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WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep [email protected]

WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep [email protected]

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Page 1: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

WP4 Security and AA(A) issues

For WP4: David Groep

[email protected]

Page 2: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 2

WP4 self-organization (1)

Configuration management What should a system look like, what is installed

Systems Installation Bootstrapping and installing software packages on 10.000 nodes

Resource Management Queuing system, task scheduling, quotas ’n budget

Page 3: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 3

WP4 self-organization (2)

Monitoring Performance and functional monitoring

Fault Tolerance & Exception Recovery Detect exceptions using monitoring information and schedule

recovery actions, make self-healing nodes

Gridification Job authorization, credential mapping, information abstraction and

network accessibility

Page 4: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 4

Internal and external AAA

External AAA: interaction of a compute centre with “global” grid → through WP1

(ComputeElement) and WP2 (StorageElement)

Internal AAA: recognizing trusted components and operators

authorization for jobs and files

access to information services

Protecting jobs and files whilst in the fabric (uid issues)

Page 5: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 5

A use case for job submission

Accept a job from ComputeElement (the Grid)

Check authorization w.r.t. extra local policies

Assign necessary local credentials

Have the job run on the local fabric

Page 6: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 6

Gridification of a Compute Centre

ComputeElmt

GridJobMediating Serv

GridJobMediating Serv

LRMS

Far

ms

Far

ms

Far

ms

Local CredentialMapping Serv

Local CredentialMapping Serv

User Rep.

Job Rep.

LCASLCAS

AuthZ plugins:AuthZ plugins:

QuotaCheckQuotaCheckPolicy list

Fabric-localID-service

Fabric-localID-service

Local to the fabric

Externally visible

Grid Info Serv (WP3)

GriFIS

GridGATEprotocol gateway

GridGATEprotocol gateway

Page 7: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 7

Job life cycle in a fabric

GjMS – Grid-job Mediating Service Accept jobs from ComputeElement and shuffle them through the

AAA chain

LCAS – Local Community Authorization Service Authorize a job or store request to run on this fabric

Based on community-wide CAS (VO’s) add extra constrains like: budgets, ban lists, wall clock limitations

LCMAPS – Local Credential Mapping Service Obtain the `usual’ credentials for running (uid/gid)

Issues: additional credentials for AFS, K5, ….

Page 8: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 8

Gridification of a Compute Centre

Grid Info Serv (WP3)

GriFIS

ComputeElmt

GridJobMediating Serv

GridJobMediating Serv Fabric-local

ID-service

Fabric-localID-service

Local CredentialMapping Serv

Local CredentialMapping Serv

LRMS

Far

ms

Far

ms

Far

ms LCASLCAS

AuthZ plugins:AuthZ plugins:

QuotaCheckQuotaCheckPolicy listUser Rep.

Job Rep.Local to the fabric

Externally visible

GridGATEprotocol gateway

GridGATEprotocol gateway

Page 9: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 9

FLIDS (Fabric-local ID service)

within a fabric only a local certifying entity will be sufficiently trusted

Signing authority for LCAS accepted (job) requests Identify trusted operators for installation of new systems Identify and certify hosts within a fabric

FLIDS is (a tree of) certification authorities

Some of those “automated” CA’s Sign certificates when request is singed by trusted operator

Page 10: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 10

Information and Configuration

A configuration database existscontaining the desired state of the local fabric

Contains sensitive information

Prevent unauthorized read access

Prevent snooping information sent to other hosts

PM9 (and possibly beyond?):web-server XML over HTTPS

Write access limited to special operator interface only

Page 11: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 11

Another FLIDS application

Adding a new host to a fabric

Possibly in a `hostile’ environment

We have a trusted operator with an install disk

Need to get initial configuration information

Which includes,e.g., a ssh host key

Next slide is for your reference only (don’t be baffled by it)

Page 12: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 12

New host to be installed

CFG Configuration Database

Secured http server

LCA root cert

Operator install disk:-kernel and init-CFG https agent-Signed cert of operator-Protected private key of operator-LCA root certificate

CFG data ACLs

LCA cert and privkey

FLIDS engine

Automated CA,Will sign when requestApproved by `operator’

1:Operator boots system

2:agent makes https requestusing operator credentials

3:https server checks CFG data ACL(operator has all rights), can verify IDof operator using LCA root cert

4: sens config data encryptedusing session key

5: host generates key pair(but without a passphrase to protecting private part)

6: request sent to FLIDS engine,signed by operator key (in cleartext)(FLIDS hostname known from CFG data)

7: FLIDS checks signature of operator, and signsrequest with LCA key. Request DN namespace limited.

8: signed host cert back to host (in clear)

9: host checks signature on cert using the LCA root cert on the boot disk

10:

htt

ps

req

ues

ts t

o C

FG

auth

enti

cate

d w

ith

new

sig

ned

ho

st c

erti

fica

te11: CFG web server can checkhostname in cert againstrequesting IP addressand check ACLs

Page 13: WP4 Security and AA(A) issues For WP4: David Groep hep-proj-grid-fabric@cern.ch

David Groep – WP4 security and AAA issues – 2001.06.06 - 13

Issues not (yet) addressed

Information services Use whatever security framework WP3 chooses

Will likely not publish list of authorized users

Networking issues WP4 does not envision using network-layer security

IPv6 is being studied, but only for address space issues

GridGATE is not a VPN router and is not doing IPsec