A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism

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A Defense of Yogācāra BuddhismAuthor(s): Alex WaymanSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 447-476Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399492Accessed: 23-04-2015 23:18 UTC

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A DEFENSE OF YOGACARA

BUDDHISM

Introduction:

Defense

from What?

There have been

many

discussions

in

India,

where

Yogacaraorigi-

nated, and elsewhere. Inevitablyit was misrepresentedand the mis-

representation

epeated

and

copied.

Now,

this situation

is

much

more

complicated

than would first

appear.

In

India here was

a

practice

start-

ing

from the

Veda of

memorizing

texts

by repetition

and

transmitting

them

orally.

Much

later

in the A.D.

period

there was a

writing

down of

such

scriptures,

and then a

copying

of

them. The Buddhists ransmitted

their

scriptures

n a

comparable

manner,

and the written-downcanon

was also

copied.

Such

scriptures-whether

Hindu or Buddhist-are re-

garded

by

the

respective groups

as

conveying

truth.

Therefore,

we can-

not

argue

against

copying

itself.

Clearly,

it

is what is

copied

that con-

cerns us now, namely,

whether

or

not there

are

misrepresentations.

Then,

as concerns

'misrepresentations',

t could be asked: What is

wrong

with

them?

Well,

some are

good-natured

and some are rather

venomous.

In

general

there is a

great

range

of

such,

extending

from

speculations

and

guesses

to

downright

ies,

that are

repeated

and

copied.

In the case

of

misrepresentations

f the

Yogacara,

I

accept

them as

usually

of

the

good-natured

kind,

whether it be a

type

of

refutation

n

a

Hindu

commentary,

or

by

a Buddhist

opponent

of the

Yogacara.

An im-

portant

llustration

f the Hindu

type

of refutation omes from

the

com-

mentarieson

the

Brahmasutras,

here the

author,

say

Sarkara,

can write

in terms

of the

system

itself,

setting

forth ts

tenets,

or

attempts

o

express

certain

tenets,

while

distorting

an

opposing system.1

These Hindu

sys-

tems and their

rival

systems

were established

by

geniuses

or

otherwise

brilliant

persons.

It

might

have

been

thought

better that

these rival

sys-

tems

not be

presented

correctly,

or followers

might

get

confused,

won-

dering

if their own

system

was indeed

better,

or whether a certaintenet

being

refutedwas

not

really

identical

with a tenet of their own

system.

Therefore,

when the

Buddhist

ystem supposedly being

refuted

n

such a

Hindu

commentary

an

reasonably

be identified

with a

sort

of

Yogacara

position,

it seems fair

to conclude that it is a

good-natured ype

of refu-

tation-one

necessary

for

a successful

commentary.

Perhaps

the same

judgment

could be renderedfor the

quarreling

between

the Hindu

logic

school

and the

Buddhist

ogicians,

which at

least

in modern imes

is

acknowledged

to have

sharpened

he

arguments

on both

sides,

so

that when

Buddhism

eft IndiaaroundA.D.

1200,

the

Hindu

logic

school

began

to

stagnate

for

lack

of

intelligentopposition.

I

interpret

also

the

Madhyamika

Buddhist refutation

of

the

Yogacara

philosophical

position

to

be a

good-natured

ype-probably

more an

ex-

ercise

in

discourse,

with the

premise

hat some tenets can be

expounded

ProfessorEmeritus f

Sanskrit t Columbia

University

Philosophy

East& West

Volume

46,

Number4

October 1996

447-476

?

1996

by University

f

Hawai'i Press

447

Alex

Wayman






in

themselves and certain

others

can

be clarified

by

the

refutation f

an

opposing

position.

The

Madhyamika-type

efutation

f

the

Yogacara

re-

garded

its

'mind-only'

(cittamatra)

eaching

as a denial

of the

external

world,

and

further ook

its

'store-consciousness'

alayavijinana)

s an un-

warranted

ddition o the

traditional ist of

vijnanas.

Granting, hen,

that these sorts of refutationsare

not made out of

malice,

one must

face the

problem

of what there

is

to

defend

against

on

behalf of

the

Yogacara.

I

claim

that

this

system

itself is

its best

defense.

After

all,

Asarga,

the

founder,

wrote

the

huge

YogacarabhOmi

nd

the

Mahayanasamgraha,

hile

Vasubandhu,

besides

his

commentary

on

the

latter,

as well as on the Dasabhomika-sOtrand

on

the

Madhyanta-

vibhaga,popularized

he

system

in

abbreviated

reatises.

There s

no

lack

of texts

explaining

this

system,

whether

in an

argumentative

or in

a

nonargumentative

ashion.

Therefore,

he

role of the

present

writer

to

defend

the

system

really

amountsto

exposing

it,

taking

it as the

impor-

tant

thing,

with ancient and

modern writers ess

important

n

compar-

ison.

Accordingly,

he defense of the

system

against

anyone

is

really

the

system's

own

response;

and the

role

of the

present

writer s to find this

response

of

the

system

itself.

To

illustratewhat

is

meant

by

this

kind

of

attitude,

let us

take

the

case of

a

review article

I

wrote

for

Philosophy

Eastand

West on Ashok

Kumar

Chatterjee's

ook

expounding

he

Yogacara.

concluded:

If

Chatterjee's

"Yogacara"

s indeed

the

Yogacaraperson

that Vasubandhu

was,

then

Chatterjee's

ook

is

certainly

a wonderful

exposition

of the

Yoga-

cara

philosophy.

But,

f

the

Yogacara

undamentals re what

I

have indicated

above, happeningto be in rough agreementwith [P. T.] Rajuand with

[Surendranath]

asgupta,

the

Chatterjee

book is still worth

reading

as a

philosophical exegesis

of

what was

traditionally

held,

principallyby

non-

Yogacarins,

o

be the

Yogacaraposition.2

Philosophy

East& West

When

I

wrote

this,

it

was

already

known

to

me-though

not mentioned

in the review-that

Chatterjee

had

adopted

the

very

interpretation

that

his teacher T.R.V. Murti

had

espoused

in

chapter

13 of his well-known

book on

Madhyamika.3

As has

already

been

acknowledged,

there

is

nothing wrong

with this kind of

copying

of a teacher's

position.

But

it

also

shows that

if

what was

copied

was

in

fact

incorrect,

the

copy

is also

incorrect. Still, we do not know yet if Murti was incorrect in that chapter.

The

present essay

will deal with this matter

later

on.

Another

example

is the more

recent

work

by

Schmithausen

on

the

Yogacara's alayavijnana teaching,

wherein Schmithausen

disagreed

with

a

Japanese

scholar,

H.

Hakamaya,

who insisted

that

Asanga

was the

compiler

of the entire

encyclopedic YogacarabhOmi.

Here Schmithausen

thought

to counter

Hakamaya's

position

by noting

the use of the

scrip-

ture Samdhinirmocana

in

some

parts

of the

larger

work and not

in

other

448






parts.

About that

scripture,

Schmithausen

concluded:

"Therefore,

he

Samdhinirmocana-sutra,

t least

the

portions

concerned with the

new

kind

of

vijnanadistinguished

rom the

ordinary

ix,

was

most

probably

composed

before the

ViniscayasamgrahanT

ut after the

Basic Section

of the

Yogacarabhomi."4

t

happens

that a

Japanese

student,

H.

S. Sa-

kuma,completeda dissertation t Hamburg, pprovedby Schmithausen,

wherein he

presented

(in

German)

this

very position

stated

above-

hence

copied.

In

my

review of this

published

work

I

pointed

out: "One

may

refer

n

my Analysis

of the

Sravakabhumi

Manuscript,5

10-11,

to a

passage

on the

three doors

of

vipasyana.

This

passage

is

virtually

he

same

as

is

found

in

the

Samdhinirmocanasctra,

h.

8,

sect.

10.

This is a

proof

that the

author

of

the

Sravakabhomi-agreed

to be the

oldest

part

of what Sakumacalls

MaulT

BhCmi

the

'Basic

Section']-had

available

and

used the

Samrdhinirmocanasutra."6

his, then,

is an

example

of

where

the

copying

turnedout to

be

incorrect,

and was

defended

against

by calling

attention

o what the

Yogacara

tself

says

about

the matter.

These

two

examples

should

clarify

what

is meant

by

misrepresenta-

tions

(or

possible

ones)

that are

defended

against-not

really by

the

present

writer as an

independent

thinker,

but

rather

by

the

Yogacara

system

itself

being brought

o bear

upon

the

alleged misrepresentation.

This

essay

continues

with

two

main sections below:

(1)

The Position of

the

Yogacarins

and

(2)

Clarification f the

Position.

The Positionof

the

Yogacarins

Here

I

present

our

topics:

(a)

Vasubandhuand an

early scripture;

b)

about

cittamatra;

c)

about

alayavijfinna;

nd

(d)

about three

laksana.

Vasubandhuand an

EarlyScripture.

Some authors treat the

Yogacara

system

as

though

it were an

invention of the

founders,

notably

the

brothers

Asarga

and Vasubandhu.

To

suggest

otherwise,

may

we notice

that BhikkhuNananandahas

put

out

a booklet on

the

Kalakarama utta.7

This

scripture

s

in

the

Ahguttara-Nikaya,

ook of

Fours,

where

it

was

translated

by

Woodward,8

who noticed certain textual difficulties.The

Bhikkhu used some other editions and

studied

Buddhaghosa's

com-

mentary

on

every

word for

his

English

rendition,

wherein he

obviously

uses Woodward's words whenever

possible.

In

the

following

I

have

substituted

my

rendition

'gods

and humans' and

subdivide

the trans-

lation with brief,bracketedremarks.

The

Kalakarama

utta.

The

Setting.]

At

one time

the ExaltedOne was

staying

in

Saketa

n

Ka aka's

onastery.

here he

Exalted ne addressedhe

monks,

saying:

"Monks." Revered

ir,"

eplied

hosemonks n assent.

As

a Vedic

or

Greek

god

would

talk,

declaring

omniscience,]

the Exalted One said:

"Monks,

whatsoever

n

the world with its

gods,

Marasand

Brahmas,

mong

the

progeny consisting

of

recluses

and

brahmins,

gods

and

humans-what-

soever

is

seen, heard,

sensed

(sensations

arising

rom

taste,

touch and

smell),

Alex

Wayman

449






cognized,

attained,

ought

afterand

pondered

over

by

the mind-all that do I

know.

Monks,

whatsoever

n the world ... of

gods

and

humans,-whatsoever

is

seen,...

by

the

mind,-that

have

I

fully

understood;

ll that is

known

to the

Tathagata,

ut the

Tathagata

as not taken his stand

upon

it.

[Now

he

denies

alternatives o be construedas four

in

number,

because

the

scripture

s in the

Book

of

Fours.]

If I were

to

say:

'Monks,

whatsoever n the world

...

of...

gods

and humans-whatsoever is seen ...

by

the mind-all that I do not

know'-it would be a falsehood

in me. If

I

were to

say:

'I

both

know it

and

know it

not'-that too would

be a falsehood

in me. If I were

to

say:

'I neither

know it nor am

ignorant

of it'-it would

be a fault

in me.

[The

Buddhanow

declares

how one uses the senses

while

avoiding

the

'apprehender'

nd the

'apprehended'.]

hus,monks,

a

Tathagata

oes not conceive of a visible

thing

as

apart

rom

sight;

he does not

conceive of an

'unseen',

he does not conceive

of

a

'thing-worth-seeing',

e does

not conceive about a seer. He

does not

conceive of

an

audible

thing

as

apart

rom

hearing;

he

does not conceive

of

'an

unheard',

he does not conceive of a

'thing-worth-hearing',

e does

not

conceive about

a

hearer.

He does not conceive of a

thing

to

be

sensed

as

apart

romsensation;he does not conceive of a

'thing-worth-sensing',

e does

not conceive about one

who

senses.

He

does not conceive of

a

cognizable

thing

as

apart

rom

cognition;

he

does

not conceive of a

'thing-worth-cogniz-

ing',

he

does

not conceive

about

one who

cognizes.

Thus, monks,

the

Tathagata,being

such-like

in

regard

o all

phenomena

seen, heard, sensed,

and

cognized,

is 'Such'.

Moreover,

han he who is

'Such',

here

is none

other

greater

or more

excellent,

I

declare."

[Now

verses on

how

ordinary

persons

use

their

senses,

sometimescalled 'the

fantasy

of

normalcy'.]

Whatever is

seen,

heard,

sensed or

clung

to,

is esteemed as

truth

by

otherfolk.

Midst hosewho are entrenched ntheirown views, being'Such'Ihold

none as true

or

false.

This barb I

beheld,

well in advance

[i.e.,

at the

foot

of

the Bodhi

tree],

whereon humansare

hooked,

impaled.

"I

know,

I

see,

'tis

verily

so"-no such

clinging

for

the

Tathagatas.

This

scripture

clarifies the Buddhist

prescription

"to see

things

as

they

really

are,"

since

it

implies

that

one should

simply

see without

adding

anything.

Recall

the ancient Hermes

epigram

found on

a

Grecian urn:

"Who

shall

say

more,

will

lie."9

As

to

the

'barb'

of the

verse,

the Pali is

sallar,

equivalent

to the Vedic word

salya,

which down the

centuries

means an 'arrow', on which one is impaled (if such be the case). I have

cited this

scripture

in

this

essay

because

I

do

believe

that

Vasubandhu's

popularizing

treatises

have

such

a

scriptural

source

in

the

background.

About

Cittamatra.

Past

writings

on

this

topic

uniformly

render

the

term

cittamatra

as

'mind-only',

and so do

I also in

my

own former

essays.

Notice that such renditions take

the

topic

outside

India

by way

of Asian

translations and

essays

in

English

and

European

languages.

Inside

India,

Philosophy

East

&

West

where the term

originated,

the words citta and

matra

appeared

as such

450






with connotations

of

Sanskrit

words; outside,

there was

the connotation

of the words 'mind' and

'only'.

I

propose

to consider these

words

with

their connotation n the Sanskrit

language.

In

current lexical

work I

have

learned various

usages

of the term

matra.10The lexicons of India

recognize

a

neuter form

matram

and a

feminine form matra,so the adjectives can go with the neuter or the

feminine. Of the two definitions or the

neuter

form-'all,

the

entirety'

(kartsnya),

nd 'restriction o the instance'

(avadharana)-the

adjective

'only'

could

agree

with

'restriction

o the

instance'.

The rendition

only'

works for the

other

definition-the

entirety.

For

example,

there

is

the

compound

sthanamatra,

n

the

meaning

a

place

in

general',

thus

any

and all

places

and

excluding

what

is not a

place.

When

cittamatra

s

understood

in

this

way,

the citta is

unmixed

with

anything

hat is not citta.

Accordingly,

f

we

suppose

in

the

compound

cittamatra

hat

matra

means

'only',

then is

only

one

of the

two

senses

intended,

or

can

it be both?

It

is

well

to

point

out that other

adjectives

are

feasible

from

the

feminine

matra.

The definition

'any

measure'

(mana)

yields

the

entry

in

Apte's

Sanskrit-English

ictionary

paromatra

'vast')

or

the

spatial

mea-

sure

and,

in

the

lexicons,

tatkalamatra

'at

once')

for the

temporal

mea-

sure-and also

alpa

('a

trifle')

as well as

aksibhaga

('a mirror').

As ad-

jectives applied

to

cittamatra,

we could

say

'amounting

o

mind'-both

spatially

and

temporally.

Or

we could

say

'just

mind'

and

'mirroring

mind', and,

for

the

latter,

perhaps

also

'being

mirrored

y

mind'.

In

a

previouslypublished

essay,

I

presented

Asariga's

tatement

on

cittamatra,

which

I

translated n

part.11

t is clear

that the

Buddhist

op-

ponents

did not criticize on the

grounds

that

Asarga

denied the ex-

istence of the externalworld

(which,

of

course,

he did

not

do).

As

the

first

attack,

he

opponent

states:"It s

not valid that

there

is a

mind-only

n

the

sense of a

'continuous

substantiality'

dravyatas),

ecause it

contradicts

scripture."

The

opponent

is

asked:

"How

does it

contradict

scripture?"

That

person responds:

"He

(the

Buddha)

said,

'If

the citta

consisted of

lust defilement

(upaklesa)

and

consisted of

hatred and

delusion

defile-

ment,

it

could

not

become

liberated.'"

Asanfga eplies:

"But

what is

the

objection

to that?"He

seems to

mean that

we

accept

what

the

Buddha

taught,

and so if

the citta

does not

consist of

these defilements

or

contain

them),it would be liberated;hence yourscriptural

ppeal

cannot

deny

to

mind-only

a

'continuous

substantiality'.

he

opponent

does not

give

up,

and retorts:

"Mind-onlyby

itself is

invalid,

because

if

there

is

not two

together,

when

one

does

not

resortto

representation

vijnapti)

f

lust,

etc.,

one would be

free

(of

those

defilements)

which

we know

is

not the

case]."

The

opponent

is

obviously

a

follower

of the

Buddhist

Abhi-

dharma,

which

teaches thatthere

is no citta

withouta

caitta

(=

caitasika-

Alex

Wayman

451






Philosophy

East& West

dharma)-a

'mental'.12Thatwe

cannot have a citta

by

itself is

the sec-

ond

meaning

I

treated

above,

the

'totality'

ense,

all

citta,

unmixedwith

anything

else. But

Asanga

appears

to

espouse

this

'totality'

sense. His

response

starts

by

saying

"There is no

fault

in a

prior representation,"

and continues:

There swhatwas saidbytheBhagavat,owit,"concomitantsahaja)eeling

(vedana),

dea

(samjnj),

nd

thinking-volition

cetana),"

nd

what

was said

(by

Him),

o

wit,

"Thesenatures

dharma)

re

mingled,

not

unmingled,

o

these

natures re

not

objects

ndividuallyeparated

ut;

or when

separated

out

(not

objects)

or reference

s

distinct,

r

clear,

or

different." o demon-

strate

he

meaning

f the

mingling

e used he simile

of

the

light

of

a butter

lamp.13

ccordingly,

f

they

were not

concomitant,

t

wouldalso havebeen

improper

o

saythey

are

mingled.

Asanga

has cited a

scripture

in Buddhist Sanskrit

equivalent

to the

Mahavedalla-sutta

f the Pali canon

Majjhima-Nikaya.

pparently

or

Asanga,concomitancedoes not deny a pure cittaany morethan it de-

nies a

pure

feeling,

and

so

forth.

Ordinary hinking

s not able

to

separate

out the

individual

actors,

because

they

are

mingled.

Presumably,

t takes

a

yogin

to

separate

he mental items.

Then this

yogin

can arrive

at a

pure

citta.

The

Pataijali YogasCtra

eems to

have a similar

dea when

it

refers

to 'cessation

of

the

modifications

of the

citta'

(cittavrrtti-nirodha).

Now

I

shall

deal with

three

subtopics:

1)

the

phrase

cittamatram

ad

uta

traidhatukam,

2)

the

Yogacara

theory

of

ekagracitta,

and

(3)

the

theory

that Vasubandhu

denies the external

world.

The

Phrase Cittamatram

ad

uta traidhatukam.

There is

a rather

famous

passage

in the Buddhist

Dasabhumika-sutra,

ts Sixth

Stage

(bhumi).

This has

been cited

as

cittamatram

ad

uta

traidhatukam,

nd

the

scripture's

ranslation

by

Megumu

Honda,

as revised

by

Professor

Johannes Rahder,

understands his

to mean

"This

triple

world

is mind-

only."'4 Sylvain

Levi,

in

a learned

note at the

beginning

of his French

translation

of Vasubandhu's

Virnsatika

the

Twenty

Verses),

presents

several

versions

of this

formula,

n each case

showing

the form

traidha-

tukam,

and

he

appears

to

recognize

that the DasabhOmika-sutra

s the

source

of

such

nonscriptural

itations

of the entire

formula.15

This

pas-

sage

has seemed

to

support

he claim

that the

Yogacara

denies the

exis-

tence of the externalworld,as here, 'threeworlds'-of desire,form,and

the

formless

worlds,

according

o the usual

Buddhist

dogmatics.

Now,

one of the

difficulties

of the usual

translation

nd

consequent

interpretation

s that

this

scripture,

he

Dasabhumika-sQtra,

s not

really

a

Yogacara

cripture.

ndeed

it is a basic

scripture

f

Mahayana

Buddhism

and is not

devoted

to the

particular

hilosophical

view of the

Yogacara.

The

particular

phrase

was inserted

by

that

scripture

within

a

discussion

of

Dependent

Origination,

which

is

important

o

all Buddhist

chools.

452






Vasubandhu,

n

his

great

commentary

on the

Dasabhomika-sutra,

ives

two

explanations

or this

phrase,

neitherof which

promotes

any particu-

lar theories

of the

Yogacara

school,

even

though

the

first

explanation

uses the

Yogacara

theory

of

multiple vijinas.16

This first

explanation

goes

into

the Buddhist

heory

of

waywardness

(viparyasa),

nd then an-

nounces thatthe 'mind-only'passagewas promulgated o thatone may

be

liberated romthe 'storeconsciousness'

(alayavijfiyna)

nd from other

perceptions(vijfina).

Here,

the sense of

matram

eems to be

'amounting

to',

that

is,

'amounting

o

mind',

where the 'mind'

(citta)

here standsfor

all the

vijynanas,

ounted as

seven or

eight.

These are the

perceptions

(vijafna)

based

on the

five outer-directed

enses,

the

manovijnana

based

on the mind

(manas)

as an inner sense

organ,

and the 'store conscious-

ness'

(for

7),

or

number

7,

the

'defiled mind'

(klistamanas),

lus

the 'store

consciousness'

for

8.

If

someone

of

Madhyamaka persuasion

had

been

commenting,

probablyonly

the first ix

vijfnana

ould be mentioned.

Therefore,

t is not

a

particularYogacara

eaching

here that is

meant,

but

simply

that these

various

perceptions

are what lead to

waywardness viparyasa)

nd then to

rebirth

ccording

o

the

precepts

of

Dependent

Origination.

Vasubandhu

was entitledto

interpret

he term

cittamatra

y

the set

of

vijfiana

because

the

Abhidharma

ives

the

terminological

et

citta,

manas,

vijfnana,

hich

allows their mutual substitution n

certain

contexts;17

and

CandrakTrti's

autocommentary

n his

Madhyamakavatara

lso

changes

the

cittamatra

of the famous

formula

about the

'three

worlds' to

vijfnanamatra

n

his

section

attempting

o refute he

'storeconsciousness'

(alayavijinana).'8

The second

explanation

has

to

do with the

formulaof

Dependent

Origination,

ndhere the

'thought'

s thatof the

Buddha,

who realized he

formulawith

just

one

thought

(ekacitta)

nd then

taught

t

in

a

twelvefold

way.

Here,

the

meaning

of

matram

s

the

temporal

sense 'at once' or in

temporal sequence

when

the twelve

members are

taught

one

after

an-

other,

thus

taking

time,

eventually

to

have the

theory

that the

twelve

amountto three lives.

And this

information rom Vasubandhu

shows

that the rendition

of

traidhatukam

s

'three worlds'

is

incorrect. The Sanskrit

erm is

a

derivative noun from 'three

worlds'

(tridhatu).

The derivative

nouns of

Sanskrithave to be

interpretedby

each

such term.

For

example,

Gau-

tama is the derivativeof Gotama; his is a

family-type

of derivative uch

that

Gautama

s the

descendent

of

Gotama.The

derivative

paurusa

rom

purusa

(a

human

person

or

man)

applies

more

to the

present

case,

be-

cause as a masculine

noun

paurusa

can

mean 'human action'

(karman)

and

'the

weight

that one man

with both

hands can

raise

upwards'

(urdhvavistrta-dobhpaninrmana).19

e

can

also

interpret

traidhatukam

in

two

ways.

Both

ways

take

the

derivative here to be

the

formula of

twelvefold

Dependent

Origination,

that

is,

that

it

is

derived

from,

or

Alex

Wayman

453






Philosophy

East&

West

faithful

o,

the

three

worlds,

so realized

in

one moment's

houghtby

the

Buddha

and then

taught

n

twelve terms.Thisone-moment's

hought

s a

variety

of cittamatra.The other

interpretation

f the

twelvefold

formula

is that it is the

way

of rebirth

hrough

waywardness

due to the set of

vijnana,

and this is a different

nterpretation

f

cittamatra.

But

rebirth

requires-that is, is related o-the threeworlds.NeitherofVasubandhu's

explanations

n this

commentary ustifies

he

interpretation

hat

the

pas-

sage,

so misrendered-to

wit,

"This

triple

world is

mind-only"-has

anything

o do

with

denying

the existence

of

the external

world.

The natural

question,

then,

is how should

that

Sanskrit

phrase

be

rendered?

would

offer: he derivative

of

the three worlds is

only

mind.

That is

to

say,

whatever

may

be

the 'threeworlds'

in

a

minimalsense-

whateverelse

is

attributed

o

them,

an

elaboration

of

them,

a

product

of

them-has

been

added

by

the mind.

In one case it was

added

by

the

mind of

the Buddha-the

twelvefold

formula

of

Dependent

Origination.

In

the

other

case it

was

added

by

the mind

of other

sentient

beings.

Hence,

such

an observation

agrees

with the

scripture

ranslated

above,

the

Ka akaramautta,

which

gave

the

message

that to

see

things

as

they

really

are,

one

must not

add

anything.

Apparently

he six senses

(when

normal)

ee

things

as

they really

are,

and it is the

perceptions

(vijnana)

based

thereon

that do the

adding.

But this

is the

interpretation

f

citta-

matra

when

it is tantamount

o the

set of

vijinana.

his

shows

that

it was

proper

for

me to cite that

scripture

as a

background

of

Vasubandhu's

position.

Besides,

the

large

chapter

3 of

Vasubandhu's

Abhidharmakoga

nd

his own

commentary

s devoted

to

the

worlds,

which,

when in two

sets,

are the world of sentience

(sattva-loka)

nd the

support

world

(bhajana-

loka).20

He

was

therefore

very

familiar

with the

respective

attributions

f

these

two

kinds of

worlds. He would

undoubtedly

know

of

the

scripture

in the

DTgha-nikaya,

II,

called

Aggannia-sutta

though

in the Buddhist

Sanskrit

Agama

version)-a

scripture

on the Buddhist

heory

of

genesis.

One

may

read

the account

in the

translation

f the

Paliversion

that,

after

a

long period,

this world

passes

away.

This is

the Indian

heory

of

cycles,

with

the

passing

away

and

emergence

of the

'support

world'.

The

scrip-

ture

mentions

that

with the

passing

away

the

sentient

beings

had re-

treated to

a

'higher'

realm-that

of

Form

(ropa-dhatu)-and

while the

worldwas

plunged

inwaterydarkness, heywere 'made of mind',fed on

joy,

and

were

self-luminous.

The earth

reappeared

ike a

scum on

the

cooling

water and

became

endowed

with

color, odor,

and

taste.

The

sentient

beings

tasted

this and

found

it

very

sweet.

As

they

ate more

and

more,

they gradually

ost their

self-luminance,

while the

moon

and sun

became manifest.

The

beings

had

evidently

fallen

into

the

realm

of

desire.21

In such an

account

we see the

prior

disappearance

and

re-

appearance

of

the

support

world,

and

that

the sentient

world

follows

suit.

454






Accordingly,

he

way

of

translating

hat

phrase

about

cittamatra

nd the

traidhatukahat

I

have had to

discard,

namely

that the three worlds

are

dependent upon

citta,

would have been indirectviolationof the

Genesis

story.

I

don't believe that Vasubandhuwould have

taken

a

position

in his

brief

popularizing

works in

direct

opposition

to the Buddhist

criptures.

The

Yogacara

Theory

f

Ekagracitta.

t

was

pointed

out above

that

the

Buddha

was

credited

with

realizing

the

entire formula

of

Dependent

Origination

with "one-moment's

hought."

In

that

place,

the term

was

ekacitta. The

theory

of Buddhist meditation sets

forth a

goal

called

samadhi,

which is defined as

ekagracitta.

This term

has

frequently

been

rendered

"one-pointed

thought

(or

mind)."

Then what is

meant

by

the

Sanskrit

word

agra?

Since

this is an

important

erm

in

the

Sanskrit

an-

guage,

the

Indian

lexicographers

have had to make it

a defined word.

Over four of their

lexicons include for it the

definition alambana.22Lit-

erally,

this means a

'support'.Many years ago

I

learned

that

this

is

the

basic

term

in

Buddhism or the

'reflected

image'

in

the

mind,23

which is

what one should

meditate

upon,

given

that it

is

an

appropriate

object

for

such meditative

purposes.

It follows that

such a definition

permits

a

translation

or the entire

compound

ekagracitta,namely

"mind

on a

single

meditative

opic."

Also,

see Vasubandhu's

Abhidharmakosa,

hap-

ter

1,

for a similar

distinction between the

outer

sense

object

(visaya)

and the mental reflection

(alambana).24

Besides,

three of these

four lexicons also defined

the

expression

ekagra,namely

as "a

single

continuity"

ekatana)

nd as

"being

without

discord"

(anakula).

So the

expression ekagracitta

can

be furtherex-

plained

for the

practice

of a

yogin,

to

wit,

"the mindor consciousness as

a

single

continuity

and

as without discord."25The

two definitions

go

together,

because the

continuity

would be

broken

if

the mind

were

subjected

to discord. And

in

such a case there would not

be a

"single

meditative

object."

This is

an

implication

of the

definition

I

found,

namely

ekatana,

because

this

contrasts with a well-known

Buddhist

term, samtana,

which is

usually

understoodas a "streamof

conscious-

ness,"

but

which

the

foregoing

information

suggests

should be

better

renderedas a

"mingled

streamof

consciousness."

I

should call

attention

to

the

fact

that the

prefix

sam-

in

Sanskrit s

cognate

with

an

Indo-Euro-

pean prefix hat is presentin Englishas con- in the sense of

"together,"

that

is,

that

in

the

ordinary

case of a

samtana,

the

continuity

(tana)

s

composite.

Therefore,

when a

modern

Tibetan

author,

Lozang

Tsewang,

in a

published

seminar

paper,

writes,

"LordBuddha

says

in

the sOtras:

The

consciousness

of

a sentient

being

is of

a

single

stream'

"26

(but

does

not

identify

he sctra

so

saying),

the cited

passage

might

mean

what

I

called

attention o

above,

that

although

he

mentalfactors

are

mingled,

a

yogin

Alex

Wayman

455






-if

successful-may separate

out the citta and

find it

consisting

of a

single

stream. But

it

is

important

o notice that the

yogin

does

this with

his

own

mind,

and because he is

engrossed

in

a

samadhi.

He

does

not

do this

separating

out

in

the minds of other sentient

beings,

who cannot

verify

hatthe consciousness is of

a

single

stream,

or

the

reasons hat

the

mental actorsaremingledand thatthey have not learnedhow to go into

the

appropriate

amadhi. This Tibetan

author

attempted

to

apply

that

cited

passage

in

a

philosophical

reatment f

the

Yogacaraposition.

But

it is not valid

to

argue

that

something

s the case

with

all minds

(and

their

presumed

objects)

when

it

was

only

the case

of

a

certain

yogin

and his

personal

attainment.

Philosophy

East&

West

The

Theory

that Vasubandhu

Denies the ExternalWorld. Cer-

tainly

some readersdecided

that Vasubandhu's

wenty-verse

reatise

the

Vimgsatika)

nvolves

a denial of the external

world. And such

persons

are

entitled

to

say: suppose

we

grantyour previous argument

about

citta-

matra

and

the

traidhatuka. ven

so there are

verses

in

that Vasubandhu

treatise

hat

appear

to

deny

the external

world.

Before

going

into those

particular

erses,

it is well

to notice the situation

n

his Abhidharmakosa.

Abhidharma

Buddhism

ecognizes

six

senses

and their

objects,

from

the

sense of

eye

with its

object

of formations

in

shape

or

color)

to

the sense

of

mind

(manas)

with

its

object

of

natures

(dharma).

But this does not

mean

that one

necessarily perceives

such sense

objects.

So Buddhism

taught

hatthere is

a

'perception'

vijfina)

based

on the

eye,

and so with

the

other senses

as

bases

(ayatana).

Because

the senses had the

power

to

apprehend

hose various

objects, they

were

given

the Sanskritname

indriya,

a wordwhich means'a

power'.

Itfollows

immediately

hat

'per-

ception'

is

powerless;

hat

is,

it

is unable

to

contact the

object directly,

but must

depend

on whatever

he sense

organ

comes

up

with.

Bareau

presents

he manner

n which

Vasubandhu reated

his matter

in his Abhidharmakosa:27

opam

paincendriyany

rthah

panfcavijnaptir

eva

ca

(I,

9)

("Formation

s

five sense

organs,

five

objects,

and

non-

representation");

aksuh

pasyati

ropani

sabhagam

na

tadasritam

vijna-

nam

drsgyateQpam

na

kilantaritam

atah

(1,

42)

(Bareau's

ranslation:

"When it

is in condition to

work,

the

eye

sees

formations;

he

con-

sciousness

which is

leaning

on it does

not

(see

formations),

ecause

for-

mation,then

being

concealed, is not seen"). If we grant hatperception

fails to reach

the

object

that was

apprehended

by

a sense

organ,

we

be-

gin

to notice

how

perception,

perhaps

automatically,

dds

to the

sensory

evidence,

as

was discussed

above.

And this

may help

to

explain why

the

same art

object

is

viewed

differently y

different

persons-presumably

it

was

about the same

as a sense

object,

but the

subjective

perceptions

evaluate

it

quite

divergently.

Now

to the

twenty-verse

reatise.

The translation

rom

the Chinese

456






by

Hamilton28

was

reprinted

n A

Source

Book

by

Radhakrishnan

nd

Moore.29

We learn

there that these

twenty

verses

are on

vijnfaptimatrata,

there rendered

'Representation-Only'.

t

is somewhat

embarrassing

o

me

to

point

out

what

the

editors have added

in

their

footnote on

page

328,

because

I

have

always

had

great

admiration

or

both Radhakrishnan

and Moore.They say: "A bettertranslationof vijfiaptimatrataould be

'ideation-only,'

since

'representation' uggests

rather than denies

ex-

ternal

reality."

Well,

no fair

mistranslating

Sanskrit erm

just

to make

one's

theory

come

out

right

That remarkwas

made because

of

thinking

that

Vasubandhu's reatisedenies external

reality.

Sylvain

Levi'sedition30

of the Sanskrit

or the

twenty

verses

numbers

them as

twenty-two.

His

verse

1

can be taken as

introductory,

nd his

verse

22 as

concluding.

The translation rom

the

Chinese,

as

presented

by

Hamilton,

tarts

with Sanskrit

umber

2

as the

firstverse.

This is

Levi's

introductory

erse with

my

translation:

vijfiaptimatramvaitad sadarthavabhasanat

yatha

aimirikasyasatkesacandradidarsanam

/

This

ust

amountso

representation,

s the

sight

of

unreal

air,

moon,

etc. of

one

with an

eye-caul-because

being

the

(subsequent)

anifestationf

an

unreal

rtha

external

hing).

This

introductory

tatement

does not

deny

an

external

object.

Instead

there

is

a mental

representation

hat

amounts to

tinsel,

'fool's

gold',

a

false wealth.

Vasubandhu

appears

to

mean that the

mind

imagines

an

externalartha

n

front,

but

the

mind has

only

a

report

or

representation

f

what the sense

organ

had

sensed.

Thisis Levi's

verse,

and whatfor boththe Chinese andthe Tibetan s

verse

1,

with

my

rendition

Levi

had to

reconstruct he

Sanskrit):

yadivijfnaptir

nartha

iyamo

esakalayoh

samtanasyaniyamas

a

yukta

krtyakriya

a

ca

//

If

representation

acks n external

bject

artha),

here s no

certainty

aniyama)

of

space

and

ime;

here s no

certainty

f

the

composite

tream

of

conscious-

ness)

and

agency

s not

valid.

We

notice

again

that

Vasubandhu

does not here

deny

an

external

object,

because

the sentence

makes a

supposition,

"If...."

The verses

go

on to

make a distinctionbetween the

beings

of differentdestinies,

gods,

hu-

mans,

hungryghosts,

and so

forth,

n

how

they

view

externals.Thus

the

gods

see the

river

sparkling

with

gems,

humans see it

as

good

to

drink,

and the

hungryghosts (preta)

ind

the river ull of

unclean

things

render-

ing

it

unfitto drink.

We

notice this

difference n

terms

of

destiny

classes

that it

involves the use of

external

hings.

Again,

it

is

not a

denial of ex-

ternal

objects,

but a claim

that different

destinies have a

different

addi-

tion

(philosophically

alse)

to what

was

sensed.

Alex

Wayman

457






Philosophy

East& West

Then there is

what is

numberedverse 16 in

Hamilton's

ranslation,

where

he renders he

first

part

as follows:

"As has

been

said,

the

appar-

ent

object

is a

representation.

t

is from

that

memory

arises"

the

Sanskrit

for this:

uktam

yatha

tadabhasavijnaptih;

maranam

tatah).

Hamilton

translates he

commentary

on

this:31

"As

we

have said

earlier,

although

thereis no externalobject,a sense representation,isual,etc., appearsas

an

outer

object.

From his

comes the later state with its

memory

asso-

ciate,

the

discriminatedmental

representation,

ppearing

as a

seeming

former

object.

Then we

speak

of

this

as a

memory

of

what has been

al-

readyexperienced."

Notice that Hamilton

ranslated he

first

entence of

this

commentary

as

though

there

is

denial of the

copula

("although

here

is

no external

object").

Butwhen we

consult

the

Sanskrithat Levi

edited,

we find the sentence worded

differently:

Even

n

the absence of an ex-

ternal

object" (vinapy

arthena).

It is

necessary

to translate his

way

to

make sense of the comment that Hamilton translates rom Chinese:32

"That

s,

he defends his

positionby saying

thatthere must have been this

object immediately

received

in

the

past by

the

five

organs

of

sense,

eye,

etc.

[so that]

in

the

present

he intellective

consciousness

is able to hold

it in

memory."

We have

probably

all

had such

an

experience,

when

concentrating

on some

problem

or

passage,

if

someone

comes to the

door

and

says,

"Dinner is

ready"

and,

not

immediatelyhearing

a

response

of the

type

"O.K.

I'm

coming,"

continues,

"I

said:

'Dinner

is

ready' "-whereupon

the

concentratingperson responds,

"I

heard

you

the first time"-not

exactly

as this

person

now

says

it,

because

if we mean

by hearing

the

actual sounds as heard at

the time the

sounds

are

made,

this

is

true

just

for

the

reception

by

a

sense

organ

(of

hearing),

and not true for

auditory

perception.According

o

Vasubandhu,

as the Chinese

commentary

here

understood

him,

the

person

remembered he words "Dinner s

ready."

Thus,

"even

in

the absence of an external

object,"

that

is,

even

though

that sound is no

longer

sounding,

a

person may

hear it as a

memory

image.

Due

to the actual

experiences

of

yogins,

this situation

was

taken

for

granted.

There s a celebratedcase associated

with

what

in

Buddhist

history

is called the Second

Council,

to determine

if

certain

erring

monks should be

ousted from

the

Samgha:

all the senior monks

were called to assemble

for the

hearings,

but one of these monks was

in

the

deep

concentration alled

nirodha-samapatti. ccording

o the

story,

upon

his

emerging

from the

samadhi

a

divinity

gave

him the

message,

whereupon

he

sped

to the

meeting.33

It should be admitted that this

yogin

remembered he

message,

while the

instigating

sound was no

longer

sounding.

Thus,

when we examine the text

more

carefully,

we find that Vasu-

bandhudoes not

deny

the existence of external

objects

in this and in

the

previously

cited

materials,

ven

though

the

translator,

ust

by

his manner

458






of

translating,

made it

appear

so.

Besides,

two authors

of recent

books

translating

numberof the Vasubandhu

reatises

agree

that

Vasubandhu

does not

deny

an external

object

(Kochumuttom34

nd

Anacker35).

As

to

Murti's

hapter,

previously

alluded

to,

a few words will

suffice.

A

reader of that

chapter,

supposedly

on

the

'absolutism'

of

Vedanta,

Madhyamika, nd Vijnanavada,will readilyfind out that the Yogacara

position

(called

here

'Vijinnavada')

s set

forth,

not from

Yogacara

books,

but from their rival

Vedanta

and

Madhyamika

books.

Having

decided

that the

opponents

must be

right,

when he then

cites a

Yogacara

reatise

it

must be made

to

agree

with Murti's

supposition.

So,

referring

o

the

Madhyantavibhaga,

e

says,

"The

constructed

subject-object

world

is

unreal;

but

this

does not

make the

abhutaparikalpa

nreal;

or,

it

is

the

substratumor the

unreal

subject-object

duality.

It

is, however,

non-con-

ceptual."36

So

abhutaparikalpa,

hich

means

"the

imagination

of

what

did not

(really)

happen,"

is

'non-conceptual'

I

conclude

that

Murti

n

this

chapter

does not

advance

the

understanding

f

Yogacara

Buddhism.

AboutAlayavijnana.

When

we turn

o the

Yogacara

heories hat

devolve

about

the

term

alayavijnana,

we

notice that

what

must have

been

a

hotly

contested

point

even

in

the time of

the

Buddhist

master

Asanga

is

still in

present

times

disputed.

I

already

mentioned that

there is

a

two-volume

work

on

the

topic

by

Schmithausen.

Here,

under

a

heading

"Intro-

duction

and

Original

Meaning

of

Alayavijnffna,"

e

points

to a

passage

in

the

SamahitabhCmi

portion

of

the

YogacarabhOmi

bout a

person

in

the

deep

concentration

called

nirodha-samapatti,

nd

that

it is a

con-

tinuance of

the

alayavijiiana

with

its

seeds,

which

shows that

even

though

variousothermental unctionshave

ceased,

vijinana

tselfhas not

ceased,

and these

seeds

will

bring

forth

the

evolving types

of

vijfnna

when the

person

emerges

from

the

samadhi.37

Schmithausen

calls

this

the

"Initial

Passage"

here and a

numberof

times

lateron in

his

work.

He

goes

on

to

claim38

hat

the

passage,

although

not

stating

his

explicitly,

implies

that the

continued

presence

of the

alayavijnana

has

kept

alive

that

yogin

who

is in

nirodha-samapatti.

nd

if

that

is

so,

then the

alaya-

vijnana

must also

be

associated

with the

moment of

conception

in

the

womb,39

and so

this

is

the

vijfnana

on

which

Name-and-Formation

(nama-rCpa)

rises

in

dependence-in

the

usual

sequence

of the

Bud-

dhistDependentOrigination.Accordingly,he insists hatthe

pratisamdhi

(or

'linking',

he

'rebirth')

ind of

vijnafna

s

that initial

alayavijnana

hat

descends

into the

male-female

element

union in

the

womb.40

In the

course of

his

investigation

he

was led

to

disagree

with

various

Japanese

scholars

who

understood

hese

matters

differently

rom

him. I

shall

have to

evaluate

whether his

conclusions

are

consistent

with

the

positions

of

Asahga,

the

founderof

the

Yogacara,

or

of

Vasubandhu,

he

great popularizer

hereof.

Alex

Wayman

459






It

happens

that

Asanga

himself-obviously responding

to a

number

of

challenges

and

condemnations

of

this

alayavijinana

position-gave

his

answers in the

opening

section of his

exegetical

section called

Viniscaya-

samgrahanT,

which I

employ

in the Tibetan

version

in

the

Tanjur.

There

we

learn that the

'store consciousness'

is the abode of

seeds

(alaya-

vijfnanm

bTjasrayah).41

Asanga claims that this is a secret teaching of the

Bhagavat, citing

a well-known verse

from the

Samdhinirmocana-sOtra

about the

adanavijfnana

the

consciousness that 'takes'

[seeds]).42

But

the

reader

of this section cannot avoid the

conclusion that

Asanga

is con-

vinced that of

the

many

references to

vijinana

n

the old Buddhist Sanskrit

canon

(the

four

Agamas)

that

he

employed, they

cannot all be

explained

as the standard

six

perceptions

based on the six sense

organs,

but

that

there

are various contexts of

this Sanskrit

expression

which

justify

it

to be

understood

differently.

Now,

as

Asanga

continues in his

defense

of this

type

of

vijfnana,

he

sets

forth three reasons

that

surprisingly

were not

referred to

by

Schmit-

hausen.

I

shall

cite

the

Tibetan

along

with

my

translation

below each

passage,

and then follow with a discussion-insofar

as

it

is

possible.

/

ci'i

phyir

kun

gzhi

rnam

par

ses

pa

med

na

lus

kyi

tshor

ba

mi

rung

zhe na

/

'di Itar shul

bzhin nas

tshul bzhin

ma

yin

pa

sems

par byed pa dang

/

rjes

su

rtog

par byed pa'am

/

sems

mnyam

par bzhag

pa'am

/

sems

mnyampar

ma

bzhag pa gcig cig

lus la tshorba

rnam

pa

du

ma

rnam

pa

mang

po

sna

tshogs

gang

dag 'byung

ba'i

rigs

na

snang

ste

/

de'i

phyiryang

kun

gzhi

rnam

par

ses

pa yod

do

/43

1.

Why

in

the

absence

of

alayavijfnana

s

the

body's feeling

not

feasible?

It is

this

way:

when

positing

thatthe mind attendsin the

right

mannerand then

imagines

in the

wrong

manner;

or that the

mind is

equipoised,

then is not

equipoised,

there

appear principles

hat

bring

forth

a multitude

of

aspects

of

varied kinds

of

feelings

in

a certain

body.

Therefore,

here

is the 'store-

consciousness'.

/

ci'i

phyir

kun

gzhi

rnam

par

ses

pa

med na sems

med

pa'i

snyomspar 'jugpa

mi

srid ce na

/

'di Itar du ses

med

pa

la

snyomspar

zhugs pa'am/ 'gog

pa

la

snyoms par zhugs

pa'i

rnam

par

ses

pa

lus

dang

bral

ba kho

nar

'gyur

zhing

ma

bral

bar

mi

'gyur

bas

/

de'i

phyir

si

ba

kho nar

'gyur

ba

zhig

na bcom Idan

'das

kyi

de

skad

du

/

de'i

mam

par

ses

pa

ni lus

dang

bral

ba ma

yin

no zhes

gsungs pa'i phyir ro

/44

2.

Why

in the

absence

of

alayavijfina

would

there

be

no

possibility

of

equi-

poise

without

hought(acittika-samapatti)?

t is

this

way:

the

vijnana

hat

is in

non-ideational

equipoise (asamjinika-samapatti)

r is

in

cessation

equipoise

(nirodha-samapatti)

nly

occurs

when it is absent

from the

body,

and

would

not

occur

[that

way]

when not absent

(from

he

body).

For hat

reason,

it was

only

for

the case

of death

that the

Bhagavat

declared,

"his

vijnana

is not

Philosophy

East&

West absent from

he

body."

460






/

ci'i

phyir

kun

gzhi

rnam

par

ses

pa

med na 'chi

'pho

mi

rung

zhe na

/

'di

Itar

'pho

ba'i

tshe'i

mam

par

ses

pas

lus ro stod dam

/

ro

smad du

drod

yal

bar

byed

cing spong

la

yid kyi

rnam

par

ses

pa

ni nam

yang

mi

'byung

ba ma

yin

bas

/

de'i

phyir

lus len

par byed

pa'i

kun

gzhi

rnam

par

ses

pa

kho na

dang

bralbas lus

kyi

drod

yal

ba

dang

/

lus la

tshorba med

par

snang

barzad

kyi

yid

kyi

rnam

par

ses

pa dang

bral

bas

ni ma

yin

te

/

de'i

phyir

yang

mi

rung

ngo

/45

3.

Why

in the absence

of

alayavijiina

is there no

feasibility

of

transmigra-

tion?

It is

this

way:

the

vijnana

at the time of

[dying

and]

transmigrating

eaves

when the warmth

of

the

upper

and

lower

parts

of the

body

fades

away,

and

the

manovijnana

ertainly

does not

occur and is not

[at

that

time].

On

that

account,

only

in the absence

of

the

alayavijfiana

which takes a

body

does

feeling

(vedana)

get

lost

in

the

body,

but this

does not

happen through

he

absence of

manovijnana.

So there is no

feasibility

in

the

absence of

alaya-

vijiana).

One of the first conclusions about these three passages is that

Schmithausen was

wrong

in

concluding

that

alayavijnana

was

necessary

so

that a meditator who

is

in

the

trance state

nirodha-samapatti

would

not die

there.

Certainly,

if

Asanga

had

thought

so,

this would

be the

place

for him to

have

said so. It

is a case when

vijnana

departs

from

the

body,

but the

person

does

not die

(on

that

account).

But when a

person

does

die,

vijnana

does

depart

from

the

body.

However,

the

three

passages

certainly

require

further

explanations.

A

certain amount

of ex-

plication

should come

through

considering

certain

Schmithausen claims

as were

alluded to

above.

As to his view

that

the

alayavijnana

is

the kind

of

vijnana

that de-

scends into

the

male-female element

union in

the

womb,

supposedly

bringing

life

thereto,

there is

Asarga's

own

explanation

in

the

early part

of the

Yogacarabhomi:

[tatra]

arvabrjakam

ipakasamgrhTtam

srayopa

adanad

alayavijiina.msam-

murcchati

/46

There,

he

'store-consciousness'

ll-seeded and

restrained

y

maturation,

fter

taking

a

body,

faints

(or

falls

unconscious,

or

becomes

inactive).

And:

yatra

ca

kalaladege tad

vijninam

sammurcchitam

o

'sya

bhavati tasmin

samaye hrdayadesah

/47

Wherethat

vijnana

aints

n a

place

of

the kalala

initial

ormof

the

embryo),

t

[that

place]

becomes for it

[the

embryo]

at that

time the

place

of the

heart.

Notice that in

this

account,

the

initial form

of the

embryo

after

concep-

tion is

already

there

when the

'store

consciousness'

enters. The

term ka-

lala is used

in

Indian

medicine for

the initial

embryo.

So

it is

a

case like

Alex

Wayman

461






Philosophy

ast

&West

the

Genesis account

already

mentioned

where the

support

world

pre-

cedes the

subjective

element.

Thus

while

Schmithausen

was

right

about

the

role

of

alayavijinna

o

represent

n

some

way

the

vijiana

that

is the

third

member

of

Dependent

Origination,

nd

so to fall

into the

womb

(in

the human

case),

it

is

clear that

Asaiga

does

not,

and

would

not,

ascribe

to

vijnafna

he

role

of

conferring

ife-as

Schmithausen

laimed.

These

remarks

help

to

explain

somewhat the thirdof

Asahga's

defenses of

the

alayavijynana.

Then

Schmithausen

laimed,

and

repeated

his

claim,

that this

alaya-

vijinana

hat falls

into

the

womb is the

pratisamdhi

rebirth)

ype

of

vij-

inana.

Apparently

ecause some

pandits

were

espousing

such

a

theory

at

the time

of

Vasubandhu,

he countered it in

no uncertain erms in

his

DependentOrigination

ommentary:

"It s

not

right

hat the

pratisamdhi-

vijfiana

s

by

way

of

samskara

the

second memberof

Dependent

Origi-

nation].

It is

true that

vijinana

rises

[as

the third

member];

he

Name-

and-Formation

nama-rupa)

as

the fourth

member]

arising

on

that

basis

is the time of

pratisamdhi-this

is the faultless

position."48

Gunamati

claims

that

Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakogadentifies the

pratisamdhi

('linkage'

=

reincarnation)

with the skandha kind of

vijiana.49

He

pre-

sumably

means

chapter

3,

the

introductory

aragraph

o k.

14,

where the

first ine

in

the Sanskrit ext has the

expression

"five

upadana-skandha,"

and

in

the next line it

says

"Themomentof

pratisamdhi

s the

birth n

the

destinies

(gati)" (upapattibhavo

atisu pratisamdhiksanah).50

Buddhaghosahelps

to make sense of the

foregoing

when,

in

his

fa-

mous

work

Visuddhimagga,

e sets

forth under

the

topic

of

the

fourth

member

of

Dependent

Origination

hat

the

naman

(of

nama-rupa),

when

initiallydevelopingin the womb, consists of threeaggregates.That s, he

defines

it,

vedanadayo tayo

khandha,

"the three

personal

aggregates,

feelings,

etc.,"51

thus

leaving

out

vinnfifna

the

Pali

way

of

writing

vij-

nana),

while the standardAbhidharma

isting

of the

naman

part

presents

the four

members,

including

vijinana.

This forces the well-known can-

onical

passage holding

that

nama-rupa

rises

in

dependence

on

vij~nan

and that

vijinana

rises in

dependence

on

n,ama-rupa

o mean that

vij-

nafna s added to the namanto make four.

In

short,

when the

vijinana

hat

is

number

3 in

Dependent Origi-

nation falls into the

womb,

it is there the

'store

consciousness' that is a

store of seeds. As to the word 'seed' (bTja), saiga gives a set of words

that are

roughly

definitions,

the

bTja-paryaya:

ealm

(dhatu),

lineage

(gotra),

basic nature

(prakrti),

asic

cause

(hetu),

the real set

(satkaya),

elaboration

(prapanca),

store

(alaya),

the

taking (upadana), suffering

(duhkha),

foundation

of

reifying

views

(satkyadrtyadhisthad

a),

and

foundation

of

'I

am'

pride

(asmimanadhisthana)-and

any

others be-

longing

to the same set.52

Besides,

Asahga

gives

a list of various out-

comes

of

these seeds:

family

(kula),

strength

bala),

bodily

appearance

462






(rOpa),ength

of life

(ayus),

enjoyments

(bhoga),

and so

on;

and

of these

effects,

principallygood

(subha)

and

bad

(asubha)

karma s

the

cause.53

Later,

Asanga

told how

this

'store

consciousness'

gets

its seeds:

evam

avyakrta

dharma

kusalakusalavyakrtan

harmanavahanti

tadyatha

kusalakusalavyakrtabTjakam

layavijnanam

vahanti54

Thus,

the

indeterminate

natures

(avyakrtadharma)ring

the

virtuous,

unvir-

tuous,

and

indeterminate

atures,

as follows:

they bring

(them)

o the 'store

consciousness',

which

is

seeded with the

virtuous,unvirtuous,

and

indeter-

minate.

Previously

t was

mentionedthat

the

Yogacara requently

presents

a

list of

eight vijnana,

of which

number

7 is the

'defiled manas'

and num-

ber 8 is the

alayavijnana.

Now,

in Buddhist

ommentarial

exegesis

of

the

scriptures,

here was a

problem

with the

vijinna

that is third in

Depen-

dent

Origination,

nd

was said to have a

'vision'

of

the

birthplace

and so

to be attracted hereto.Now, even in the Yogacara, t would hardlybe

feasible

to

identify

his

third

memberwith the

alayavijnana,

ince a store

of seeds could

hardly

be called

visionary,except

for the

envisioning

of

effects,

as an acorn

might

be

said

(poetically

or

metaphorically)

o fore-

see the

oak tree. But

however

we

might

credit the acorn with such an

ability,

we should

all

admit

that

the acorn

cannot

imagine

where it will

grow.

Vasubandhuwas well aware

of

the

difficulty,

so

in

his

Mahaya-

samgraha

ommentary

he said:

Besides,

when the

manovijnana

hat

is

defiled witnesses the

birthplace,

he

intermediate tate

[between

death and

rebirth]

comes to an end. That

it

"faints"means that the manovijiana comes together with the male and

female

generative

elements,

[and]

experiences

a

single

[moment of]

bliss,

whereupon

the

manovijnana

aints

[i.e.,

becomes unconscious

or

inactive],

and on the basis

thereof,

a different

ortof

manovijnana

nters."55

Since

Asariga

had

already

denied that the

manovijiina

(i.e.,

the

one

based

on the manas as the sixth

sense)

is

operative

at the time

of

death,

Vasubandhumust mean the seventh

vijnana,

what

in

later

Yogacara

was

referred

o as

the 'defiled mind'

(klista-manas).

ater,

Vasubandhu om-

ments:

"Therefore,

he

manovijnana

hat faints is not

[i.e.,

is no

longer]

a

manovijnana,

but

is a

vipaka-vijinana

i.e.,

a resultative

kind];

and that is

'all-seeded'."56 He therefore admits that it was the 'defiled mind' that

falls into the

womb

and,

once

there,

is

called

alayavijnana.

This

separate

category

of a 'defiled mind'

seems

to have been

adopted

for

the death

vision,

for the visions

during

he

intermediate tate

(antarabhava),

or

the

birth

vision,

and

perhaps

also

(just my

own

speculation)

or

hypnogogic

states

during

a lifetime.

Now,

as this

'store consciousness' is credited with

having

a store

of

'all'

dharmas,

we

should recall that

in

BuddhistAbhidharma t is the

Alex

Wayman

463






Philosophy

ast&

West

manovijfnana

hat has those

dharmas

upposedly

as

object,

while

it

is the

sixth sense manas hat has those

dharmas

directly

as

object.

Inthe

theory

of

Dependent Origination

alluded

to

above,

for a

vijnafna

hat

arises

in

dependence

on

Name-and-Formation,

unamati

xplains

hat

the mano-

vijnana

is the main one: "Given the set

of

six

vijnafna,

nly

manovij-

nanais the fastening Tib.sbrelba)of pratisamdhithe reincarnation)."57

This

means

that

the fourthmemberName-and-Formation

s

necessary

or

the Abhidharma

manovijnana

o

operate;

so the

remaining vijfnanas,

based

on

the-five outer-directed

enses,

must

require

he fifth

member,

the Six

Sensory

Bases

(sadayatana),

o

operate.

All

the

foregoing

should

clarify

that the chief demand to have the

concept

of

alayavijfnana

as

for

Asahga's

third reason-the

theory

of

rebirth.

Schmithausen's

heory

that

the

initial

place

is the

context

of

a

special yoga

state-that

is,

nirodha-samapatti-is

hardly

tenable. The

discussion at some

length

in

the

early

part

of

the

Yogacarabhomi

shows that

it

was the Buddhist

arguments

over whether some

persons

had

or

did

not

have the

potentiality

of

Nirvana,58

nd

the

attempt

to

justify

events

of the

present day

as the effect

of

previous

lives,

that

demanded a

carrierof a

seed-nature.

This

must

be

why

Asahga

allows

for the

operation

of

alayavijinana

hen the

'evolving

perceptions'

are

in

abeyance.59

But then there are the first and second reasons

that

Asarfga

men-

tioned. These are

quite

difficult

because

yoga

states are

implicated.

When

Asahga

mentioned,

as cited

above,

that

vijnana

entered the em-

bryo

at the

place

where the

heart would

form,

this makes

it

clear that

when he said

in

the second

reasonthat

in

the case of those two kinds

of

samapatti

he

vijnana

s

absent fromthe

body,

it means that

vijfnna

had

left its 'heart'

ocation,

and was

somewhere else

for

the time

being

(-in

the

head?).

This

suggests

hatthe

yogin

is in a

sortof

cataleptic

state.And

this

seems to

be

why,

in the

first

reason,

Asaflga

had credited the 'store

consciousness'

with

enabling

the

feelings

of

the

body.

Thus,

in

certain

trance states there is

a

local or more

general

loss of

feeling,

and

Asafga

claims that

to

understandwhat is

going

on in

these

specialized

states,

one must

posit

a

'store

consciousness'.

This

appears

to be

enough

for

these three

reasons,

as far as this

essay

is

concerned.

It would also

take

too much

space

to

go

into

the

matter of

the

transmutation f the 'store consciousness'

(alayavijfnana-pariv.rtti),

nd

the matter

of which

advanced

persons-a

Buddha,

an

arhat,

advanced

bodhisattvas,

nd so on-have

transmuted

his

'storeconsciousness'

and

so

do not

possess

it.60

But this

teaching

shows that the

alayavijnana

theory

does not

require

t for the

yoga experience

of

ekagracitta,

s it

was

discussed

above,

which

implies

a

special

condition of the

evolving

per-

ceptions,

especially manovijfnana

the

perception

based

on the

mental

sense

of

mind,

manas).

464






About

Three Laksanas.

There

is

considerable

treatment

already

in

West-

ern sources

on the three laksanas of

Yogacara theory

that are also

called

the three

svabhava.

Nagao

has written a

spirited

essay

on the

topic,

"The

Buddhist

World View as

Elucidated

in

the Three-Nature

Theory

and

its

Similes."61

As

Nagao

describes the

three,

they

are

the

imagined

nature

(parikalpita-svabhava), he other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava),

and

the consummated nature

(parinispanna-svabhava).

And he

explains:

"The

'imagined'

nature,

therefore,

is characterized

by

'unreality'

and

'total

nonexistence'."

"In

contrast to

this,

parinispanna

or

'consummated'

means

perfect,

real,

and existent and connotes

'reality,'

'truth,'

'real

exis-

tence',

or 'the

absolute'." "Between

them is

the

third

nature,

called

paratantra,

the 'other

dependent'.

It

exists,

but

only by

depending

on

some other

entity."62

Nagao

cites

an

important

observation from

Vasu-

bandhu's

Trirmsiki,

. 21

c-d: "When

the

other-dependent

nature obtains

a state

absolutely

free of

the

imagined

nature,

it

is

then

the

consummated

nature."63

It

is the conclusion of

the

present

writer that this

system

of

three

natures is

very

close

to what is

found

in

the

writings

of

the earlier

and

famous

Nagarjuna,

with

the difference

that the

Yogacara

thought

it

was

improving

in

describing

what

is

going

on.

I

allude to

two

verses in

the latter's

Acintyastava,

44-45:64

hetupratyayasambhutaaratantra

a

samvrtih

paratantra

ti

proktahpara-

marthas v akrtrimah

/

44

svabhavah

prakrtis

attvam

dravyam

vastusad

ity api

/

nasti vai

kalpito

bhavo

paratantras

u

vidyate

/

45

Convention,with

dependence

on other(s)

paratantra),

rises roma cause and

from

conditions.This

dependence

on

other(s)

has

been

announced

(by

Thee).

The Absolute s not

fabricated.

44)

It

(the

Absolute)

s

termed

self-existence

(svabhava),

rimary

nature

(prakrti),

reality

(tattva),

ubstance

(dravya),

biding

essence

(vastu),

he

really

existent

(sat).

An

entity

(bhava)

when

imagined

does not

exist,

but

(exists)

when

its

dependence

on

other(s)

s found.

(45)

Notice

the

complete agreement

with

the

Yogacara

that an

entity

when

imagined

does not

exist,

but

does exist with

its

dependence

on

another;

and the same

word for

dependence

on

another

(paratantra)

is

used.

Nagarjuna,

like the

Yogacarin

espousers

of the three svabhava

theory,

has

an

absolute,

defined

by

six

terms. The

only

seeming

difference is

when

Vasubandhu holds

that this

absolute

nature

is

the

other-dependent

na-

ture

when the

latter is

free of the

imagined

nature.

This

amounts to

ac-

cepting

for

Dependent

Origination

(pratTtyasamutpada)

hat there

is both

a

conventional and an

absolute

explanation.

Even

if

Nagarjuna

accepts

this,

it

would

probably

be

difficult

to draw it

from

his works.

This

brief

account of the

three

natures should

suffice.

Alex

Wayman

465








cognition

that does not exist?

That

by

which the twofold

appearance

is

affected.

Using

the Sanskrit

or the

verses as

is

found

in

Kochumuttom,68

accept

Prasad's

ranslation s

on

the whole correct.

In

the case

of

the second of

his cited

verses,

his

rendition

may possibly

mislead the

reader,

as

sug-

gestingthat a nonexistentexternal has appearedin the mind. I believe

that here we should

adhere more

literally

o the Sanskrit:atrakim

khyati

asatkalpah

katham

khyatidvayatmana

"What

appears

here?The

imag-

inationof

an unreal.

How

does

it

appear?

As the

subject-objectduality").

This

subject-object

duality

is

found

discussed

in Buddhist

iterature

en-

erally

by

the

terms

grahaka

(the

apprehender)

and

grahya

(the

appre-

hended).

The

avoidance

of the

two

is

the

topic

of the

scripture

presented

above,

the Kalakarama

utta.

Thus,

when Vasubandhu

writessuch

verses,

he

evidently

believes

that

hey

are consistent

with the Buddha's

teachings.

Clarification

n Terms f Buddhist

Logic.Stcherbatsky

nd othersclaimed

thatthere

is a

pronounced

nfluence

of

Yogacaraphilosophy

on

Buddhist

logic

of the

Dignaga-DharmakTrti

ineage.69

If one is to credit the

Yoga-

cara with

such

influence,

one should

state the

influence rather

pecifi-

cally.

I have

previously

published

hree

essays

on this

matter,

"Yogacara

and the Buddhist

Logicians,"70

"A Reconsideration

of Dharmakirti's

'Deviation'

from

Dignaga

on

Pratyaksabhasa,"71

nd

"DharmakTrti

nd

the

Yogacara

Theory

of

BTja."72

n the first

of

these

essays

I

translated

Dignaga's

brief

treatise,

the

AlambanaparTksa,

hich deals

with

the

theory

of

'atoms',

which

Vasubandhu

also

dealt

with in

his

twenty-verse

treatise.

I

also cited

the commentator

Dharmottara's

assage explaining

the so-called atoms as

constituting

olor

(varna),

while the

shape

(sams-

thana)

was

added,

presumably

n

Representation-Only.

he

article

"A

Reconsideration

..."

defended

DharmakTrti's

position

that

there

are four

kinds of falsification

of

perception

(pratyaksabhasa)

nd that

this

was

also

Dignaga's

position.

The one on DharmakTrti

nd

bTja

howed that

Dharmakirti

as

amenable

to this 'seed'

way

of

talking.

Among

the

many

authors

who

claim

this

Yogacara

nfluence is C.

L.

Tripathi,

who wrote a

book titled The Problemsof

Knowledge

n

Yoga-

cara

Buddhism hat

included a treatment

f Buddhist

ogic.

He

is

among

the

many

who think that

Yogacara

Buddhismdenies external

existence,

saying:

"Vasubandhu ...

categorically

denies the existence of the ex-

ternal

world."73

Yet

this same author

has a

chapter

"Object

of

Percep-

tion"

presenting

the

position

of Buddhist

logic

that the

object

called

svalaksana

s the

only

real.74He calls it a

'particular', sing

the Western

terminology

of 'universal'

and

'particular'.

This

author

seems not to re-

alize

that

if

the

Yogacara

does indeed

deny

external

objects,

it

opposes

Buddhist

ogic-and

so

why

treat Buddhist

ogic

in a book with such a

title?

Alex

Wayman

467








example

of

hatred,

his

clearly goes

with

representations

f the

'defiled

mind'.

About

the 'defiled

mind',

Asarga's Paramartha-gatha,

9-41,

contains

these

points:

"The defiled mind

(klistam

manas)

always

arises

and ceases

together

with

defilements

klesa)";

"On anotheroccasion it

is

born

pure";

and

"Thatwhich was

defiled,

here

in the end

is

purified,

with its intrinsic ight (prakrtibhJsvara)."78his shows that the 'defiled

mind'

requires

defilements,

which

are

dharmas.

Hence,

the four causes of error

found

in

those

texts of

Buddhist

logic

are

reasonably

based on the

Yogacaratheory

of

'representation-

only',

and this is

certainly

a better

solution than

my

old

attempt

in

the Bhandarkar

ournal

to

associate

these four

causes of error with

the four

pratyaksa

of

the

Buddhist

logic

system.79

Accordingly,

these

causes of error

are

not a

theory

that the

world is an

illusion,

since the

causes of errorcan be 'seen

through',appreciated

or

what

they

are,

in

particular.

Clarification

n

Termsof Western Discourse. Modern

Western

philos-

ophers

have

concerned themselves with

getting proper

descriptive

tate-

ments

regardingperception

and

its

associate functions.

Since

such

topics

can

generate

much

writing,

I

shall

restrict

my

comparisons

to

issues

raised n an

article

by Bijoy

H.

Boruah,

"Seeing

in the

Mind's

Eye."80

He

concerned himself with theories of the

author

Gilbert

Ryle

and others.

He was

clearly impressed

with the

phraseologyby

Elizabeth

Anscombe,

'intentional

seeing'

and 'material

seeing'.

The

example

was:

suppose

we

look at a

painting

of

Gandhi

(the

'material

seeing'),

and then

go away

and ask

ourselves,

"What did I

see?"

Then

these

authorsare forced

to

use the same

expression, namely

the translation nto

English

of

vijna-

ptimatra

s

'representation-only',

ut

say 'representational

eeing',

which

is 'intentional

seeing',

while

Wittgenstein

used

words like

'seeing

as'. But

then Boruahhas to

decide

that

'seeing

in

the

mind's

eye'

is not

repre-

sentational

seeing,

and this

conclusion

forces

him

to

reject

various

theories

by

Ryle

and

others.

Thus,

to

see

in

the

mind's

eye

is

to have an

image

that involves both

"doing

and

achieving"

and

so is

distinguished

from

"abstract r

purely

conceptual

contemplation."

But

Boruah

recog-

nized

(speaking

'metaphorically')

hat

this

image

"emerges only

when

the

finger

of

thought

ouches the

right

cord

of

sentience."

He thus

admits

thata sentience precedesthis

image.

Asaiga-or

it

might

have

been the

opponent-was

cited

above for a

consistent

remark,

which I

would now

render:

"Besides,

there is

no

par-

ticular ault

in

understanding

hat

there is a

priorrepresentation."81

his

apparently

means,

"At

least there is one

thing

we can

agree

on-there

was some

kind of

prior

representation."

Therefore,

for

the

Yogacara

theory

of the

'store

consciousness',

the

seeds stored here

cannot

sprout

unless there is

a

prior

representation-only'

riggeredby sensory input

or

Alex

Wayman

469






by

the

'defiled

mind'.

And the

sprouting

eeds

would

provide

he

images

alluded to

in

Boruah's

ssay.

To illustrate he

independence

of the

image

from

sentience

as well

as

from

abstract

hought-which

Buddhism

calls

'discursive

thought'

(vi-

kalpa,

etc.),

one could take the

example

of the

composer

Beethoven. He

first ook classes in music, heardBach,and so forth,and this was repre-

sented

in

his

mind,

'heardas'.

Later,

he

composed

great

worksof

music,

but this

did

not involve

hearing

with

his

ear-because

he

was

becoming

stone deaf.

Therefore,

his

auditory magery

of music became

indepen-

dent

of

sentience,

that

is,

in

terms of

hearing

external

sounds,

and was

also

independent

of

discursive

hought.

He

did

have discursive

thought

to

change

his

score-"l

should

change

it

thus"-or to

fume

against

other

persons,

and

so

forth,

which

is outside

his

composing

music. Of

course,

even in his deafness

he

still had visual

input

rom

musical scores.

The

example

of

Beethoven

also illustrates he

description

of the

image-here auditory magery

(heard

by

the sixth

sense,

manas)-as

a

sort of

doing

and

achieving.

The

Yogacara

ssuance fromthe 'store

con-

sciousness' that

is

expressed

in

the

language

of

'seeds'

(bTja)

mounts

o

a

compatibleway

of

talking

because

the seed can

do

something,

achieve

a

result,

say,

a

shoot.

Since

this

issuance

from the 'store

consciousness'

can be

of the indeterminate s well

as

of the virtuousand

the

unvirtuous,

there

are

a

vast numberof

images

possible.

Since these

images

can also

be

called

representations,

his shows the

active nature

of

these

repre-

sentations.

It

is

hoped

that this

essay, including

the

preceding

three clarifica-

tions,

may

help

to elucidate

Yogacara

Buddhism.

Philosophy

ast

&

West

Final Declaration

I

hope

that the

Yogacara

system

has been somewhat

clarified

on

behalf

of

anyone

who wants

it

clarified.

The

misrepresentations

f this

system

that have

appeared

in older as

well as in

recently

published

works

are not more

correct

simply by being

copied

over

and over. Of

course,

the

Yogacara

put

its trust

n

the

subjective

search

for truth

by

way

of a

samadhi.

This rendered

the external

world not less

real,

but less

valuable as

the

way

of

finding

ruth.

The

tide of misinformation

n

this,

or on

any

other

topic

of Indian

lore comes about because authors

requently

read

just

a few verses or

paragraphs

f

a

text,

then

go

to

secondary

sources,

or to treatises

by

rivals,

and

presume

to

speak

authoritatively.

Only

after

doing

genuine

research on

such a

topic

can one

begin

to answer

the

question: why

were those

texts and

why

do the moderns

write the

way they

do?

Decades

ago

I knew

that the

Yogacara

position

was

misrepresented

in

many

works,

ancient

and modern.

Only recently

was

the means

to defend

Yogacara

Buddhism

put

in

my

hands,

as

has been detailed

470






above.

I

do

not care whether or not others are convinced

by

the

argu-

ments

presented

here.

NOTES

1

-

Cf.

Gregory

J.

Darling,

An Evaluation

of the

Vedantic

Critique

of

Buddhism

Delhi:

Motilal

Banarsidass,

987),

p.

371,

taking

notice

of an incorrect

portrayal

f Buddhism

n

Vedantic

criticism.

2

-

A.

Wayman,

"The

Yogacara

Idealism,"

Philosophy

Eastand West

15

(1)

(1965):

65-73.

3

-

T.R.V.

Murti,

TheCentral

Philosophy

of Buddhism

London:

George

Allen

and Unwin

Ltd.,1955),

chap.

13,

"The

Madhyamika,

Vijna-

navada

and

Vedanta

Absolutism,"

pp.

311-328.

4

-

Lambert

chmithausen,

Alayavijfnana:

n

the

Origin

and the

Early

Development

of

a Central

Concept

of

YogacaraPhilosophy,pt.

1,

Text;

pt.

2, Notes,

Bibliography

nd Indices

(Tokyo:

The

Interna-

tional Institute

or

Buddhist

Studies,

1987),

here,

pt.

1,

pp.

13-14.

5

-

Alex

Wayman,

Analysis

of the Sravakabhumi

Manuscript,

Uni-

versity

of California Publications

in

Classical

Philology,

vol.

17

(Berkeley,

California,

1961).

6

-

Alex

Wayman,

review

of

Hidenori

S.

Sakuma,

Die

Asrayaparivrtti-

theorie

in

der

Yogacarabhomi

..,

2 vols.

(Stuttgart:

ranzSteiner

Verlag,

1990),

in

Journal

of

the American

Oriental

Society

113

(1)

(1993):

144.

7

-

Bhikkhu

Nan.ananda,

The

Magic

of the

Mind:An

Exposition

of the

Kalakarama

utta

(Kandy,

Sri Lanka:BuddhistPublication

Society,

1974),

pp.

1-92.

8

-

F. L.

Woodward,

TheBook of

the Gradual

Sayings,

vol. 2

(London:

Pali Text

Society,

1952),

pp.

26-28.

9

-

William G.

Doty,

"Hermes'

HeteronymousAppellations,"

n

James

Hillman,

ed.,

Facing

the Gods

(Dallas,

Texas:

Spring

Publications,

1984),

p.

131.

10

-

See

LozangJamspal,

ed.,

Abhidhanavisvalocanam

f

SrTdharasena

(Narita:

Naritasan

Shinshoji,

1992);

and see

Alex

Wayman,

trans.,


f

SrTdharasena

Narita:

Naritasan

Shin-

shoji,

1994).

11-

Alex

Wayman,

"Doctrinal Affiliation of

the

Buddhist Master

Asahga,"

n

N. H.

Samtani,

ed.,

Amala

Prajina: spects

of

Buddhist

Alex

Wayman

471






Studies

(Delhi:

Sri

Satguru

Publications,

1989),

p.

214

and n.

74,

furnishing

he

Tibetan n

transcription

or

the

passage.

12

-

See,

e.g.,

Th.

Stcherbatsky,

The

Central

Conception

of

Buddhism

and the

Meaning

of

the Word

"Dharma"

Calcutta:

Susil

Gupta,

1961),

p.

7:

"Consciousness,

t

is

stated,

never arises

alone,

since

it

is puresensation,withoutany content."

13

-

For

his

simile,

see I.

B.

Horner, rans.,

The

Collection

of

the

Middle

LengthSayings

(London:

Luzac, 1967),

vol.

1,

Mahavedalla-sutta,

p.

355,

where,

in the case of a

burning

oil

lamp,

"the

light

is

seen

because

of the flame and the flame is

seen because of

the

light."

14

-

This

translation

s

in

the Sata-Pitaka

eries,

Indo-Asian

Literatures,

vol.

74,

published

by

the

International

cademy

of

Indian

Culture,

New

Delhi,

1968;

and

the

passage

is at

p.

189,

where the translator

also offers: "What belongs to the triple world, that is (of) mere

mind."

15

-

Sylvain

Levi,

Mat6riaux

pour

I'Etude du

systeme Vijfaptimatra

(Paris:

Librairie

ncienne

Honore

Champion,

1932),

p.

13.

16

-

When the

Japanese

scholar,

Professor

RyOshin

Ohminami,

was

at

Columbia

University

ome

years

ago studying

his

scripture

with the

Vasubandhu

commentary

or

a work

in

Japanese,

he

kindly gave

me both

the

Peking

Tibetan

Tanjur

edition

(PTT)

and the

Derge

Tibetan edition

for Vasubandhu's

commentary.

I

have read the

beginning

of

the

Peking edition,

but

for the

present topic

have

used

just

the

Derge

edition

(publishedby

Delhi

KarmapaeChodhey

and

printed

at

Mujeeb

Press,

1976),

the

part

I discuss at

pp.

200

and

202.

17

-

As

for the

terminological

set of

three,

as

in

Vasubandhu's

Abhi-

dharmakosa,

chap.

2,

k.

34a-b,

cf.

Louis de La

Vallee

Poussin

(Paris,

1923),

p.

177,

where the

autocommentary xplains,

"Citta

s

so named

because

it

accumulates

(cinoti);

named

manas because

it

knows

(manute);

named

vijnana

because

it

distinguishes

ts

object

(alambanam

vijanati).

18 - Cf. the

Peking

Tibetan canon

(Japanesephoto

edition, PTT),

vol.

98,

p.

127.5-1,

citing,

"khams

sum

po

'di

ni

ram

par

ses

pa

tsam

mo"-where rnam

par

ses

pa

tsam

mo

=

vij~nanamatra,

nd is as-

sertedto be these three worlds.

19

-

Wayman,


f

SrTdharasena,

.

192.

20

-

Cf. Louisde La

Vallee

Poussin,

L'Abhidharmakosae Vasubandhu:

Philosophy

ast&West

Troisieme

Chapitre

Paris:

Paul

Geuthner,

1926).

472






21

-

Cf.

T. W. and C.A.F.

Rhys

Davids,

Dialogues

of the

Buddha,

pt.

3

(London:

Luzac, 1957),

pp.

77-94.

22

-

For three lexicons

which

include

the definition

alambana,

Anun-

doram

Borooah,

Nanarthasamgraha

Gauhati:

Publication

Board,

Assam,

1969),

text,

p.

3,

under

"Agra,"

cites the

MedinTkosa,

he

Vigvapraka'a,nd the one by Hemacandra.For he fourthone, see

Jamspal,

Abhidhanavisvalocana,

.

278,

no.

1625A.

Besides,

alam-

bana is a definition for

agra

in

these two lexicons of the

Deccan

College,

Poona,

series:

NanarthamafnjarT,

y Raghava,

ed.

K.R.V.

Sharma

1954),

and Dharanikoga

by

Dharanidasa,

d. E. D.

Kulkarni

(1968).

The translation

by

A.

Wayman,

Ethicsof Tibet:

Bodhisattva

section

of

Tsong-kha-pa's

Lam rim

chen mo

(Albany:

State Uni-

versity

of

New

York

Press,

1991),

adopted

the

rendering

area' for

the

term

agra,

as

though

an area in

the mind

for meditation.

23

-

That

is,

while

preparingmy

Analysis

of

the Sravakabhumi

Manu-

script

(citednote 5 above).

24

-

de

LaVallee

Poussin,

rans.of

the

Abhidharmakoga,

hap.

1,

p.

52.

25

-

See

Borooah,

Nanarthasarmgraha;

efinitions rom

Medinikoga nd

from

Visvaprakasa.

he same in

Jamspal,

Abhidhanavisvalocana,

p.

297,

no.

1742.

26

-

Tsewang,

"The

Mentalism of

Dignaga

and

DharmakTrti,"

n

Doboom

Tulku, ed.,

Mind

Only

School and

Buddhist

Logic:

A

Collection of

Seminar

Papers

New

Delhi:

Tibet

House and

Aditya

Prakashan, 990),

p.

15.

27

-

See Andre

Bareau,

"Abhidharmakosakarikaf

Vasubandhu:

ndex,"

reprinted

rom

VAK

Poona:

Deccan

College),

no.

3:45-83.

28

-

Clarence H.

Hamilton,

rans.,

Wei

Shih

Er

Shih

Lun,

or

The Treatise

in

Twenty

Stanzason

Representation-Only

New

Haven:

American

Oriental

Society,

1938).

29

-

Sarvepalli

Radhakrishnannd

Charles

A.

Moore,

A

Source Book in

Indian

Philosophy

Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1957),

pp.

328-333.

30 - Sylvain Levi, VijnaptimatratasiddhiParis,1925; reprintShanghai,

1940).

31

-

Hamilton,

Wei

Shih

Er

Shih

Lun,

p.

61.

32

-

Ibid.,

n. 114.

33

-

The

story

is

cited

in

F. D.

Lessing

and A.

Wayman,

trans.,

Introduc-

tion to the

Buddhist

Tantric

Systems

(Delhi:

Motilal

Banarsidass,

1978),

p.

65.

Alex

Wayman

473






34

-

Thomas

A.

Kochumuttom,

A

Buddhist Doctrine of

Experience

(Delhi:

Motilal

Banarsidass,

982),

p.

1,

contends

that

the

Yogacara

is

really

a "realistic

pluralism"

ather

han,

as it is

usually

described,

an "absolute

dealism,"

and so

on.

35

-

Stefan

Anacker,

Seven Works

of

Vasubandhu

Delhi:

Motilal Ba-

narsidass,1984), p. 159, rejects he theory-claimed by some per-

sons to be the

purport

of Vasubandhu's

Twenty

Verses-that con-

sciousness

unilaterally

reates

all forms

n

the universe.

36

-

T.R.V.

Murti,

The

Central

Philosophy

of

Buddhism,

p.

319.

37

-

Schmithausen,

Alayavijnana,

t.

1,

pp.

18

ff.

38-

Ibid.,

p.

31.

39

-

Ibid.,

pp.

36-39.

40-

Ibid.,

pp.

5 ff.

41 -

Asarga,

in his

Viniscaya-samgrahan,

TT,vol. 110,

p.

235.1.

42

-

Ibid.,

p.

235.2.

43

-

Ibid.,

p.

235.4-6.

44

-

Ibid.,

p.

235.4-8.

45

-

Ibid.,

p.

235.5-2.

46

-

The

Yogacarabhomi

f

AcaryaAsahga,

ed. Vidhushekhara

Bhatta-

charya

(Calcutta:

University

of

Calcutta,1957),

p.

24.4-5.

47

-

Ibid.,

p.

24.18-19.

48

-

Vasubandhu,

PratTtyasamutpadadi-vibhanganirdeSa,

TT,

vol.

104,

p.

287.3-3,

4:

/

de bas

na 'du

byed

kyi rkyengyis

zhing

mtshams

sbyor

ba'i mam

par

ses

pa

yin par

rigs

pa

ma

yin gyi

/

...

rnam

par

ses

pa

ni 'du

byed kyi rkyen

gyis

yin

no

/

de'i

rkyengyis nying

mtshams

byor

ba'i

tshe

ming dang gzugs

yin

no zhes

bya

ba de

Ita

bu'i

lugs

'di

ni

skyon

med

pa,yin

no

/

49

-

Gunamati,

PratTtyasamutpadadi-vibhahganirdega-tTka,

TT,

vol.

104,

p.

335-4-2:

/

chos

mngon

mdzod

las

/

mtshams

byor

phung

po'i

rnam

par

ses zhes

smras

pa.

50 - P.

Pradhan,ed.,

AbhidharmakoSabhasyam

f VasubandhuPatna:

K.

P.

Jayaswal

Research

nstitute,

975),

p.

124.

51

-

Visuddhimagga

f

Buddhaghosacariya,

d.

Henry

Clarke

Warren,

revised

by

Dharmananda

Kosambi

Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,1950),

p.

477,

par.

187.

52

-

Bhattacharya,

The

YogacarabhOmi

f

Acarya

Asahga,

p.

26.18-19.

Philosophy

ast

&

West

53

-

Ibid.,

p.

25.13-14.

474






54

-

Ibid.,

p.

109.13-15.

55

-

Vasubandhu,

in

Derge

edition

of

Tibetan

Tanjur,

Sems

tsam,

vol.

Ri,

f.

135a-5,

6:

/

de

yang nyon

mongs

pa

can

gyi

yid kyi

rnam

par

ses

pa

skye

ba'i

srid

pa

la

dmigs

nas

bar

ma do'i

srid

pa 'gag par

'gyur

ro

/

brgyal

ba

de la

zhes

bya

ba

ni

yid

kyi

rnam

par

ses

pa

khu

ba dang khrag dang Ihan cig grub pa dang / bde ba gcig par 'gyur

ba ste

/

yid

kyi

rnam

par

ses

brgyal

par

gyur pa

de

la brten nas

yid

kyi

rnam

par

ses

pa

gzhan

nyid

'jug

par

'gyur

ro

/

56

-

Vasubandhu,

Derge,

Sems

tsam, Ri,

f.

69a-5,6:

/

de'i

phyir

rnam

par

ses

brgyal

ba

gang

yin

pa

de ni

yid kyi

rnam

par

ses

pa

ma

yin

gyi

/

de

ni

rnam

par

smin

pa'i

rnam

par

ses

pa

ste

de

sa bon

thams

cad

pa'o

/

57

-

Gunamati,

PratTtyasamutpadadi-vibhahganirdesa-.tka,

PTT,

vol.

104,

p.

337.3-3:

/

ram

par

ses

pa'i

tshogs

drug go

zhes

gsungs

kyang yid kyi mam par ses pa kho nas nying mtshams sbrel ba yin

pa.

58

-

Asarga

alludes to

this

in

the

Yogacarabhomi

early

section,

in

Bhat-

tacharya,

The

Yogacarabhomi

of

Acarya

Asarga, p.

25.1-2.

59

-

Buddhist

Insight:

Essays

by

Alex

Wayman,

ed.

George

R.

Elder

(Delhi:

Motilal

Banarsidass,

1984),

p.

330.

60

-

Ibid.,

p.

330.

61

-

Gadjin

M.

Nagao,

Madhyamika

and

Yogacara,

rans. Leslie

S.

Kawa-

mura

(Albany:

State

University

of

New York

Press,

1991),

chap.

6,

pp. 61-74.

62

-

Ibid.,

p.

62.

63

-

Ibid.,

p.

70.

64

-

Among

the

editions,

there

is

one

in

Chr.

Lindtner,

Nagarjuniana

(Delhi:

Motilal

Banarsidass,

1987),

and

another in

Fernanda

Tola

and

Carmen

Dragonetti,

"Nagarjuna's

Catustava,"

Journal of

Indian

Philosophy

13

(1985).

65

-

See the

essay

by

M.

A.

Mehendale,

"Etymology

of

the

Word

Artha-,"

in

his

Nirukta

Notes,

series 1

(Poona:

Deccan

College,

1965),

pp.

42-46.

66

-

Bimal

Krishna

Matilal,

Perception

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1986),

p.

189.

67

-

Chakravarthi Ram

Prasad,

"Dreams and

Reality:

The

Sarikarite

Critique

of

Vijnana-vada,"

Philosophy

East

and

West

43

(3)

(July

1993):

405-455.

68

-

Kochumuttom,

A

Buddhist

Doctrine

of

Experience, p.

93.

Alex

Wayman

475






69

-

Cf. F.

Th.

Stcherbatsky,

Buddhist

Logic

(reprint,

New

York:

Dover

Publications),

:29.

70

-

Alex

Wayman,

in

Journalof

the

International

Association of

Bud-

dhist Studies2

(1)

(1979):

65-78.

71

-

Alex

Wayman,

in

Annals,

Bhandarkar

Oriental

Research

Institute

(DiamondJubilee

Volume),

1977-1978,

pp.

387-396.

72

-

Alex

Wayman,

in

Ernst

Steinkellner,

ed.,

Studies

in

the

Buddhist

Epistemological

Tradition:

Proceedings

of the

Second

International

DharmakTrti

onference, Vienna,

June

11-16,

1989

(Wien:

Verlag

der

Osterreichischen

Akademie der

Wissenschaften, 1991),

pp.

419-430.

73

-

Tripathi,

The

Problemof

Knowledge....

(Varanasi:

Bharat-Bharati,

1972),

p.

333.

74

-

Ibid.,

pp.

150-151.

75

-

Vasubandhu,

Derge,

Sems

tsam,

vol.

Ri,

f.

143b-4:

/

lus

dang

/

lus

can

dang

/

za ba

po'i

rnam

par

rigpa

zhes

bya

ba de la

/

lus ni

mig

la

sogs pa'i

khams

Inga'o

lus can ni

nyon

mong

pa

can

gyi yid

do

/

za

ba

po

ni

yid kyi

khamsso

/

76

-

Ibid.,

vol.

Si,

f. 141

b-3:

/

sems ni

rnam

pa

gnyis

te

/

de

la

gcig

ni

de'i

sa

bon

rnams

bsag pa yin

no

/

gnyis

pa

ni

de'i

dmigspa

dang

/

rnampa

dang

/

bye

brag

tha dad

pa

dag gis

sna

tshogs

pa

yin

no

/

77

-

Wayman,

in

Annals,

BhandarkarOriental

Research

Institute,

pp.

393-394.

78

-

Alex

Wayman, Analysis

of the

SravakabhOmi

Manuscript,p.

173;

reprinted

n

Elder,

Buddhist

Insight,p.

340.

79

-

Wayman,

Annals,

Bhandarkar

OrientalResearch

nstitute.

80

-

Boruah's

essay

appeared

in

Journal

of

Indian

Council

of

Philo-

sophical

Research6

(3)

(May-August

989):

119-130.

81

- Since this

remark s

important,

should cite

the Tibetan

alluded

o

in

note 11

above):

/

rnam

par

rig pa

sngon 'gro

ba

nyid

du

rtogs

pa'ang

de Ita

na

nyes pa khyadpar

med

pa

kho

nar

'gyur

ro

/

Philosophy

ast

&

West

476

Documents

A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism