Xi Jinping and Continuing Political Reform in China · Xi Jinping and Continuing Political Reform in China Brantly Womack1 # Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese

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Journal of Chinese Political Science ISSN 1080-6954 J OF CHIN POLIT SCIDOI 10.1007/s11366-017-9486-7

Xi Jinping and Continuing Political Reformin China

Brantly Womack

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Xi Jinping and Continuing Political Reform in China

Brantly Womack1

# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2017

Abstract When Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party ofChina (CPC) in 2012 he faced the major tasks of fighting corruption, getting beyondthe stymied collective leadership of Hu Yaobang, structural reform of the economy, andpromoting the rule of law. In his first term Xi has made significant progress in all theseareas through his presidential style of leadership, though not without problems. The keytask of his likely second term (the 19th Central Committee (CC), 2017–2022) will be toestablish a Bnew normal^ of leadership structure and habits that will provide politicalcontinuity for a moderately prosperous China and a CPC entering its second century.The changes are foreshadowed in the documents of the Sixth Plenum of the 18th CCreleased in November 2016.

Keywords NewNormal . Normalization . Xi Jinping . Political Reform . Succession

When Xi Jinping first used the term Bnew normal^ in 2014 to describe China’s futureoutlook, his focus was on the economy [24]. But the notion of China moving from aperiod of rapid change to a more extended era of more moderate and institutionalizedchange can be applied to China’s external relationships as well as to its economicdevelopment [23]. Although the outlook for China’s continuing political developmentis less clear, dimensions of both the Bnew^ and the Bnormal^ can be found.

The term of the 19th Central Committee, 2017–2022, will also be, unless accidentintervenes, the second term of Party Secretary and President Xi Jinping. Xi sees himselfand his mission as leading the renovation of CPC leadership and of the Party itself inorder to sustain its role as a governing party. Although Xi’s orientation is toward thefuture and the BChina dream,^ his political task is to modify the momentum of politicaldevelopment that he inherited in 2012. In his first term, Xi laid out several compre-hensive and dramatic general directives of reform. Most impressively, the 3rd plenumof the 18th CC presented a blueprint for economic reform, and the 4th plenum

J OF CHIN POLIT SCIDOI 10.1007/s11366-017-9486-7

* Brantly [email protected]

1 Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22014, USA

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presented one for rule of law. But even more notable was the new, Bpresidential^ vigorthat Xi brought to his role at General Secretary.

The novelty of the Bnew normal^ in Xi Jinping’s leadership structure consists ofthree conscious inflection points in the political development of the CPC. First, the 6thplenum’s documents present themselves as a necessary update to the 1980 BSomeGuidelines on the Party’s Political Life,^ hence a new definition of a post-post CulturalRevolution era. Second, they are also a move beyond the post-Tiananmen caution ofDeng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Last and most obviously, they attempt to establishmore effective central control that was possible under Hu Jintao. Looking forward, Xiis planning for the Bdouble hundred^ anniversaries, the 100th birthday of the CPC,which will occur in the 5th year of the 19th CC, and the 100th anniversary of the PRC,which will occur 28 years later in the 3rd year of the 25th CC, if all stays on schedule.

There are also many continuities in the new normal. Indeed, even the most strikinginnovation, the designation of Xi Jinping as Bcore leader,^ is a return to an earlierpattern. The greatest continuity is with the commitment to presidential leadership and tothe grand plans in economic restructuring and rule of law laid out in the 3rd and 4thplenums of the 18th CC. But continuity is not static. The challenge of the 18th CCwas to outline the tasks and to organize around Xi. The challenge of the 19thCC will be for Xi and his CC to implement the general directives. The newchallenge of continuity—present in 2017 and increasing in importance to2022—will be the institutionalization of succession.

While reform of the political leadership structure has its own logic and develop-mental path, it is also responsive to the substantive tasks of sustainable governance.These tasks have economic, political, and societal dimensions. Less obvious, but alsocrucial over the time frame of the double hundreds, is the task of permanent meta-constitutional arrangements for Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The Basic Laws ofthe Special Autonomous Regions (SARs) run out in 2047 and 2049 respectively, and itcan be expected that these will set a clock for more permanent arrangements for theRepublic of China on Taiwan as well. Lastly, and related, the challenges of sustainablegovernance have regional and global dimensions.

The documents of the 6th plenum of the 18th CC present a preliminary view of thedirections of political development that can be expected in the term of the 19th CC [3,4]. Even the official Chinese press notes that their most dramatic feature is thedesignation of Xi as Bcore of central leadership (以习近平同志为核心的党中央身体)^[25]. However, the purpose of the documents is to provide a new comprehensivere-casting of Party relationships and discipline. In doing so, continuity far out-weighs novelty, but the 6th Plenum does indicate a new stage in the momentum ofChina’s political development. Part of the prospective innovations of the 19th CCwill be the implementation and hence normalization of strong executive leader-ship. Another part will be policies and actions coping with the process of succes-sion at the 20th CC.

The first section of this paper will address the inflection point of the 6th Plenum and,prospectively, the 19th CC. How are the vectors of political development from 1980,from 1992, and from 2011 bent and reformulated? Thus the first section concentrateson the Bnew^ of the Bnew normal.^ The second section addresses the tasks of imple-mentation and institutionalization that lies before the 19th CC. This can be seen as thetask of the normalization of Xi Jinping’s CPC. The final section discusses briefly the

Womack B.


substantive challenges of sustainable governance facing the party-state in the new era.The most immediate problems are the domestic issues of economic, political, andsocietal sustainability. But also increasingly important will be the problem of a suitableand sustainable incorporation of Greater China. This challenge, both domestic andexternal at the same time, will greatly affect the further challenge of China’s regionaland global roles.

The 19th CC as a Bend in Several Roads

The 6th Plenum and 19th CC can be viewed simply as the consolidation of Xi Jinping’sleadership of the CPC, with his designation as the core of CPC leadership providingpublic confirmation. However, it is useful to view them in the broader perspective ofCPC development. To a great extent, the general organizational challenge facing Xi isthe same as the one Deng saw in 1979: BOnce a political line has been set, it has to beconcretely implemented by people, and the results will vary depending on who does theimplementing^ [5: 197]. But the 6th Plenum sees itself as a readjustment of Party normsset after the Cultural Revolution, and it can also be contrasted with the cautiousleadership of the 1990s. Lastly, there is the contrast with the collective leadership ofthe 16th CC and 17th CC under Hu Jintao.

Beyond the Post-Cultural Revolution Recovery

In 1980 Deng Xiaoping and the rest of the rehabilitated leadership of the CPC faced theenormous task of reorienting the Party toward the task of socialist modernization andremoving the habits of violent ideological struggle from the Party’s political culture.The organizational product of this effort was the Party Constitution (党章) of 1982, butthe main document of the attempt to redefine the Party life was BSome Guidelines onthe Party’s Political Life^ adopted by the 5th Plenum of the 11th CC in 1980 [2]. Whilethe language of BSome Guidelines^ still shows traces of Cultural Revolution ideolog-ical tension, its main purpose is to re-establish an effective leadership order gearedtoward practical progress. Rather than replacing the leftism of the Gang of Four with anequally extreme lurch in the opposite direction, it criticizes its methods of struggle andfactionalism, condemns individual dictatorship, and supports both parts of democraticcentralism.

The 1980 BSome Guidelines^ sets the stage for the replacement of Cultural Revo-lution two-line struggle with a middle path of requiring commitment to reform andopenness on the one hand and to Party leadership and orthodoxy on the other [17]. Thekey organizational problem was bringing in new leaders, removing Cultural Revolutionholdovers who would obstruct reform, and easing out older leaders who had justreturned to power but were ineffective [5]. As the Cultural Revolution receded andthe reforms deepened, the middle path became broader, but tensions grew between themore conservative leaders such as Chen Yun and the most progressive ones such asZhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang [27]. While Deng Xiaoping was critical of Mao’s over-concentration of power and therefore he generally took a back seat in official positionsand in routine policy, he remained decisive in major policy innovations such as Bonecountry, two systems^ and in leadership crises [18]: [477–522].



Deng Xiaoping was famously pragmatic about ideology, but only in the service ofthe new goal of modernization. His attitude is well expressed by his famous saying, BItdoesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.^ He wasindifferent to the color of the cat, but not to its performance. BFreeing thought^ (解放思

想) was necessary because leftism had been critical of the prerequisites of growth.While Deng’s early encouragement of science and higher education was crucial to therapid progress of modernization [15], he was not interested in freedom of thought perse. As he said in 1980:

BIt is absolutely impermissible to propagate freedom of speech, of the press, ofassembly, and of association in ways implying that counter-revolutionaries mayalso enjoy them, and it is absolutely impermissible to make contacts with counter-revolutionaries and other criminals unbeknownst to the Party organization [6]:[238].

The Bnew circumstances^ that led to the 6th Plenum’s reformulation of the 1980Guidelines were the emergence of an all-round laxness in the CPC, especially amonghigh and mid-level leadership. While the 6th Plenum appreciated the post-CulturalRevolution reestablishment of order and decency in Party life, it saw the current task ofthe Party’s core leadership as the restoration of discipline. Catching mice is stillimportant, but there must be some red in the color of the cat. Thought has been freedalready, the current task is to discipline it. This has some resonance with Mao Zedong’scritique of Bpeople in power going the capitalist road,^ but it is not a call to Bbombardthe headquarters.^ Instead, it is a Leninist attempt to enforce and institutionalizeorganizational discipline—Bbind the bureaucrats.^ Throughout the Regulations theemphasis is on obedience to the Party and to the Central Committee. As Yang Xuedongnotes in this volume, the mentality of center-local relations has shifted from the morepermissive approach of Bcrossing the river by feeling the stones (摸着石头过河)^ toBacting according to upper-level plans (顶层设计).^

It is notable that there is no safe zone from Party discipline (党内监督没有禁区、没有

例外), and the Politburo and CC are explicitly mentioned as levels where exemplaryconduct is required [4, Chapter 1, Article 3]. Although conformity to Party and Stateconstitutions and laws replaces the mass struggle of the Cultural Revolution, wavererscan expect to be embarrassed and to sweat (B红红脸、出出汗^) in their criticism andself-criticism sessions [4, Chapter 1, Article 7]. The motivation for discipline is notsimply to improve top-down effectiveness. It is also to enhance the Party’s credibilityamong the people. Moreover, the democratic side of democratic centralism and theimportance of inner-party democracy are reaffirmed, including respect for elections forParty congresses and representatives [3, point 7]. Perhaps the wholesale invalidation ofLiaoning Province’s people’s congress elections are a reflection of the new emphasis onelectoral discipline [8]. If so, it is just in time for the sequence of elections leading up tothe 19th Party Congress.

Beyond the Caution of the 1990s

The events of May 1989 were a general shock to CPC leadership. There was theuncontrollable spontaneity of the demonstrators, but also the open factional struggle

Womack B.


between Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang, followed by the bloody crackdown and byinternational sanctions. The subsequent caution was also general. Deng’s advice toBkeep a low profile^ was focused primarily on international relations, but the CPC wasalso careful to disperse possible embers of a new prairie fire and to expand the reach ofthe Party into society, most obviously by admitting entrepreneurs under Jiang Zemin’sBThree Represents^ formula. Notable also was the lack of open factional quarrellingdespite Deng’s return to reform policies in 1992 and the relatively autonomousleadership in their own spheres of responsibility of Jiang, Zhu Rongji, and Li Peng.Behind all of this caution was the awareness of the Party’s mortality made vivid byTiananmen.

By contrast, Xi Jinping is Bstriving for achievements^ in international relations. TheSilk Road Initiative (also called BOne Belt One Road^ –OBOR) and the AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are two of his most spectacular new projects.In domestic policy the record is more mixed. He seems more determined to disciplinedissent and to prevent the circulation of heterodox ideas and information. Meanwhile,his presidential style of leadership precludes the autonomy of other officials and lowerlevels of governance. He is the core; they are the periphery. He certainly does notencourage factionalism, which in 1986–89 became an increasingly serious problem, buthis method of preventing factionalism is not to allow other centers of either power or ofpublic attention. While Xi Jinping’s political centrality is sometimes compared toDeng’s, Deng was content with being the last word in leadership, while Xi often seemsto be the whole conversation.

