Yamato. Huntington swept Final Campaign... · LSM-120 one midnight when a kamikaze appeared "out of nowhere, gliding in low with its engine cut off—like a giant bat:' The plane

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 121884

Marine Avengers of Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 232 are seen throughthe hatch of a transport, which servedas a navigation plane for the overwaterflight from Ulithi to Kadena. The flightechelon landed on 22 April and beganclose-support missions the next day.

planes from all three services took tothe air to intercept the intermittentwaves of enemy planes.

Not all of the Japanese air strikeswere kamikazes. An equal number offighters and bombers accompaniedeach raid to guide the suiciders totheir targets and attack Americantargets by conventional means. Someof these included late-model fighterslike the Nakajima "Frank:' Deadlyair-to-air duels took place overhundreds of miles of ocean expanse.

The far-ranging fast carriers usual-

ly made the first interceptions. Whilemost pilots were Navy, the task forceincluded two Marine fighter squa-drons each on the carriers BunkerHill and Bennington. One Marineaviator from Bennington, LieutenantKenneth E. Huntington, flew theonly USMC Corsair in the attack onYamato. Huntington swept inthrough heavy AA fire to deliver hisbomb squarely on the battleship'sforward turret. As described by com-bat correspondent Robert Sherrod,"One Marine, one bomb, one NavyCross:'

Marine fighters of MAGs-31 and-33, flying from Yontan under Gener-al Mulcahy's TAF, provided most ofthe CAP missions over the fleet dur-ing the first several weeks of the bat-tle. The CAP requirement soaredfrom 12 planes initially to as manyas 32 on station, with an additionaldozen on strip alert. The missions in-volved long hours of patrolling, typi-cally in rough weather spiked bysudden violent encounters withJapanese raiders. The CAP planesran a double risk. Dueling a Japanesefighter often took both planes withinrange of nervous shipboard AA gun-

ners who sometimes downed bothantagonists unwittingly.

On 16 April, VMF-441 raced to therescue of the picket ship Laffey, al-ready hit by five suiciders. The Cor-sairs shot down 17 attackers in shortorder, losing only one plane whichhad chased a kamikaze so low theyboth clipped the ship's superstructureand crashed;

On 22 April, the "Death Rattlers"of VMF-323 intercepted a large flightof raiders approaching the fleet atdusk. Three Marines shot down 16of these in 20 minutes. The squadroncommander, Major George C. Axtell,knocked down five, becoming an ins-tant ace. As Axtell described thesesudden dogfights:

You'd be flying in and out ofheavy rain and clouds. Enemyand friendly aircraft wouldwind up in a big melee. You justkept turning into any enemyaircraft that appeared . . . . Itwas fast and furious and the en-gagement would be over withinthirty minutes.

But in spite of the heroic efforts ofall these aviators and their ground

A "Grasshopper" from a Marine observation squadron fliesover Naha, permitting an aerial photographer to take oblique

photos which will be used by Marine artillery units to spottargets and determine the damage already done by the Allies.


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crews, the kamikazes swarmed insuch numbers that a few always gotthrough. Soon, the protected an-chorage at Kerama Retto began toresemble a floating graveyard ofheavily damaged ships. Small groupsof suiciders appeared every night,and the fleet seemed particularly vul-nerable during the full moon. Onenaval officer described the night-timeraiders as "witches on broomsticks."More often than not, the victims ofthese nocturnal attacks were the"small boys;' the picket ships anddiminutive amphibs. Nineteen-year-old Signalman 3/C Nick Florosmanned a 20mm gun mount on tinyLSM-120 one midnight when akamikaze appeared "out of nowhere,gliding in low with its engine cutoff—like a giant bat:' The planestruck the adjacent LSM with a ter-rific explosion before anyone couldfire a shot. The small landing ship,loaded with landing force supplies,somehow survived the fiery blast butwas immediately consigned to the"demolition yard" at Kerama Retto.

Imperial General Headquarters, ac-cepting the inflated claims of the fewobservers accompanying the kikusuiattacks, believed their suicidal air

offensive had fatally crippled theU.S. Fleet. This was wishful thinking.The Fifth Fleet may have beenstressed and battered by thekamikazes, but it was simply toohuge a force to be deterred. The fleetwithstood the worst of these seem-ingly endless air attacks without fora moment forsaking its primary mis-sion of supporting the amphibiousassault on Okinawa. Naval gunfiresupport, for example, had never beenso thoroughly effective, beginningwith the 3,800 tons of munitions deli-vered on L-Day. Throughout muchof the campaign, each front-line regi-ment received direct support fromone "call fire" ship and one "illumi-nation ship:' Typical of the appreci-ation most members of the landingforce expressed for the quality ofnaval gunfire support was this mes-sage from General Shepherd to theCommander, Northern Attack Forceduring the 6th Marine Division's as-sault on Mount Yae Take: "The effec-tiveness of your gunfire support wasmeasured by the large number ofJapanese encountered. Dead ones:'

Similarly, even during the the mostintense of the kikusui attacks of 1-16April, the fleet unloaded an astonish-

26

ing 557,000 tons of supplies over theHagushi Beaches to support theTenth Army, executed the division-level assault on le Shima, and clearedmines and obstacles under fire toopen the port of Nago. The onlydirect effect the mass kamikaze raidsever had on the conduct of TenthArmy operations ashore was thesinking on 6 April of the ammuni-tion ships Logan Victory and HobbsVictory. The subsequent shortage of105mm and 155mm artillery ammu-nition delayed General Buckner's firstgreat offensive against the outer Shu-ri defenses by about three days. Inall respects, the Fifth Fleet deservedits media sobriquet as "The FleetThat Came to Stay:'

But as April dragged into May, andthe Tenth Army seemed boggeddown in unimaginative frontal at-tacks along the Shun line, AdmiralsSpruance and Turner began to pressGeneral Buckner to accelerate his tac-tics in order to decrease the vulnera-bility of the fleet. Admiral Nimitz,quite concerned, flew to Okinawa tocounsel Buckner. "I'm losing a shipand a half each day out here;' Nimitzsaid, "You've got to get this thingmoving:'

The senior Marines urged Bucknerto "play the amphib card," to executea major landing on the southeastcoast, preferably along the alternatebeaches at Minatoga, in order to turnthe Japanese right flank. They werejoined in this recommendation byseveral Army generals who alreadyperceived what a meatgrinder thefrontal assaults along the Shun linewould become. The Commandant ofthe Marine Corps, General Alex-ander A. Vandegrift, visited the is-land and seconded these suggestionsto Buckner. After all, Buckner stillhad control of the 2d Marine Divi-sion, a veteran amphibious outfitwhich had demonstrated effectivelyagainst the Minatoga Beaches on L-Day. Buckner had subsequentlyreturned the embarked division toSaipan to reduce its vulnerability toadditional kamikaze attacks, but the


During a visit to Marines in late April, the Commandant, Gen Alexander A.Vandegrift, second from left, called on MajGen Francis P Mulcahy, center,commander of the Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army, and three of his pilots: MajGeorge C. Axtell, Jr., left; Maj Jefferson D. Dorroh, second from right; and LtJeremiah I. O'Keefe. Maj Axtell commanded VMF-323, the "Death Rattlers."

unit still had its assigned ships athand, still combat loaded. The 2dMarine Division could have openeda second front in Okinawa within afew days.

General Buckner was a popular,competent commander, but he hadlimited experience with amphibiouswarfare and possessed a conservativenature. His staff warned of logisticsproblems involved in a second front.His intelligence advisors predictedstiff enemy resistance around theMinatoga beachhead. Buckner hadalso heard enough of the costly An-zio operation in Italy to be leery ofany landing executed too far from themain effort. He honestly believed theJapanese manning the Shun defenseswould soon crack under the syn-chronized application of all hismassed firepower and infantry.Buckner therefore rejected the am-phibious option out of hand. Sur-prisingly, Nimitz and his Chief ofStaff, Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman,

agreed. Not so Admirals Spruanceand Turner or the Marines. As Spru-ance later admitted in a private let-ter, "There are times when I getimpatient for some of HollandSmith's drive:' General Shepherd not-ed, "General Buckner did not cottonto amphibious operations:' EvenColonel Hiromichi Yahara, Opera-tions Officer of the Thirty-secondArmy, admitted under interrogationthat he had been baffled by theAmerican's adherence to a purelyfrontal assault from north to south."The absence of a landing [in thesouth] puzzled the Thirty-secondArmy staff," he said, "particularly af-ter the beginning of May when it be-came impossible to put up more thana token resistance in the south:'

By then the 2d Marine Divisionwas beginning to feel like a yo-yo inpreparing for its variously assignedmissions for Operation Iceberg. Lieu-tenant Colonel Taxis, Division G-3,remained unforgiving of Buckner's

27

decision. "1 will always feel;' he stat-ed after the war, "that the TenthArmy should have been prepared theinstant they found they were boggeddown, they should have thrown a lefthook down there in the southernbeaches . . . . They had a hell of apowerful reinforced division, trainedto a gnat's whisker:'

Buckner stood by his decision.There would be no "left hook:' In-stead, both the 1st and the 6th Ma-rine Divisions would join the Shunoffensive as infantry divisions underthe Tenth Army. The 2d Marine Di-vision, less one reinforced regimen-tal landing team (the 8th Marines),would languish back in Saipan. Thencame Okinawa's incessant springrains.

The Tenth Army's Action Reportfor the battle of Okinawa paid thisunderstated compliment to theThirty-second Army's defensive ef-

All Marines sight-in on the mouth of a cave into which anexplosive charge had been thrown, and wait to see if any ene-


my soldiers will try to escape. This is one of the many bitter-ly contested cave positions found in numerous ridges and hills.

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forts: "The continued developmentand improvement of cave warfarewas the most outstanding feature ofthe enemy's tactics on Okinawa." Intheir decision to defend the Shunhighlands across the southern neckof the island, General Ushijima andhis staff had selected the terrain thatwould best dominate two of the is-land's strategic features: the port ofNaha to the west, and the shelteredanchorage of Nakagusuku Bay (laterBuckner Bay) to the east. As a con-sequence, the Americans would haveto force their way into Ushijima'spreregistered killing zones to achievetheir primary objectives.

Everything about the terrain fa-vored the defenders. The convolut-ed topography of ridges, draws, andescarpments served to compartmentthe battlefield into scores of smallfirefights, while the general absence

of dense vegetation permitted thedefenders full observation and inter-locking supporting fires from inter-mediate strongpoints. As at IwoJima, the Japanese Army foughtlargely from underground positionsto offset American dominance in sup-porting arms. And even in the moreaccessible terrain, the Japanese tookadvantage of the thousands of con-crete, lyre-shaped Okinawan tombsto provide combat outposts. Therewere blind spots in the defenses, tobe sure, but finding and exploitingthem took the Americans an inor-dinate amount of time and cost themdearly.

The bitterest fighting of the cam-paign took place within an extreme-ly compressed battlefield. The lineardistance from Yonabaru on the eastcoast to the bridge over the Asa Riverabove Naha on the opposite side of

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the island is barely 9,000 yards.General Buckner initially pushedsouth with two Army divisionsabreast. By 8 May he had doubledthis commitment: two Army divi-sions of the XXIV Corps on the east,two Marine divisions of IlIAC on thewest. Yet each division would fightits own desperate, costly battlesagainst disciplined Japanese soldiersdefending elaborately fortified terrainfeatures. There was no easy routesouth.

By eschewing the amphibiousflanking attack in late April, Gener-al Buckner had fresh divisions to em-ploy in the general offensive towardsShun. Thus, the 77th Divisionrelieved the 96th in the center, andthe 1st Marine Division began reliev-ing the 27th Division on the west.Colonel Kenneth B. Chappell's 1stMarines entered the lines on the lastday of April and drew heavy firefrom the moment they approached.By the time the 5th Marines arrivedto complete the relief of 27th Divi-sion elements on 1 May, Japanesegunners supporting the veteran 62dInfantry Division were poundinganything that moved. "It's hell inthere, Marine," a dispirited soldierremarked to Private First Class Sledgeas 3/5 entered the lines. "1 know;' re-plied Sledge with false bravado, "Ifought at Peleliu." But soon Sledgewas running for his life:

As we raced across an openfield, Japanese shells of all typeswhizzed, screamed, and roaredaround us with increasing fre-quency. The crash and thunderof explosions was a nightmare

It was an appalling chaos.I was terribly afraid.

General del Valle assumed com-mand of the western zone at 1400 on1 May and issued orders for a majorattack the next morning. That even-ing a staff officer brought the gener-al a captured Japanese map, fullyannotated with American positions.With growing uneasiness, del Vallerealized his opponents already knew

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the 1st Marine Division had enteredthe fight.

The division attacked south thenext day into broken country there-after known as the Awacha Pocket.For all their combat prowess,however, the Marines proved to beno more immune to the unrelentingstorm of shells and bullets than thesoldiers they had relieved. The dis-appointing day also included sever-al 1iathjags of future conditions.First, it rained hard all day. Second,as soon as the 5th Marines seized thenearest high ground they came un-der such intense fire from adjacentstrongpoints and from higher groundwithin the 77th Division's zone to theimmediate southeast they had towithdraw. Third, the Marines spentmuch of the night engaged in violenthand-to-hand fighting with scores ofJapanese infiltrators. "This," said onesurvivor, "is going to be a bitch."

The Peleliu veterans in the ranksof the 1st Marine Division were nostrangers to cave warfare. Clearly, noother division in the campaign couldclaim such a wealth of practical ex-

perience. And while nothing onOkinawa could match the Umur-brogol's steep cliffs, heavy vegeta-tion, and endless array of fortifiedridges, the "Old Breed" in this battlefaced a smarter, more numerous foewho had more artfully prepared eachwrinkle in the ,&2imscape. In over-coming the sej,j.ent4al barriers ofAwacha, Dakeshi, and Wana, the 1stMarine Division faced four straightweeks of hell. The funneling effects

• of the cliffs and draws reduced mostattacks to brutal frontal assaults byfully-exposed tank-infantry-engineerteams. General del Valle character-ized this small unit fighting as "a slug-

• ging match with but temporary andlimited opportunity to maneuver:'

General Buckner captured the fan-cy of the media with his metaphorabout the "blowtorch andtactics needed for effective cave

• warfare, but this was simply statingthe obvious to the Army veterans ofBiak and the Marine veterans ofPeleliu and Iwo Jima. Flamethrow-ers were represented by the blow-torch, demolitions, by the cork-screw—but both weapons had to bedelivered from close range by tanksand the exposed riflemen coveringthem.

On 3 May the rains slowed and the5th Marines resumed its assault, thistime taking and holding the first tierof key terrain in the Awacha Pock-et. But the systematic reduction ofthis strongpoint would take anotherfull week of extremely heavy fight-iñg. Fire support proved excellent.Now it was the Army's time to returnthe favor of interservice artillery sup-port. In this case, the 27th Division'sfield artillery regiment stayed on thelines, and with its forward observ-ers and linemen intimately familiarwith the terrain in that sector, ren-dered yeomar service.

(Continued on page 31)


An Okinawan civilian is flushed from a cave into which a smoke grenade had beenthrown. Many Okinawans sought the refuge of caves in which they could hidewhile the tide of battle passed over them. Unfortunately, a large number ofcaves were sealed when Marines suspected that they were harboring the enemy.

A "Ronson" tank, mounting a flame thrower, lays down a stream of fire againsta position located in one of the many Okinawan tombs set in the island's hillsides.


29

Marine Artillery at Okinawahe nature of the enemy defenses and the tacticsselected by the Tenth Army commander madeOkinawa the biggest battle of the war for Marine

artillery units. General Geiger landed with 14 firing bat-talions within IlIAC; the total rose to 15 in June when Lieu-tenant Colonel Richard G. Weede's 2/10 came ashore insupport of the 8th Marines.

Brigadier General David R. Nimmer commanded IIICorps Artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Burton, Jr.,commanded the 2d Provisional Field Artillery Group,which contained three batteries of 155mm howitzers andthree of 155mm "Long Tom" guns. Colonel Wilburt S. ("BigFoot") Brown commanded the 11th Marines and ColonelRobert B. Luckey, the 15th Marines. The Marine divisionshad greatly enhanced their firepower since the initial cam-paigns in the Pacific. While one 75mm pack howitzer bat-talion remained (1/11), the 105mm howitzer had becomethe norm for division artillery. Front-line infantry units alsowere supported by the 75mm fire of medium tanks andLVT-As, 105 mm fire from the new M-7 self-propelled "siegeguns:' 4.5-inch multiple rocket launchers fired by the "BuckRogers Men," and the attached Army 4.2-inch mortarplatoons.

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick P. Henderson described thiscombination of fire support: "Not many people realize thatthe artillery in Tenth Army, plus the LVT-As and naval gun-fire equivalent gave us a guns/mile of front ratio on Okina-wa that was probably higher than any U.S. effort in WorldWar II:'

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General Buckner urged his corps commanders to integratefield artillery support early in the campaign. With his corpsartillery and the 11th Marines not fully committed duringthe opening weeks, General Geiger quickly agreed for theseunits to help the XXIV Army Corps in their initial assaultsagainst the outer Shun defenses. In the period of 7 April-6May, these artillery units fired more than 54,000 roundsin support of XXIV Corps. This was only the beginning.Once both Marine divisions of IlIAC entered the lines, theyimmediately benefited from Army artillery support as wellas their own organic fire support. As one example, priorto the 5th Marines launching a morning attack on theAwacha Pocket on 6 May, the regiment received a prelimi-nary bombardment of the objective from four battalions —two Army, two Marine.

By the end of the battle, the Tenth Army artillery unitswould fire 2,046,930 rounds down range, all in additionto 707,500 rockets, mortars, and shells of five-inch or largerfrom naval gunfire ships offshore. Half of the artilleryrounds would be 105mm shells from howitzers and the M-7self-propelled guns. Compared to the bigger guns, the old,expeditionary 75mm pack howitzers of 1/11 were the "TinyTims" of the battlefield. Their versatility and relative mo-bility, however, proved to be assets in the long haul. ColonelBrown augmented the battalion with LVT-As, which firedsimilar ammunition. According to Brown, "75mm ammowas plentiful, as contrasted with the heavier calibers, so1/11 (Reinforced) was used to fire interdiction, harassing,and 'appeasement' missions across the front'

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Generals Geiger and del Valle expressed interest in thelarger weapons of the Army. Geiger particularly admiredthe Army's eight-inch howitzer, whose 200-pound shell pos-sessed much more penetrating and destroying power thanthe 95-pound shell of the 155mm guns, the largest weaponin the Marines' inventory. Geiger recommended that theMarine Corps form eight-inch howitzer battalions for theforthcoming attack on of Japan. For his part, del Valleprized the accuracy, range, and power of the Army's4.2-inch mortars and recommended their inclusion in theMarine division.

On some occasions, artillery commanders became tempt-ed to orchestrate all of this killing power in one mighty con-centration. "Time on target" (TOT) missions occurredfrequently in the early weeks, but their high consumptionrate proved disadvantageous. Late in the campaign ColonelBrown decided to originate a gargantuan TOT by 22 bat-talions on Japanese positions in the southern Okinawantown of Makabe. The sudden concentration worked beau-tifully, he recalled, but "1 neglected to tell the generals, wokeeveryone out of a sound sleep, and caught hell from allsides:'

General Geiger insisted that his LVT-As be trained in ad-vance as field artillery. This was done, but the opportuni-ty for direct fire support to the assault waves fizzled onL-Day when the Japanese chose not to defend the Hagushi

beaches. Lieutenant Colonel Louis Metzger commanded the1st Armored Amphibian Battalion and supported the 6thMarine Division up and down the length of the island.Metzger's LVT-As fired 19,000 rounds of 75mm shells inan artillery support role after L-Day.

The Marines made great strides towards refining support-ing arms coordination during the battle for Okinawa. Com-manders established Target Information Centers (TICs) atevery level from Tenth Army down to battalion. The TICsfunctioned to provide a centralized target information andweapons assignment system responsive to both assignedtargets and targets of opportunity. Finally, all three com-ponent liaison officers — artillery, air, and naval gunfire —were aligned with target intelligence information officers.As described by Colonel Henderson, the TIC at IlIAC con-sisted of the corps artillery S-2 section "expanded to meetthe needs of artillery, NGF, and CAS on a 24-hour basis

The Corps Arty Fire Direction Center and the CorpsFire Support Operations Center were one and the samefacility—with NGF and air added."

Such a commitment to innovation led to greatly im-proved support to the foot-slogging infantry. As one riflebattalion commander remarked, "It was not uncommon fora battleship, tanks, artillery, and aircraft to be supportingthe efforts of a platoon of infantry during the reductionof the Shun position:'

(Continued from page 29)At this point an odd thing hap-

pened, an almost predictable4i.i.ijin the Japanese defensive discipline.Thegnjj General Ushijima permit-ted full s€eurse from his staffregarding tactical courses of action.Typically, these debates occurred be-tween the mpetus chief of staff,Lieutenant GeneraiTsamu Cho, andthe conservative operations officer,Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. To thispoint, Yahara's strategy of açprotraet-

ed holding action had prevaild-- TheThirty-second Army had resisted theenormous American invasion suc-cessfully for more than a month. Thearmy, still intact, could continue toinflict high casualties on the enemyfor months to come, fulfilling its mis-sion of bleeding the ground forceswhile the "Divine Wind" wreakedhavoc on the fleet. But maintaininga sustained defense to

a warrior like Cho, andh arguedstridently for a massive counterat-tack. Against Yahara's protests,Ushijima sided with his chief of staff.

The great Japanese counterattack

of 4-5 May proved ill-advised and ex-orbitant. To man the assault forces,Ushijima had to forfeit his coverageof the Minatoga sector and bringthose troops forward into unfamiliarterritory. To provide the massing offires necessary to cover the assault hehad to bring most of his artillerypieces and mortars out into the open.And his concept of using the 26thShipping Engineer Regiment andother special assault forces in a fron-tal attack, and, at the same time, a

waterborne, double envelopmentwould alert the Americans to thegeneral counteroffensive. Yaharacringed in despair.

The events of 4-5 May proved theextent of Cho's folly. Navy "Flycatch-er" patrols on both coasts interdict-ed the first flanking attacksconducted by Japanese raiders inslow-moving barges and native ca-noes. Near Kusan, on the west coast,the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, andthe LVT-As of the 3d Armored Am-

Marines of the 1st Division move carefully toward the crest of a hill ontheir way to Dakeshi. The forwardmost Marines stay low, off of the skyline.


31

a

phibian Battalion greeted the in-vaders trying to come ashore with adeadly fire, killing 700. Further alongthe coast, 2/1 intercepted and killed75 more, while the 1st Reconnais-sance Company and the war dog pla-toon tracked down the last 65 hidingin the brush. Meanwhile the XXIVCorps received the brunt of the over-land thrust and contained it effective-ly, scattering the attackers into small

groups, hunting them down ruthless-ly. The 1st Marine Division, insteadof being surrounded and annihilat-ed in accordance with the Japaneseplan, launched its own attack in-stead, advancing several hundredyards. The Thirty-second Army lostmore than 6,000 first-line troops and59 pieces of artillery in the futilecounterattack. Ushijima, in tears,promised Yahara he would never

again disregard his advice. Yahara,the only senior officer to survive thebattle, described the disaster as "thedecisive action of the campaign."

At this point General Bucknerdecided to make it a four-divisionfront and ordered General Geiger toredeploy the 6th Marine Divisionsouth from the Motobu Peninsula.General Shepherd quickly askedGeiger to assign his division to theseaward flank to continue the benefitof direct naval gunfire support. "MyG-3, Brute Krulak, was a naval gun-fire expert," Shepherd said, noting thedivision's favorable experience withfleet support throughout the north-ern campaign. Unspoken was an ad-ditional benefit: Shepherd wouldhave only one adjacent unit withwhich to coordinate fire and maneu-ver, and a good one at that, the vete-ran 1st Marine Division.

On the morning of 7 May Gener-al Geiger regained control of the 1stMarine Division and his Corps Ar-tillery from XXIV Corps and estab-lished his forward CP. The next daythe 22d Marines relieved the 7th Ma-rines in the lines north of the AsaRiver. The 1st Marine Division,which had suffered more than 1,400casualties in its first six days on thelines while trying to cover a very

Marine Corps Historical Center

In the end, victory was achieved at Okinawa by well-trained assault troops onthe ground, like this Marine flamethrower operator and his watchful rifleman.

Men of the 7th Marines wait until the exploding white phos- ble them to advance in their drive towards Shun. Thephorous shells throw up a thick-enough smoke screen to ena- smoke often concealed the relentlessly attacking troops.


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5,

wide front, adjusted its boundariesgratefully to make room for the new-comers.

Yet the going got no easier, evenwith two full Marine divisions nowshoulder-to-shoulder in the west.Heavy rains and fierce fire greeted the6th Marine Division as its regimentsentered the Shun lines. The situationremained as grim and deadly allalong the front. On 9 May, 1/1 madea spirited attack on Hill 60 but lostits commander, Lieutenant ColonelJames C. Murray, Jr., to a sniper.Nearby that night, 1/5 engaged indesperate hand-to-hand fighting witha force of 60 Japanese soldiers whoappeared like phantoms out of therocks.

The heavy rains caused problemsfor the 22d Marines in its efforts tocross the Asa River. The 6th En-gineers fabricated a narrow foot-bridge under intermittent fire onenight. Hundreds of infantry racedacross before two Japanese soldierswearing satchel charges strapped totheir chests dashed into the streamand blew themselves and the bridgeto kingdom come. The engineers thenspent the next night building a moresubstantial Bailey Bridge. Across itpoured reinforcements and vehicles,but the tanks played hell traversing

33

the soft mud along both banks —each attempt was an adventure. Yetthe 22d Marines were now south ofthe river in force, an encouraging bitof progress on an otherwise stalemat-ed front.

The 5th Marines finally foughtclear of the devilish Awacha Pocketon the 10th, ending a week of frus-tration and point-blank casualties.Now it became the turn of the 7thMarines to engage its own nightmareterrain. Due south of their positionlay Dakeshi Ridge. Coincidentally,General Buckner prodded his com-manders on the fT annuncing arenewed general offensive along theentire front. This proclamation maywell have been in response to thegrowing criticism Buckner had been

(Continued on page 35)


Heading south toward Shun Castle, a 1st Marine Division patrol passes througha small village which had been unsuccessfully defended by Japanese troops.

T he Sherman M-4 medium tank employed by theseven Army and Marine Corps tank battalions onOkinawa would prove to be a decisive weapon —

but only when closely coordinated with accompanying in-fantry. The Japanese intended to separate the two compo-nents by fire and audacity. "The enemy's strength lies inhis tanks:' declared Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijimabefore the invasion. Anti-tank training received the highestpriority within his Thirty-second Army. These urgentpreparations proved successful on 19 April when theJapanese knocked out 22 of 30 Sherman tanks of the 27thDivision, many by suicide demolitionists.

The Marines fared better in this regard, having learnedin earlier campaigns to integrate infantry and artillery asa close, protective overwatch to their accompanying tanks,keeping the "human bullet" suicide squads at bay. Althoughenemy guns and mines took their toll of the Shermans, onlya single Marine tank sustained damage from a Japanese sui-cide foray.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Stuart commanded the 1stTank Battalion during the Okinawa campaign. The unit hadfought with distinction at Peleliu a half-year earlier, despiteshipping shortfalls which kept a third of its tanks out ofthe fight. Stuart insisted on retaining the battalion's olderM-4A2 Shermans because he believed the twin General Mo-tors diesel engines were safer in combat. General del Valleagreed: "The tanks were not so easily set on fire and blownup under enemy fire."

By contrast, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Denig's 6thTank Battalion preferred the newer M-4A3 model Sher-mans. Denig's tankers liked the greater horsepower provid-ed by the water-cooled Ford V-8 engine and considered thereversion to gasoline from diesel an acceptable risk. The6th Tank Battalion would face its greatest challenge againstAdmiral Minoru Ota's mines and naval guns on OrokuPeninsula.

The Sherman tank, much maligned in the Europeantheater for its shortcomings against the heavier GermanTigers, seemed ideal for island fighting in the Pacific. ByOkinawa, however, the Sherman's limitations became evi-dent. The 75mm gun proved too light against some ofUshiima's fortifications; on these occasions the new M-7self-propelled 105mm gun worked better. And the Sher-man was never known for its armor protection. At 33 tons,its strength lay more in mobility and reliability. But asJapanese anti-tank weapons and mines reached the heightof lethality at Okinawa, the Sherman's thin-skinned weakpoints (1.5-inch armor on the sides and rear, for example)became a cause for concern. Marine tank crews had resortedto sheathing the sides of their vehicles with lumber as afoil to hand-lobbed Japanese magnetic mines as early asthe Marshalls campaign. By the time of Okinawa, MarineShermans were festooned with spot-welded track blocks,wire mesh, sandbags, and clusters of large nails—alldesigned to enhance armor protection.

Both tank battalions fielded Shermans configured withdozer blades, invaluable assets in the cave fighting to come,but—surprisingly—neither outfit deployed with flametanks. Despite rave reports of the success of the USN MarkI turret-mounted flame system installed in eight Shermansin the battle of Iwo Jima, there would be no massive retrofitprogram for the Okinawa-bound Marine tank units. In-stead, all flame tanks on Okinawa were provided courtesyof the U.S. Army's 713th Armored Flamethrower Battal-ion. Company B of that unit supported the IlIAC withbrand-new H-i flame tanks. Each carried 290 gallons ofnapalm-thickened fuel, good for two-and-a-half minutesof flame at ranges out to 80 yards. The Marines receivedconsistently outstanding support from this Army compa-ny throughout the battle.

The Marines employed the newly developed T-6 "TankFlotation Devices" to get the initial assault waves of Sher-mans ashore on L-Day. The T-6 featured a series of flota-tion tanks welded all around the hull, a provisional steeringdevice making use of the tracks, and electric bilge pumps.Once ashore, the crew hoped to jettison the ungainly rigwith built-in explosive charges, a scary proposition.

The invasion landing on 1 April for the 1st Tank Battal-ion was truly 'April Fool's Day." The captain of an LST car-rying six Shermans equipped with the T-6 launched thevehicles an hour late and 10 miles at sea. It took this iratecontingent five hours to reach the beach, losing two vehi-cles on the reef at ebb tide. Most of Colonel Stuart's otherShermans made it ashore before noon, but some of hisreserves could not cross the reef for 48 hours. The 6th TankBattalion had better luck. Their LST skippers launched theT-6 tanks on time and in close. Two tanks were lost—onesank when its main engine failed, another broke a trackand veered into an unseen hole — but the other Shermanssurged ashore, detonated their float tanks successfully, andwere ready to roll by H plus 29.

Japanese gunners and mine warfare experts knocked out51 Marine Corps Shermans in the battle. Many more tankssustained damage in the fighting but were recovered andrestored by hard-working maintenance crews, the unsungheroes. As a result of their ingenuity, the assault infantrybattalions never lacked for armored firepower, mobility,and shock action. The concept of Marine combined-armstask forces was now well underway.

Marine Tanks at Okinawa

34

(Continued from page 33)receiving from the Navy and someof the media for his time-consumingattrition strategy. But the riflemen'swar had progressed beyond high-level exhortation. The assault troopsknew fçto expect — and whatit would likely cost.

The 7th Marines was an ex-perienced outfit and well command-ed by Guadalcanal and Bougainvilleveteran Colonel Edward W. Snedek-er. "1 was especially fortunate atOkinawa," he said, "in that each ofmy battalion commanders hadfought at Peleliu." Nevertheless, the

had its hands full withDakeshi Ridge. "It was our mostdifficult mission;' said Snedeker. Af-ter a day of intense fighting, Lieu-tenant Colonel John J. Gormley's 1/7fought its way to the crest ofDakeshi, but had to withdraw underswarming Japanese counterattacks.The next day, Lieutenant ColonelSpencer S. Berger's 2/7 regained thecrest and cut down the counterat-tackers emerging from their reverse-slope bunkers. The 7th Marines wereon Dakeshi to stay, another signifi-cant breakthrough.

"The Old Breed" Marines enjoyedonly a brief elation at this achieve-ment because from Dakeshi theycould glimpse the difficulties yet tocome. In fact, the next 1,200 yardsof their advance would eat up 18days of fighting. In this case, seizingWana Ridge would be tough, but themost formidable obstacle would besteep, twisted Wana Draw that ram-bled just to the south, a deadly kill-ing ground, surrounded by toweringcliffs pocked with caves, with everypossible approach strewn with minesand covered by interlocking fire."Wana Draw proved to be the tough-est assignment the 1st Division wasto encounter," reported GeneralOliver P. Smith. The remnants of the62d InfQntry Division would defendWana to their deaths.

Because the 6th Marine Divison'scelebrated assault on Sugar Loaf Hilloccurred during the same period,

historians have not paid as much at-tention to the 1st Division's parallelefforts against the Wana defenses.But Wana turned out to be almost asdeadly a "mankiller" as Sugar Loafand its bloody environs. The 1st Ma-rines, now led by Colonel Arthur T.Mason, began the assault on theWana complex on 12 May. In time,all three infantry regiments wouldtake their turn attacking the narrowgorge to the south. The division con-tinued to make full use of its tankbattalion. The Sherman mediumtanks and attached Army flametanks were i4ispensab1e in boththeir assault and direct fire supportroles (see sidebar). On 16 May, as anindicator, the 1st Tank Battalion firednearly 5,000 rounds of 75mm and173,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammu-nition, plus 600 gallons of napalm.

Crossing the floor of thecontinued to be a heart-stopping raceagainst a gauntlet of enemy fire,however, and progress came extreme-ly slowly. Typical of the fighting wasthe division's summary for its g-

-gicga progress on 18 May: "Gainswere measured by yards won, lost,then won again:' On 20 May, Lieu-tenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol's3/1 improvised a different method ofdislodging Japanese defenders fromtheir reverse-slope positions in WanaDraw. In five hours of muddy, back-breaking work, troops manhandledseveral drums of napalm up thenorth side of the ridge. There theMarines split the barrels open, tum-bled them down into the gorge, andset them ablaze by dropping whitephosphorous grenades in their wake.But each small success seemed to beundermined by the Japanese abilityto reinforce and resupply their posi-tions during darkness, usuallyscreened by mortar barrages orsmall-unit counterattacks. The fight-ing in such close quarters was viciousand deadly. General del Vallewatched in alarm as his casualtiesmounted daily. The 7th Marines,which lost 700 men taking Dakeshi,lost 500 more in its first five days

35

fighting for the Wana complex. Dur-ing 16-19 May, Lieutenant Colonel E.Hunter Hurst's 3/7 lost 12 officersamong the rifle companies. The otherregiments suffered proportionately.Throughout the period 11-30 May,the division would lose 200 Marinesfor every 100 yards advanced.

Heavy rains resumed on 22 Mayand continued for the next ten days.The 1st Marine Division's sector con-tained no roads. With his LVTs com-mitted to delivering ammunition andextracting casualties, del Valle resort-ed to using his replacement drafts tohand-carry food and water to thefront lines. This proved less thansatisfactory. "You can't move it all onfoot," noted del Valle. Marine torpe-do bombers flying out of Yontan be-gan air-dropping supplies byparachute, even though low ceilings,heavy rains, and enemy fire made forhazardous duty. The division com-mander did everything in his powerto keep his troops supplied, support-ed, reinforced, and motivated — butconditions were extremely grim.

To the west, the neighboring 6thMarine Division's advance south be-low the Asa River collided against atrio of low hills dominating the opencountry leading up to Shun Ridge.The first of these hills — steep butunassuming — became known as Su-gar Loaf. To the southeast lay HalfMoon Hill, to the southwest Horse-shoe Hill and the village ofTakamotoji. The three hills represent-ed a singular defensive complex; infact they were the western anchor ofthe Shun Line. So sophisticated werethe mutually supporting defenses ofthe three hills that an attack on onewould prove futile unless the otherswere simultaneously invested.Colonel Seiko Mita and his 15th In-dependent Mixed Regiment defend-ed this sector. Its mortars andantitank guns were particularly well-sited on Horseshoe. The westernslopes of Half Moon contained someof the most effective machine gunnests the Marines had yet encoun-tered. Sugar Loaf itself contained

Sugar Loaf, western anchor of the Shun

elaborate concrete-reinforced reverse-slope positions. And all approachesto the complex fell within the beat-en zone of heavy artillery from ShunRidge which dominated the battle-field.

Battlefield contour maps indicateSugar Loaf had a modest elevationof 230 feet; Half Moon, 220; Horse-shoe, 190. In relative terms, SugarLoaf, though steep, only rose about50 feet above the northern ap-proaches. This was no Mount Sur-ibachi; its significance lay in thejgty of its defensive fortifica-tions and the ferocity with whichGeneral Ushijima would counterat-tack each U.S. penetration. In thisregard, the Sugar Loaf complex moreclosely resembled a smaller versionof Iwo Jima's Turkey Knob4-phit1testetor. As a tactical objec-tive, Sugar Loaf itself lacked thephysical dimensions to accommodateanything larger than a rifle compa-ny. But eight days of fighting for thesmall ridge would chew up a seriesof very good companies from tworegiments.

Of all the contestants, American orJapanese, who survived the strugglefor Sugar Loaf, Corporal James L.Day, a squad leader from WeaponsCompany, 2/22, had indisputablythe "best seat in the house" to observethe battle. In a little-known aspect ofthis epic story, Day spent four daysand three nights isolated in a shell

hole on Sugar Loaf's western shoul-der. This proved to be an awesomebut unenviable experience.

Corporal Day received orders on12 May to recross the Asa River andsupport the assault of Company G,2/22, against the small ridge. Dayand his squad arrived too late to domuch more than cover the fightingwithdrawal of the remnants from thesummit. The company lost half itsnumber in the day-long assault, in-cluding its plucky commander, Cap-tain Owen T. Stebbins, shot in bothlegs by a Japanese Nambu machine-gunner. Day described Stebbins as "abrave man whose tactical plan for as-saulting Sugar Loaf became the pat-tern for successive units to follow:'Concerned about the unrestricted firefrom the Half Moon Hill region,

Major Henry A. Courtney, Jr., bat-talion executive officer, took Cor-poral Day with him on the 13th ona hazardous trek to the 29th Marinesto coordinate the forthcoming at-tacks. With the 29th then committedto protecting 2/22's left flank, Court-ney assigned Day and his squad insupport of Company F for the nextday's assault.

Day's rifle squad consisted of sevenMarines by that time. On the 14th,they joined Fox Company's assault,reached the hill, scampered up theleft shoulder ("you could get to thetop in 15 seconds"). Day thenreceived orders to take his squadback around the hill to take up adefensive position on the right(western) shoulder. This took somedoing. By late afternoon, Fox Corn-


defenses, and objective of the 22d Marines, is seen from a point directly north:

Amtracs, such as these, were pressed into service in the difficult terrain to resupplythe Marines on Sugar Loaf and to evacuate the wounded, all the while under fire.


36

A

pany had been driven off its exposedposition on the left shoulder, leavingDay with just two surviving squad-mates occupying a large shell hole onthe opposite shoulder.

During the evening, unknown toDay, Major Courtney gathered 45volunteers from George and Fox com-panies and led them back up the leftshoulder of Sugar Loaf. In hours ofdesperate, close-in fighting, theJapanese killed Major Courtney andhalf his improvised force. "We didn'tknow who they were;' recalled Day,"because even though they were only50 yards away, they were on the op-posite side of the crest. Out of visualcontact. But we knew they were Ma-rines and we knew they were in trou-ble. We did our part by shooting andgrenading every [Japanese] we sawmoving in their direction." Day andhis two men then heard the soundsof the remnants of Courtney's forcebeing evacuated down the hill andknew they were again alone on Su-gar Loaf.

Representing in effect an advancecombat outpost on the contestedridge did not particularly bother the19-year-old corporal. Day's biggestconcerns were letting other Marinesknow they were up there andreplenishing their ammo andgrenades. "Before dawn I went backdown the hill. A couple of LVTs hadbeen trying to deliver critical suppliesto the folks who'd made the earlierpenetration. Both had been knockedout just north of the hill. I was ableto raid those disabled vehicles severaltimes for grenades, ammo, and ra-tions. We were fine:'

On 15 May, Day and his menwatched another Marine assault de-velop from the northeast. Againthere were Marines on the easterncrest of the hill, but fully exposed toraking fire from Half Moon and mor-tars from Horseshoe. Day's Marinesdirected well-aimed rifle fire into acolumn of Japanese running towardsSugar Loaf from Horseshoe, "but wereally needed a machine gun." Good

fortune provided a .30-caliber, air-cooled M1919A4 in the wake of theretreating Marines. But as soon asDay's gunner placed the weapon inaction on the forward parapet of thehole, a Japanese 47mm crew openedup from Horseshoe, killing the Ma-rine and destroying the gun. Nowthere were just two riflemen on theridgetop.

Tragedy also struck the 1st Battal-ion, 22d Marines, on the 15th. Awithering Japanese bombardmentcaught the command group assem-bled at their observation post plan-ning the next assault. Shellfire killedthe commander, Major Thomas J.Myers, and wounded every compa-fly commander, as well as the COand XO of the supporting tank com-pany. Of the death of Major Myers,General Shepherd exclaimed, "It's thegreatest single loss the Division hassustained. Myers was an outstandingleader." Major Earl J. Cook, battal-ion executive officer, took commandand continued attack preparations.The division staff released thisfu warning that midnight: "Becauseof the commanding ground which heoccupies the enemy is able to ac-curately locate our OPs and CPs. Thedangerous practice of permitting un-

necessary crowding and exposure insuch areas has already had seriousconsequences." The warning wasmeaningless. Commanders had toobserve the action in order to com-mand. Exposure to interdictive firewas the cost of doing business as aninfantry battalion commander. Thenext afternoon, Lieutenant ColonelJean W. Moreau, commanding 1/29,received a serious wound when aJapanese shell hit his observationpost squarely. Major Robert P. Neu-ffer, Moreau's exec, assumed com-mand. Several hours later a Japaneseshell wounded Major Malcolm "0"Donohoo, commanding 3/22. MajorGeorge B. Kantner, his exec, tookover. The battle continued.

The night of 15-16 seemed endlesstot-Corporal Day and his survivingsuadmate, Private First Class DaleBertoli. "The Japs knew we were theonly ones up there and gave us theirfull attention. We had plenty ofgrenades and ammo, but it got pret-ty hairy:' The south slope of SugarLoaf is the steepest. The Japanesewould emerge from their reverse-slope caves, but they faced a difficultascent to get to the Marines on themilitary crest. Hearing them scram-ble up the rocks alerted Day and Ber-

Tanks evacuate the wounded as men of the 29th Marines press the fight to captureSugar Loaf. The casualties were rushed to aid stations behind the front lines.


37

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toli to greet them with grenades.Those of the enemy who survivedthis mini-barrage would find them-selves backlit by flares as they strug-gled over the crest. Day and Bertoli,back to back against the dark side ofthe crater, shot them readily.

"The 16th was the day I thoughtSugar Loaf would fall," said Day. Hean,d BertoliJi1Qkl down as Ma-rine tanks, artillery, and mortarspounded the ridge and its support-ing bastions. "We looked back andsee the whole battle shaping up, agreat orama." This was the turnof 1/3/22, well supported by tanks.But Day could also see that theJapanese fires had not slackened atall. "The real danger at Sugar Loafwas not the hill itself, where we were,but in a 300-yard by 300-yard killingzone which the Marines had to crossto approach the hill from our linesto the north . . . . It was a dismalsight, men falling, tanks gettingknocked out. . . . the division prob-ably suffered 600 casualties that day."Inct, the 6th Marine Divi-

sion considered 16 May to be "the bit-terest day of the entire campaign:'

By then the 22d Marines wasdown to 40 percent effectiveness andGeneral Shepherd relieved it with the29th Marines. He also decided to in-stall fresh leadership in the regiment,replacing the commander and execu-tive officer with the team of ColonelHarold C. Roberts and LieutenantColonel August C. Larson.

The weather cleared enough dur-ing the late afternoon of the 16th toenable Day and Bertoli to see wellpast Horseshoe Hill, "all the way tothe Asato River." The view was notencouraging. Steady columns ofJapanese reinforcements streamednorthward, through Takamotoji vii-lage, towards the contested batt-lefield. "We kept firing on them from500 yards away;' still maintaining thesmall but persistent thorn in the fleshof the Japanese defenses. Their riflefire attracted considerable attentionfrom prowling squads of Japaneseraiders that night. "They came at usfrom 2130 on," recalled Day, "and all

38

we could do was keep tossinggrenades and firing our M-ls." Con-cerned Marines north of Sugar Loaf,hearing the nocturnal ruckus, triedto assist with mortar fire. "Thishelped, but it came a little too close:'Both Day and Bertoli were wound-ed by Japanese shrapnel and burnedby "friendly" white gpborous.

Early on the 17th a rüiiIerfFomthe 29th Marines scrambled up to theshell-pocked crater with orders forthe two Marines to "get the hell out:'A massive bombardment by air,naval gunfire, and artillery wouldsoon saturate the ridge in preparationof a fresh assault. Day and Bertolireadily complied. Exhausted, rJc-i, and partially deafened, theystumbled back to safety and an in-tense series of debriefings by staffofficers. Meanwhile, a thunderingbombardment crashed down on thethree hills.

The 17th of May marked the fifthday of the battle for Sugar Loaf. Nowit was the turn of Easy Company,2/29, to assault the complex of

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defenses. No unit displayed greatervalor, yet Easy Company's fourseparate assaults fared little betterthan their many predecessors. Atmidpoint of these desperate assaults,the 29th Marines reported to divi-sion, "E Co. moved to top of ridgeand had 30 men south of Sugar Loaf;sustained two close-in charges; killeda hell of a lot of Nips; moved backto base to reform and are goingagain; will take it." But Sugar Loafwould not fall this day. At dusk, af-ter prevailing in one more melee ofbayonets, flashing knives, and barehands against a particularly viciousounterattack, the company had towithdraw. It had lost 160 men.

The 18th of May marked the be-ginning of seemingly endless rains.Into the start of this soupy mess at-tacked Dog Company, 2/29, this

time supported by more tanks whichbraved the minefields on both shoul-ders of Sugar Loaf to penetrate theno-man's land just to the south.When the Japanese poured out oftheir reverse-slope holes for yetanother counterattack, the waitingtanks surprised and riddled them.Dog Company earned the distinctionof becoming the first rifle companyto hold Sugar Loaf overnight. TheMarines would not relinquish thatcostly ground.

But now the 29th Marines werepretty much shot up, and still HalfMoon, Horseshoe, and Shun re-mained to be assaulted. GeneralGeiger adjusted the tactical bound-aries slightly westward to allow the1st Marine Division a shot at theeastern spur of Horseshoe, and healso released the 4th Marines from

39

Corps reserve. General Shepherddeployed the fresh regiment into thebattle on the 19th. The battle stillraged. The 4th Marines sustained 70casualties just in conducting the reliefof lines with the 29th Marines. Butwith Sugar Loaf now in friendlyhands, the momentum of the fightbegan to change. On 20 May, Lieu-tenant Colonel Reynolds H. Hayden's1/4 and Lieutenant Colonel Bruno A.Hochmuth's 3/4 made impressivegains on either flank. By day's end,2/4 held much of Half Moon, while3/4 had seized a good portion ofHorseshoe. As Corporal Day hadwarned, most Japanese reinforce-ments funneled into the fight fromthe southwest, so 3/4 prepared for.&tnL visitors at Horseshoe.These arrived in massive numbers,up to 700 Japanese soldiers and

The difficult and shell-pocked terrain of Okinawa is seen herein a view from the crest of Sugar Loaf toward Crescent Hilland southeast beyond the Kokuba River. This photograph also


illustrates the extent to which Sugar Loaf Hill dominatedthe Asato corridor running from Naha to Shun and demon-strates why the Japanese defended the area so tenaciously.

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sailors, and surged against 3/4 muchof the night. Hochmuth had a wealthof supporting arms: six artillery bat-talions in direct support at the onsetof the attack, and up to 15 battalionsat the height of the fighting.Throughout the crisis on Horseshoe,Hochmuth maintained a direct radiolink with Lieutenant Colonel BruceT. Hemphill, commanding 4/15, oneof the support artillery firing battal-ions. This close exchange betweencommanders reduced the number ofshort rounds which might haveotherwise decimated the defendersand allowed the 15th Marines to pro-vide uncommonly accurate fire onthe Japanese. The rain of shells blewgreat holes in the ranks of everyJapanese advance; Marine riflemenmet those who survived at bayonet

point. The counterattackers died tothe man.

Even with Hochmuth's victory theprotracted battle of Sugar Loaflacked a climactic finish. Therewould be no celebration ceremonyhere. Shun Ridge loomed ahead, asdid the sniper-infested ruins of Naha.Elements of the 1st Marine Divisionbegan bypassing the last of the Wanadefenses to the east. The 6th Divisionslipped westward. Colonel Shapley's4th Marines crossed the Asa River,now chest-high from the heavy rain-fall, on 23 May. The III AmphibiousCorps stood poised on the outskirtsof Okinawa's capital city.

The Army divisions in XXIVCorps matched the Marines' break-throughs. On the east coast, the 96thDivision seized Conical Hill, the Shu-

ri Line's opposite anchor from SugarLoaf, after weeks of bitter fighting.The 7th Division, in relief, seizedYonabaru on 22 May. Suddenly, theThirty-second Army faced the threatof being cut off from both flanks.This time General Ushijima listenedto Colonel Yahara's advice. Instead offighting to the death at Shun Castle,the army would take advantage ofthe awful weather and retreat south-ward to their final line of prepareddefenses in the Kiyamu Peninsula.Ushijima executed this withdrawalmasterfully. While American aviatorsspotted and interdicted the south-bound columns, they also reportedother columns moving north. Gener-al Buckner assumed the enemy wassimply rotating units still defendingthe Shun defenses. But these north-

rage on Japanese positions during the Tenth Army drive tothe south of Okinawa. Such barrages were very effective.

Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC) 181768

"Buck Rogers" rocket Marines load projectiles into the racksof a mobile launcher in preparation for laying down a bar-

40

bound troops were ragtag units as-signed to conduct a do-or-die rearguard. At this, they were.eminentlysuccessful.

This was the situation encounteredby the 1st Marine Division in its un-expectedly easy advance to ShunRidge on 29 May as described in theopening paragraphs. The 5th Ma-rines suddenly possessed the aban-doned castle. While General del Valletried to the igtion of the77th Division commander the Ma-rines' "intrusion" into his zone, he gotanother angry call from the TenthArmy. It seems that that the Com-pany A, 1/5 company commander,a South Carolinian, had raised theStars and Bars of the Confederacyover Shun Castle instead of the Starsand Stripes. "Every damned outpostand O.P. that could see this startedtelephoning me," said del Valle, ad-ding, "1 had one hell of a ±tla12aloconverging on my telephone." DelValle agreed to erect a proper flag,but it took him two days to get onethrough the intermittent fire ofUshijima's surviving rear guards.Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Ross,commanding the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, raised this flag in the rainon the last day of May, then tookcover. Unlike Sugar Loaf, Shun Cas-tle could be seen from all oversouthern Okinawa, and everyJapanese gunner within range openedup on the hated colors.

The Stars and Stripes flutteredover Shun Castle, and the fearsomeYonabaru-Shuri-Naha defensivemasterpiece had been decisivelybreached. But the Thirty-secondArmy remained as deadly a fightingforce as ever. It was an army thatwould die hard defending the finaleight miles of shell-pocked, rain-

The retreating Japanese troops didnot escape scot-free from their Shundefenses. Naval spotter planes locat-ed one southbound column andcalled in devastating fire from a halfdozen ships and every available at-tack aircraft. In short order severalmiles of the muddy road were strewnwith wrecked trucks, field guns, andcorpses. General del Valle congratu-lated the Tactical Air Force: "Thanksfor prompt response this afternoonwhen Nips were caught on road withkimonos down."

Successful interdictions, however,remained theion. Most ofUshijima's Thirty-second Army sur-vived the retreat to its final positionsin the Kiyamu Peninsula. The TenthArmy missed a golden opportunityto end the battle four weeks early,but the force, already slowed byheavy rains and deep mud, was sim-

soaked southern Okinawa.


Men of Company G, 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, found themselves fighting in anurban environment in their house-to-house attack against the Japanese in Naha.

A Marine who had his clothing blown from his back by a Japanese mortar explo-sion, but is otherwise unwounded, is helped to the rear by an uninjured buddy.


41

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yond description:' The 96th Divisionwearily reported the results of oneday's efforts under these conditions:"those on forward slope slid down;those on reverse slope slid back;otherwise no change."

ply too iido_us to respond with

The infantry jggI southward,cussing the weather but glad to be be-yond the Shun Line. Yet every ad-vance exacted a price. A Japanesesniper killed Lieutenant ColonelHoratio C. Woodhouse, Jr., the com-petent commander of 2/22, as he ledhis battalion towards the Kokuba Es-tuary. General Shepherd, grievingprivately at the loss of his youngercousin, replaced him in commandwith the battalion exec, LieutenantColonel John G. Johnson.

As the IlIAC troops advanced fur-ther south, the Marines began to en-counter a series of east-west ridgesdominating the open farmlands intheir midst. "The southern part ofOkinawa," reported Colonel Snedek-er, "consists primarily of cross ridgessticking out like bones from the spineof a fish:' Meanwhile, the Army di-visions of XXIV Corps warily ap-proached two toweringin their zone, Yuza Dake and YajuDake. The Japanese had obviouslygone to ground along these ridges

and peaks and lay waiting for theAmerican advance.

Rain and mud continued to plaguethe combatants. One survivor of thissegment of the campaign describedthe battlefields as "a five-mile sea ofmud." As Private First Class Sledgerecorded in the margins of his sod-den New Testament, "Mud in campon Pavuvu was a nuisance.. . . Butmud on the battlefield is misery be-

The Marines began tof at theheavy-handed controls of the TenthArmy, which seemed to stall witheach encounter with a fresh Japaneseoutpost. General Buckner favored amassive application of firepower onevery obstacle before committingtroops in the open. Colonel Shapley,commanding the 4th Marines, tooka different view. "I'm not too sure thatsometimes when they whittle youaway, 10-12 men a day,ybeit would be better to take 100 lossesa day if you could get out sooner:'Colonel Wilburt S. "Big Foot" Brown,a veteran artilleryman commandingthe 11th Marines, and a legend in hisown time, believed the Tenth Armyrelied too heavily on firepower. "Wepoured a tremendous amount of me-tal into those positions;' he said. "Itseemed nothing could be living inthat churning mass where the shellswere falling and roaring, but whenwe next advanced the Japs would stillbe there and madder than ever:'Brown also lamented the overuse ofstar shells for night illumination: "1felt like we were the children of Is-rael in the wilderness — living under


A bereaved father prays for his dead Son: Col Francis I. Fenton, 1st Marine Divi-sion engineer, kneels at the foot of the stretcher holding the body of PFC MichaelFenton, as division staff members mourn. Col Fenton said that the other dead Ma-rines were not as fortunate as his son, who had his father there to pray for him.

This self-propelled M-7 105mm gun was completely bogged down in the heavyrains which fell on Okinawa in the last weeks in May. It replaced the half-track-mounted 75mm gun as the regimental commander's artillery in Operation Iceberg.


42

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General Shepherd, appreciative ofthe vast amphibious resources stillavailable on call, decided to interjecttactical mobility and surprise into thesluggish campaign. In order for the6th Marine Division to reach its in-termediate objective of the Naha air-field, Shepherd first had tooverwhelm the Oroku Peninsula.Shepherd could do this the hard way,attacking from the base of the penin-sula and scratching seaward — or hecould launch a shore-to-shore am-

a pillar of fire by night and a cloudof smoke by day."

Such a heavy reliance on artillerysupport stressed the amphibious sup-ply system. The Tenth Army's de-mand for heavy ordnance grew to3,000 tons of ammo per day; eachround had to be delivered over thebeach and distributed along thefront. This factor reduced the avail-ability of other supplies, includingrations. Front-line troops, especiallythe Marines, began to go hungry.Again partialj,. came from thefriendly skies. Marine pilots flyingGeneral Motors Avenger torpedo-bombers of VMTB-232 executed 80air drops of rations during the firstthree days of June alone. Thisworked well, thanks to the intrepidpilots, and thanks to the rigging skillsof the Air Delivery Section, veteransof the former Marine parachute bat-talions.

Offshore from the final drivesouth, the ships of the fleet continuedto withstand waves of kamikcize at-tacks. Earlier, on 17 May, AdmiralTurner had declared an end to theamphibious assault phase. GeneralBuckner thereafter reported directly

to Admiral Spruance. Turner depart-ed, leaving Vice Admiral Harry W.Hill in command of the huge am-phibious force still supporting theTenth Army. On 27 May, AdmiralWilliam F. "Bull" Halsey relievedSpruance. With that, the Fifth Fleetbecame the Third Fleet— same ships,same crews, different designation.Spruance and Turner began planningthe next amphibious assault, thelong-anticipated invasion of theJapanese home islands.

phibious assault across the estu tocatch the defenders in their flank."The Japanese expected us to force acrossing of the Kokuba," he said, "1wanted to surprise them." Convinc-ing General Geiger of the wisdom ofthis approach was easy; gettingGeneral Buckner's approval tooklonger. Abruptly Buckner agreed,but gave the 6th Division barely 36hours to plan and execute a division-level amphibious assault.

Lieutenant Colonel Krulak and hisG-3 staff relished the challenge.Scouts from Major Anthony "ColdSteel" Walker's 6th ReconnaissanceCompany stole across the estuary atnight to gather intelligence on theNishikoku Beaches and the Japanesedefenders. The scouts confirmed theexistence on the peninsula of a cob-Jajcj force of Imperial Japanese Navyunits under an old adversary. Fitting-ly, this final opposed amphibious


Cleanliness is next to godliness, figures this Marine, as he stands knee-deep in waterwhile shaving in the midst of a totally saturated and flooded bivouac area.

Okinawa's "Plum Rains" of May and June came close to immobilizing the U.S. TenthArmy's drive south. Heroic efforts kept the frontline troops supported logistically.

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remained firm in his desire to executethe assault on K-Day, 4 June. Ad-miral Halsey backed him up.

landing of. the war would belaunched against one of the last sur-viving Japanese rikusentai (SpecialNaval Landing Force) commanders,Rear Admiral Minoru Ota.

Admiral Ota was 54, a 1913 gradu-ate of the Japanese Naval Academy,and a veteran of rikusentai servicefrom as early as 1932 in Shanghai.Ten years later he commanded the 2dCombined Special Landing Force des-tined to assault Midway, but wasthwarted by the disastrous navaldefeat suffered by the Japanese. InNovember 1942, commanding the8th Combined Special Landing Forcein the Central Solomons, he defend-ed Bairoko against the 1st MarineRaider Regiment. By 1945, however,the rikusentai had all but disap-peared, and Ota commanded a rag-tag outfit of several thousand coastdefense and antiaircraft gunners, avi-ation mechanics, and constructionspecialists. Undismayed, Otabreathed fire into his disparate forces,equipped them with hundreds ofmachine cannons from wrecked air-craft, and made them sow thousandsof mines.

Krulak and Shepherd knew theyfaced a worthy opponent, but alsosaw they held the advantage of sur-prise if they could act swiftly. The fi-

nal details of planning centered onproblems with the division's previ-ously dependable LVTs. Sixty-fivedays of hard campaigning ashore hadtaken a heavy toll of the tracks andsuspension systems of these assaultamphibians. Nor were repair partsavailable. LVTs had served in abun-dance on L-Day to land four divi-sions; now the Marines had to scrapeto produce enough for the assault ele-ments of one regiment. Worse for theplanners, the first typhoon of the sea-son was approaching, and the Navywas getting jumpy. General Shepherd

Shepherd considered ColonelShapley "an outstanding officer ofgreat ability and great leadership,"and chose the 4th Marines to lead theassault. Shapley divided the 600-yardNishikoku Beach between 2/4 on theleft and 1/4 on the right. Despiteheavy rains, the assault went onschedule. The Oroku Peninsulaerupted in flame and smoke underthe pounding of hundreds of navalguns, artillery batteries, and aerialbombs. Major Anthony's scoutsseized Ono Yama island, the 4th Ma-rines swept across the estuary, andLCMs and LCIs loaded with tanksappeared from the north, from "Loo-mis Harbor;' named after the IlIACLogistics Officer, Colonel Francis B."Loopy" Loomis, Jr., a veteran Ma-rine aviator. The amphibious forceattained complete surprise. Many of1/4's patched-up LVTs broke downenroute, causing uncomfortable de-lays, but enemy fire proved intermit-tent, and empty LVTs from the firstwaves quickly returned to transferthe stranded troops. The 4th Marinesadvanced rapidly. Soon it becametime for Colonel Whaling's 29th Ma-rines to cross. By dark on K-Day the6th Division occupied 1,200 yards of


When the heavy rains of May arrived, deep mud caused by days of torrentialdown pours made air delivery the only possible means of providing forwardcombat units with food, ammunition, and water. As a result, Marine torpedo-bombers of VMTBs -131 and -232 were employed in supply drops by parachute.The white panels laid on the ground at the right mark the target area for the drops.

As soon as the parachute drops landed in the target zone, grateful Marines en-thusiastically retrieved the supplies, often while under enemy fire. Some of the dropswere out of reach as they landed in territory where Japanese soldiers claimed them.


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troops under my command havefought gallantly, in the finest tradi-tion of the Japanese Navy. Fiercebombardments may deform themountains of Okinawa but cannotalter the loyal spirit of our men:' Fourdays later Ota transmitted his finalmessage to General Ushijima ("Ene-my tank groups are now attackingour cave headquarters; the NavalBase Force is dying gloriouslyand committed suicide, his dutydone.

the Oroku Peninsula. Admiral Otafuriously redirected his sailors to thethreat from the rear. Then ColonelRoberts' 22d Marines began advanc-ing along the original corridor.

The amphibious assault had beennigh letter-perfect, the typhoon cameand went, and the Marines occupiedthe peninsula in force, capturing theairfield in two days. When the 1stMarine Division reached the south-west coast north of Itoman on 7 June,Admiral Ota's force lost its chance ofescape. General Shepherd then or-chestrated a three-fold envelopingmovement with his regiments and theoutcome became inevitable.

Admiral Ota was no ordinary op-ponent, however, and the battle forOroku was savage and lethal. Ota's5,000 spirited sailors fought with

and they were very heavilyarmed. No similar-sized force onOkinawa possessed so many auto-matic weapons or employed mines soeffctively. The attacking Marinesalso encountered some awesomeweapons at very short range — eight-inch coast defense guns redirected in-land, rail-mounted eight-inch rock-ets (the "Screaming Mimi"), and theenormous 320mm spigot mortarswhich launched the terrifying "flyingashcans." On 9 June the 4th Marines

reported "character of opposition un-changed; stubborn defense of highground by 20mm and MG fire:' Twodays later the 29th Marines report-ed: "L Hill under attack from twosides; another tank shot on rightflank; think an eight-inch gun:'

Ota could nevertheless see the endcoming. On 6 June he reported tonaval headquarters in Tokyo: "The

General Shepherd knew he haddefeated a competent foe. He count-ed the costs in his after-action sum-mary of the Oroku operation:

During the 10 days' fighting,almost 5000 Japanese werekilled and nearly 200 takenprisoner. Thirty of our tankswere disabled, many by mines.One tank was destroyed by twodirect hits from an 8-inch navalgun fired at point blank range.Finally, 1,608 Marines werekilled or wounded.

When the 1st Marine Divisionreached the coast near Itoman itrepresented the first time in more

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 122167It seemed to be one hill after another in the drive south. Amidst tree stumpswhich hardly serve as adequate cover, a bazooka team waits for an opportunityto charge into the face of Japanese fire over the crest of the hill in front of them.

Trying in vain to escape and knee deep in the water's edge along the sea wall nearthe Qroku Peninsula, a Japanese soldier passes the bodies of two other soldiers.


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than a month that the division hadaccess to the sea. This helped relievethe Old Breed's extended supplylines. As we reached the shore wewere helped a great deal by amphib-ian tractors that had come down thecoast with supplies;' said ColonelSnedeker of the 7th Marines, 'Other-wise we couldn't get suppliesoverland:'

The more open country in thesouth gave General del Valle the op-portunity to further refine thedeployment of his tank-infantryteams. No unit in the Tenth Armysurpassed the 1st Marine Division'ssynchronization of these two sup-porting arms. Using tactical lessonspainfully learned at Peleliu, the di-vision never allowed its tanks torange beyond direct support of theaccompanying infantry and artilleryforward observers. As a result, the1st Tank Battalion was the only ar-mored unit in the battle not to losea tank to Japanese suicide squads —even during the swirling close-quarters frays within Wana Draw.General del Valle, the.., nstim-teartilleryman, valued his attachedArmy 4.2-inch mortar battery. "The4.2s were invaluable on Okinawa7 hesaid, "and that's why my tanks hadsuch good luck:' But good luckreflected a great deal of application."We developed the tank-infantry

team to a fare-thee-well in thoseswales—backed up by our 4.2-inchmortars:'

Colonel "Big Foot" Brown of the11th Marines took this coordinationseveral steps further as the campaigndragged along:

Working with LtCol "Jeb"Stuart of the 1st Tank Battalion,we developed a new method ofprotecting tanks and reducingvulnerability to the infantry inthe assault. We'd place an ar-tillery observer in one of thetanks with a radio to one of the155mm howitzer battalions.We'd also use an aerial observ-er overhead. We used 75mm,both packs and LVT-As, whichhad airburst capabilities. If anyJap [suicider] showed anywherewe opened fire with the airbursts and kept a pattern ofshell fragments pattering downaround the tanks.

Lieutenant Colonel James C. Ma-gee's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, usedsimilar tactics in a bloody but suc-cessful day-long assault on Hill 69west of Ozato on 10 June. Magee lostthree tanks to Japanese artillery firein the approach. but took the hill andheld it throughout the inevitablecounterattack that night.

Beyond Hill 69 loomed Kunishi

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Ridge for the 1st Marine Division, asteep, coral escarpment which total-ly dominated the surrounding grass-lands and rice paddies. Kunishi wasmuch higher and longer than SugarLoaf, equally honeycombed withenemy caves and tunnels, and whileit lacked the nearby equivalents ofHalf Moon and Horseshoe to the rearflanks, it was amply covered frombehind by Mezado Ridge 500 yardsfurther south. Remnants of the vete-ran 32d Infantry Regiment infestedand defended Kunishi's many hiddenbunkers. These were the last ofUshijima's organized, front-linetroops, and they would renderKunishi Ridge as deadly a killingground as the Marines would everface.

Japanese gunners readily repulsedthe first tank-infantry assaults by the7th Marines on 11 June. ColonelSnedeker looked for another way. "Icame to the realization that with thelosses my battalions suffered in ex-perienced leadership we would neverbe able to capture (Kunishi Ridge) indaytime. I thought a night attackmight be successful:' Snedeker flewover the objective in an observationaircraft, formulating his plan. Nightassaults by elements of the TenthArmy were extremely rare in thiscampaign — especially Snedeker's am-bitious plan of employing two bat-talions. General del Valle voiced hisapproval. At 0330 the next morning,Lieutenant Colonel John I. Gormley's1/7 and Lieutenant Colonel SpencerS. Berger's 2/7 departed the combatoutpost line for the dark ridge. By0500 the lead companies of both bat-talions swarmed over the crest, sur-prising several groups of Japanesecalmly cooking breakfast. Then camethe fight to stay on the ridge and ex-pand the toehold.

With daylight, Japanese gunnerscontinued to pole-ax any reliefcolumns of infantry, while those Ma-rines clinging to the crest enduredshowers of grenades and mortarrounds. As General del Valle put it,


This Marine patrol scouts out the rugged terrain and enemy positions on the reverseslope of one of the hills in the path of the 1st Division's southerly attack.

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"The situation was one of the tacti-cal oddities of this peculiar warfare.We were on the ridge. The Japs werein it, on both the forward and reverseslopes:'

The Marines on Kunishi criticallyneeded reinforcements and resup-plies; their growing number ofwounded needed evacuation. Onlythe Sherman medium tank had thebulk and mobility to provide relief.The next several days marked thefinest achievements of the 1st TankBattalion, even at the loss of 21 ofits Shermans to enemy fire. Byremoving two crewmen, the tankerscould stuff six replacement riflemeninside each vehicle. Personnel ex-changes once atop the hill wereanother matter. No one could standerect without getting shot, so all"transactions" had to take place viathe escape hatch in the bottom of thetank's hull. These scenes then becamecommonplace: a tank would lurchinto the beleaguered Marine posi-tions on Kunishi, remain buttoned upwhile the replacement troopsslithered out of the escape hatch car-rying ammo, rations, plasma, andwater; then other Marines wouldcrawl under, dragging their wound-ed comrades on ponchos and man-

handle them into the small hole. Forthose badly wounded who lackedthis flexibility, the only option wasthe dubious privilege of riding backdown to safety while lashed to astretcher topside behind the turret.Tank drivers frequently sought toprovide maximum protection to theirexposed stretcher cases by backingdown the entire 800-yard gauntlet. Inthis painstaking fashion the tankersmanaged to deliver 50 fresh troopsand evacuate 35 wounded men theday following the 7th Marines' nightattack.

Encouraged by these results,General del Valle ordered ColonelMason to conduct a similar night as-sault on the 1st Marines' sector ofKunishi Ridge. This mission went to2/1, who accomplished it smartly thenight of 13-14 June despite inadver-tent lapses of illumination fire by for-getful supporting arms. Again theJapanese, furious at being surprised,swarmed out of their bunkers incounterattack. Losses mounted rapid-ly in Lieutenant Colonel Magee'sranks. One company lost six of itsseven officers that morning. Againthe 1st Tank Battalion came to therescue, delivering reinforcements andevacuating 110 casualties by dusk.

General del Valle expressed greatpleasure in the success of these ser-ies of attacks. "The Japs were sodamned surprised;' he remarked, ad-ding, "They used to counterattack atnight all the time, but they never feltwe'd have the audacity to go and doit to them:' Colonel Yahara admittedduring his interrogation that theseunexpected night attacks were "par-ticularly effective," catching theJapanese forces "both physically andpsychologically off-guard:'

By 15 June the 1st Marines hadbeen in the division line for 12straight days and sustained 500casualties. The 5th Marines relievedit, including an intricate night-timerelief of lines by 2/5 of 2/1 on 15-16June. The 1st Marines, back in therelative safety of division reserve,received this mindless regimental.,jdrjhe next day: "When nototherwise occupied you will bury Japdead in your area:'

The battle for Kunishi Ridge con-tinued. On 17 June the 5th Marinesassigned K/3/5 to support 2/5 onKunishi. Private First Class Sledgeapproached the embattled escarp-ment with dread: "Its crest looked somuch like Bloody Nose that myknees nearly buckled. I felt as though

men maneuver to attack the next hill to be taken in the driveto the south of Okinawa, where the enemy lay in wait.


A Marine-manned, water-cooled, .30-caliber Browningmachine gun lays down a fierce base of fire as Marine rifle-

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I were on Peleliu and had it all to gothrough again:' The fighting alongthe crest and its reverse slope tookplace at point-blank range — too closeeven for Sledge's 60mm mortars. Hiscrew then served as stretcher bearers,extremely hazardous duty. Half hiscompany became casualties in thenext 22 hours.

Extracting wounded Marines fromKunishi remained a hair-raising feat.But the seriously wounded facedanother half-day of evacuation byfield ambulance over bad roads sub-ject to,icti fire. Then the avi-ators stepped in with a bright idea.Engineers cleared a rough landingstrip suitable for the ji.ii.is"Grasshopper" observation aircraftnorth of Itoman. Hospital corpsmenbegan delivering some of the casual-ties from the Kunishi and Hill 69 bat-tles to thisj airfield. Therethey were tenderly inserted into thewaiting Piper Cubs and flown backto field hospitals in the rear, an eight-minute flight. This was the dawn oftactical air medevacs which wouldsave so many lives in su ent Asi-an wars. In 11 days, the ptlpi-lots of Marine Observation

Squadrons (VMO) -3 and -7 flew out641 casualties from the Itoman strip.

The 6th Marine Division joinedthe southern battlefield from its for-cible seizure of the Oroku Peninsula. Colonel Roberts' 22d Marinesbecame the fourth USMC regimentto engage in the fighting for Kunishi.The 32d Infantry Regiment diedhard, but soon the combined forcesof IlIAC had swept south, over-lapped Mezado Ridge, and couldsmell the sea along the south coast.Near Ara Saki, George Company,2/22, raised the 6th Marine Divisoncolors on the island's southernmostpoint, just as they had done in Aprilat Hedo Misaki in the farthest north.

The long-neglected 2d Marine Di-vision finally got a meaningful rolefor at least one of its major compo-nents in the closing weeks of the cam-paign. Colonel Clarence R. Wallaceand his 8th Marines arrived from Sai-pan, initially to capture two outly-ing islands, Iheya Shima and AguniShima, to provide more early warn-ing radar sites against the kamikazes.Wallace in fact commanded a siza-ble force, virtually a brigade, includ-ing the attached 2d Battalion, 10th

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Marines (Lieutenant Colonel RichardG. Weede) and the 2d AmphibianTractor Battalion (Major Fenlon A.Durand). General Geiger assigned the8th Marines to the 1st Marine Divi-sion, and by 18 June they hadrelieved the 7th Marines and weresweeping southeastward with vigor.Private First Class Sledge recalledtheir appearance on the battlefield:"We scrutinized the men of the 8thMarines with that hard professionalstare of old salts sizing up anotheroutfit. Everything we saw broughtforth remarks of approval:'

General Buckner also took an in-terest in observing the first combatdeployment of the 8th Marines.Months earlier he had been favora-bly impressed with Colonel Wallace'soutfit during an inspection visit toSaipan. Buckner went to a forwardobservation post on 18 June, watch-ing the 8th Marines advance alongthe valley floor. Japanese gunners onthe opposite ridge saw the officialparty and opened up. Shells struckthe nearby coral outcrop, driving alethal splinter into lljeneral's chest.He died in 10 minutes, one of the fewsenior U.S. officers to be killed in ac-tion throughout World War II.

As previously arranged, GeneralRoy Geiger assumed command; histhird star became effective immedi-ately. The Tenth Army remained incapable hands. Geiger became theonly Marine—and the only aviatorof any service — to command a fieldarmy. The soldiers on Okinawa hadno qualms about this. Senior Armyechelons elsewhere did. Army Gener-al Joseph Stillwell received urgentorders to Okinawa. Five days later herelieved Geiger, but by then the bat-tle was over.

The Marines also lost a good com-mander on the 18th when a Japanesesniper killed Colonel Harold C.Roberts, CO of the 22d Marines,who had earned a Navy Cross serv-ing as a Navy corpsman with Ma-rines in World War I. GeneralShepherd had cautioned Roberts theprevious evening about his propen-


Navy corpsmen lift a wounded Marine into the cabin of one of the Grasshop-pers of a Marine Observation Squadron on Okinawa. The plane will then flythe casualty on to one of the aid stations in the rear for further treatment.

Subsidiary Amphibious LandingsIthough overshadowed by the massive L-Daylanding, a series of smaller amphibious operationsaround the periphery of Okinawa also contribut-

ed to the ultimate victory. These subsidiary landing forcesvaried in size from company-level to a full division. Eachreflected the collective amphibious expertise attained by thePacific Theater forces by 1945. Applied with great econo-my of force, these landings produced fleet anchorages, firesupport bases, auxiliary airfields, and expeditionary radarsites for early warning to the fleet against the kamikazes.

No unit better represented this progression of amphibi-ous virtuosity than the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac)Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, commandedthroughout the war by Major James L. Jones, USMC. Jonesand his men provided outstanding service to landing forcecommanders in a series of increasingly audacious exploitsin the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas (ia1lfinii3,and Iwo Jima. Prior to L-Day at Okinawa, these Marinessupported the Army's 77th Division with .tealth landingson Awara Saki, Mae, and Keise Shima in the Kerama Ret-to Islands in the East China Sea. Later in the battle, therecon unit conducted night landings on the islands guard-ing the eastern approaches to Nakagusuku Wan, which laterwhat would be called Buckner Bay. One of these islands,Tsugen Jima contained the main Japanese outpost, andJones had a sharp firefight underway before he could ex-tract his men in the darkness. Tsugen Jima then became thetarget of the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, which stormedashore a few days later to eliminate the stronghold. Jones'Marines then sailed to the northwestern coast to executea night landing on Minna Shima on 13 April to seize a firebase in support of the 77th Division's main landing on leShima.

The post-L-Day amphibious operations of the 77th and27th Divisions and the FMFPac Force Recon Battalion wereprofessionally executed and beneficial, but not decisive. Bymid-April, the Tenth Army had decided to wage a campaignof massive firepower and attrition against the mainJapanese defenses. General Buckner chose not to employhis many amphibious resources to break the ensuinggridlock.

Buckner's consideration of the amphibious option was

not helped by a lack of flexibility on the part of the JointChiefs of Staff who kept strings attached to the Marine di-visions. The Thirty-second Army in southern Okinawaclearly represented the enemy center of gravity in the Ryu-kyu Islands, but the JCS let weeks lapse before scrubbingearlier commitments for the 2d Marine Division to assaultKikai Shima, an obscure island north of Okinawa, and the1st and 6th Marine Divisions to tackle Miyako Shima, nearFormosa. Of the Miyako Shima mission Lieutenant GeneralHolland M. Smith observed, "It is unnecessary, practicallyin a rear area, and its capture will cost more than Iwo Jima."General Smith no longer served in an operational capaci-ty, but his assessment of amphibious plans still carriedweight. The JCS finally canceled both operations, andGeneral Buckner had unrestricted use of his Marines onOkinawa. By then he had decided to employ them in thesame fashion as his Army divisions.

Buckner did avail himself of the 8th Marines from the2d Marine Division, employing it first in a pair of amphibi-ous landings during 3-9 June to seize outlying islands forearly warning radar facilities and fighter direction centersagainst kamikaze raids. The commanding general then at-tached the reinforced regiment to the 1st Marine Divisionfor the final overland assaults in the south.

Buckner also consented to the 6th Marine Division's re-quest to conduct its own amphibious assault across an es-tuary below Naha to surprise the Japanese Naval GuardForce in the Oroku Peninsula. This was a jewel of an oper-ation in which the Marines used every component of am-phibious warfare to great advantage.

Ironically, had the amphibious landings of the 77th Di-vision on le Shima or the 6th Marine Division on Orokubeen conducted separately from Okinawa they would bothrate major historical treatment for the size of the forces,smart orchestration of supporting fires, and intensity offighting. Both operations produced valuable objectives —airfields on le Shima, unrestricted access to the great portof Naha — but because they were ancillary to the larger cam-paign the two landings barely re pãMng mention. Asevents turned out, the Oroku operation would be the finalopposed amphibious landing of the war.


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band and ran up the American flagat Tenth Army headquarters. Thelong battle had finally run its course.

sity of "commanding from the front:'"1 told him the end is in sight," saidShepherd, "for God's sake don't ex-pose yourself unnecessarily:' Lieu-tenant Colonel August C. Larsontook over the 22d Marines.

When news of Buckner's deathreached the headquarters of theThirty-second Army in its cliff-sidecave near Mabuni, the staff officersrejoiced. But General Ushijima main-tained silence. He had respectedBuckner's distinguished military an-cestry and was appreciative of thefact that both opposing commandershad once commanded their respec-tive service academies, Ushijima atZama, Buckner at West Point. Ushiji-ma could also see his own end fastapproaching. Indeed, the XXIVCorps' 7th and 96th Divisions werenow bearing down irab1yon theJapanese command post. On 21 JuneGenerals Ushijima and Cho orderedColonel Yahara and others to savethemselves in order "to tell the army'sstory to headquarters;' then conduct-ed ritual suicide.

General Geiger announced the endof organized resistance on Okinawathe same day. True to form, a finalkikusui attack struck the fleet thatnight and sharp fighting broke outon the 22d. Undeterred, Geiger brokeout the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing

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There was little elation among theexhausted Marines in southernOkinawa at the official proclamationof victory. The residual death,throesof the Thirty-second Army kept thebattlefield lethal. The last of Gener-al Ushijima's front-line infantry mayhave died defending Kunishi Ridgeand Yuza Dake, but the remaining

ggQof support troops soldtheir lives dearly to the last. In theclosing period 17-19 June, die-hardJapanese survivors wounded MajorEarl J. Cook, CO of 1/22; MajorWilliam C. Chamberlin, S-3 of the


This is the last photograph taken of LtGen Simon B. Buckner, Jr., USA, right, be-fore he was killed on 19 June, observing the 8th Marines in action on Okinawafor the first time since the regiment entered the lines in the drive to the south.

END OF ORGANIZEDRESISTANCE IN IlIAC ZONE

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8th Marines; and Lieutenant ColonelE. Hunter Hurst, CO of 3/7. Even thetwo Marines who had survived solong in the shell crater on Sugar Loafsaw their luck run out in the finaldays. Private First Class Bertoli diedin action. A Japanese satchel chargeseriously wounded Corporal Day, re-quiring an urgent evacuation to thehospital ship Solace.

Okinawa proved extremely costlyto all participants. More than 100,000Japanese died defending the island,although about 7,000 uncharac-teristically surrendered at the end.Native Okinawans suffered the most.Recent studies indicate as many as150,000 died in the fighting, a figurerepresenting one third of the island'spopulation. The Tenth Army sus-tained nearly 40,000 combat casual-ties, including more than 7,000Americans killed. An additional26,000 "non-battle" casualties oc-curred; combat fatigue cases account-ed for most of these.

Marine Corps casualties overall —ground, air, ships' detachments —exceeded 19,500. In addition, 560members of the Navy Medical Corpsorganic to the Marine units werekilled or wounded. General Shepherddescribed the corpsmen on Okinawa

as "the finest, most courageous menthat I know . . . . they did a mag-nificent job." Three corpsmenreceived the Medal of Honor (seesidebar). As always, losses within theinfantry outfits soared out of propor-tion. Colonel Shapley reported loss-es of 110 percent in the 4th Marines,which reflected both the addition ofreplacements and their high attritionafter joining. Corporal Day of 2/22experienced the death of his regimen-tal and battalion commanders, plusthe killing or wounding of two com-pany commanders, seven platooncommanders, and every other mem-ber of his rifle squad in the battle.

The legacy of this great battle canbe expressed in these categories:

• Foreshadow of Invasion ofJapan. Admiral Spruance describedthe battle of Okinawa as "a bloody,hellish prelude to the invasion ofJapan." As protracted a nightmare asOkinawa had been, every survivorknew in his heart that the next bat-tles in Kyushu and Honshu would beincalculably worse. In a nutshell, theplans for invading Japan specified theKyushu landings would be executedby the surviving veterans of Iwo Jimaand Luzon; the reward of the Okina-wa survivors would be the landing

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on the main island of Honshu. Mostmen grew jtic.. nobody's luckcould last through such

Amphibious Mastery. By coin-cidence, the enormous and virtual-ly flawless amphibious assault onOkinawa occurred 30 years to themonth after the colossal disaster atGallipoli in World War I. By 1945 theAmericans had refined this difficultnaval mission into an art form.Nimitz had every possible advantagein place for Okinawa — a proven doc-trine, specialized ships and landingcraft, mission-oriented weapons sys-tems, trained shock troops, flexiblei\ogistics, unity of command. Every-thing clicked. The massive projectionof 60,000 combat troops ashore onL-Day and the subsequent series ofsmaller landings on the surroundingislands represented the f.1i�n of adoctrine earlier constahare-brained or suicidal.

Attrition Warfare. Disregardingthe great opportunities for surpriseand maneuver available in the am-phibious task force, the Tenth Armyconducted much of the campaign forOkinawa in an unimaginative, attri-tion mode which played into thestrength of the Japanese defenders.An unrealistic reliance on firepowerand siege tactics prolonged the fight-ing and increased the costs. The land-ings on le Shima and OrokuPeninsula, despite their successful ex-ecutions, comprised the onlydivision-level amphibious assaultsundertaken after L-Day. Likewise, thefew night attacks undertaken by Ma-rine and Army forces achieved un-common success, but were notencouraged. The Tenth Army squan-dered several opportunities for tac-tical innovations that could havehastened a breakthrough of the ene-my defenses.

Joint Service. The squabble be-tween the 1st Marine Division andthe 77th Division after the Marinesseized Shun Castle notwithstanding,the battle of Okinawa representedjoint service cooperation at its finest.This was General Buckner's greatest


Okinawa's caves behind front lines were used as temporary hospitals for emergen-cy operations and treatment, at times when casualties could not be rushed to therear or to a hospital ship standing in the transport area off of the landing beaches.

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mand all Marine Corps bases on theisland.

During the taping of the 50th an-niversary commemorative video ofthe battle, General "Brute" Krulakprovided a fitting pitJ3 to the Ma-rines who fell on Okinawa. Speak-ing extemporaneously on camera, hesaid

The cheerfulness with whichthey went to their death hasstayed with me forever. What isit that makes them all the same?I watched them in Korea, I

watched them in Vietnam, andit's the same. American youthis one hell of a lot better thanhe is usually credited.


1st Division Marines and 7th InfantryDivision soldiers cheer exuberantly atOkinawa atop Hill 89, where the Thirty-second Army commander took his life.

achievement, and General Geigercontinued the sense of teamwork af-ter Buckner's death. Okinawa re-mains a model of interservicecooperation to succeeding genera-tions of military professionals.

• First-Rate Training. The Marineswho deployed to Okinawa receivedthe benefit of the most thorough andpractical advanced training of thewar. Well-seasoned division andregimental commanders, anticipatingOkinawa's requirements for cavewarfare and combat in built-up areas,conducted realistic training and re-hearsals. The battle produced fewsurprises.

• Leadership. Many of those Ma-rines who survived Okinawa wenton to positions of top leadership thatinfluenced the Corps for the next twodecades or more. Two Commandantsemerged — General Lemuel C. Shep-herd, Jr., of the 6th Marine Division,and then-Lieutenant Colonel LeonardF. Chapman, Jr., CO of 4/11. OliverP. Smith and Vernon E. Megee roseto four-star rank. At least 17 othersachieved the rank of lieutenant gener-al, including George C. Axtell, Jr.;Victor H. Krulak; Alan Shapley; andEdward W. Snedeker. And CorporalJames L. Day recovered from hiswounds and returned to Okinawa 40years later as a major general to corn-

52* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 440-649/4000 1

For Extraordinary Heroism

T he Secretary the Navy awarded Presidential Unit Citations to the 1stand i Ii Marine Divisions, the 2d Marine .Aircraft Wing, and MarineObservation Squadron Three VMO-3 for "cxir.iordinarv heroism in ac-

tion against encmyJapancsc l.ries during the invasion of Okinawa." Marine Oh-sersation 'qLIadron Six also received the award as a specified airached unit tothe 6th Marine Division.

On an individual basis, 23 servicemen received the Medal I Honor fr :11 -dons pcrtrnicd during the battle. Thirteen I these went to the Marines andtheir organic Navy corpsmen. nine to Army troops, and one to a \avy officer.

Within IlIAC. 10 Marines and 3 corpsmen re eivcl the awaid. Eleven the1 ',urc posthumous awards. Most. if not all, deceased Medal ul Honor ret iplentshave had either U.S. Navy ships or Niajitte Corps installations named in theirhonor. The Okinawa Medal of Ilonor awardees were:

Corporal Richard E. Bush, LSMC. 1/i: HA 1/c Robert E. Bush. USN, 2I:Maj Henry A. Courtney,Jr.. LISMC, 2122: *Corporaljohn P. Fardv, USML. 1/1:

*PFC William A. Faster, L'SMC, 311: PFC Harold Gonsalves, USMC. 15; *PhM

2k \Xilliam D. Halyhurton. USN, 2/5:*Pvr Dale NI Hansen, USNIC, 2/1;*Corporal I.uisJ. Hauge.Jr.. USMC. 1/1; *sgt Elbert L Kinser, USMC. 3/1;11A 1/c Fred F. Lester, USN. 1/22: *pvt Robert M. NIJureous.Jr., USMC, 3/2t):and *PFC Albert F. Schwab, 1*MC. 1/5.

Posthumous award

So u vcesThe Washington National Records Center in

Suitland, Maryland, holds primary documentsof the Okinawa campaign. The III Amphibi-ous Corps After Action Report provides the bestoverview, while reports of infantry battalionscontain vivid day-by-day accounts. The MarineCorps Oral History Collection contains 36 in-terviews with Okinawa veterans, among themLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.; Pedro A. del Valle;Alan Shapley; Edward W. Snedeker; and Wil-burt S. Brown. The Marine Corps HistoricalCenter also holds Oliver P. Smith's outspokenaccount of his Okinawa experiences as MarineDeputy Chief of Staff, Tenth Army, as well asthe original interrogation report of ColonelHiromichi Yahara, Operations Officer of theJapanese Thirty-second Army.

Among the official histories, the most use-ful are Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw,Jr., Victory and Occupation, vol V, Historyof U.S. Marine Corps Operations in WorldWar II (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div,HQMC, 1968); Charles J. Nichols, Jr., andHenry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in thePacific (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div,HQMC, 1955); and Roy E. Appleman, et al,Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington:OCMH, Department of the Army, 1948).Two excellent unit histories provide detail andflavor: George McMillan, The Old Breed: AHistory of the 1st Marine Division in WorldWar II and Bevan G. Cass, History of the 6thMarine Division (Washington: Infantry Jour-nal Press, 1948). Jeter A. Isley and Philip A.Crowl provide an analytical chapter onOkinawa in U.S. Marines and AmphibiousWar (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1951). Robert Sherrod provides lively cover-age of Marine Air units in the campaign inhis History of Marine Corps Aviation inWorld War II (Washington: Combat ForcesPress, 1948).

More recent accounts of note include Ge-orge Feifer, Tennozan: The Battle of Okina-wa and the Atomic Bomb (New York:Ticknor & Fields, 1992), and Thomas M.Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June1945 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. ArmyCommand and Staff College, 1990). A par-ticularly dramatic, first-person account is 'AHill Called Sugar Loaf" by lstSgt Edmund H.DeMar, USMC (Ret), in I.eatherneck (Jun95).

The author benefited from interviews withLtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), BGenFrederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret), Mr.Benis M. Frank, and Dr. Eugene B. Sledge.

The author is also indebted to MajGenJames L. Day, USMC (Ret) and LtCol OwenT. Stebbins, USMCR (Ret), for extended per-sonal interviews—and to the entire staff ofthe Marine Corps Historical Center for itsprofessional, courteous support.

C olonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret),served 29 years on active duty as an assault

amphibian officer, including two tours in Viet-nam and service as Chief of Staff, 3d Marine Di-vision, in the Western Pacific. He is adistinguished graduate of the Naval War Collegeand holds degrees in history from North Caroli-na, Jacksonville, and Georgetown.

Colonel Alexander, an independent historianin Asheville, North Carolina, wrote Closing In:

Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima and Across the Reef: The Marine Assault onTarawa in this series. His book, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (An-napolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), won the 1995 General Wallace M. GreeneAward of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. He is also co-author (with Lieu-tenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett) of Sea Soldiers in the Cold War (Annapolis:Naval Institute Press, 1983).

945 iøWORLD WAR II

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part bya grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information

Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1996PCN 190 003135 00

AA:n.I C

Documents

Yamato. Huntington swept Final Campaign... · LSM-120 one midnight when a kamikaze appeared "out of nowhere, gliding in low with its engine cut off—like a giant bat:' The plane