Youth, Conflict, and TerrorismYouth, Conflict, and Terrorism

Zachary RothschildZachary RothschildEurasian Regional Affairs OfficerEurasian Regional Affairs OfficerOffice of the Coordinator for CounterterrorismOffice of the Coordinator for CounterterrorismU.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of Staterothschildzr@state.govrothschildzr@state.gov202-647-2169202-647-2169

OVERVIEW

Definitions

Relationship between Youth and Conflict

Lessons learned and programmatic approaches

Definitions…

• “Terrorists care about how many people are watching, not how many are dead.”

• Insurgents: an armed group seeking to wrest political power from a government.

…and a relationship…

• In 2006, al-Qaida and other terrorists (sought to) exploit insurgency and communal conflict as radicalization and recruitment tools, especially using the Internet to convey their message.”

- U.S. Department of State

Are youth a cause of war and terrorism?

• No statistical correlation between youth ‘bulge’ and civil conflict, except where other factors present:

– High unemployment– States in transition– Politics is organized around violent factions.

• Most recruits into violent groups are alienated youth…

How Conflict Emerges

• USAID’s Conflict Assessment USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework:Framework:

– Incentives for Violence (Greed and Incentives for Violence (Greed and Grievance – personal Grievance – personal and and group)group)

– Resources (Weapons, Training, Resources (Weapons, Training, RecruitsRecruits))

– Weak State & Social Capacity to Weak State & Social Capacity to RespondRespond

Not just self-interest… • Profile of Shehzad Tanweer, 21, one of the British Tube

Bombers, July 2005– Accomplished athlete studying sports science at Leeds

Metropolitan U.– Born and raised in U.K, of Pakistani origin– Loving, supportive, and financially successful parents– A friend described him as “not interested in politics,” and “as

sound as a pound.”

• Sageman’s study of Al-Qaeda Biographies– 2/3 were middle or upper class– 60% had gone to college

….It’s also who you know…

• Sageman: 88% of Al-Qaeda members studied (n=400) had family/friends in the ‘Jihad’

• Peer pressure: No suicide bomber has ever acted alone.

…and what you accept as right (legitimizing ideology)…

“He is an enemy of ours whether he fights us directly or merely pays his taxes.”

- Osama bin Laden

Doing something about it: Principles and Programs

• Peer networks and peer pressure drive Peer networks and peer pressure drive radicalization and recruitment… but radicalization and recruitment… but can also support youth engagement can also support youth engagement and development. and development.

• Programs: Programs:

– Networking in and out-of-school youth, Networking in and out-of-school youth, – Service learningService learning

A Mathematical Interlude

• 4th grade math puzzle in 4th grade math puzzle in Afghanistan:Afghanistan:

– ‘‘The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3200 meters from a of 3200 meters from a mujahidmujahid, and that , and that mujahid mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead?’strike the Russian in the forehead?’

Doing something about it: Principles and Programs

• Lesson: What youth know can shape Lesson: What youth know can shape what they believe to be right.what they believe to be right.

• Programs: Programs: – Maradi Youth Development (Niger)Maradi Youth Development (Niger)– Madrasa Street Law Program Madrasa Street Law Program

(Kyrgyzstan)(Kyrgyzstan)

Doing something about it: Rural Dynamics

• ““Traditional authority figures often wield enough power to Traditional authority figures often wield enough power to single-handedly drive an insurgency. This is especially true in single-handedly drive an insurgency. This is especially true in rural areas.” rural areas.” – U.S. Army Counterinsurgency ManualU.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual

• Pacifying the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: The Datu and his Pacifying the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: The Datu and his bananasbananas

• Lesson: Engage youth Lesson: Engage youth withwith traditional leadership, not traditional leadership, not apart apart fromfrom youth in isolation – and create opportunity. youth in isolation – and create opportunity.

• Programs: Programs: – Intergenerational Dialogue Workshops (Burundi)Intergenerational Dialogue Workshops (Burundi)– Create economic opportunity to reinforce hope and dignity.Create economic opportunity to reinforce hope and dignity.

Doing something about it: Rural Dynamics

• Safehavens key to terrorist access to resources; often found Safehavens key to terrorist access to resources; often found in (rural) border areas.in (rural) border areas.

• Less state control, less state services = More opportunities for Less state control, less state services = More opportunities for insurgents. insurgents.

• Examples: Examples: Hamas & HizballahHamas & Hizballah

• Lesson: Engage youth in service-delivery to reduce Lesson: Engage youth in service-delivery to reduce likelihood safehavens emerging.likelihood safehavens emerging.

• Programs: Programs: – Youth Service Corps to improve service deliveryYouth Service Corps to improve service delivery

Closing Note – Closing Note – Trusted NetworksTrusted Networks