Beyond the Consultative Leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao

Hu Jintao’s time as General Secretary got off to a slow start in 2002 because of thereluctance of Jiang Zemin to relinquish power. Hu’s succession depended on new rulesregarding age limits and succession in the Politburo, and he himself was respectful ofthese new implicit rules [12, 19]. Although important policies such as BDevelop theWest^ and rural relief were implemented during his time in office, there was a generalfeeling of frustration with the pace of reform, especially in Hu’s second term. It wasthought that there were too many players who had veto powers in their areas of interest,and while the GDP grew fast, corruption seemed to grow faster. Premier Wen Jiabaoplayed a prominent role in public leadership, but although he sometimes voiced hisown opinions there was not a return to the hostile factionalism of the late 1980s.

However, the rise of Bo Xilai was a new phenomenon in top-level politics, as washis sudden and spectacular fall. Bo was not primarily engaged in factional struggleswith other potential leaders. Rather, he was building a populist image that might drivehim to the top. Without the defection of his police chief Wang Liqun to the Americanconsulate in Chengdu it is impossible to know how successful Bo might have been. Asit was, the detention and removal of Bo from February 2012 to his trial in August 2013gave the central leadership a prolonged occasion to consider the attractions of populismand its risks.

The bend in the road between Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping is the most obvious of thethree inflections. Given the frustration with inaction under Hu and the cloud created byBo, it is hardly surprising that Xi Jinping would begin his leadership with a bang. Hisapproach was presidential rather than consultative. Moreover, it was accompanied by



an active public image of personal command and power, borrowing an element fromBo Xilai’s success. It is important to note, however, that Xi did not gain power througha factional victory. Ultimately his new style had the support or at least acquiescence ofthe rest of central Party leadership.

Xi did not publicly criticize Hu, and Hu’s signature slogan, the scientific concept ofdevelopment, is included in the 6th Plenum’s litany of approved sayings. Moreover,one can see the Central Asia part of the Silk Road Initiative as an internationalextension of Hu’s policies of developing the western provinces. Even the economicand legal initiatives of the 3rd and 4th Plenums have antecedents in Hu’s term, thoughthe fact that they had to be re-launched implies that the earlier attempts were non-starters. Most importantly, the level of crisis in Party life and discipline addressed byXi’s anti-corruption campaign and by the 6th Party Plenum imply that Hu left the Partyin serious disarray. Moreover, while Hu came and left power according to the new rulesof leadership circulation, it is unclear how much Xi owed to the rules, or how bindingthey are on him.

Toward the Double Hundred

While some changes in policy are reactions to the failures of earlier policies or to thenew problems that they generated, another reason to change direction is the adjustmentto new goals. Xi Jinping’s overall framing of the future, the BChina Dream,^ remainswithin the parameters of the hundred years of the preliminary stage of socialismarticulated by Zhao Ziyang at the 13 PC in 1988, and the emergence of the goal ofthe moderately prosperous society (小康) in the 1990s. But the specific Bhundreds^facing the new normal are important. The hundredth anniversary of the founding of theCPC will occur during the term of the 19th CC, and it will occasion long-termreflections on the Party’s future as well as on its past. The hundredth anniversary ofthe founding of the PRC in 2049 is several CCs down the road, but it coincides with atimeline for resolving temporary administrative arrangements such as the Basic Laws ofHong Kong and Macau and resolving the major problem left over from 1949, therelationship of the PRC to the ROC.

Normalization in the new Normal

BNormalization^ is a good word for recent developments in CPC leadership. It isstronger than Broutinization,^ which suggests only habituation to repetition, but it isweaker than Binstitutionalization,^ which implies that structures are created that controlthe actors. Normalization implies an expected course of action in certain situations—the Bnorm^—deviations from which are abnormal and thus can be considered deviantunless they are justified. Of course, normalization implies repetition, and eventually itcan be institutionalized. However, in the case of expectations such as the term and agelimits of Politburo membership, there have not been many repetitions, and the normsare not codified in CPC documents. Nevertheless, the expectations have becomenorms, and deviations must be justified. This is especially true for the 19th CC becauseof its general emphasis on overcoming laxness and its assertion that no one is aboveParty discipline.

Womack B.


Normalization as Continuity

Continuity is the most important dimension of normalization because what is notchanged from the past rises to a higher level of confident expectation. Clearly XiJinping remains committed to the party-state as China’s basic form of governance.Also, despite new emphasis on orthodox discipline, he remains committed to reformand the principal task of sustainable governance of development. His commitment toopenness is less clear, but he remains within the framework of the middle road ratherthan returning to a two-line struggle. The road just happens to be narrowing rather thanbroadening at the moment.

Change may or may not be an indication that normalization has occurred. Forexample, if an exception is made to the age limit in the Politburo but it is justified asan exceptional or ad hoc arrangement, then the normalization of the rule is implicitlyconfirmed, although only conditionally. If on the other hand, a rule like Bseven up, eightdown^ (67 is OK for promotion/retention to Politburo, 68 is too old), an expectationestablished only in 2002, is dismissed as Bfolklore,^ then it ceases to be a specific norm[1]. The question then arises of what are the new parameters of the CPC’s commitmentto top leadership circulation. The norm of a limit to two full terms, which is institu-tionalized for top state officials, including the Premier and President, is institutionalizedin the 1982 PRC Constitution, Articles 79 and 87. Thus if Xi Jinping were to continuein office as General Secretary for a third term in 2022 he would break the current agenorm by one year and also break the Party two-term norm. But if he wanted to continueas President as well in 2023 he would have to amend the PRC Constitution.

Normalizing the 18th CC

Normalization is an active process as well as a confirmation or delimitation ofcontinuity. Xi Jinping and the 19th CC will have a particularly strong interest in activenormalization because a major task will be the consolidation of the CPC and theimplementation of the general directives of the 18th CC plenums.

Although the documents of the 6th Plenum are the last of the general directives ofthe 18th CC, the tightening of Party discipline that they presage are crucial to thenormalization of the ongoing anti-corruption efforts begun in 2012. Moreover, theconsolidation of Party effectiveness under the personal leadership of Xi is key to theimplementation of the 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2021) passed by the 5th Plenum,the economic restructuring promised by the 3rd Plenum, and legal reformsoutlined by the 4th Plenum. These earlier Plenum documents of Xi’s first termcan be expected to operate as general guidelines for the practical work of execu-tion over the next five years.

An interesting and possibly problematic part of normalization is the confirmation ofXi Jinping’s status as the Bcore^ of CPC leadership, a designation first bestowed onJiang Zemin by Deng Xiaoping on 16 June 1989 [13]. On the one hand, it follows fromthe change from consensus leadership under Hu Jintao to presidential leadership underXi, and it is appropriate for the implementation tasks of the 19th CC. It implicitlyaffirms the tightening of central leadership structures around Xi. On the other hand, it isunclear whether the shift from consensus leadership to presidential leadership is itself anorm or whether it was a response to needs at the time. Moreover, if the affirmation of



core leadership is appropriate for the 19th CC because it represents an implementationphase, what about the 20th CC? Do the general directives of the 18th CC constitute themarching orders for the 19th CC alone, or for all subsequent CCs? Lastly, how personalis the designation of Xi Jinping as core leader? Does the 6th Plenum create a position ofcore leadership, currently filled by Xi Jinping, or does it give him a personal rank? Is Xithe implementer of the rule of law, and thus he must be obeyed, or is his rule law, andtherefore the laws must be obeyed? The 6th Plenum’s affirmation of collective leader-ship suggests the former, but core leadership is a very powerful and individual position.

Coping with Succession

The discussion of core leadership leads naturally to the problem of succession. Suc-cession is difficult enough in political systems with competitive elections, as the recentAmerican election has demonstrated. However, in competitive electoral systems thebasic problem of transitional governance is how to modulate discontinuity, while innon-competitive systems like China the problem is how to modulate continuity.Succession was one of the major problems that Deng Xiaoping coped with, and oneof the major sources of tension in the factionalism of the late 1980s. Hu Jintao was boththe personal and the normalized beneficiary of Deng’s efforts. Presumably Xi Jinping isbound by the same norms. However, there are not many examples of orderly successionin the PRC, and it is unclear how far they can be considered binding precedents.

If we consider the full range of norms that could be applicable to the succession ofXi Jinping in 2022, they would begin with the Politburo nominees of the 19th CC. AsAlice Miller has detailed, two patterns can be discerned at the Politburo level: the agelimit of 67, and promotion to the Standing Committee from the regular Politburo inorder of seniority.1 Because of their anticipated length of service, candidates for PartySecretary and Premier are exceptions to the latter norm. These norms and even theexception reflect general norms operative throughout the party-state. There are agethresholds at every level, and there is an extensive Breserve cadre^ system (后备干部)that pre-selects pools of promising officials for preparatory training and early promo-tion [16]. Thus the Politburo norms are not sui generis, but rather part of a generalcommitment to leadership circulation and a preference for preselected promotion.Though the details of the Politburo norms might change, a major deviation would callinto question the 6th Plenum declaration that there are no reserved spaces beyond thereach of Party norms.

Of course, even if the 19th CC designates a reserve General Secretary and a reservePremier, the next five years will be probationary for them as well as preparatory.Moreover, personal accidents and political crises might override prepared successions.The fates of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang are reminders thatthe status of being next in line can be precarious. Given the relative youth of potentialsuccessors, their personal authority will be rather limited, and they will dependprimarily on the strength of Party norms for eventual promotion. Of course, since thewhole Party operates under similar norms, there will be a collective expectation andinterest in the norms being followed.

1 Alice Miller [12]. I have consolidated her three patterns into two.

Womack B.


It is imaginable that the CC itself could play a livelier role in the selection of thePolitburo, its Standing Committee, and the General Secretary. In Vietnam the CCelections are open-ended and decisive. It is interesting that the greater role of CCdeliberations in Vietnam occasionally leads to deviations from age and term limitnorms, and sometimes to odd lengths of term in office, but the fact that opinions inthe CC count, as do those in the National Assembly, gives the national elite confidencein their voice in the system and hence support for its norms. It should be noted,however, that despite similarities in party-state systems Vietnam’s political culture isquite different from China’s. While there is no multi-party system and legitimateopposition to the Vietnamese Communist Party is not permitted, there is a greatersense of the legitimacy of personal and policy differences and the pursuit of thesedifferences without mortal risk.

The designation of Xi Jinping as core leader has led to concern inside and outsideChina that he would not abide by the two-term limit and would take a third term in2022. I think that this is unlikely. Although Xi will probably be in a stronger position ofpersonal power in 2021 than his predecessor as core Jiang Zemin was in 2001, it wouldbe a surprising step for him to excuse himself from the norms that he is vigorouslyenforcing. Even in a house of cards one must generally play by the rules. However, likeHu Jintao succeeding Jiang, Xi’s successor will be in a much weaker personal positiondespite his or her new office, and he or she will only reach the point of transfer ofpower if Xi is not in opposition. Thus the most likely smooth succession would begentle, and the successor would spend the first term continuing Xi’s policies whileconsolidating personal authority and establishing a distinctive policy identity.

Sustainable Governance

Chinese political development in the reform era has been determined as much by thechallenges and outcomes of governance as it has been by the evolution of internalnorms. Deng Xiaoping came back to power for the third and last time because of thepalpable bankruptcy of leftist governance and Hua Guofeng’s slow and problematicstart at changing direction. The consolidation of reform in the 1980s depended not onlyon new norms but on success in finding the stones to step on. The societal turbulence of1989 was linked to inflation and unemployment as well as to perceived openings tospontaneity opened by factional tensions. Hu Jintao’s frustrations in his second termwere exacerbated by the need to cope with the 2008 global financial crisis. It wouldhave been difficult for Hu to launch large infrastructural projects and to clamp down oncorruption at the same time. Likewise, the substantive problems of governance facingXi Jinping’s new normal will be as important as inner-Party norms in determiningpolicy and political development. While it is impossible to know what will happen, orwhat crises or accidents might occur, the general substantive challenges of governancecan be sketched.

Economic, Political, and Societal Sustainability

The primary task in economic policy for the 19th CC is to close the gap between thegrand plans of structural change laid out in the 3rd Plenum and the tactical responses to



crisis stabilization. The implementation of the 3rd Plenum certainly involves morereliance on market mechanisms and forces. However, it also requires continuing publicguidance of economic development toward a broad-based consumer economy andecologically sustainable growth [21]. Perhaps Zhu Rongji’s vigorous actions in the1990s can serve as a model of what can be done as well as a lesson in anticipating theeffects of dramatic intervention.

Politically, the greatest challenge of the 19th CC is to restore a sense of security toParty members and to the public at large without simply retreating from the anti-corruption initiatives. The campaign cycle of all-out mobilization followed by relaxa-tion and correction of excesses is very deeply embedded in CPC political culture. Itdates back to 1933 in the Jiangxi Soviet, and campaigns were quite effective inmobilizing scarce resources for undeniably important goals [20]: [161–169]. However,the campaign method faces a dilemma in the situation of a mature party-state. Either itbecomes formalized and repetitive, so that people wait for it to pass, or it prolongsuncertainty and becomes extreme and self-destructive. The solution to the dilemma is toreplace the fluctuation of the campaign cycle with the rule of law. With law, peopleknow what to expect. Not only can crimes be minimized and punished, but excessescan be avoided. People can know when they are safe. The rules of the 6th plenum go along way in laying out the normalization of discipline for Party members, and the 4thPlenum lays out important structural improvements in the general legal system. Imple-mentation is the next step.

The basic societal task is perhaps the most challenging of the domestic tasks. Theproblem is how to preserve and expand confidence in the authority of the people as therectification of the Party proceeds. According to the 1954 and 1982 PRC Constitutions,Article 2, BAll power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people.^ If therectification of the party-state is imagined primarily in terms of increasing its top-downefficiency and effectiveness, then the people benefit, but only as the passive beneficia-ries of better governance, not as the origin of its power. States with competitive partieshave many shortcomings and inefficiencies, but because the public participates inelections the public usually supports the system, whatever the result. The societalchallenge for an enmeshed party-state-society system is how to develop andencourage the feeling of popular authority within the system. There has beenprogress. The successes in basic-level democratization have been historic im-provements in face-to-face democracy. Reforms in inclusiveness, transparency,and informational openness improve the popular sense of involvement in gover-nance. Strengthening the people’s congress system and the autonomy of deputiesis also important. More is needed.

Greater China

The challenge of managing relationships with BGreater China^—Hong Kong, Macau,and Taiwan—might seem more remote, but the 19th CC will cover one-sixth of thetime between now and the end of the fifty-year term of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Apermanent arrangement needs to be worked out before 2047. Since all four are alreadyconstituted, successful political communities, with different paths of political andeconomic development, a sustainable solution acceptable to all would have to be ameta-constitution based on respect for the individuality of each.

Womack B.


The current challenge for CPC central leadership in Greater China relationships is tomake credible the PRC’s lasting commitment to the autonomy and welfare of allcomponents. For various reasons the sense of alienation has grown between themainland and Hong Kong and Taiwan during Xi Jinping’s first term. Polls show anincreasing number of citizens in both places consider themselves BHong Kongers andnot Chinese,^ or BTaiwanese and not Chinese.^ The dilemma of the individuation ofidentity and the economic necessity of integration is not likely to diminish [11].However, the gap between the horns of the dilemma can be modified. The basic tasksfor Beijing are to demonstrate respect for the individuality of the other components andto reduce the insecurity associated with integration. Xi Jinping’s handshake with MaYing-jeou was a historic step in the right direction. Also, the continuing restraint withregards to the countries still recognizing the Republic of China is a good sign. Furtheraction vis-à-vis Taiwan might be the reduction of military forces in Fujian. Beijing willachieve more by showing confidence in Taiwan’s mutually beneficial integration thanby threatening to use force against independence. The latter point is already made; theformer needs development.

Regional and Global Presence

The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States has injected a note ofprofound uncertainty into global politics for the next four years. While PresidentObama developed the prudent insight, BDon’t do stupid things,^ unfortunately heexpanded the capacity of the U.S. chief executive to do stupid things, and Trump hasshown the necessary imagination. Regardless of Trump’s policy initiatives, the foreignpolicy inexperience of Trump and his team is likely to lead to missteps and volatility.While as Xi Jinping has pointed out Bcooperation is the only correct choice,^ [26] theUnited States and China face each other as asymmetric rivals [23]. While cooperation isnecessary, some degree of competition is inevitable. More broadly, Trump’s victory is areflection and encouragement of a nativist reaction in the developed world at least.While it is not likely to reverse globalization, it is already adding to the noise, frictions,and difficulties of global politics.

Just as the global financial crisis of 2008 presented China with an opportunity for astabilizing global economic role, Trump’s election presents an opportunity to pursue astabilizing global political role. China’s interests and commitment on environmentalissues are not contingent on American commitments, and China will stand out as aglobal leader if the U.S. wavers. More generally, China has the advantage ofexperienced, consolidated leadership for the next five years. It cannot replace theU.S. as global hegemon because the global political economy is already post-hegemonic [14], but the steadiness and quality of its global posture shouldincrease its general prestige.

China has undertaken massive regional initiatives during the 18th CC, and the 19thCC will have to cope with the challenges of following through. This will not be easy,because programs such as the Silk Road Initiative and AIIB involve committing largeamounts of money to infrastructure projects in other countries. The projects themselvesare certainly praiseworthy, and they have drawn the support of most neighbors. If theyeventually succeed, they will add a transformative new dimension to Asia’s connectiv-ity infrastructure that would be China-centered but inclusive [9].



The challenge faced by the 19th CC will be implementing these initiatives under theconstraints of the new normal. Transformative change is easier to imagine and topromise than it is to deliver. With slower growth at home, led by services, the moneyallocated to regional initiatives might seem excessive. Moreover, one problem withinfrastructural investment is that it is slow to show results. The initiatives need to beginwith low-hanging fruit that can be completed quickly and show clear benefits. Lastly,large infrastructural project involve slippage—corruption, cost overruns, delays, and soforth [7]. The transnational dimension of regional projects exacerbates these difficulties[10]. Despite these anticipated problems, however, the regional projects are not likely tobe total failures, but instead limited successes.

While regional development projects might be more stressful in Xi Jinping’s secondterm than in his first, the opposite could be true of regional security relationships. From2008 Japan and Southeast Asia were particularly anxious about China’s regionalintentions, in part because of the global turbulence of the times [22]. China’s slowerrate of growth will be in line with the growth rates of other developing countries,including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Therefore, the earlier image will fade of Chinasurging forward while the rest of the world steps backward. The actions of PresidentDuterte of the Philippines and also uncertainties about Trump’s policies might providespecific opportunities for China to prove to its neighbors that its intentions are Bwin-win^ and that it respects the interests and concerns of its neighbors.

Conclusion

BContinuity and change^ is the most over-used trope in political analysis because it isalways true. The problem with being more specific about Bwhat continuity?^ andBwhich changes?^ is that truth becomes more problematic, especially in anticipatingthe future. Nevertheless, the future, while occasionally unexpected, is not totallyrandom, and each step leaves from the previous footprint.

In the case of the term of the 19th CC and of its core leader, Xi Jinping, continuity islikely to be the principal aspect of the primary contradiction, as Mao might put it.Consolidations strengthen changes already begun, and tasks of implementation pre-sume pre-existing directions. The economic new normal enhances the second-termrhythm of continuity. The material substratum of political development is likely toremain more stable. Moreover, China’s anticipated growth will be less at variance withits neighbors and with the developing world more generally. But of course the futurealways looks more predictable than the past turned out to be.

The general challenge for the CPC in the 19th CC and beyond is how to live past100 and yet not become old. The philosopher Hegel described aging as a process ofhabituation in which actions that originally required conscious thought to completebecome, through repetition, unconscious skills. A baby must think through each step,but an adult simply walks. As one gets older, the proportion of one’s activity thatis still new and rational diminishes, and the capacity to do things other than theestablished routine atrophies. Increasingly one lives in a smoother but narrowinggroove. While social organizations have the advantage of renewing their mem-bership, they face an analogous problem of the increasing inconvenience ofadapting to new circumstances.

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Xi Jinping’s efforts at economic reform and rule of law reform, as well as his anti-corruption campaign and the 6th plenum Party discipline, can be seen as attempts torejuvenate the CPC by broadening its groove. Whether it is enough to adjust to thegovernance needs of a moderately prosperous and quite complex political communityremains to be seen.

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Brantly Womack is Professor of Foreign Affairs and holds the Miller Center’s C K Yen Chair at theUniversity of Virginia. He is the author of Asymmetry and International Relationships (Cambridge UniversityPress, 2016), China Among Unequals: Asymmetric International Relationships in Asia (World Scientific Press2010), and of China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge 2006), as well as other books andover a hundred articles and book chapters. He co-edited with Prof. Hao Yufan Rethinking the Triangle:Washington, Beijing, Taipei (University of Macau Press and World Scientific Press, 2016), and he editedChina’s Rise in Historical Perspective (Rowman and Littlefield 2010) and Contemporary Chinese Politics inHistorical Perspective (Cambridge 1991).

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Xi Jinping and Continuing Political Reform in China · Xi Jinping and Continuing Political Reform in China Brantly Womack1 # Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese