Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians

7/28/2019 Yogcra and the Buddhist Logicians

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THE JOURNAL OF THEINTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFBUDDHIST STUDIESE D I T O R - I N - C H I E F

A . K. NarainUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

E D I T O R SHeinz Bechert Leon Hurvitz

Universitat Gottingen FRG University of British ColumbiaVancouver, Canada

Lewis Lancaster A . W . MacDonaldUniversity of California, Berkeley, USA Universiti de Paris X, Nanterre, France

B. J. Stavisky Alex WaymanWCNILKR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA

A S S O C I A T E E D I T O R

Stephen BeyerUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Volume 2 1979 Number 1


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T A BL E O F C O N T E N T S

I . A R T I C L E S1. T he Mongo l K ha ns a nd Ch ine s e Buddh i s m a nd T a o i s m , bySechin Jagchid2. From Madhyamika to Yogacara , an Analys is of MMK,XX IV. 18 an d MV, 1.1-2, by Gadjin m. Nagao3 . Dynamic L ibe ra t ion in Yogaca ra Buddhism, by AlanSponberg4 . Yogacara and the Buddhis t Logic ians , by A lex Wayman

I I . S H O R T P A P E R S1. Sambodhi in ASoka 's 8th Rock Edict , by A . L. Basham2 . Can Medi ta t iona l Prac t ice be Measured? A Repor t on aQuant i t a t ive Survey , by Jacques Maquet3 . Nirvana and Me taphys ica l Expe r ience , by Ismael Qu iles

I I I . B O O K R E V IE W S A N D N O T I C E SReviews:

1. W o r l d C o n q u e r o r a n d W o r l d R e n o u n c e r , by S.J. Tambiah2 . Com pa r a t ive E th i c s i n H indu a nd Buddh i s t T r a d i t i ons , byRoderick Hindery.3 . Mahayana Buddhis t Medi ta t ion : Theory and Prac t ice , byMinoru Kiyota, assisted by Elvin W. Jones4. C h a n d i B o r o b u d u r : A M o n u m e n t o f M a n k i n d , by Dr.

SoekmonoObituary:

1. Paul Demieville, by A lexander W. Macdonald

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YOGACARA AND THE BUDDHISTLOGICIANS

by A lex Wayman

IntroductionThe school of Buddhism known as Yogacara or a l te rna te lyas Ci t tamatra i s a s tandard topic in surveys of Indian phi losophy. I t is a lso one of the two main s ides of Mahayana Buddhis tphi losophy, the o ther s ide be ing ca l led Madhyamika . Manyscholars have gone deeply into the intr icacies of the Indian systems of philosophy, and the Yogacara school has not escapedthe i r keen cons idera t ions . However , the present wr i te r foundin the course of his s tudies over the years that the philosophicalposi t ion of these texts that emerged while he read the texts ofAsahga and h is fo l lowers d id not bear out the s tandard survey

explanation of the Yogacara posi t ion. At the same t ime, i t became appa ren t why some scho la r sundoub ted ly in te l l igen tan d cap able w ould co m e to a con clusion n ot ver if ied by myow n delvings into this l i te ra t ur e . I a l lu de to the unqu alif iedden ia l of an ex te rn a l ob ject , a t t r i bu ted to th is school . Of co urse ,i f indeed the Yogacara school denies the real i ty of an externalobject, i t would hardly be possible to f ind its position attractiveto the Buddhis t logic ians who were to fol low, s ince Dignaga andhis successors , espec ia l ly Dharmaklr t i , do not deny an ex te rna lobject; rather they call i t a svalaksana ( the 'par t icular ' ) and evensomet imes descr ibe i t as paramartha-sat ( 'absolute existence') , tounderscore the real i ty of this object of direct perception (pra-tyaksa). But i t has been c la imed by Stcherba tsky and o thers tha tth er e is a pr o n ou n ce d inf luence of Yogacara phi losophy on Bu ddhis t log ic of the Dignaga-Dharmaklr t i l ineage . I f we grantthis, and indeed we shou ld , the re r ema ins the p rob lem of wha t


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is the nature o f the influence and what kind of Yogacara is m ostaffiliated to the Buddhist logician's position.But, then, there appear to be different kinds of Yogacara.At the sutra stage, there is the Samdhinirmocanasutra and itscontinuation into Asanga's school, and there is the Lahkdvatdra-sutra. As a kind of revealed Sastra, there is the Madhydntavibhdga,attributed to Maitreya, with Vasubandhu's commentary. Finally,there is Vasubandhu's VirnSatikd and Trimiikd. Of course thereare Mahayana sutras or sutra portions besides the above thatwere authoritative for both the Madhyamika and Yogacaraschools, and also further exegetical commentaries on the mainworks, as well as more independent treatises to be included inthe general category of Yogacara; the present paper can barelytouch upon this extensive literature. After considering certaintexts of the above-named literature, I shall treat the termdlayavijndna, and, finally, some views about the Yogacara.

A . Vijnaptimdtratdsiddhi and the SamdhinirmocanasutraThe Samdhinirmocanasutra is the main Yogacara scripture. Vasubandhu's two brief treatises are the form of Yogacara themost known and treated by Western scholars as to attributedYogacara philosophical position. The introduction to Tripathi'sThe Problems of Knowledge in Yogacara Buddhism says:1 "Dr.Stcherbatsky has also corroborated the view that Dihnaga'sAlambanapariksa simply summarizes the arguments of Vasubandhu's Vijnaptimdtratasiddhi. A comparative study of the Vimsatikdand the Alambanapariksa certainly lends support to the view ofDr. Stcherbatsky." In further support, one may observe thatVinltadeva, who wrote several well-known commentaries onDharmaklrti's logical works, composed the commentaries,Prakarana-vimiaka-tikd and Trimsika-tika, on the two Vasuban-dhu treatises, perhaps as a preparation for his logic commentaries, including his commentary, A lambanapariksa-tika, on thesmall Dignaga work.It is necessary to treat certain terms. There is the termdlambana, employed in the title of Dignaga's work, and I renderit 'consciousness-support.' Then there is the correlative subjective term, vijndna, which I usually translate 'perception.' In thesummary of the master Yogacara commentator Sthiramati,from his commentary on Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaprakarana:266


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Now, what is vijnana? I t i s def ined as representat ion (vijnapti)of a consc iousness-suppor t (alambana). A consc iousness-support is a sense object 01 a t h o u g h t (citta) and a men ta l (caitta);Furthermore, i t i s of s ix kinds, f rom form (rupa) up to nat u r e s (dharma). Besides , rep rese nta t ion is def ined as ap pr eh e n s i o n (graha), a s c e r t a i n m e n t (*pratipatti), a n d u n d e r s t a n d in g {*adhigama). I t is the six evolving perceptions (pravrtti-vijndna) f rom eye-based percept ion up to mind-based per cep t ion (manovijndna).Notice that there is no denial of an alambana i n t he mean ingof a sense object . Passing to Vasubandhu's two treatises, we cannot ice re fe rences to the ord inary s i tua t ion of mankind and tothe t ranscendenta l exper ience . In the f i r s t case , h i s ' r epresenta t ion-only ' (vijnapti-matra) as appl ied to the normal consc iousness in sent ient beings is somewhat subt ler than a s imple denialof external th ings . This is c lear f rom verse 3 of the Sanskr i tVimfatikd, con ta in ing the words , " fu r the rmore , l i ke the hungryghos ts (preta), so with all , th er e is n o cert ain ty in th e stre am ofconsc iousness , up o n see ing the s t ream of pu s , and so on ." 3 T h i sal ludes to the Buddhis t mythological theory of f ive or s ix dest inies (gati), inc luding the hungry ghos ts as those d i sembodiedspi r i t s tha t a re perpe tua l ly hungry and th i r s ty because the i rown consc iousness po l lu tes wh at is inhe ren t ly pu re , m akin g i tso r epu l sive a s t o be unea tab le and u nd r inka b le . Jn an ag a rb ha ' scommentary on the Mai t reya chapter of the Samdhinirmocanasutrai l lus t ra tes the mis - repor ted na ture of the ex te rna l ob jec t wi ththe s tandard example of the s t ream of water which an imals ,hungry ghos ts , men, and gods a l l see d i f fe ren t ly , the hungrygh osts se ein g it full of p us , the go ds see ing i t as lapis lazuli , an dso on.4 T h e s t ream itself is no t den ied . W hat those rem ark smean is that the consciousness shared by a par t icular dest iny(gati), say men, or hungry ghos ts , agrees on a par t icu la r fabr icat ion a t t r ibuted to an external , and that the external i s notthe way i t was represented. Hence, the point i s not to deny anexternal object , but ra ther to aff i rm the representat ion of i t asa group fabr ica t ion ; and so the common denia l o f an ex te rna lobject means in these terms that there is no object of which there pr es en tat io n is a fa ithful copy. In sh or t , V asu ba nd hu cou ldwel l argue that his representat ion-only is the correct way tospeak of the nature of consciousness in the l ight of the Buddhist teaching of f ive or six destinies {gati), with the posit ion67


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that the object is the same for all the sentient beings: they onlysee it differently on account of the destiny.Once we take this as Vasubandhu's position, it becomes m orereasonable to assume a possible consistency with Dignaga'sAlambanapariksa, since this work indeed admits an alambana.It is also well to notice that Vasubandhu treats the transcendental experience, since Dignaga also admits a yogipratyaksa.Thus toward the end of the Trimfikd (verse 28) :5When perception (vijndna) does not perceptively reach themeditative ooject (alambana), it abides in the state of perception-only (vijndna-mdtra)y which lacks an apprehenctible byreason of not apprehending that meditative object.

Here again Vasubandhu clarifies that he does not deny thealambana. The state of vijndna-mdtra is reached when vijndnadoes not apprehend the alambana. Subject and object have become one in samddhi; an d Vasuban dhu's verse is consistent withAsanga's citation of the Samdhinirmocanasutra (Maitreya chapter) in his Mahdydnasamgraha:Lord, is that image which is the sarnddhi-domam differentfrom that mind (wnich perceives) or is it the same? The Lordanswered: Maitreya, it is not different. And why? Becausethat image amounts to representation-only (vijnaptimdtra).Maitreya, I have explained that the meditative object{alambana) of perception (vijndna) is distinguished (vibhakta)by representation-only (vijnaptimdtra).6

This passage again clarifies that there is no denial of thealambana even in the successful samddhi situation. Indeed, representation-only distinguishes the consciousness-support whenit is no longer perceived. This corresponds to the usual situation when, seeing something quite striking and wondering ifit is really there, we would turn away from it and not see it,showing that our perception itself was not responsible for theobject (here the alambana), and that the object was distinguished (set apart) by our no longer perceiving it. By the sametoken, the state of samddhi is distinguished by the yogin's returning to ordinary consciousness.Now, is the preceding consistent with Dignaga'sAlambanapariksdl Since it is a brief work, I shall translate theeight verses with the help of Dignaga's own commentary.

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1. Although atoms are the cause of the sensory representation, they do not appear therein, so its sense object (visaya)is not the atoms, like a sense organ (has objects).2. Whatever appears (i.e. in the representation) that way,does not (do so) from them, because it (the representation) isnon-substantial, like a double moon. Accordingly, neither ofthe two externals (atoms and their aggregation) is feasible asthe object of cognition.3. Some persons claim that the aspects (dkdra) of aggregation accomplish (the cognition), and that the aspect of atomsis not the object of representation, like solidity, etc.4. If it were that way, the cognitions of pot, cup, etc. wouldbe the same. If the differentiation (of cognition) is by virtue ofdifferentiation of aspects, it would exist as atomic substance5. because if it were not (so), there would be no differentiation of measure (e.g., roundness). Therefore, it exists (i.e., conventionally) without material. Because if one excludes the atoms, the cognition of an appearance in that place woulddisappear.6. The form of the inner knowable, which appears asthough it were external, is the objectbecause it is the formof perception (vijndna) and because it is the conditional state(pratyayatd) of that (= dlambana).7. And it is the condition (pratyaya) because a single part(amsa) is not delusive. Because it establishes capacity (sakti), itis in sequence. Whatever is the form of sense capacity that isan associated cause (sahakdrin), is the sense organ (itself).8. Besides, that does not contradict the representation. Accordingly, these (three) pass (as valid):1) the form of the sensory object (visaya);2) the capacity of mutual cause (i.e., capacity of eye, and basedon inner form the perception, vijndna, to wit, the dlambana appearing as objective thing);3) immemorial time.Later, we shall see by a passage of Dharmottara's thatDignaga has a kind of nominalism here. He distinguishes between the atoms and the form of atoms. What causes sensoryrepresentation is atoms, not an aggregation of 'form' of atoms.In his summary (verse 8, 2), he shows that this cause is furthertreated by an associated cause, to wit, the sense-organ capacity.69


