Writing Assignment #1

7/17/2019 Writing Assignment #1

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The Revolution was not as great a revolution as it is made out to be by

history, when one examines the internal fractionation of the spontaneous political

factions, the disparity between the poor masses and the conicts within and without

the minority political elite. The French Revolutionaries, at rst, attempted to

emulate the American and nglish Revolutions, whilst avoiding the fates of !harles "

and #liver !romwell, respectively. The French Revolution in e$ect was a greatsocial revolt, doomed to fail its designated goals. "n fact, the end goal of the

Revolutionaries became blurred as the fractionali%ation increased exponentially as

each faction had its own, incompatible, goals for the Revolution.

The social revolt of the French is universally boo&mar&ed at the plight of the

Third state against the noblesse, the &ing and the !atholic !hurch. This social

revolt began in no less an extraordinary than the Revolts of the Americans and the

nglish. The merchants and upper'middleclass men of the (ourgeois were as

analogous as the American colonial lawyers and shipping merchants and the )*s of

the +ouse of !ommons only men of well'to'do means and had a vested'interest in

the -tate, counted for anything, politically or economically. omen, the poorer

farmers /peasants0 1and slaves in the French !olonies2 were left to the mercy of the

bourgeois and the noblesse.

The barriers between the peasants and the bourgeoisie with the noblesse

tended to remain xed stalwart. The monarchy and the states'3eneral were

primarily concerned with and within themselves. The peasants felt the e$ects of the

nancial debt crisis, and the tric&le'down e$ects on ination, and roc&eting food

prices. The food supply and demand followed a proverbial the inverse curve to

which the political elites responded ignorantly and disastrously. Those in power,

with the ability to do something about the problems France was facing, on the other

side of the barrier were increasingly factionali%ed. The fractionali%ation increased

dramatically in the wa&e of the ill'fated episode of the 4ing5s Flight to 6arrenes in

7une of 89:8; further decimating the proverbial barrier between the minority

powerbase and ma<ority of the starving, destitute French peasantry. hile the

political minority debated on implementing the =eclaration of the Rights of )an into

the new republican constitution1s2; the peasantry cared about protecting

themselves from starvation, protection from ultra'radical 7acobins raining their

homes and massacring innocents, not the restoration of the Ancien Régime or

implementing a constitutional monarchy. +owever, in the years after 89>:, people

could not agree on the practical application of the =eclaration5s principles, driving

the Revolution in new directions. #pponents of change inside and outside Franceforced governments to ta&e measures to preserve the Revolution itself, culminating

in the most controversial period of all, the ?Terror5 of 89:@ :B. i

arly in 89:C, the Dational Assembly issued the !ivil !onstitution of the !lergy a

document, in 7uly 89:C, which bro&e ties with the !atholic !hurch and established a

national church system in France with a process for the election of regional bishops.

The document angered the pope and church oEcials and turned many French

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!atholics against the revolutionaries. French clergy who did not swear an oath of

loyalty to the RevolutionG, but were not necessarily counter'revolutionaries, were

labeled non'<urying clergy. The peasantry wanted to &eep their non <urying priests,

holding services, fullling their priestly duties; meanwhile the mainstream

Revolutionaries 1e.g. 3irondins, 7acobins, etc.2 wanted to brea& all ties with AllG

external secular and ecclesiastical powersHinuences, vi%. the Austrians and the*ope. France was not necessarily willing to turn *rotestant, en masse. 1*rotestant

and atheist members existed in both revolutionary parties2. #nce the war with

Austria and *russia commenced in early 89:I, the fractionali%ation extended to the

rst estate. The !atholic !lergy, over the course of the 89:Cs, fell from their

elevated role in the rst estate, to the same role as the counter'revolutionaries. The

military crisis made life far more dangerous for those openly opposed to the

Revolution, in particular for all those religious who had refused the oath of loyalty to

the nation and its constitution. #n the same day as the eighteen foreigners were

made citi%ens of France, the Assembly voted for the expulsion or imprisonment of

non'<urying clergy still in France. ii

"n the worst case combined scenarios of religious and political intolerance,

Robespierre initiated the Festival of the -upreme (eing 17une >, 89:B2 to inaugurate

the 7acobin'established control of the Revolution and commencement of what will

later be dubbed the Reign of Terror. Robespierre had even gone so far as to erect a

statue promoting a national religionG in *aris. This statue and the festival was, in

part, a visual demonstration in response to the 7acJues +ebert and the de'

!hristiani%ation faction of the 7acobins. Robespierre feared +ebert and the

de!hristiani%ing wave was a cover for enemy inltration of the Revolution by

France5s enemies, under the guise of 7acobin goalsKthis being yet another

illustration of the contradictory, self'defeating goals that evolved within theRevolutionaries.

*olitical fractionali%ation at the drop of a coc&ade was perhaps the one consisted

regularity, the glue holding the factions and the process all together, despite

internal and external stressors counter'intutitive to any denition or concept

1before or sense2 of a civil war. "n one sense, the Revolution was a 3reat French

!ivil ar, within and without. The prime example of this plague of regional civil wars

was the insurrections in the 6endee, commencing )arch 88, 89:@. "n another sense,

uropean monarchies 1e.g. (ritain, Austria, *russia, and -pain2 became involved in

this French !ivil ar or fears of Republican sentiment 1and violence2 spreadingK

potentially dissolving their own monarchies; power bases. -pea&inganachronistically, the fears and responses to thwart the spread of French

Republicanism were not any di$erent to the spread of communism across urope

and Asia in the 8:LCs.

The Revolution5s e$ects on France 1and the orld2 demonstrated the

combined follies of incompetent, wea& absolute rulers 1Mouis N6"2 and the myopia of

minority ruling classes serving their own self'interests 1the states'3eneral,

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especially the noblesse and the clergy2. The mismanagement of the inherent crises

and the war'proper 1the military aspects of the Revolution2 allowed for

experimentation with Republicanism. +owever, French Republicanism in the 89:Cs

was merely thatKan experiment. The French Revolution did not replace an absolute

monarchy with a French (ourgeoisie Republic, rather served to augment the

monarchy upon its ersat% restoration; vi%. the rise of Dapoleon (onaparte inDovember 89:: and the e$ective creation of the First French mpire.

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i *eter )c*hee. The French Revolution 14indle Mocations >O'>:2.

ii "bid, 14indle Mocations 8BI8'8BIB2.

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Writing Assignment #1