App. Op. ¶¶ 15, 16.
In its unanimous decision, the court of appeals also reviewed, in some detail, those
ministerial duties that Appellants had not disputed in the trial court. See Ct. App. Op. 1111, 12.
Clearly, this is not a case that turned on broad constructions or "categorical notions."
Appellants' job titles, certifications, sworn admissions to the IRS and duties all confirmed they
were ministers. Moreover, it is undisputed that, like the plaintiff/parishioner in Howard,
Appellants were asking the civil courts to review and overturn internal church discipline. Based
on all of the above, the court of appeals unanimously concluded that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute. This case involved nothing more than the simple application of the
ministerial exception to the facts of this case. As such, there is no substantial constitutional
question for this Court to resolve.
7
Appellants' Pronosition of Law No. 3: If A Trial Court Does NotExclude Evidence Presented In Connection With A Motion ToDismiss Based On The "Ministerial Exception," It Must ConstrueThe Evidence In The Light Most Favorable To The Employee,Giving The Employee The Benefit Of All Reasonable InferencesAnd Credibility Determinafions.
Response To Proposition Of Law No. 3: Where Subject Matter Jurisdiction IsBeing Challenged Pursuant To Rule 12(B)(1), No Presumptive TruthfulnessAttaches To The Plaintiff's Allegations.
Ignoring the fact that the trial court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(B)(1), Horine and Williams misleadingly argue that the trial court was required to
assume the truth of all allegations in the Complaint. The case law on this issue is clear: the trial
court in determining whether it has jurisdiction over a case may decide disputed issues of
material fact without attaching presumptive truthfulness to plaintiffs allegations. See Ct. App.
Op. ¶ 3; See also Southgate Development Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. (1976), 48
Ohio St. 2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526. Stated differently, in determining whether it has jurisdiction,
the trial court is not required to assume the truth of the plaintiff's allegations and this analysis
does not change merely because the defendant filed both a Rule 12(B)(1) motion and a Rule
12(B)(6) motion.
The case of Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 24, 705
N.E.2d 385, is directly on point. In Howard, defendants filed both Rule 12(B)(1) and Rule
12(B)(6) motions, arguing that the complaint must be dismissed because the disputes were
ecclesiastical in nature. The Howard court recognized that, at times, the inquiries under Rule
12(B)(1) and (6) were intertwined, but nonetheless concluded that the trial court was required to
"deterniine whether the complaint set forth a cause of action cognizable in the trial court and
within its jurisdiction." Id.
8
Contrary to Horine's and Williams's arguments, the trial court in this case did not
unnecessarily address the "merits" of their underlying claims; that is, the trial court made no
determination whether Appellants suffered an unlawful adverse employment action. Rather, the
trial court merely addressed the sometimes intertwined nature of Rulel2(B)(1) and Rule 12(B)(6)
analysis and referred to materials outside of the pleadings for the Rule 12(B)(1) inquiry.
Appellants cite to several cases wherein courts refused to dismiss a case for lack of
jurisdiction without first considering the merits of the dispute. See Montez v. Department of
Navy (C.A.4, 2004), 392 F.3d 147, 148 ("because the federal cause of action and federal
jurisdiction are interdependent, the district court erred in dismissing the case under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)..."); see also Redmon v. U.S. (C.A.10, 1991), 934 F.2d 1151. In
both of these cases, however, the challenge to jurisdiction was inexorably intertwined with an
attack on the merits of plaintiffs claims. Stated differently, these courts could not decide the
threshold question of jurisdiction without ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs underlying
claims. In such cases, which were all federal courts applying federal procedure, courts have held
that the Rule 12(B)(6) standard should apply to the determination of the merits of the claims.
Here, there can be no real dispute that the trial court ruled merely on the application of
the ministerial exception without reaching the merits of Appellants' retaliation claim. Indeed,
the policy behind the ministerial exception is aimed at preventing the courts from exercising
jurisdiction and addressing the merits of the complaint, which would constitute impermissible
entanglement with religion. Thus, the trial court acted properly in determining, first, whether it
could exercise jurisdiction over this dispute. As recognized by the court of appeals, there was no
procedural error connnitted.
9
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this case presents no substantial constitutional
question and is not a case of great or public interest. Both the trial court and the court of appeals
thoroughly considered the record and the argument of the parties and unanimously agreed that
the court lacked jurisdiction over this dispute. Accordingly, Appellees respectfully request that
this Court deny Appellants' request for jurisdiction in this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
David K. Montgomery (0040276)Yvette R. Simpson (0078009)Keating Muething & Klekamp PLLOne East Fourth Street, Suite 1400Cincinnati, Ohio 45202Tel: (513) 579-6475Fax: (513) [email protected]@kmklaw.comAttorneys for Defendants/AppelleesVineyard Community Church, et al.
OF COUNSEL:
KEATING MUETHING & KLEKAMP PLLOne East Fourth Street
Suite 1400Cincinnati, Ohio 45202(513) 579-6400
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TOJURISDICTION was served upon Martin McHenry, Haverkamp, Rebold & Riehl Co., L.P.A.,5856 Glenway Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45238 by ordinary U.S. mail, this 28a_jay^f^ebruary,2007.
David K. Montgomery
1937989.5
10