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T he se ar e taken t og eth er as on e i tem . Lef t over 1) is the ' fo rm '( the so-cal led 'aggregat ion of atoms' ) a t t r ibuted to the object ;th is is a d d e d by th e m ind , an d is an o th e r i tem (which he calls"the form of the sensory object") . A th ird i tem is ' t ime, ' s incethis is necessary for sequence, as in the d iscussions on variouscauses .So far I de tec t no d iverg enc e from tha t par t o f V asub and hu ' stwo treat ises , Asahga 's c i ta t ion in the Mahdydna-samgraha, a n dSth i ramat i ' s passage , as p resen ted above. In th is k ind o f nominal ism 8 ( though cal led ' ideal ism' in Indian Phi losophy surveys), what is real is the atomic object, called in other logic textsth e svalaksana, an d th e real is causal an d ha s the sense or ga nas a coopera t ing capaci ty . On top o f th is the mind adds the' fo rm, ' m ore com prehe ns ib le by the word ' shape , ' m ean ing tha tthe aggregat ion o f a toms was no t what caused the percep t ion :th is aggregat ion i s a represen ta t ion-on ly (vijnapti-mdtra) of ac o n sc i o u sn e s s - su p p o r t (alambana) and makes up a p ic tu re inthe mind , which the mind a t t r ibu tes to the ex ternal wor ld . I tis impossib le that th is p icture or aggregat ion could exist in theexternal world , s ince i t is representat ion-only . The vulgar interp re ta t ionthat th is den ies ex ternal ob jec tsis nonsense . I tfai ls to get Vasubandhu 's point , or Dignaga 's e i ther .

W he n V as uba nd hu says, " like the hun gr y ghosts (preta)" h eintends that when they see the r iver as fu l l of pus and otherunc lean m at ter , th is is the i r repres en ta t ion-o n ly ; h e does no tdeny the ex ternal ob jec t . He here appears cons is ten t wi th theMai t reya chap te r o f the Samdhinirmocanasutra. However, Vasu ba nd hu an d Dignaga show a d i f fe ren t em phas i s . D ignagaat tempts to g ive equal weight to the real object and the unrealobject . Not par t icular ly in th is t reat ise , Alambanapariksd, b u t ,rather , in h is Pramdnasamuccaya, he sets forth the object of pra-tyaksa (sensory percep t ion) as the svalaksana; and the object ofan app rop r ia t e cogn i t ion ca l l ed ' i n fe rence ' {anumana) as thesdmdnyalaksana.

B. Madhydntavibhaga and two 'reals'This t r ea t i se ob ta ined a r everence t an tamoun t to tha t o f sc r ip ture by the legend that Asanga received i t f rom Maitreya,u n d e r s t o o d a s t h e B o d h isa t tv a ; a n d V a su b a n d h u ' s c o m m e n t a r y70


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has a derived lustre thereby. I have cited Dharmottara'sPramdnapariksd for a passage on color and shape to show a consistency with the Madhydntavibhdga'sfirstchapter, in an old review article of mine in Philosophy East and West. Here the philosophical position is evidently a kind of nominalism, and as waspreviously indicated, is apparently consistent with Dignaga'sAlambanapariksd. Dharmottara is a well-known commentator onDharmaklrti. This is Dharmottara's passage:9

Of those, the efficient entity is the subtle atom, and color(varna) is the nature of the subtle atom, but shape (samsthdna)is not. Thus, shape exists conventionally (samvrtitas) whilecolor exists in the absolute sense (paramdrthatas). The latterserves for an effect while shape does not. Consequently,while one ordinarily sees something efficient as a multiple,when one understands the nature of this and that, it is notdistinct, for example, a moment. [It is objected:] "Shape isthat way. Its existence in a distinct manner pervades as anadjunct to an entity in the sense of a distinct configuration.Just as in the absence of a thesis there is no reason, it wouldcontradict this were the adjunct to an object (visaya) (to be)without distinctness." Now we have explained that shape isnot an adjunct. Therefore, the shape, or the 'state of a giventhing' (dhos po nid, S. vastutva), or a moment, are dependenton something, whatever the something else.

Here, Dharmottara takes the 'color' out there, 'shape' in themind; the realist takes the shape and color out there. In myreview article on Chatterjee's The Yogacara Idealism, I pointedout that the Madhydntavibhdga has two reals, the void Dharmadhatu and the Imagination of Unreality. Here, the voidDharmadhatu is on the side of the efficient entity, the color,where the Buddhist logician puts the svalaksana\ and the Imagination of Unreality is on the side of constructive imagination,discursive thought, which adds the dimension, the shape,where the logician puts his sdmdnyalaksana. For example, theclay is the atomic portion in the void Dharmadhatu, and theshape impressed upon itconsequently the 'pot'came fromthe potter's mind, a vestige of the Imagination of Unreality.

C, The Lahkdvatdrasutra and CittamdtraThis sutra is frequently taken to be in the Yogacara tradition,71


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since it uses freely the term dlayavijndna (though in conjunctionwith the T atha gatag arbh a), a characteristic term of the Asanga-Vasubandhu Yogacara (which, however, does not appear to accept the Tathagatagarbha theory), and frequently employs theterm cittamdtra. Suzuki, in his Studies in the Lankavatara-sutra"states that this sutra never employs the term vijndnamdtra (employed by Vasubandhu in an above citation), although it usescittamdtra and vijnaptimatra interchangeably. In terms of thepreviously-mentioned two situations from Vasubandhu's twotreatises, namely, the ordinary situation of mankind, and theyogin's samadhi situation, it appears that the Lahkdvatdra usesthe term cittamdtra in terms of the ordinary situation. At least,this is the conclusion of passages cited in Tson-kha-pa's commentary on Candraklrti 's Madhyamakdvatdra (a work in theMadhyamika tradition). Thus, the Lanka, Chap. I l l , verse 3 3 : u

There is nothing manifested outside, for the mind manifeststhe multiplicity. Body, sense experience, dwelling placeIcall mind-only.Tsoh-kha-pa explains:13 'body' means the m aterial (rupin) sensebases (dyatana) of eye, etc.; 'sense experienc e' (bhoga) means thefive sense objects, form , sou nd , etc.; 'dwelling place' means thereceptacle world (bhdjana-loka). While they are all manifestedby the m ind, they appear as thou gh external. Tsori-kha-pa callsthis a sutra of 'provisional meaning' in the Madhyamika meaning of the terms neydrtha (provisional meaning) and nltdrtha(final meaning). He claims that such sutra passages as this onewere taught by the Lord to divert sinful beings from their attach m ent to sense objects; and so they are provisional. He b earsthis ou t by citing ano ther verse from the Lanka, Chap. I I , 123 : u

In the way that a physician offers a medicine to one patientand a medicine to another patient, in that way the Buddhasteach mind-only for the sentient beings.

T h u s the teaching of mind-only is subservient to the particularsentient beings that are taught. This application of theMahay ana 'skillful-means' (updya-kausalya) approach, in contrast to what is actually the case, would hardly be inviting to theBuddhist logicians.On the other hand, it is possible to take the term cittamdtra

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in a medi ta t ive context . Perhaps consis tent wi th thoseLahkavatara verses i s what S th i ramat i says in h is subcommen-tary on the Mahdydna-Sutralamkdra, Bodhipaksa chap te r , ve r se6 6 : "The ha l t ing o f though t on such a s ing le a rea o f though tas 'Mind-only i s the three wor lds ; they are nothing but themind , ' cons t i tu tes ca lming (o f the mind) (samatha)."*5 That i s ,he here counts the passage "Mind-only i s the three wor lds" asa medi ta t ive objec t in the form of an aphor is t ic sentence , ra therthan as a phi losophica l tenet of ordinary d iscurs ive thought .This medi ta t ive sense of the te rm cittamatra is also in theSutrdlamkdra itself, C ha p . XIV, ve rses 24 -25 , du r in g an exp lana t ion o f the four degrees o f yogawarmth , summi ts , fo r b e a r a n c e s, a n d s u p r e m e m u n d a n e n a t u r e s :1 5

So as to expand the l ight of dharma, he begins s tr iving inea rnes t . And hav ing expanded the l igh t o f dharma, he s tandsfast in mind-only {cittamatra). Th e n h e d i s c e rn s t h e a p p e a r ance of all objects in the citta. At that t ime there are cast offh is sh i f t ing objec ts of percept ion .

In these medi ta t ive passages , i t could be argued, the sense ofmdtra in cittamatra, i .e. 'only, ' as excluding external objects, isnot to do away wi th external objec ts , but to d is regard them,s ince th is s i tua t ion of samadhi i s pure ly an in ter ior movement .

D. The dlayavijndnaIn t h e S id d h a n t a b o o k o f t h e T ib e t a n a u th o r Dk o n -mc h o g -' j igs -med-dbah-po , the Yogacar ins {sems tsam pa) are d iv idedinto two: those who fo l low scr ip ture (dgama-anusdrin), a n dthose who fo l low reason (yukti-anusdrin). Th e fo rme r a r e t h o sewho follow the five divisions of Asanga's Yogdcdrabhumi. T h elat ter are those who fol low the seven treat ises of logic (by Dhar-m aklr t i ) . W orthy of note is the d i f ference a t t r i bu ted to the tworegarding the i r theory of the ' subjec t ive ' (visayin, T yul can):"The fo l lowers of scr ip ture accept the dlayavijndna as the personality (pudgala) because they bel ieve in the eight kinds ofvijndna. The fol lowers of reason bel ieve in the mano-vijndna asthe basic character is t ic of the personali ty." 17 I have pointed outin ano the r s tudy tha t the Buddhis t log ic ians apparen t ly re p laced the dlayavijndna with the kind of pratyaksa called 'in-73


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trospection' (svasamvedana)However, Dharmaklrti, in his Pramdnavdrttika, Pratyaksachapter, verse 522, refers to the alaya, which Prajnakaraguptain his commentary explains as the alayavijnana. The commen-tarial passage is qu ite difficult, an d here I shall ju st give the gistof it. First, there are verses 521 and 522 by Dharmaklrti:19

521. When capacity ends for the previous cognition, thereis no cognition in the absence of the prior cognition,because one does not understand the arising of a cognition in the event the cognition loses the capacity foranother object.522. Although the two, unaffiliated, have arisen simultaneously by means of a single perspicacious thought( = evolving percep tion ), since loss of capacity has setin, there is no arising of another from the alaya.Dharmaklrti here refers to the situation where a cognitionof an object is dissipated and there is a problem of accountingfor the next cognition. But do we have to bring in the help ofa 'store-consciousness' (alayavijnana) to get the next cognition?It seems that DharmakTrti denies any need of the alayavijnana.However, Prajnakaragupta concludes: "Let this thought (cintd)of alayavijnana stay! Besides, since it is imagined as the basis of'habit-energy' (vasana), there is no fault."20This reference to vasana recalls the discussion earlier in thispaper about Vasubandhu's 'representation-only' in terms of thedestiny distortion, e.g. the hung ry ghosts. Stan dard Bu ddhisttenets relate this to the karma theory. T hu s, Tso h-kha -pa, in hisTibetan commentary on Candraklrti 's Madhyamakdvatara,which refutes the alayavijnana, mentions four theories to account for effectiveness of karma. In brief, the four are: 1. that

of certain 'mind-only' (cittamdlra) followers, who resort to thealayavijnana to account for it; 2. that of a Vaibhasika schooloutside of Kashmir, as is explained by Avaiokitavrata (a voluminous commentator on Bhavaviveka's Prajndpradipa), crediting the samskdras (motivations) with an indelible record of thedebt to be paid; 3. that of the standard Vaibhasika school,which claims that the dhanna called 'reach' (prapti) has the capacity to reach the fruit; 4. that of a number of persons, bothVaibhasika and Sautramika, who held that the stream of74


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vijndna is suffused (from Ch ines e texts on e wo uld say 'p erfumed ' ) wi th the hab i t -energy (vdsand) of karma (the volit ionalact).2 1 In shor t , some Ci t tamatra fo l lowers appea led to thealayavijndna alone for effectiveness of karma. Som e o the r s tooksamskdras alone. Some decided on a special force called ' reach 1 .F inal ly , some combined vijndna a n d samskdras, without analayavijndna, for the karma ro le . P ra jnak a ragup ta app a ren t lymeans tha t the Buddhis t log ic ians t rea t the problem of per cep t ion and in fe rence wi thout b r ing ing in the no t ion ofalayavijndna; and for all that , not necessarily rejecting i t inte rms of the karma theory .

E. Do the Yogdcdrins deny an external object?Japanese scho la r s have in r ecen t yea r s pub l i shed a num ber o fbooks deal ing with the Yogacara , usual ly by the nameVijnapt imatra , as a topic in itself, or in com par is on wi th theMadhyamika . When I was in Kyoto in 1970 , I spoke wi th oneof these au thors , Professor Masaaki Hat tor i , who had recen t lypubl ished such a book, in col laborat ion with a phi losopher ,Professor S hu np ei Uey am a. I m en t ion ed tha t I ha d fai led tof ind any denial of an external object when I read the mirrors i m i l e p a s s a g e 2 2 i n t h e M a i t r e y a c h a p t e r o f t h eSamdhinirmocanasutra and as i t was taken over by Asahga in hisMahaydnasamgraha a long w i th V asubandhu ' s com m ent ; o rwhen I read the extensive mater ia l on that s imile passage inYuan- ts ' e ' s g rea t commentary on the Samdhinirmocana that wast r ans la t ed in to T ib e tan ; o r w h en I r ead Jn an ag a rb ha ' s com mentary on the Mai t reya chapte r . I t seemed to me tha t theseau thors took the ex te rna l en t i ty for g ran ted , bu t were s i len tabout i t because the sutra i tse lf was concerned with the samddhiim age , which is no t de r ive d from the reflex in consciou sness o fan ex te rna l ob jec t . Dr . Hat tor i agreed wi th me tha t theSamdhinirmocana there was s i len t about an ex te rna l ra ther thanin denial of i t . But he added: the la ter Yogacara school s temsfrom the Vi jnap t imat ra ta a f te r Vasubandhu, and in th is develo ped school th er e is def inite ly a den ial of th e exte rn al object.I am p leased to ment ion th is agreement on the thes is I havebeen advanc ing in th is paper , s ince my own cons idera t ions ofthe Yogacara in compar ison wi th the Buddhis t log ic ians go up75


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to Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati; and so far,anyway, there is no denial of the external object, but rather astress on its mis-reported nature. Professor Hattori's book iscalled Ninshiki to Choetsu (yuishiki) (Tokyo, 1970). In responseto a later inquiry, he wrote me, among other things, that theterms 'Ninshiki ' (cognition) and 'Choetsu' (Tran scen den ce/T heAct of Tra ns ce nd ing ) in the title of his book "stand respectivelyfor the theoretical and the practical aspects of the Yogacara-vijnanavada." After writing the foregoing, I found a corroboration from a work of Tsoh-kha-pa, founder of the Gelugpa sectof Tibetan Buddhism. He sa id , refer r ing to theSamdhinirmocanasutra, "In that sutra it is clearly stated that thedenial of an external is in the phase of calming (the mind)." 23However, even granted that the Samdhinirmocanasutra, the basicscripture of Yogacara, did not deny an external object exceptfor in the samddhi situation, it should be acknowledged thatvarious scholars have understood Vasubandhu's Vims'atikdVijnaptimdtratdsiddhi to have denied an external object withoutreference to the samddhi situation. But the opening gloss, whichseems to indicate such a den ial, can be un de rsto od differently.Explaining the term "representation-only" {vijnaptimdtra), itdefines the "only" this way: mdtram ity arthapratisedhdrtham("only" means negation of an object). Here the word artha isproperly taken as "external object." The word pratisedha isknown in Indian logic, including Buddhist logic, to have twokinds, "simple negation" (prasajya-pratisedha) and "qualified negation" (paryuddsa). The interpretation that this treatise of Vasu ba nd hu 's has denied an ex ternal object without qualificationsopts for the "simple negation." In the light of passages previously cited from his two treatises, it is reaso nab le to op t for the"qualified nega tion ." It is qualified because for the o rd ina rysituation of life Vasubandhu indicates that the representationdiffers for the various destinies of men, hungry ghosts, etc.;and because for the special case of the yogin, "representation-only" concerns the samddhi situation.

ConclusionAs I long ago pointed out in the review article on the Chat-

terjee book, the belief of some that the Yogacara system admits76


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a sole reality, called Mind-only, does not prevent Chatterjee orany number of other authors of East and West from writinggood books on the topic, with refined philosophical sentences.But problem-solving is of a different nature. It should havebeen intriguing, to say the least, that the Buddhist logiciansshould be classified as 'Yogacarins' if these Yogacarins deny anexternal object and those logicians affirm it, insisting on thereality of the momentary object of direct perception (pratyaksa).Because Ratnakarasanti comes near the end of the Buddhistperiod in India and follows the Yogacara position in certainindependent treatises, while having also written a little text ofBuddhist logic, I should like to close with a passage from a commentary of his on the Guhyasamdjatantra: "Because the mentalburnt-offering (homa) is 'mind-only,' one should understand itas not dependent on an external thing."24

- . * * * < \ . . ,

NOTES N^V"1. The introduction by Sangam Lai Pande to C. L. Tripathi, The Problemsof Knowledge in Yog&c&ra Buddhism (Varanasi, 1972), p. xiv.2. Photographic edition of Peking Tibetan canon (PTT), Vol. 114, ThePaficaskandha-prakarana-vaibhdsya, p. 20-1,2.3. . . . pretavat punah / samtananiyamah sarvaih puyanadyadidarsane //4. Aryasamdhinirmocanasutre A ryamaitreya-kevala-parivarta-bhdsya, PTT, Vol.109, p. 198-4.5. yadalambanam vijnanam naivopalabhate tada / sthitam vijnanamatratvegrahyabhave tadagrahat //6. Etienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Louvain, Paris, 1935), pp. 90-91,211; also Lam otte, La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga (Mahdydnasamgraha)(Louvain, 1938, 1939), Chap. II.7. Translated from the Tibetan texts (in transcription) contained in N.Aiyaswami Sastri, Alambanaparfksd and Vrlti by Dinndga with the Commentary ofDharmapdla (The Adyar Library, 1942). However, Sastri's reconstructed Sanskrit and other materials were not employed for my translation.8. Cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem in Buddhis-mus," in Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils, ed. by G. Oberham-me r (Wien, 1978), p. 13 1, for th e observation that th e entire school of Buddhist logic has a nominalist position in the theory of concepts.9. PTT, Vol. 138, p. 63-2-1. As translated with Tibetan cited in A. Way-man, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," forthcoming IndologicaTaurinensia.

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10. Philosophy East and W est, XV : 1, Ja n . 1965.11. Daise tz Tei ta ro Suzuki , Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra ( L o n d o n ,1930) , p . 181 .12. The Lankdvat&ra Sutra, ed. by Bunyiu Nanjio (Kyoto, 1956), p . 154:

d r S y a m n a v i d y a t e b a h y a m c i t t a m c i t r a m h i d r S y a t e /d e h a b h o g a p r a t i s t h a n a m c i t t a m a t r a m v a d a m y a h a t n / /13 . Ts o n - k h a - p a , t h e Dbu ma la 'jugpa'i rgya cher Mad pa 'Dgonspa rob gsal'

Us bya ba, PTT, Vol . 154, p . 74-1-7 ,8 .14. The Lankavat&ra Sutra, p . 49 : a tu re a tu r e yadvad bh isag d ravyam p ray -acchat i / b ud dh a h i tadvat sa t tv j inam c i t ta m atra m vada nt i vai / /15. PTT, Vol . 109 , p . 6 1 - 1 - 3 : / khams gsum thams cad n i sems tsam duzad pa ste / sems las glan med do zes sems rtse gcig tu ' jog pa ni zi gnas zesbya ste / . T hi s passag e was called to my atte ntio n by a fo rm er stu de nt, Shinj6

Kawasaki , now a professor a t the Tsukuba Univers i ty , Tokyo.16. Sylvain Levi, ed. , Mahaydna-Sutralamhara, p . 9 3 : d h a r m a l o k a s y av r d d h y a r t h a m v i ry a m Sr a b h a t e d r d h a m / d h a r m a l o k a v i v r d d h y a c a c it ta -matre 'va t is tha te / / sa rvar thapra t ibhasa tvam ta taS c i t te prapaSyat i / p rahlnograhyaniksepas tada tasya bhavaty asau / /17. D k o n - m c h o g - j i g s - m e d - d b a r i - p o , Grub pa'i tntha'i rnam par bzag pa rin

po che'i phreh ba (edit ion of Dha-sa-$es-rig press of India, 1967), p . 49.18. T h e ar t ic le "Ref lec t ions on the Study of Bud dhis t L ogic ," n . 8 , above .19 . Rahu la Sankr i tyayana , ed . , Pramdnav&rtikabhashyam of Vdrtikd-

lahkarah of Prajndkaragupta (K. P. Jayasw al Ins ti tute , Patna, 1953), p . 45 7:5 2 1 . sakt iksaye purvadhiyah nahi dhlh pragdhiya v ina /a n y a r th a Sa k t iv i g u n e j n a n e j n a n o d a y a g a t e h //5 2 2 . sakrdvijatiyajatav apy ekena patlyasa /c i t t enah i tava igunyad a layan nanyasambhavah / /2 0 . Sa n k r i t y a y a n a , e d . , P r a j n a k a r a g u p t a , p . 45 7 : a s t a m i ya malayavi jnanacin ta / vasanadhara taya va par ika lp i tan tad i t i na dosah / .2 1 . Tsori-kha-pa (cf . n . 12, above), PTT, Vol. 154, p. 52-5 to p. 53-2.22 . This mirror simile goes with the passage cited above, per n. 6 .2 3 . Ts o h - k h a - p a ' s Drah hes legs Mad snih po (Sarnath ed . , 1973, p . 73) :mdo de las zi gnas kyi skabs su ni phyi rol dgag pa gsal bar gsuns so / .24 . Sriguhyasamdja-mandalavidhi-tika, PTT, Vol. 65, p. 155-2: yid kyi sbyinsreg ni sems tsam yin pas phyi rol la bltos pa med par ies par bya 'o .

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Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians