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P E R S P E C T I V E

OPERATION BLUE STAR 30 YEARS LATER

Punjab wa s scorched 30 summers ago, theburn still hurtsA whole new generation has come up since OperationBlue Star in 1984, which set Punjab on the path of bitterness that continues to this day. Many in India aswell as abroad have only heard tales of whattranspired immediately before and during the assaulton the Golden Temple complex. Not all accounts areunbiased or informed. The Tribune attempts to puttogethe r the chain of inglorious events in an objectiveperspective, based on narrations and c laims of peopled irectly involved in the Operation.by Ka nwar Sandhu

T HIRTY years ago, Punjab was on the boil. In June 1984,the the n Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, ordered Operat ionBlue Star to flush out the head of Damdami Taksal, JarnailSingh Bhindranwale, and his band of armed followers fromthe precincts of the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Whatfollowed was a bloodbath, the stains of which have notbeen washed off even in three decades.

TW O DECADES AND A HALF

LOOKING FOR A CLOSURE

KEY CO MBATANTS

SUNDAY SPECIALSOPINIONS

PERSPECTIVEGROUND ZERO

J&K

Whats the politics behind Art 370A can of worms has been opened following a statement by a BJP minister onthe abrogation of Article 370 which gives J&K special status. While the BJPseeks a debate , the regional parties are opposed to it. At the core is thestates integration with India.by A run Joshi

I T was a race to seize the ownership on the BJPs longstanding demand for theabrogation of Article 370 that made the Minister of State in the Prime MinistersOffice, Jitender Singh, commit on Tuesday that the process to repeal Article 370 hadbegun, triggering a furore.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS UNDER T HE ART ICLEWHAT PART IES STAND FOR

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OPERATION BLUE STAR 30 YEARS LATER Punjab was scorched 30 summers ago, the burn still

hurtsA whole new generation has come up since Operation Blue Star

in 1984, w hich set Punjab on the pa th of bitterne ss thatcontinues to this day. Ma ny in India a s we ll as a broa d have onlyheard tales of what transpired immediately before and during

the assa ult on the Golden T emple complex . Not all accounts ar eunbiased o r informed. T he T ribune attempts to put together thechain of inglorious eve nts in an o bjective pe rspective, base d on

narra tions a nd claims of peo ple directly involved in the Ope ration.by Kanwar Sandhu

THIRTY years ago, Punjab was on the boil.In June 1984, the then Prime Minister,Indira Gandhi, ordered Operation Blue Starto flush out the head of Damdami Taksal,Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, and his band of armed followers from the precincts of t heGolden Temple in Amritsar. What followedwas a bloodbath, the stains of which havenot been washed off even in threedecades.

Operation Blue Star marked a watershed incont emporary history. The Sikh psychewas bruised. Indira Gandhi was killed,spiralling widespread violence against Sikhsin the National Capital of Delhi andelsewhere. Hindus and Sikhs, whosebonding appeared intrinsic, stood polarised.Instead of stemming violence, the militaryact ion in Punjab sent the region into t he throes of a crisis of unimaginableproportions, lasting more than a decade. Reprisals continued to claim valuable livesfor years and among the innumerable people who fell to assassins bullets were aretired Army Chief, General A.S. Vaidya, and Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh.

Three dec ades later, t he Operation still rankles. T he outrage and bruise may havediminished but it has not gone away. The anguish appears to have not only spilledover to the next generations of Sikhs, it has got particularly amplified amongst t heSikh Diaspora abroad. Lt Gen Kuldip Singh Brar (retd), who as a Major General hadcarried out the Operation, continues to be their prime target. Though he lives in thehighly secured Mumbai Cantonment, he was attacked and knifed in London when heand his wife were on a visit there in September 2012. In fact, some recentrevelations of the possible involvement of the British Special Forces, the SAS, in therun-up to the 1984 military operation have fuelled their anger.

Two years ago, despite opposition from various quarters the Shiromani GurdwaraParbandhak Committee (SGPC) succumbed to pressure from radical Sikh groups tobuild a memorial in memory of those who died during the Army operation. Thistriggered a demand for another memorial for those who were killed by militants. Now,on the 30th anniversary, certain Sikh groups are demanding that the 1984 incident be

referred to as the third Sikh Ghalughara (holocaust) the previous ones being in1746 and 1762.

The Akal Takht building was destroye d in the Oper ation. Such was the anger of the Sikh comm unitythat the building which was repaired through a government sponsored kar seva was razed and anew structure built (right) through a massive voluntary "kar seva". Tribune photo: Vishal Kumar

Political shenanigans

Operation Blue Star was the culmination of a series of events in the 1970s and 80s.There was restiveness in Punjab, emanating from a clash between the mainstream

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Sikhs and the Nirankari sect in April 1978, which worsened over a litany of religiousand political demands raised by the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD). Gradually, the SADleadership of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, Gurcharan Singh Tohra and ParkashSingh Badal, which had taken a stringent stand over its demands with the Centre,found itself going along with the hardliners. The Congress then was plagued by rivalrybetween the factions owing allegiance to the then President of India, Giani Zail Singh,who had earlier been Union Home Minister, and former Punjab Chief Minister DarbaraSingh.

Referring to the uncertainty in Punjab, former Punjab Chief Secretary K.D. Vasudevasays that Giani Zail Singh had once compared the situation to the strewing of pagesof a book come unstuck (Punjab vich kitab da varqa-varqa khilrya hoya hai).

On the other hand, Bhindranwale, who till the Sikh-Nirankari clash had confinedhimself to dharam parchar (religious preaching), had by the end of 1983 begun towrest cont rol of events. By January 1984, the legend of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale,popularly referred to as Sant Bhindranwale, had attained a peak. Operating from hisheadquarters in Guru Nanak Niwas on the outer periphery of the Golden Templecomplex, he had come to epitomise the Sikh struggle started in the form of a DharamYudh Morcha by the Akali Dal in August 1982. As the Sikh face of the struggle, hewould address almost every evening a congregation of hundreds of supporters anddevotees at Manji Sahib Diwan Hall in the complex.

Initially hesitant to send the Army into the complex, Indira Gandhi reportedly exploredvarious opt ions, including sending commandoes into the complex. Recent reports evensuggest that the advice of the British Government and Britains elite Special Forceswas sought in early 1984. Opinion prevailed against a limited operation due to thedangers involved and the chances of success being slim. Meanwhile, as the powerstruggle within the Sikh groups intensified, Bhindranwale moved to Akal Takht with his

armed supporters in early 1984.Gandhi finally succumbed to the hardliners within her group of advisers to send theArmy in. Veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar recalls, Three or four days before theOperation was launched, she sent the then I&B Minister, HKL Bhagat, to me to ask if they should send the Army in. I told him that they should never send the Army intothe complex, which is the Vatican of the Sikhs. They will never forgive you.

The military action was preceded by hectic behind-the-scenes negotiations betweenthe Centre on one hand and the SAD leadership on the other. On and off, the Centreeven made some overtures to Bhindranwale through emissaries. A number of times,senior Akali leaders were taken out of jails where they were interned and flown toDelhi for secret confabulations. According to MPS Aulakh, a retired IPS off icer, whowas then an Assistant Director with the Intelligence Bureau in Amritsar, the last suchmeeting with Akali leaders was held on May 26, 1984 - six days before the Army wascalled out in Punjab. Interestingly, among those who negotiated for the Centre wasPranab Mukherjee, c urrent President of India (who was then a Congress leader), whilethe Akali leaders included Parkash Singh Badal. T he talks were inconclusive. T hat iswhen the die was cast and the then Western Army Commander, Lt Gen K. Sundarji,was asked to storm the complex.

Former MP Tarlochan Singh, who was a c lose aide of the late President Zail Singh,claims that when the final decision to storm the complex was taken, even thePresident was kept in the dark about it.

T he build-up

During the six months preceding the Operation, Bhindranwales ranks had swelled withvolunteers from the countryside, many of who were ex-soldiers as well as police andarmy deserters. The most prized catch was former Major General Shabeg Singh, oneof the heroes of the 1971 Indo-Pak war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Hewas feeling wronged due to, what he alleged, a false case of financial bunglingmade out against him. He had joined Bhindranwale and moved into the complex inMarch 1984. He was responsible for the ent ire fortification and build-up of militantswithin the c omplex. Besides, Bhindranwale had a c lose-knit group of confidants andarmed guards who had sworn to do and die for the Panth.

On the eve of the Operation, the Golden Temple complex had been turned into anarmed citadel by different militant groups. These included Damdami Taksal, All-IndiaSikh Students Federation, Babbar Khalsa, Dal Khalsa, Akhand Kirtani Jatha, and theAkal Federation. Though they were unable to prevent the inflow of arms andammunition into t he complex, t he Punjab Police and other sec urity agencies were ableto get a fairly accurate account of the weaponry being piled up inside the complex.Most of the weapons had been smuggled in from across the border and brought intothe complex in kar seva vehicles. Due to internecine war within militant groups,even certain SGPC officials and government agencies facilitated the inflow of weapons to arm their own men. As per a CID report of May 1984, the Bhindranwalegroups alone had 10 light machineguns (LMGs), four anti-aircraft guns, 25-30 SLRs(self-loading rifles), 100-125 carbines, 150-200 Sten guns, 250 rifles, 1500 HE-36

grenades, and 4,000-5,000 country- made grenades.

Alas, the Army did not take this information into consideration while preparing for thebattle. It presumed that t he militants only had antiquated guns.

After General Sundarji was given the go-ahead for the Operation on May 27 by theCentre, t he Army units c hosen for the Operation started heading for Amritsar. On t heevening of May 31, Major General (later Lt Gen) Kuldip Singh Brar, GOC of 9 Infantry



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Division in Meerut, who was then proceeding to Manila on holiday with his wife, wascalled to Chandimandir Cantonment near Chandigarh for a conference the followingmorning. The Western Command, which was then situated in Shimla, set up itsTactical Headquarters in Chandimandir. At the conference, General Brar was told of the impending task and told to submit his detailed plans to General Sundarji by June3. Meanwhile, it was decided to seal the border with Pakistan.

General Brar, known in military circles as Bulbul Brar, was specially hand-picked forthe Operation by General Sundarji. Belonging to an illustrious military family, he hadbeen decorated with the Vir Chakra in the 1971 war with Pakistan.

On June 1, things had begun to hot up in Amritsar and the CRPF and the BSF, whichhad occupied buildings around the Golden Temple complex, began to engage thearmed militants which had oc cupied c ertain towering struct ures around the c omplex inorder to size up t heir weaponry and deployment patte rn. By the evening, 11 peoplehad been killed, resulting in considerable tension.

On June 2, then Akali Dal president Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, SGPC PresidentGurcharan Singh Tohra and Akal Takht Jathedar Giani Kirpal Singh met to discuss thefiring on the previous day. The Akal Takht Jathedar and the Darbar Sahib HeadGranthi, Giani Sahib Singh, issued a strongly worded appeal to the Sikh Panth tosafeguard the sanctity of Darbar Sahib.

That evening, Indira Gandhi in her address to the nation made no reference of theArmy being called out but stated that the government could no longer remain a silentspectator to the sad happenings in Punjab. Soon after, at 10 pm, an AIR newsbulletin announced that the Army had been called out in view of civil disobedience inPunjab.

With the announcement the previous night, on June 3 the stage was set for themilitary operation at the Golden Temple complex. Due to the martyrdom day of GuruArjan Dev, hundreds of devotees had come especially to the complex that day. And inview of the ongoing Dharam Yudh Morcha, a fresh group of volunteers (jatha) hadalso come from Sangrur to court arrest.

Motives have been ascribed to the operation coinciding with the martyrdom day of Guru Arjan Dev. The government has explained that its decision was forced by anumber of fact ors, which included increasing incidents of violence; Akali Dal plan totake the civil disobedience movement to the next level by stopping food grains fromPunjab; reports of Bhindranwale planning to declare Khalistan on or about June 10 andits possible recognition by Pakistan; and intelligence reports of instruct ions havingbeen issued by militants on killing Hindus in Punjab countryside June 10 onwards.

On the other hand, many Sikhs have argued that the government claims had not beenauthenticated. They believe that an auspicious day was chosen for the attack to

teac h Sikhs a lesson, something that succ essive governments have denied.

The Army set up tac tical headquarters atop a building overlooking the c omplex. T hemain offensive was tasked to 350 Infantry Brigade under Brig D.V. Rao. The four unitstasked for the main operation were 10 Guards, 26 Madras, 12 Bihar and 9 Kumaon.

T he ba ttle

On June 4, while most of Punjab was asleep and a handful of devotees were engagedin the morning rituals, an Army rocket from a shoulder-held launcher slammed into theAkal Takht building at 4.40 am, shattering the serenity of the complex. Two more suchblasts soon after woke up the city residents.

An hour or two later, t he people in Punjab and Chandigarh woke up on t o a s tate-widecurfew and a complete news blackout. Phones (there were only landlines then) weredisconnected.

Intermittent firing continued the whole day and by the evening the power supply tothe complex was cut off. Militants who had taken up positions atop the water tankadjoining the c omplex were engaged by the Army and when the tank collapsed, t herewas panic in the area. Towards the evening, a publicity van of the districtadministration was seen making announcements in Punjabi, asking all those strandedinside the complex to come out with their hands raised. There were hardly any takersfor these appeals. Later, many of those who surrendered claimed that t hey had notheard the announcements. Army officials claimed that a few who tried to come outwere shot by militants from inside and their bodies could be seen lying in front of theGhanta Ghar main entrance of the complex.

Meanwhile, the Army was battle-ready for what it believed would be a quick surgicalstrike lasting a f ew hours. At a conference in Amritsar Cantonment, while mostofficers listened to General Brar intently as he laid out his plans, BSF DIG G.S.Pandher argued against the way the operation was planned. He warned that sincethe militants were highly motivated and well entrenched, there could be a bloodystalemate. He was, however, overruled and replaced overnight.

The stage was set for storming of the complex. A detachment of the Special FrontierForce (SFF) carrying special weaponry had also arrived in Amritsar. Even Naval divershad been airlifted and brought to Amritsar. Gas masks and CS gas canisters were alsobrought in to meet any eventuality.

On June 5 morning, Major General Brar visited various units taking part in theOperation. Meanwhile, the heavily fortified militants positions atop the two 18th



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century bungas on either side of the Langar building of the complex were blasted off by the Army using RCL guns and a 3.7-inch howitzer. This had the salutary eff ect andon the afternoon of June 5, about 120 men, women and children came out of DarbarSahib with their hands raised.

Within the complex, while Bhindranwale and his close associates, including the All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) president, Bhai Amrik Singh, stayed put insideAkal Takht, Shabeg Singh was seen by the Army sentries supervising thefortificat ions. All five storeys of t he Akal Takht building had been fortified and slitsmade in the marble slabs for firing automatic weapons.

It was at 7 pm on June 5 t hat General Brar issued the operational instruct ions forOperation Blue Star. T hese said t he operation would be in three phases c learing themilitant morchas around the complex, capturing the terrorists through simultaneousmilitary action and then repairing the damaged buildings before resuming the religiousservices. Nearly 50 gurdwaras in Punjab were also to be searched. Part of theoperation in Amritsar was to secure the sanctum sanctorum, Harmandar Sahib, bygetting divers and commandos to swim across the holy sarovar.

The plan was based on an assessment that there were about 2,000 militants insidethe complex, of which about 500 were hardcore. Six to eight tanks, eight BMPinfantry carrying vehicles and three armoured personnel carriers (APCs) weredeployed around the complex. It was decided that in addition to the battalionsearmarked for the Operation, elite troops of 1 Para Commando and the SFF would alsotake part in the main assault. Troops of 9 Garhwal and 15 Kumaon battalions werekept in reserve.

Finally, the complex was stormed at 10.30 pm on June 5. The attacking troopssurmounted tremendous opposition from militant battlements atop the Ghanta Ghar

entrance of the complex and also automatic fire coming from the slits on the twosides of t he staircase at the entrance.

Troops trying to gain entry from the Langar side were stalled by the militantsentrenched there. In the nearby hostel complex, where the Akali Dal offices werehoused, an unfortunate incident was reported. Sometime in the night, when a largenumber of men and women had gathered in an open compound, a grenade wasthrown, resulting in the massacre of a large number of innocent people. Theseincluded many of those who had come to the complex either to take part in the

Morcha or to pay obeisance on t he occasion of the martyrdom day of Guru ArjanDev.

Meanwhile, Army casualties piled up. After bitter fighting at every level, the troopsmanaged to gain a foothold in the buildings around Akal Takht. However, not only wasAkal Takht holding out, it was bringing heavy fire on the troops lodged around it. Eventhe reserve troops were inducted. Repeated attempts to storm Akal Takht wererepulsed. The CS gas canisters lobbed at the heavily fortified Akal Takht provedineffective.

Meanwhile, APCs were wheeled in, followed by tanks to cause shock and awe to themilitants. The zenon lights on the tanks were switched on to blind the militants, butto no avail.

It was then that General Sundarji, who was watching from his command post outsidethe complex and listening in on the communications on his radio set, got desperate.With troops suffering heavy casualties, a stalemate stared him in the face. Withdaylight just an hour away, he feared t he possibility of thousands of villagersmarching in to the Golden Temple. Meanwhile, one of the APCs in the parikarma heading for Akal Takht had been shot up with a rocket and immobilised.

General Sundarji then called up Delhi for permission to use the main gun of the tanksto silence the militants in Akal Takht.

A little after 5 am, New Delhi gave the green signal to use the main tank gun. Andfinally, as t he rays of the sharp summer sun hit t he c omplex, two of the tankspounded Akal Takht with 105-mm high-explosive squash heads. General Brar told melater that they had fired about 20 rounds at the Takht. While this silenced allopposition from Akal Takht, the use of tanks continues to be a sore point to this day.

Around 8.30 am some people came out of the complex. While some made a dash forthe sarovar, a few went for the buildings around. They were all killed by the troops.Bhindranwale and his associate, Bhai Amrik Singh, were among those killed in thegroup.

The Army learnt later t hat earlier in the night when t he t roops were finding it difficultto make a breakthrough, they had gained an unexpected success - Shabeg Singh washit on the parikarma. He was carried into the basement of Akal Takht, whereBhindranwale was. He died soon after and his body lay covered with a sheet in acorner of the room as a battle raged outside. The body was discovered only on June8, the day President Giani Zail Singh visited the complex.

It was around 5 pm on June 6 that General Brar made the announcement that theArmy was in complete cont rol of the complex. The body of Bhindranwale, which hadhis customary pistol strapped to it, was identified and placed at the entrance of thecomplex.

According to the figures given out by the government, the Army lost 83 personnel,including four officers. A total of 248 armymen were wounded, including 13 officers.



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The civilians, including militants killed, were 492 30 women and five children amongthem. Civilians wounded were 86. A total of 1,592 persons were apprehended fromthe complex. However, t he off icial figures have been c hallenged.

The Army also announced that a total of 927 weapons were recovered from thecomplex, including rocket-propelled grenade launchers, LMGs, and SLRs.

Complications

By about the noon of June 6, the complex had been secured. But the Army had otherworries. Akali Dal leaders Sant Longowal, G.S. Tohra and Balwant Singh Ramoowalia,though safe, were still inside the complex. They had been secured in one of the

rooms, and their evacuation was the Armys top most priority. It was only by theafternoon that they could be evacuated in an APC. When accosted by Army officers,their first question was: Oh mar gaya ke haiga? (Is he (Bhindranwale) dead oralive)?

The task of the removal of the dead and injured from the complex was extremelydifficult. Some of the bodies had putrefied in the heat and sun over the 48 hours.There was stink in the air and the holy sarovar (the house of nectar) had bodiesfloating in it. Brig Onkar Singh Goraya (a colonel then), recalls: The bodies, many of which were bloated, were stinking. DDT powder was sprinkled on them, which made itworse. The cocktail of decaying flesh and DDT was unbearable.

Since the Army had washed its hands of the removal of bodies, the officialssummoned the local municipality sweepers. When they hesitated, they were given theincentive of keeping the wristwatches and other valuables from the bodies. Bodieswere dumped into garbage trucks and carried away like firewood being carried, recallsBrigadier Goraya. While Bhindranwale and two of his associates, Bhai Amrik Singh andThara Singh, were c remated with proper rituals, others were cremated in heaps of 10to 15.

Excesses not probed

What has continued to anger the Sikh community over the years is that excessesallegedly committed during the Operation have not been inquired into. These havebeen documented in various eyewitness accounts, including in the latest book byBrigadier Goraya, who had as a c olonel then led the Army t eam which evacuated t heAkali Dal leaders from the complex.

He said that on the morning of June 6 when he had gone into the complex, he wastold by the Akali leaders, including Balwant Singh Ramoowalia, that they had seenpeople being made to sit along a wall and shot the previous night. Brig Goraya alsonarrated another incident of a young officer shooting an arrested person in coldblood. He said he was witness to an injured person being killed by an irate jawan onthe evening of June 6.

A question that has persisted even after 30 years is whether people were killed withtheir hands tied behind. This followed an Associated Press (AP) report on June 14,1984, which said, Sikh rebels tied and shot. The post-mortem reports of some of thepeople killed with gunshots did mention that their hands were tied behind their back.General Brar categorically denied that any one was shot after being lined up withhands tied. He, however, admitted in his book that some people who had beendetained were fired upon when they tried to escape.

An Army Court of Inquiry also confirmed instances of looting of household goods bysome of the jawans from houses around the complex.

Sikh religious and academic circles are also yet to recover from the fact that the SikhReference Library, which was a repository of about 1,500 rare manuscripts andartefacts, was destroyed during the Operation. How this happened remains unclear to

this date.

The aftermath

As news of Operation Blue St ar spread, there was a megaton f all-out . While DarbarSahib, the sanctum sanctorum, was intact, Akal Takht, seat of the temporalauthority, had suffered irreparable damage as its edifice had all but crumbled. Sincethe Punjab Governor, BD Pande, had expressed himself against the Operation, heresigned soon after. Author-journalist Khushwant Singh and the founder of Pingalwarain Amritsar district, Bhagat Puran Singh, returned their Padma awards.

The Army operation resulted in instant polarisation. The Golden Temple was hithertothe binding force amongst the Sikhs and Hindus. Aft er the operation, while t hemajority of the Hindus saw justificat ion in the military ac tion, the Sikhs saw it as anaffront.

But what was perhaps the most disturbing fallout was the effect of the Operation onsome of the Army units with Sikh troops. Starting with 9 Sikh, there were instancesof collective insubordination (mutiny) in about one dozen units involving more than3,000 deserters. The Commandant of the Sikh Regimental Centre in Ramgarh, BrigS.C. Puri, and his two deputies, Col Jagdev Singh and Col H.S. Cheema, wereattacked. While Brigadier Puri died, his two deputies were injured.

Major General C.S. Panag (retd), a Sikh Regiment officer, at tributes t he desertions t ocommand failure. He t he t roops should not have been kept in the dark of the



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impending actions.

The incidents shattered the very ethos of the Army, at least for some time. The FirstColonel of the Sikh Regiment, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, was shocked and defended theactions of the deserting Sikh troops. He felt that the actions of the Sikh soldiersshould be understood in the context of the fact that he (Sikh soldier), like hiscomrades of other religious denominations in the Indian Army, is nurtured of old, onhis religious tenants and t raditions, which have been approved and supported by theGovernment of India. Though many deserters were tried by court martial anddismissed from service, the Ministry of Defence was forced to change its stancetowards the majority of the deserters swayed by emotions. The Akali Dal and theSGPC honoured the dharami faujis. The issue continues to rankle to this day.

Such was the anger of the Sikh community that the damaged Akal Takht building,which was got repaired through a government sponsored kar seva by Nihang chief Santa Singh, was razed to the ground. The community then raised a new structurethrough a massive voluntary kar seva.

Alternatives

General Brar insists t hat he did what a soldier was required to do - carry out alegitimate order. In a detailed interview with me two years ago he said, I made surethat minimal force was used. I made sure that places of religious importance weresafeguarded to t he extent possible. I wish he (Bhindranwale) had seen reason andcome out of the Golden Temple. There is nothing better that I could have done. Ihave always regretted that I had to do this. I wish a task of this nature had beenavoided.

However, there are many who feel otherwise. Major General Jagdish Singh Jamwal(retd), who was then commanding the division in Amritsar, told me, The Operationwas not needed. We should not have ordered it. We could have plugged all inlets forwater and food going into the complex.

Lt Gen P.C. Katoch (retd), who as a major was injured while leading his commandos inthe Operation, told me, This was an Operation which was rushed through. TheOperation was conducted just contrary to what you are taught in the Army aboutfighting in built-up areas. He said that the National Security Guards, which c arriedout Operation Black Thunder in 1988, had learnt the right lessons from the 1984Operation. But General Brar refutes such suggestions, Plugging all inlets was notfeasible. Also, the two operations cant be compared.

Some officers feel that storming of Akal Takht should have been at tempted from thenarrow alleys behind it. Some also advocate a top down approach, which was usedby the US SEALS while picking out Osama Bin Laden from his hideout in Abbottabad inPakistan in 2011.

Breaking the homogeneity of command has also come under criticism. Units fromvarious formations were brought together under the command of a Brigadier to carryout the Operation. Most troops that took part were unfamiliar with the layout of thecomplex.

However, most of t hese suggestions are made with t he benefit of hindsight. The onewhich was made much before the Operation and is credible is that of Lt Gen S.K.Sinha, former Western Army Commander and Governor. He had in 1981 prevented theArmy from getting involved in the arrest of Bhindranwale from his headquarters inChowk Mehta.

Following this experience, General Sinha had laid down a procedure for c onductingoperations in religious places. Had this procedure been followed even remotely,things would have been very different, he explained to me in an interview last year.He said that as per his plan, the Army would have involved the local Sikhs to seewhat the Army was doing. There would have been TV coverage. A temporary

gurdwara would have been established outside and Bhindranwale and his people wouldhave been asked to come out and offer prayers. If still we were forced to go in, alltroops taking part in the Operation would have of fered prayers at the temporarygurdwara before going in. And when you enter, use minimum force. And if it takes oneday or two days, so be it. You should be patient.

Lt Gen Sinha was superceded and in 1983, General Vaidya became the Army Chief.The rest is history.

TWO DECADES AND A HALF

April 13, 1978: Clash between Sikh groups and Nirankaris in Amritsar. 12 Sikhs and 3Nirankaris dead.

April 25, 1982: SAD (Longowal) starts 'civil disobedience movement'.

July 26, 1982: SAD (Longowal) adopts agitation launched by Sant Jarnail SinghBhindranwale.

Oct 6, 1983: Congress government of Darbara Singh dismissed, President's ruleimposed in Punjab.



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(From left) General Krishnaswami Sundarji, LtGen Ranjit Singh Dy al and Lt Gen Kuldip SinghBrar at t he Golden Temple complex after t heOperation in June 1984.

June 2, 1984: Indira Gandhi calls out Army in Punjab, orders Operation Blue Star.

June 3-6, 1984: Operation Blue Star. Control of Golden Temple wrenched frommilitant s. Bhindranwale killed.

July 24, 1985: Rajiv Gandhi-Sant Longowal Accord signed. SAD (L) withdrawsagitation.

August 31, 1995: Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh assassinated in Chandigarh.

September 30, 2012: Lt Gen K.S. Brar (retd) attacked by four persons in London.

April 27, 2013: Operation Bluestar Memorial inaugurated in Amritsar in memory of Sikhs

killed in Blue Star.

December 10, 2013: General Brar's attac kers convict ed and sent enced in the UK.

LOOKING FOR A CLOSURE

The Operation throws up some uncomfortable quest ions for the Sikh community too,especially its leaders. While the government can be blamed for using excessive force ,including use of tanks, and carrying out the Operation on an auspicious day, can thecommunity justify a religious place having weapons of war like rocket launchers,machine guns and grenades?

Even after three decades a closure awaits the event. Says Gurpreet Singh, treasurerof the Institute of Sikh Studies, Chandigarh, "We demand an inquiry under the aegisof the United Nations into the entire gamut of issues relating to the Operation. In itsabsence, the newer generation of Sikhs, especially abroad, is at a loss to understandthe event. The anger instead of diminishing is rising."

Will an apology or regret help? Says Ashok Singh Bagrian, a Sikh scholar, "It sure will.If the British Prime Minister could express regret for the Jallianwala Bagh massacreand Canadian PM apologise for the Komagata Maru incident, why can't our owngovernment?"

Chaman Lal, a historian, feels that an apology by the government endorsed by allpolitical parties could mitigate the anger. But, he asks, "Will vested political interestsallow that t o happen?" He also feels that since religion has an overriding influence inour society, it would be difficult to bring about a closure in any real sense. "Perhapswith the passage of time, the event will get relegated to the pages of history," headds.

KEY COMBATANTS

General Krishnaswami Sundarji

Born on April 28, 1930, he wascommissioned into the Mahar Regiment.Though known as a scholar-worrier, hewas involved in two military operationswhich got embroiled in controversies -Operation Blue Star in 1984 and the IPKFoperations in Sri Lanka in 1987. He wasGOC-in-C, Western Command, during BlueStar. Later, as the Chief of Army Staff, heconducted a military exercise, OperationBrasstac ks, which nearly took India andPakistan to war. He died in 1999.

Lt Gen Ranjit Singh Dyal

Born on Nov 15, 1928, he wascommissioned into the Punjab Regiment(Para). In the 1965 war he led the captureof Haji Pir Pass in J&K, for which he wasawarded the Maha Vir Chakra. He was theChief of Staff, Western Command, duringOperation Blue Star. He was later theGOC-in-C, Southern Command. Afterretirement, he served as Lt Governor of

Pudducherry and Governor of Andaman & Nicobar. He died in 2012.

Lt Gen Kuldip Singh Brar

Born in 1934, he was commissioned intothe Maratha Light Infantry. During the1971 war, he commanded a battalion. He



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Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in front of HarmandarSahib sometime before the Operation.

was awarded the Vir Chakra during theoperations. He was commanding 9 InfantryDivision at Meerut when he was calledupon to c arry out Operation Blue Star. As Lt General, he was GOC-in-C, East ernCommand. After retirement, he stays under heavy security in Mumbai Cantonment.

Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale

Born on June 2, 1947, he belonged to Rode village in Moga district of Punjab. He wasbaptised at a young age and joined the Sikh seminary, Damdami Taksal, which has itsorigin in the 18th c entury. The first head of the Taksal was Baba Deep Singh. SantBhindranwale was appointed as Taksal's 14th head at the age of 30 years in 1977. Hedied during the military assault in June 1984.

Major Gen Shabeg Singh

Born in 1925 in Khiala Nand Singhwala village of Amritsar, he was commissioned intothe Punjab Regiment. Adopting an assumed name (Beg Ali), he played a pivotal role inthe training of the Mukti Bahini during the 1971 war, which led to the creation of Bangladesh. Later, he nursed a grudge for being allegedly implicated and dismissedfrom service. He joined Bhindranwale and was instrumental in the fortifications in theGolden Temple. He was killed during Operation Blue Star.

J&KWhats the politics behind Art 370

A can of worms has be en ope ned following a statement by a BJPminister on the a broga tion o f Article 370 which gives J& K spe cial

status. While the BJP seeks a debate, the regional parties areoppo sed to it. At the core is the states integration with India.

by Arun Joshi

I T was a race to seize the ownership on the BJPs longstanding demand for theabrogation of Article 370 that made the Minister of State in the Prime MinistersOffice, Jitender Singh, commit on Tuesday that the process to repeal Article 370 hadbegun, triggering a furore.

The two major regional parties said it was a blasphemy against t he Constitut ion of India and that of the state. The statement set off alarm bells ringing within the rulingNational Conference (NC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Two days later, t hehardline separatist leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, stepped in to say that this was a

design to reduce t he majority into a minority. J&K is the only Muslim-majority stat ein the country.

Jitender Singh, a practic ing doctor, had apparently miscalculated the move, and hadto retract his statement the same evening. The backdrop of his victory from theUdhampur-Doda parliamentary constituency by defeating former Chief Minister andunion minister Ghulam Nabi Azad, and also the victory of his party colleagues fromJammu-Poonch and Ladakh const ituencies, gave an impetus t o the move.

NC workers protest against the stat ement of Jitender Singh, Minister of State in the PMO, onthe abrogation of Article 370, in Srinagar. PTI

Act ivists of the Shiv Sena and Dogra F ront raiseslogans against Article 370, which they wantscrapped, in Jammu. PTI

War on T witter

The NC had lost all three parliamentary seat s in the Valley. T he fat her-son duo,Farooq and Omar Abdullah, lost to the PDPs father-daughter duo, Mufti MohammadSayeed and Mehbooba Mufti. The Assembly polls are scheduled in the state for theyear-end. Alarmed, Omar started meeting people and listening to party workers. Hisparty was looking for a poll issue, which was delivered to it on a platter by JitendraSingh. And t he first reac tion came on Twitt er.

The tweets said: So the new MOS PMO says process/discussions to revoke Art 370have started. Wow, that was a quick beginning. Not sure who is talking. He had beenclaiming that the PDP and the BJP had a nexus in the Lok Sabha elections. Sinceneither side denied it, he thought it was true. He went on to say: Mark my words & save this tweet long after Modi Govt is a distant memory, either J&K wont be partof India or Art 370 will still exist.



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The NC leader elaborated, saying: Art 370 is the only c onstitutional link between J&Kand the rest of India. Talk of revocation is not just ill informed, its irresponsible.

A political assault of this sort rattled New Delhi. T he Abdullahs, espec ially Farooq,having lost for the first time could still spell trouble. The trouble could be at aninternational level. T he Abdullahs had floated the plebiscite front which embarrassedthe country internationally. It was to contain that influence and bring Kashmir back tothe Indian fold that the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi entered into an agreementwith Omars grandfather Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, hailed as the Sher-e-Kashmir.She formed the Congress government in the st ate led by Syed Mir Qasim to hand overthe government to Sheikh Abdullah. All Congress legislators and leaders were made tofall in line. All this was done to bury the plebiscite issue.

Omar also hinted that the issue could be resurrected, and the message was not loston the Modi government, which was into its first day.

Wa rning sign

PDP president Mehbooba Mufti also wondered how the new Prime Minister, seeking toharmonise relations among SAARC countries, was allowing a minister to break the

bridge between J&K and the rest of India. She also sought to fuel the fear that thestat e was already divided on geographical, political and ethnic lines.

While fierce ly defending Article 370, she read out a blueprint of her own, based onthe way people had vot ed during the Lok Sabha elect ions. The Muslim majority partsof the state had either voted for the NC or the PDP, and to some extent theCongress, and Buddhists and Hindus had voted for the BJP. New nomenclatures PirPanjal for Rajouri and Poonch and Chenab Valley for Doda, Ramban, Kishtwar andparts of Udhampur and Reasi districts have already become a seedbed of thepsychological division of the state.

Omar and Mehbooba were on the same page on and wanted to be seen on the side of the majority community. It was a warning signal to Delhi that Kashmir-centric partieshad the revolutionary spirit which c ould be invoked.

The theory being sold is that Article 370 (the creation of the states ConstituentAssembly 1952-1957) is the symbol of Kashmirs unique identity and confers dignity onthe people of the state. Both leaders have an eye on the forthcoming polls.Mehbooba wants to retain and expand the influence of her party while Omar wants tomake up for the worst-ever defeat. This is a war between the 75-year-old NC and15-year-old PDP.

Accession issue

Both parties brought forth the issue of the states accession if the Article is

abrogated. Then we will have to revisit 1947 and make a choice which way to go India, Pakistan or stay independent, she stat ed. Omar said if the Article goes,accession also goes. It is true that the provisions of the Article flow from theinstrument of accession, but accession is irrevocable.

Dr Karan Singh, former Sadar-e-Riysat (president of the state) has upheld that: Theacc ession signed by his father Maharaja Hari Singh was the same what was signed byother princely states, but the difference is that other states merged with India whileJ&K did not. He sees no harm in the special status of the state as such arrangementsexist elsewhere in the world too. He cited the example of Chinas relationship withHong Kong, where separate laws govern citizens.

Can Article 370 be sc rapped? No power on earth can revoke Article 370, says Saif-ud-Din Soz, Pradesh Congress Committee president. It is a sett led and closedchapter. Thats all as far as the Congress is concerned. The st ate is an integral partof India, he adds.

For the first time, the BJP has won three seats in the state. Voters were candid inadmitting that they were voting for Modi because they wanted to see him as thePrime Minister. Fed up with misgovernance, corruption and price rise, the voterswanted a change in Kashmir. However, t he BJP candidates who got elect ed toParliament viewed it as their individual victory. That misplaced perception caused theverbal political riot in the state.

The BJP sought a debate on the issue because it thinks this was a barrier thatneeded to be removed for the complete integration of the state. It is opposed to J&Khaving its own constitution and flag and the bar on the extension of laws passed byParliament to the state unless it is ratified by the state legislative Assembly.

T he tussle

Another hurdle the Article creates is related to the fact that West Pakistan refugeeswho have been living in Jammu since the Partition cannot get citizenship rights of thestat e. In t he early 1980s, t he Sheikh Abdullah government had passed theResettlement Bill (now Act and under the judicial review of the Supreme Court) t oprovide for the resettlement of those who had fled to Pakistan and their descendentsto return and reclaim their properties and enjoy citizenship of the state. It was afterthe uproar against this provision by the Congress and t he BJP in 1980s that thematter was t aken to t he Supreme Court and it could not be implemented. But the lawexists. If Article 370 is to get its original form, it would deprive Sc heduled Castes andScheduled Tribes of reservation in overnment obs and rofessional colle es.



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The Constituent Assembly ceased to exist in 1957. The President of India can revokeit if t he Constituent Assembly recommends so. Since t here is no Assembly, thiscannot happen. Still, central laws have been extended to J&K as state leaders havesupplicated to the Centre in the past. All leaders know that Delhi should be kept ingood humour if the government is to be run in the state. The state doesnt have themoney to pay wages to its employees. It is dependent on the Centre for that. Butthat doesnt give leverage to any party at the Centre to revoke the Article.

Within the st ate, they are playing the game of one-upmanship. Against Delhi theywant to be seen as raising their decibel, and on the home front, they want to beseen as the greater symbol of Kashmiri identity and dignity. The real target is thevoter for the Assembly polls.

People, however, c an sense t he politics behind this high-pitc hed rhetoric and havestayed aloof so far. But Kashmir is unpredictable. It has seen many mid-summertroubles. And 2014 may not be an exception, given the fact that trouble-makers areout on parole.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS UNDER THE ARTICLE

It was a temporary provision included in the Constitution of India, grantingspecial status to J&K. T he provision was introduced after Maharaja Hari Singhsigned the Instrument of Acc ession with t he Indian Union in 1947.Dr BR Ambedkar, the architect of Indian Constitution and the first Law Ministerof India, refused to draft Article 370. It was drafted by Gopalaswami Ayyangar,former dewan of Maharaja Hari Singh along with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah,the NC founder. Ayyanger was a minister in the Cabinet of then Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehru.According to the Article, except for defence, foreign affairs andcommunications, Indian Parliament needs t he consent of the stat es legislatureto implement laws of the Indian Union in the state.J&K has a separate constitution and flag. The Article imposes limits on thelegislative power of Indian Parliament over the state. Special measures arerequired to extend any ordinary legislation to the state.Citizens of other states of India cannot purchase land or property in the state.Further, the Centre has no power to dec lare financial emergency in J&K. It c andeclare emergency only in case of war and external aggression.Residents of J&K live under a separate set of laws, including those related tocit izenship, ownership of property, and fundamental rights. T hey enjoy dualcit izenship. They would lose t heir J&K citizenship if they marry residents of other stat es. However, the women of the stat e can retain their citizenshiprights if they marry non-permanent residents of the state because of the HighCourt judgment in 2003. But her husband and children cannot enjoy the samerights.The term of the state legislature is six years, unlike other elected bodies whichhave a five-year period, including Indian Parliament. The state Assembly had afive-year term but was extended to six years during the Emergency on thepattern of Parliament in 1976. But it did not revert because of the specialstatus.A Pakistani woman gains citizenship if she marries a citizen of J&K. Howeverlakhs of West Pakistan refugees living in the state for over six decades havebeen denied citizenship as they migrated from Sialkote and West Punjab(Pakistan), which was not part of J&K. The Article prevents them from enjoyingtheir fundamental rights.

(Compiled by Sumit Hakoo)

WHAT PARTIES STAND FOR

NATIONAL CONFERENCE

It is opposed to the abrogation of Article370. It wants the original form of theArticle to be restored. It is a matter of faith for the party which fought for therights of the people in the pre-Independence era. First as the MuslimConference (1931) and later as the NC(1938) when it opened its doors tonon-Muslims it agitated against theDogra rule. T he party believes in thesupremacy of the J&K constitution. Thisidentification with history and rabble rousing on the Article issue is its st aple politicaldiet. Its founder Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah would champion Kashmiri identity anddignity, which was taken as a slogan by the next two generations of the Abdullahs totell the people that they were the original guardians of their exclusive rights in acountry with two systems. Over the years, the titles of Sadar-e-Riyasat (head of the state) and Wazir-e-Azamm (PM) have gone.



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PDP

Though the PDP is only 15 years old, ithas become a force to reckon with inKashmir politics. It has shown itself as analternative to the NC. Mehbooba Muftisays the abrogation of the Article wouldlead to further alienation. You alreadyhave territory. J&K has the largestpresence of security forces. Now you aretrying to take away from them even whatgives them dignity, she claims.

CONGRESS

The Congress ruled the state for manyyears when the NC during the era of the second PM of the state, BakshiGhulam Mohammad was converted intothe Congress and Ghulam MohammadSadiq took over as the first CongressChief Minister. The party maintains thestat e is an integral part of India. PCCpresident Saif- ud-Din Soz has said: It isa closed chapter. There is no need for adebate. No power on earth c an abolish it.

BJP

J&K is and shall remain an integral part of the Union of India. The territorial integrityof India is inviolable. The party will pursuean agenda of equal and rapid developmentin all the three regions of the state Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, as per itsmanifesto. The BJP reiterates its stand onArticle 370, and will discuss this with allthe stakeholders. It remains committed tothe abrogation of the Article.

HARDLINERS

The separatists dont acknowledge the

Indian Constitution, but feel that as longas the state is with India, the specialprovisions under Article 370 need to bepreserved. They have called for anagitation against any attempt to repealthe Article. Syed Ali Shah Geelani hassaid: It is a design to turn the majorityinto a minority in the state. Any suchattempt would be resisted tooth and nailby the people of Kashmir.

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