World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/120851467991906660/pdf/ICR3304-P...IDA-4441-KH IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 1.7 MILLION (US$ 2.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE . KINGDOM

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003304

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA Grant No H386-KH IDA Credit No 4441-KH)

ON A

GRANT

IDA-H386-KH IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.3 MILLION (US$ 8.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND

CREDIT

IDA-4441-KH IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 1.7 MILLION

(US$ 2.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

FOR A

LAND ALLOCATION FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

September 30, 2015

Agriculture Global Practice East Asia and Pacific Region

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CAMBODIA – GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective as of July 21, 2015)

Currency Unit = Cambodian Riel (KHR) 1 Cambodian Riel = US$0.00024452

US$ 1.00 = SDR0.720165

FISCAL YEAR

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AWPB Annual Work Plan and Budget BCR Benefit Cost Ratio CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCs Commune Councils DWG District Working Group EA-EMP Environmental Assessment and Environmental Management Plan EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMP Environmental Management Plan FEA Financial and Economic Analysis FIRR Financial Internal Rate of Return FM Financial Management FNPV Financial Net Present Value GDA General Directorate of Agriculture GIZ Gesellschaftfuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit GSSLC General Secretariat for Social Land Concession HH Household IA Implementing Agency IDA International Development Association IEC Information, Education and Communication IFR Interim Financial Report IPA Independent Procurement Agent IPPF Indigenous People Planning Framework IRR Internal Rate of Return JSDF Japan Social Development Fund LASED Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development (Project) LR Land Recipient M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries MBPI Merit Based Performance Incentive MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance MLMUPC Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction MoI Ministry of Interior NCDD National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development

NCDDS National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development Secretariat

NCSLC National Committee for Social Land Concession NGO Non-Government Organization NPV Net Present Value O&M Operations and Maintenance PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PIM Project Implementation Manual PLUAC Provincial Land Use and Allocation Committee POC Priority Operating Costs RGC Royal Government of Cambodia RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SLC Social Land Concession UXO Unexploded Ordinance

Vice President: Axel Van Trotsenburg, EAPVP

Country Director: Ulrich Zachau, EACTF Country Manager Alassane Sow, EACSF

Global Practice Senior Director Juergen Voegele, GFADR Global Practice Director Ethel Sennhauser, GFADR

Practice Manager: Nathan Belete, GFADR Project Team Leader: Mudita Chamroeun, GFADR

ICR Team Leader: Pushina Kunda Ng’andwe, GFADR

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

LAND ALLOCATION FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

TABLE OF CONTENTS Data Sheet

A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... i B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... ii C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... ii D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii E. Bank Staff .................................................................................................................. iii F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................. viii H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................ ix I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................. ix 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ........................................................ 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 24 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 26 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 28 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 30 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 34 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 39 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 42 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .................................................. 44 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR .................... 54 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 61 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 62 Annex 10: LASED Institutional Framework ................................................................ 66

MAP IBRD 41762 ........................................................................................................ 67

A. Basic Information

Country: Cambodia Project Name: Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development Project

Project ID: P084787 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-44410,IDA-H3860 ICR Date: 09/30/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: IPF Borrower: THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

Original Total Commitment:

IDA XDR Grant 5.30M IDA XDR Credit 1.70M Disbursed Amount: IDA Grant: XDR 5.30M

IDA Credit: XDR 1.70M

Revised Amount: XDR Grant 5.30M XDR Credit 1.70M

Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: National Level: General Secretariat for Social Land Concession (GSSLC), Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development Secretariat (NCDDS), Ministry of Interior (MOI) Sub-National Level: Governor Offices of Tbong Khmum (Formerly part of Kompong Cham), Kratie, and Kompong Chhnang Department of Agriculture, MAFF Department of Rural Development, MRD Department of Women Affair, MoWA Department of Water Resources and Meteorology, MoWRAM Department of Health, MoH Forest Administration, MAFF Department of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction, MLMUPC Department of Environment, MoE Department of Education, MoEYS Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: German Agency for Technical Development – Deutsche Gesselleshaft fur Techisde Zurannerabeit (GIZ) Wathnakpheap (WP) Life With Dignity (LWD), Localized from Lutheran World Federation (LWD) Habitat for Humanity International – Cambodia (HfHI-C) Government of Japan, Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) Government of Japan, Policy and Human Resource Development (PHRD)

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B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 07/21/2004 Effectiveness: 09/11/2008 09/11/2008

Appraisal: 03/07/2008 Restructuring(s):

12/19/2010 10/09/2012 04/25/2013 05/22/2014

Approval: 05/20/2008 Mid-term Review: 06/01/2011 10/03/2011 Closing: 06/30/2013 03/31/2015 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 65 65

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Sub-national government administration 35 35

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Land administration and management 25 25 Other rural development 50 50 Participation and civic engagement 25 25 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg James W. Adams Country Director: Ulrich Zachau Ian C. Porter Country Manager: Alassane Sow Nisha Agrawal Global Practice Senior Director: Juergen Voegele Global Practice Director/Sector Director: Ethel Sennhauser Christian Delvoie Practice Manager/Sector Manager: Nathan M. Belete Rahul Raturi Project Team Leader: Mudita Chamroeun Steven N. Schonberger ICR Team Leader: Pushina Kunda Ng'andwe ICR Primary Author: Pushina Kunda Ng'andwe F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Financing Agreement) The Financing Agreement states, “The objective of the Project is to improve the process of identification and use of state lands transferred to eligible, poor and formerly landless and land poor land recipients through a transparent and well-targeted selection process”. Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) In the Project Appraisal Document the PDO reads as follows: “The development objective of the Pilot Program is to improve the process for identification and use of state lands transferred to eligible, poor and formerly landless or land-poor recipients selected through a transparent and well targeted process.” The PAD formulation used the term “Pilot Program”, whereas the FA formulation used the term “Project”. Nonetheless, the Project was the main source of financing for the Pilot Program.

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Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised. Changes were made to the outcome indicators as described in section 1.3. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: At least 60% of land recipients adopt improved soil management and agricultural production systems.

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 60% 57%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015 Comments (incl. Number achievement)

Substantially Achieved. 57% (1,752) of those who received agricultural plots had engaged in inter/mixed cropping of cash and permanent crops, adopted improved water management techniques and observed crop rotation. Achievement was 95%.

Indicator 2: At least 90% of land recipients selected matched the selection criteria agreed for those specific SLCs.


0 90% 100%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015 Comments (incl. number achievement)

Exceeded. All land recipients (100%) were selected based on the eligibility criteria and transparent mechanisms that involved “ID Poor System”. Achievement was 111.1%.

Indicator 3: At least 70% of challenges to land recipients selection were reviewed and decision taken through the program dispute resolution mechanism.


0 70% 100%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015

Comments (incl. number achievement)

Exceeded. All 678 complaints were reviewed and screened against the selection criteria and scoring system as per the Complaint Handling Mechanisms laid out in the Project Implementation Manual. About 44% (297) of complaints were found to be from non-eligible households or unrelated to the process. Remaining 56% (381) of complaints were re-assessed and scores adjusted accordingly. Achievement was 142.8%.

Indicator 4: Technologies demonstrated in the project areas (number) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 1 7

Date achieved 10-Aug-2012 10-Aug-2012 31-Mar-2015

Comments (incl. Number achievement)

Exceeded. This is a Core Sector Indicator added as requirement under IBRD/IDA operations. Seven technologies were promoted and demonstrated in the SLC sites (demonstration plots) on chicken raising, pig raising, composting, rice production/intensification, planting of fruit trees, home gardening, and vegetable production and marketing.

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: 20 communes submit approved SLC plans.


0 20 7 7

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 09-Oct-2012 31-Mar-2015


Fully Achieved. All the seven communes had approved plans which served as the basis for the planning and implementation of infrastructure support services funded under the project. (The target from 20 to seven was adjusted through second restructuring in October 2012 as the seven communes already covered an area (10,273 hectares) more than what was originally planned, i.e., 10,000 hectares for 20 communes).Achievement was 100% based on revised target.

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Indicator 2: Approximately 10,000 hectares of appropriate state land registered as state private land for SLCs under LASED.


0 10,000Ha. 10,273Ha.

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015 Comments (incl. number achievement)

Exceeded. The 10, 273 hectares covered by the seven SLC sites were registered as state private land. Achievement was 103%.

Indicator 3: Target land area with use or ownership rights recorded as a result of project.


0 10,000Ha. 10,273Ha.

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 15-Nov-2012 31-Mar-2015

Comments (incl. number achievement)

Exceeded. This is a Core Sector Indicator added as a requirement under all IBRD/IDA operations. 10, 273 ha of registered state private lands were allocated to land beneficiaries who had rights and responsibilities over the land, formalized in written agreements. Achievement was 103%.

Indicator 4: At least 3,000 eligible families receive SLCs under LASED.


0 3,000 3,148



Exceeded. Given bigger SLC areas, 3,148 families who met the eligibility criteria were selected and provided with lands (i.e. 74 families with residential lands, 658 families with agricultural lands and 2,416 with residential and agricultural lands). These families were selected based on transparent mechanisms and participatory selection processes that included the “ID Poor” System. Achievement was 104%.

Indicator 5: Target people with use or ownership rights recorded as a result of the project.


0 12,690 15,226

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 15-Nov-2012

31-Mar-2015


Exceeded. This is a Core Sector Indicator included as a requirement under all IBRD/IDA operations. 3,148 families totaling 15,226 are legally allowed to occupy and cultivate state private lands allocated through formalized written agreements under the SLC program. Achievement was 120%.

Indicator 6: 100 percent eligible households receive appropriate private settling in support as agreed in SLC plan.


0 100% 100%


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Comments (incl. % achievement)

Fully Achieved. All the land recipients and their households received appropriate and basic settling-in support. This is in the form of rice (food for work program), residential starter kits, housing construction materials, latrine materials, demarcation poles, agricultural starter kits, and other planting and livestock inputs (seeds, seedlings, chickens). These addressed their immediate food security and shelter needs. Achievement was 100%.

Indicator 7: 80 percent of public infrastructure and other services provided as elaborated in SLC plan.


0 80% 98.88%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Exceeded. The project addressed almost all the infrastructure and service priority needs indicated in the SLC plans such as road (access tracks, latrine and earth roads), primary schools, health posts and water wells. Achievement was 123.6%.

Indicator 8: Women’s participation in training, workshops and as applicants (head of households or cosignatory).


0 60% 60% 53%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 04-Oct-2012 31-Mar-2015


Substantially Achieved. This indicator was moved from Component C to B during the 2nd Restructuring carried out in 2012. Gender responsive training and livelihood skills courses were mainstreamed into training activities wherein women participation was 53%. Achievement was 88.3%

Indicator 9: SLCs based on land from at least three sources (cancelled economic land concessions, recovered illegally occupied lands, & degraded forest lands) tested, experiences documented and guidelines updated.


0 3 2



Partially Achieved. The eight SLC sites were sourced from two sources: (a) degraded forest lands (94.5%); and (b) recovered illegally occupied lands (5.5%). No land was available from cancelled economic land concessions at the time of SLC site identification. Achievement was 66.7%.

Indicator 10: Broad knowledge of LASED supported SLC approach, procedures and experiences amongst RGC, local authorities, civil society organizations and donors.


0 National National


Comments (incl. Text achievement)

Achieved. Legal, technical and operational procedures and experiences on SLC implementation have been continuously improved and shared with various stakeholders. The knowledge sharing was done through annual project workshops, land governance training and NGO forum. IEC materials were also produced and shared through print medium and the NCDDS website.

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Indicator 11: 90 percent of MBPI recipients assessed as effectively carrying out LASED responsibilities.


0 90% 100% 100%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 12-May-2011 30-Jun-2013 31-Mar-2015


Fully Achieved. Staff providing support to the project were closely monitored prior to release of MBPI. (The target was increased to 100% and on May 12, 2011, the MBPI was replaced by Priority Operating Costs (POC)). The provision of MBPI/POC ended on June 30, 2013. Achievement was 100%.

Indicator 12: Procurement activities implemented consistent with the Bank’s Procurement guidelines.


0 100% 100%

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Fully Achieved. 100% of the prior and post procurement reviews indicated compliance with the Bank’s procurement guidelines. No mis-procurement was noted. Achievement was 100%.

Indicator 13: Financial audit confirms implementation consistent with agreed procedures.


0 Yes Yes

Date achieved 30-Sep-2008 30-Sep-2008 31-Mar-2015 Comments (incl. Text achievement)

Fully Achieved. Annual project audit reports indicated no qualified findings and no significant internal control weaknesses were reported. Target was achieved.

Indicator 14: Reporting to NCDD, NCSLC and Bank on time.


0 100% 100%



Fully Achieved. Reports were prepared regularly (quarterly, semester and annually) at the sub-national level. These were reviewed and consolidated by the NCDDS and GSSLC. Timeliness of submission to the Bank improved over the period of project implementation. Reports generally were submitted in a timely manner. Achievement is 100%.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 04/28/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.96 2 05/09/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.63 3 01/03/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.08 4 01/01/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.17

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5 12/15/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.90 6 05/27/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.82 7 12/09/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.09 8 06/28/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.70 9 12/23/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.73

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP

12/19/2010 N MS MS 2.06 Cancelation of MBPI (Merit Based Pay Initiative)

10/09/2012 N S S 6.39 Revision of Results Indicators

04/25/2013 N S S 8.48 Extension of closing date and reallocation of credit proceeds.

04/22/2014 N S S 10.57 Extension of closing date and reallocation of grant proceeds.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. In 2004, poverty in Cambodia was estimated to have declined to 35% from 47% in 1993/94 driven mainly by garment manufacturing and tourism. However, progress was uneven with higher poverty declines in urban than in rural areas. Income inequality between urban and rural areas was increasing while inequality within the rural population accounted for 86% of the overall increase in inequality for the country. A 2004 poverty assessment highlighted increasing landlessness and land poverty amongst the rural poor. The poverty assessment identified access to land as the utmost critical asset for the rural poor as rural households were dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Landlessness was estimated to have increased from 12.6% in 1997 to 19.6% in 2004. During that period, 15% of the poor and 13% of the poorest quintile were landless in rural areas and 40% of the rural population that farmed less than 0.5 Ha were unable to meet even half of the nutritional requirements of a typical rural family. 2. There was an urgent need for the country to improve the management of its state land areas. State land constituted about 80% of Cambodia’s 18.1 million Ha land area and only a total of 2.5 million Ha that had been distributed to households in 1989 was considered to be strictly private. The remaining area was largely occupied by both large and small landholders and primarily consisted of forests and protected areas, military development zones and other state lands. Institutional accountability in the management of state lands was a challenge and there was little knowledge of the evolving legal framework. Public disclosure mechanisms were weak as was enforcement of existing laws. This led to regular informal possession of land, inefficiencies and corrupt practices in dealing with state lands. Increasing landlessness and speculative pressures on land continued to drive encroachment on state lands largely through conversion of forested or degraded forest areas. The activities outside the legal framework often resulted in conflict as more powerful interests attempted to ‘grab’ land insecurely held by small farmers with potential to cause irreversible, negative environmental and social impacts in areas of high conservation value and amongst indigenous people’s communities. In 2005, the Government issued Sub Decree 118 on State Land Management that de-concentrated land use allocation to the provincial level, working with Commune Councils (CCs) and districts to develop a more participatory and transparent framework for the use and management of state lands. 3. The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) initiated the distribution of land to the landless and land poor through Social Land Concessions (SLCs) as a key component of its strategy to enhance the agricultural sector. In the Rectangular Strategy and National Strategic Development Plan (2006 – 2010), RGC committed to “accord priority to the strengthening of land tenure rights of the people who needed small lots of settlement and family production within the social land concessions framework, as a mechanism to assist poor households and vulnerable groups. SLCs are defined in Cambodia’s Land Law and regulated by Sub Decree No. 19 on SLCs of March 2003. Under Sub Decree No. 19, Government defined two types of SLCs: ‘nationally-initiated” and “locally-initiated”. Locally-initiated SLCs were generally much smaller and primarily intended to meet the

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needs of new families and other landless and land poor people to obtain land with legal tenure security within a commune as an alternative to illegal, anarchic settlements. Commune Councils had primary responsibility for planning and implementing locally initiated SLCs with support from provincial and district line agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations. 4. In support of RGC’s Rectangular Strategy and National Strategic Development Plan, the Bank committed to support the country’s SLC program by committing resources to test mechanisms aimed at assisting poor households’ access land. The Bank was viewed by the Government and other donor partners as uniquely positioned to support an initiative based on the improved governance of state lands as part of poverty reduction. The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, 2005-2008, extended to 2011) fully supported the governance reform process in a number of challenging areas such as public financial management, trade facilitation and decentralization. Under natural resource management, the Bank was working across broad areas of important land resource management (forestry, protected areas and land tenure and distribution) to support enhanced mechanisms for assessing and responding to broad land resource use concerns and tradeoffs, and sustainable access to such resources by local communities, consistent with national and global priorities. 5. The Bank, along with the German Agency for Technical Cooperation – Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Technische Zusammenarbeit (now called GIZ) – had been long-term partners of the government in developing and implementing its land agenda. The Bank supported the formulation of Cambodia’s overarching land policy in 2001 that provided the basis for the Land Law (2001) and also took a lead role in supporting a national dialogue on Cambodia’s agrarian structure to share international and domestic experiences relevant to decisions regarding the role of small holders and large plantations in the development of the rural economy. Given the challenges of policy reform, governance and technical complexity, the Government requested support from the Bank and GIZ - as the two lead donors on land policy – to facilitate the development of practical approaches to implementation of state land distribution to the poor, working with local commune councils. The Bank agreed to provide a grant and a credit through a Specific Investment Loan (now IPF) over a period of five years from 2008 – 2013 and GIZ committed to provide assistance and support to the Government, relevant technical line departments at sub national level and commune council for technical implementation of project activities. Separate complementary grant financing from the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) was approved for three (3) NGOs to support implementation of SLCs1.

1A total of $2,368,088 in JSDF funding was given to 3 NGOs (Wathnakpheap (WP), Life With Dignity (LWD), Localized from Lutheran World Federation (LWD) and Habitat for Humanity International – Cambodia (HfHI-C)) to support the SLC program initiated by RGC. The objective was to build capacity of voiceless in gaining access to land and livelihood; to test community based mechanisms and procedures for civil society and government collaboration for land tenure security; and to pilot a rights based approach to SLC planning and implementation for sustainable poverty reduction. The grants were implemented over a five year period in 6 sites (outside of LASED project area). All three NGOs successfully implemented Social Land Concession (SLC) programs with direct finance from JSDF. They built transparent and participatory mechanisms to provide the poor and landless residential and/ or agricultural land as well as basic infrastructure to ensure sustainable livelihood. They helped respective local authorities establish and implement transparent processes and procedures to implement SLC successfully. Implementation Completion Memorandums are available which include more detailed information.

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1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 6. As stated in the Financing Agreement, the objective of the Project was to improve the process for identification and use of state lands transferred to eligible, poor and formerly landless and land poor land recipients through a transparent and well-targeted selection process. 7. The associated key indicators are the following:

• At least 60% of land recipients adopt improved soil management and agricultural production systems.

• At least 90% of land recipients selected matched the selection criteria agreed for those specific SLCs.

• At least 70% of challenges to land recipient selection were reviewed and decision taken through the program dispute resolution mechanism.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. The PDO was not revised. Changes to indicators are detailed in Section 1.7 “Other Significant Changes”.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 9. The project expected to benefit about 3000 landless and land-poor households with land coverage of 10,000 Ha. Beneficiaries, allocated residential and/or agricultural plots, derived direct benefits from allocated plots, site preparation assistance, settling-in packages and other social and infrastructure services provided by the project. By project end, about 3,148 households had benefitted from project interventions and 10,273 Ha of land were distributed to them. 10. Secondary beneficiaries included:

• Farming households in surrounding areas who benefitted from improved services (access roads, schools and health posts) and improved marketing and trade in the area.

• Local traders who benefitted from increased production and trade. • Non-land recipients residing in the SLCs who benefitted from social and

infrastructure services. • Commune Councils, district, provincial and national level staff who benefitted

directly from training and capacity building developed through the project.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

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11. The project financed four major components as follows: 12. Component A – Commune Based Social Land Concession Planning and Land Allocation (US$1.5 million): The component aimed to support 20 communes (later revised to 7) to prepare Social Land Concession Sub-project Plans, including: (i) identification, environmental and social screening and registration of state private lands for SLCs; (ii) soliciting application from screening and selecting eligible landless and land poor from the commune, and; (iii) developing the SLC sub-project plan with land recipients for submission to their respective Provincial Land Use and Allocation Committee (PLUAC) for approval. The support included training, incremental operating costs and equipment for the communes, as well as provision of state land mapping registration services by Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC). 13. Component B – Rural Development Services and Investments (US$5.7 million): The component financed implementation of 20 (later revised to 7) approved SLC sub-project plans, including basic SLC site preparation, first year settling in assistance for land recipient (LR) families, and second and third year rural livelihood support. Financing was for civil works, goods, technical assistance and training. The component provided grants to the commune councils working with LRs, to contract civil works, goods, technical assistance and training services identified in approved SLC sub-project plans. SLCs were to include initial priority support for the first year settling-in needs of the LRs, including land preparation and plot demarcation, access tracks, portable water wells, household kits with shelter materials, focused health and agricultural support. During the second and third years of SLC sub-project implementation, LRs were to receive additional livelihood development assistance as part of broader village support for extension and training for agricultural and other economic activities and additional community infrastructure. 14. Component C – Sustainable and Transparent Program Development (US$4.0 million): The component financed the development of institutional capacity at the national, provincial and district levels to support transparent and sustainable implementation of locally initiated SLCs in LASED project areas and nationally. Financing covered technical assistance, salary incentives under the Merit Based Performance Incentive (MBPI)2, incremental operating costs, training, vehicles and goods for key government agencies involved in supporting locally initiated SLCs. Complementary

2 Government initiated a Merit Based Pay Initiative approach that introduced key elements of modern and efficient civil service structure, including clear description of positions, competitive selection, annual performance reviews and limitation of salary incentives to those provided through the MBPI system. The MBPI rates introduced a broader salary range as an incentive for performance and promotion. The MBPI Sub Decree was signed in 2005 and piloted in the context of the Public Financial Management Reform Program in the Ministry of Economy and Finance. In 2008, the Government issued Sub Decree 29 SE that specified pay levels and implementation arrangements for the MBPI. Through the Government-Donor Working Group on Civil Service Reform and the Public Financial Management Program, implementation of MBPI in different Government agencies was being monitored and evaluated to determine its effectiveness in promoting the broader civil service reform agenda. Emerging from a conflict situation and having to re-establish working systems, we have observed cases (for example, Afghanistan) where the absence of additional compensation for civil servants has led to implementation road blocks because people do not have adequate incentives for taking on additional responsibilities to their regular job functions, as was the case in Cambodia. In the context of LASED, MBPI was introduced on a pilot basis to MLMUPC and MoI pending a broader application in the context of the development of sectoral programs for land and decentralization. The 66 government staff who received payments through the MBPI worked at national and sub-national level for LASED, at least for a significant share of their time. Considering that the project was implemented by 2 ministries at national level, and involved several more departments at sub-national level in 3 provinces, working at 8 project sites, 66 covered staff was considered to be a manageable number.

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funding for NGO involvement was sourced through JSDF to support local communities and encourage participation, transparency and dispute resolution. 15. At the national level, support was provided to the General Secretariat for Social Land Concession (GSSLC) in the MLNUPC to strengthen policy development, public information sharing, training and monitoring of SLCs with special focus on LASED project provinces. GSSLC facilitated SLC sharing of experiences, proposed policies and procedural changes to the National Committee for Social Land Concession and facilitated the coordination of key public agencies, donors and NGOs at the national level. At the provincial level, support financed capacity building of the PLUAC Secretariat and specific line departments for their role in: i) training and public information; ii) ensuring that CCs received technical guidance for SLC sub-project planning and implementation; and iii) assessing SLC sub-project proposals and plans including monitoring and reporting to GSSLC. At the district level, the District Working Group (DWG) supported and worked closely with CCs to understand and meet requirements of SLC sub-project planning and implementation. The DWG provided CCs with technical support to ensure consistency with LASED SLC sub-project guidelines and facilitated reporting between CCs and PLUAC on progress of SLC planning and implementation. 16. Component D – Project Administration (US$1.8 million): The component financed capacity strengthening for project implementation support including procurement, financial management and donor-specific reporting. Financing was for technical assistance, training, incremental operating costs, vehicles and goods. At the national level, the component supported strengthening of the National Committee for the Management of Decentralization and Deconcentration (NCDD) Secretariat (now called National Committee for Sub-national Democratic Development Secretariat) in contract administration, financial management, procurement oversight and coordination with the Independent Procurement Agent3 and reporting. At the provincial level, Provincial Rural Development Committees (PDRC) were strengthened in the areas of financial management, procurement, contract administration and technical support units.

1.6 Revised Components 17. No revisions were made to project components.

1.7 Other significant changes 18. A number of changes were instituted during project implementation that were reflected in four Level 2 restructurings as follows:

• In 2010, Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) canceled the MBPI, Priority Mission Group (PMG) and other salary supplements and incentive schemes in

3 In December 2007, an Independent Procurement Agent (IPA) was recruited by the Government to carry out procurement under all Bank-financed projects in Cambodia, following instances of fraud and corruption identified in other projects in the portfolio.

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response to the global economic and financial crisis and to address imbalances in civil service pay. This was later replaced by the Priority Operating Costs (POC) in January 2012, which was a temporary scheme meant to address the short term issue of service delivery and reform implementation. The changes were not unique to the project and were applied to the entire country portfolio.

• In 2012, a revision was made to the target number of communes to be covered (20) by the project as the communes already covered were much bigger in terms of area coverage and land recipients than originally estimated. At the design phase, it was assumed that LASED-SLC sites would be of smaller area and coverage. As the project resources could only cover the existing seven communes, the Government proposed a revision to the indicator to read as “seven (7) communes submit approved LASED-SLC plans”. Another intermediate indicator4 was transferred to a different component more relevant to activities undertaken and a core sector indicator5 was introduced as part of key outcome indicators

• In 2013, the project closing date was extended by one year from June 30, 2013 to June 30, 2014 and grant proceeds partially reallocated to enable full completion of remaining rural infrastructure contracts in the final sites and to cover costs of the infrastructure investments for the various project sites

• In 2014, a nine-month project extension up to March 31, 2015 was approved along with reallocation of grant proceeds to allow continuation and completion of planning for rural infrastructure contracts in last project sites and for anticipated project locations of the next phase. The extension was meant to accommodate and support preparatory work for the follow on-operation.

19. Furthermore, the Provincial Rural Development Committee-Executive Committee (PRDC-ExCom) - a part of the provincial organizational structure - was replaced by the Provincial Administration in 2011. This change did not affect project implementation and management as the same personnel were involved in the project.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 20. The project was the main source of financing for pilot activities to identify and test practical and efficient mechanisms of identification and use of state lands that could be applied more broadly in the SLC program. The design was well aligned with the country’s Land Law (especially the sub decrees on SLC and state land management), the Rectangular Strategy, and the National Strategic Development Plan. 21. The PDO was kept simple and process-oriented to align the project’s approach with the Government’s overall strategy. Indicators were simple and measurable. The complexity

4“Women’s Participation in training, workshops and as applicants (head of households or cosignatory)”

5 “Target land area with use or ownership rights recorded as a result of the project”

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and risks associated with land distribution were recognized from the onset and strongly influenced the modest approach taken at project start with expectations to eventually scale up activities gradually based on experiences and institutional capacities. It was anticipated that a demonstration of effective implementation of mechanisms could strengthen political will to prioritize suitable state land allocation for distribution to the poor. The choice of a specific investment loan (now IPF) was appropriate for the project. 22. Initiated in 2004, the formal preparation of LASED was interrupted from 2005 – 2007 because government disengaged while mis-procurement problems which led to the suspension of another project (Land Management and Administration Project, LMAP) implemented by MLMUPC were resolved. The preparation process was completed in 2008 and drew from: (a) results of the Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) which was conducted by the Government in collaboration with the Bank, GIZ and Oxfam GB; and (b) domestic and international experiences, including study tours to Malaysia and the Philippines. Several alternatives were considered at the design stage but the general consensus was for the development of a locally-initiated SLC approach that could lend itself to working within existing institutional systems where transparency and accountability mechanisms could be reasonably integrated and made more responsive to beneficiary priorities. To minimize Government implementation complexities and capacity constraint risks, the project identified a limited set of critical services that could be provided directly by RGC in conjunction with an International Procurement Agent with contracts for most support services being handled by communes based on existing administrative and technical support arrangements in the country. 23. Risks and mitigation measures: Critical risks identified at appraisal were related to forestry, land issues and management of fiduciary issues. Based on domestic and international experiences, the project developed a number of key framework documents that identified critical issues and outlined approaches and mitigation measures to be taken. The project also drew from the implementation experience of the broader portfolio in Cambodia to strengthen the integrity of the Government service delivery aspects of the program that included: (i) utilizing the Independent Procurement Agent for all Government procurement; (ii) ensuring the opportunity and resources for civil society participation in all aspects of project implementation from the outset; and (iii) strengthening accounting for operating cost expenditures and ensuring frequent process monitoring to identify “symptoms” of possible irregularities in the delivery of services to beneficiaries. To that effect, the project prepared the following documents: (i) Good Governance Framework (GGF) that paid close attention to fiduciary risks; (ii) Civic Engagement Framework, which broadened participation for civil society support in the procedures for information dissemination and clarification, including dispute resolution mechanisms, and (iii) Strategic Communications Program meant to contribute to an accurate understanding of the project and the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders. Furthermore, safeguards documents, financial management and procurement assessments all identified potential risks along with associated mitigation measures. 24. Adequacy of participatory process: The preparation process for the project was conducted in a highly participatory manner. The Government assembled a multisectoral

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team of stakeholders who would play a critical role in the implementation stage of the project. The National Project Preparation Team (NPPT) working under Cambodia’s Council for land policy led the preparation of the project for government. NPPT was housed in MLMUPC and comprised of representatives from MLMUPC, MoI, Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and Ministry of Commerce. GIZ also provided technical support to NPPT for the preparation process. At design, extensive consultations were held with beneficiaries, local communities, NGOs, large landholders, researchers, local and national officials, donors and technical specialists to discuss land distribution issues affecting the poor. The Government was extremely committed to working with the Bank and GIZ based on the latter’s collective experience in supporting the country’s policy development for land use and administration. Particularly, the Government had expressed strong interest in improving its land allocation procedures and requested the Bank to directly support the entire SLC process so as to develop a transparent and participatory delivery model for the allocation of SLCs.

2.2 Implementation 25. Implementation of project activities was carried out through existing government structures with additional project support to build systems, procedures and capacity. The institutional framework was quite complex. The management and coordination structures required mechanisms to organize and coordinate the implementation of multiple inputs across a wide range of disciplines involving many departments from national to sub-national level (see attached graph in Annex 10). Given that the SLC process was new to many and the level of coordination and collaboration required was equally unfamiliar to most, the expectations of meeting set targets in the early years may have been overly ambitious. Many of the implementation challenges occurred during the first two years of the implementation period and contributed to a much slower start to activities than planned. 26. Procurement was a major part of implementation of the project as almost all of the rural development services and investments financed under the second component were infrastructure contracts. It took almost two years from project initiation before procurement was fully operational, in part, due to delays in recruitment of the technical assistance required to support preparation of designs, specifications and estimates. There were also initial delays in procurement with the Independent Procurement Agent mainly due to coordination challenges between the Government and IPA. 27. The implementation of the rural development services and investments component not only required timely procurement of competent contractors but also needed to ensure that different investments were properly sequenced and avoided seasonal delays. The level of multi-disciplinary collaboration and coordination was something that the staff in provincial administrations – who were the focus of this work – were not accustomed to. 28. The Government’s decision to discontinue the Merit Based Performance Incentive in 2010 did affect project momentum as the scheme to replace it – the Priority Operating Costs- only came into effect a year later (2011) and did not run for the full duration of the

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project (up to 2013). Instead, per diem payments were used to remove disincentives for government staff to visit the field and support the project. 29. The world financial and economic downturn that began in 2008 not only impacted the Government’s decision to discontinue MBPI but also affected the project budget. The budget envelope was reduced by $800,000 due to exchange rate fluctuations between the dollar and SDR. The loss required adjustments to scale back planned activities and implement them within the available resources. 30. The identification, classification and registration of land for SLCs was a challenging undertaking for those involved in the process. The design stage had anticipated that SLC lands would be sourced from 3 main sources (canceled economic land concessions, recovered illegally occupied lands and degraded forest lands), however, implementation experience showed that much of the land that did eventually come under the SLC was largely from degraded forests (96.5%) and the rest came from recovered illegally occupied lands (5.5%). There were challenges in understanding what exactly qualified as ‘degraded forests’ which caused some SLC proposals to be rejected by the Forest Administration (FA) – under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries - which was the deciding authority on degraded forests. Commune Councils, which oversaw the identification and registration processes, did not involve the FA early enough in the process to potentially address such issues as this could have minimized resultant delays.

31. The presence of Unexploded Ordinances (UXOs) in one of the registered sites in Memot District (administered with MoI as Sreleu Senchey village/site) also contributed to implementation delays as it required recruitment of a demining agency, Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC) to clear lands for settlement. The removal of UXOs in the LASED – SLC site was completed in May 2011 (under a 9-months contract). Upon completion of UXO clearing activities, CMAC certified that the site was safe for habitation and the land recipients immediately established their houses and started cultivating the agricultural land awarded to them. The unexpected expenditures related to contracting CMAC had to be accommodated in the budget envelope which necessitated some adjustments to other planned activities. Although the SLC was already registered, land recipients could not move immediately as planned, which contributed to the delayed initiation of livelihood activities. 32. Between 2009 and 2011, Cambodia was also adversely affected by a series of natural disasters in the form of floods, drought and storm surges. Flooding in some SLC sites in Kratie and Memot caused extensive damage to mostly cassava farm lands owned by LRs that caused a food security crisis as beneficiary investments were wiped out. With little to no savings, affected families became vulnerable to food insecurity. The loss in potential earnings from agricultural production was also a setback for livelihood development at the affected sites. 33. Annual Work Plans and Budgets (AWPBs) were based on commune-based SLC plans, with coordination and consolidation at the provincial level. They were then consolidated at national level for approval and incorporated into provincial and Commune

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Investment Plans. Project funding was also delayed by capacity constraints that affected the timely preparation and approval of AWPBs. GIZ played a critical role in filling the resources gap by supplying cash for work, access roads and agricultural inputs to alleviate the effects of delay in release of IDA funding caused by delayed approvals. 34. At the time of the Mid-Term Review in 2011, five SLCs were registered and an additional two sites were in the final stages of the registration process. A close review of the above-mentioned implementation challenges was undertaken in addition to the following:

• Reassessment of project scope and number of communes given that area already registered under the five communes represented about 70% of the target coverage and 40% of targeted land recipients. The project had to determine a realistic number of communes that could be effectively covered within the time and resource constraints available to the project

• Assessment of the impact of the institutional changes (Provincial Administration or PA) on overall project management and implementation at the sub-national level including absorptive capacity and priority technical assistance/training required

• Reassessment of project investment policies and guidelines given that some of the priority needs of land recipients were not limited to SLC/LASED sites but also required some access tracks for connection to the nearest roads

35. The project was restructured as documented in Section 1.7 to adjust original expectations to the ground realities. As confidence levels were gained in implementation, with SLC plans approved, and as procurement and other project systems became operational, the latter part of the implementation period focused on procurement and implementation of the site investments alongside development services to implement the plans and settle landless and land-poor families. Towards project end, implementation focus shifted to completion of remaining activities and consolidation. The adjustments, subsequent actions and reassessment of risks led to significant improvements in implementation that resulted in substantial achievement of key indicators and satisfactory achievement of the PDO ratings.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 36. M&E design. The project had established a monitoring system to track results framework indicators along some additional SLC implementation and development related indicators. The nature of the project and its design were such that the majority of indicators were quantitative and relatively easy to collect and measure. Two of the outcome indicators included in the design were linked to measuring success of processes used. By midterm, it was clear that the process had been mostly worked out, and the focus turned to ensuring impact and sustainability, so the baseline survey and beneficiary livelihood surveys were conducted.

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37. M&E implementation. Progress in settlement and development of plots was assessed directly at the Commune level. Data was entered into an excel spreadsheet database at the provincial level and compiled at the national level. Data was collected by sub-national/provincial teams for preparation of quarterly reports and aggregated at the national level on a quarterly basis. The national team verified figures and data with provincial teams and updated the M&E database on a quarterly basis. Establishment of the system and spreadsheet database only became fully operational at the later stages of the project when an international consultant was recruited to develop a more comprehensive system and manual. Once established, the monitoring system and excel database were able to adequately capture the development performance of the project through the quantitative results framework indicators as well as additional SLC related indicators identified. 38. The baseline survey for the project was only completed in January 2011, two and a half years after project effectiveness, and a Mid-term Review in May 2011.The project carried out small (limited coverage) annual land recipient beneficiary livelihood surveys to assess different aspects of impact, including production, income, access to market, etc. The GIZ team carried out annual food security surveys using Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) and Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) methods to assess food security in LASED SLCs and control villages. This was in part to support their technical assistance efforts on land use and management planning.

39. The project, with support from the World Bank and GIZ, held workshops to assess lessons learned and produced documentation such as the “LASED Annual Lessons Learnt Workshop (2011)” and the “LASED Lessons Learnt and Experiences Workshop (2012)” listed in Annex 9. Surveys conducted such as the “LASED Limited Beneficiary Assessment Report (2014)” used randomized controls and drew from the baseline survey. Overall, the surveys and case studies provided adequate information to assess project results. The various surveys and assessments carried out were considered by the ICR to be adequate for providing evidence on project results—although they could have been better coordinated—and obviated the need for the Impact Evaluation that was originally planned in the PAD. 40. M&E utilization. The quarterly reports generated from data collection were used for decision-making and evaluation purposes. The required quarterly, bi-annual and annual reports were generated using data from the M&E system. The project generated livelihood surveys used data drawn from the M&E system. M&E data was also used as a basis for the preparation of the project’s annual work plans and budgets (AWPB). The ability of the reporting to capture and explain depth of change and progress with appropriate supporting analysis was fairly limited and could have been improved, particularly with regard to performance of individual beneficiaries and in terms of the use of the land allocated for productive assets.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 41. The project triggered six (6) safeguard policies. These included environmental assessment, natural habitats, forests, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples and

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physical cultural resources. The project was classified as Environmental Category B, based on its potential for limited and small scale impacts from development of land and agricultural use. 42. Environmental Safeguards. The project complied with environmental safeguard procedures and guidelines (Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01; Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04; and Forests (OP/BP 4.36). Environmental assessment and the application of safeguards principles (including mitigation and monitoring) were integrated into SLC planning. The early adoption of participatory land use planning was effective in ensuring that proposed project sites were sourced from degraded forests and in delineating remaining forests within the sites. There was no conversion of community forests, water bodies or common green areas for residential and agricultural uses. These were delineated in coordination with the Forestry Administration, relevant line departments, land recipients and Commune Councils. Provincial LASED working groups were expanded to include Forest Administration, Environment, Water Resources and Meteorology, Rural Development, and Women Affairs to ensure that environmental issues were considered and screened at the commune and provincial planning levels. Environmental impacts from land site and infrastructure development activities were negligible with mitigation measures factored into Environment Assessment and Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) in both design and contracts. Delineated community forestry areas were also well maintained by beneficiaries. 43. Social Safeguards. The project triggered Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10), and Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11) safeguards. The project was implemented in line with all safeguard policies and their associated policy frameworks and guidelines. The social safeguard screening conducted during SLC land planning process confirmed that no land taking was required for the establishment of SLC sites. A small proportion of land (5.5%) initially identified for potential inclusion in the project SLC sites was from recovered illegally occupied lands. Given that the legal status of existing land occupants was usually unknown and took time to verify whether they occupied lands formally or informally, it was agreed that land in this category would not be included as potential SLC land under the project. Rather, after surveying such pieces of land, the existing land-users would remain but not as part of the potential SLC lands.

44. Provincial “hotspots” maps were prepared to identify areas with environmental importance, UXO, Economic Land Concessions, indigenous peoples or cultural sites, so that these could be avoided in the selection of possible SLC sites. The potential for involuntary resettlement issues with existing families on the identified SLC sites was mitigated through provision of three options: (1) give up land and accept a SLC plot through the “lucky draw” procedure, (2) accept some adjustments of their existing plots to fit the SLC plan and become eligible for title and other SLC services, or (3) not join the SLC, in which case their existing land would be excluded from the SLC. Lands still occupied or used by encroachers were excluded from the registered sites. However, encroachers were not excluded from utilizing the public services provided in the project

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sites including access to schools and health posts. The cut-off date mechanism6 provided a fair and transparent way to avoid further encroachment. Issues that were encountered were addressed through negotiation with local and provincial authorities. The selection of beneficiaries was conducted in a transparent manner and they were adequately informed of their rights and responsibilities associated with moving to the sites. Guidelines related to avoidance of land predominantly occupied by indigenous people (IP) population were complied with. Selection criteria included multiple objective criteria against which potential eligible applicants were assessed which protected all groups, including IPs, against discrimination in the selection process and allowed them to access project benefits. 45. Fiduciary Compliance. The financial performance rating of the Project was moderately satisfactory during the course of project implementation. All audit opinions on the audited annual financial statements of NCDD and GSSLC were unqualified (clean) during the project period; however, there were general delays in the submission of some reports. The project prepared quarterly IFRs although submission of reports was generally delayed due to time taken to consolidate technical aspects in the report. Some control weaknesses were identified and appropriate actions were taken to address them. The high turnover of FM consultants and counterpart staff during project implementation presented major challenges. Financial management consultants were engaged to support and build capacity of the counterpart staff and while this improved financial management performance, more was required to effectively transfer critical FM skills and systematically build up capacity of project staff. 46. Procurement Arrangements. All procurement was carried out in accordance with provisions of the Bank’s Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits. The sub-national level procurement followed the Commune/Sangkat Fund Project Implementation Manual and the Guidelines on Commune/Sangkat Procurement while the procurement process for national level procurement (National Competitive Bidding) followed the Government’s Standard Operating Procedure and Procurement Manual for Externally Assisted Projects/Programs in Cambodia. These procedures and manuals were acceptable to IDA and broadly consistent with the provisions of Section I of the Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits applicable to LASED Project. Consistent with the strict procurement approach in place at the time for all projects in the Cambodia portfolio, it was agreed in the case of LASED to allow NCDDS to take care of only procurement through the direct contracting method, procurement from UN agencies, and single source and sole source selection, and to allow the Communes to carry out only small packages (under $40,000 for civil works and $20,000 for goods) under Component II of the project, while the rest of packages were to be procured through the Independent

6The Cut-off date – public knowledge of plans to establish an area for SLC has been found to trigger accelerated encroachments and squatting beyond what may already exist in the area. An early cut-off date for eligibility regarding entitlements for compensation for loss of assets within an SLC areas is therefore required (the date of the government declaration of the areas as an adjudication areas). The cut-off-date is defined as the date two months prior to the first public information meetings on the SLC with the Commune Council and the Commune population. The CC will use existing records on residence and land use within the Commune to provide a baseline on authorized occupation within proposed SLC areas. This information will be verified by the CC and PLUAC, and through a public meeting during the SLC planning process.

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Procurement Agent. There were coordination challenges between the Government and IPA that led to procurement delays in the first year. The absence of a technical advisor and high turnover of procurement staff at NCDDS also contributed to delays as there was no technical expertise to provide inputs for infrastructure procurement. Procurement progress improved significantly following the recruitment of national and international consultants who also supported the training of procurement staff at the sub-national level. Post-reviews were carried out throughout project implementation and procedures were generally found to be in line with the Bank’s procurement guidelines with no cases of mis-procurement identified.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 47. In terms of sustainability, the expectations placed on SLC programs go beyond land allocation and obligate programs to meet infrastructure needs and deliver necessary support service requirements to enable land recipients to derive benefits from land allocated. Based on lessons that have emerged from implementation (see Section 6), a follow-up proposed project is being prepared (LASED-II) which is proposed to focus on consolidation and enhancement of livelihood opportunities for land recipients in the existing sites as these activities came much later than originally planned and require incubation for long-term sustainability. It is envisaged that the proposed project would address the remaining priority needs of beneficiaries by providing land recipients a package of agricultural services and infrastructure support to make their lands productive and sustainable. In addition, the proposed project is expected to provide support to eligible land recipients to apply for issuance of full land titles.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 48. Relevance of Objective: The relevance of the project’s objective remains high. The project financed pilot activities to test processes and develop systems, tools, procedures and capacities for the implementation of Sub Decree No. 19 on SLCs supported by the Land Policy 2009. The project is fully in line with the government policies and poverty reduction objectives laid out in the National Strategic Development Plan (2009 -2013; and 2014-2018) and the 3rd and 4th Rectangular Strategy documents, in which government committed to “accord priority to the strengthening of land tenure rights of the people who need small lots for settlement and family production within the SLC framework, as a mechanism to assist poor households and vulnerable groups”. These policies stress the importance of distributing and using state lands for private and public purposes in a transparent and equitable manner that responds to the needs of the population. The project was also aligned with the Bank’s 2005 Country Assistance Strategy7 goal of improved broad-based rural growth based on enhanced management of natural resources.

7The 2005 Country Assistance Strategy, which was extended to 2011, was the last one completed.

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49. Relevance of Design and Implementation: The relevance of design and implementation arrangements is rated substantial. The project set out to pilot and test processes that could be integrated into a broader government program and included a clear statement of objectives that was to be achieved through four main components. The first component included activities that were relevant to achieving the improved process of identification and use of state lands objective. The component provided technical support for the preparation of SLC sub-project plans with land recipients and financed approved plans that directly impacted on the objective of improving the use of state lands. The component also supported the registration of state lands and recipient selection processes that allowed the project to better understand the key constraints faced in implementing these procedures and identifying measures to address bottlenecks. This also contributed to improving the identification process as set out in the objectives. In addition, the selection of eligible beneficiaries fed into validating the transparency and targeting processes used. 50. The link between the second component and the objective was also clear. By supporting eligible households to receive support packages as agreed in the SLC plans, opportunities were being created for land recipients to invest more time and resources on productive assets, and to receive training on improved soil management practices. The provision of public infrastructure and other services such as roads, schools, latrines, small irrigation and open wells contributed to enhancing community livelihoods. Overall, there was a strong link to improving the use of state lands 51. The third component was meant to strengthen capacity of implementing staff to undertake the SLC process. The component facilitated learning and experience sharing from selected activities that had been initiated under the component by providing technical facilitation to broaden options for SLC sources in order to test the institutional strength and identify areas of weakness that required attention. The added incentive of MPBI served to ensure that staff were sufficiently motivated to carry out assigned tasks and make the necessary adjustments when required. These interventions, along with the administrative interventions of the fourth component, were expected to strengthen the institutional capacity for government staff to carry out these processes. Therefore, they did contribute to the overall objective. 52. Rating: Given the above considerations, relevance of objective, design and implementation is rated as Substantial.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 53. Rating: Substantial 54. LASED’s systems, procedures and processes worked well enough to meet the development outcomes envisaged in the project. The project financed pilot activities to test processes in the implementation of social land concession programs, which successfully identified, surveyed, screened, mapped, accepted and met the project target of registering 7 SLCs as public state lands for social land concessions. The combined land coverage of the SLCs (10,273 ha) and land recipients (3,148) exceeded project targets of covering

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10,000 ha of land and 3,000 land beneficiaries respectively. The guidelines set out in the Project Implementation Manual for participatory and transparent preparation were fully adopted by all SLCs as they were able to prepare and submit approved SLC plans for land use. All land recipients selected matched the selection criteria set out in the SLCs and all complaints related to the selection process were reviewed and resolved through established complaints handling channels. With regard to improvements in land use, in addition to meeting the targets for provision of settling in support for land recipients, the project successfully provided key infrastructure services as well as agricultural training through an agricultural extension package. Access to these services enabled almost 60% of LRs to engage in agricultural production using improved technologies and practices. The interventions led to notable improvements in food security as noted in the GIZ Food Security Survey and also improved income generated from agricultural activities (refer to paragraph 55 and footnote 9 and 10). Overall, three out of the four PDO level indicators were fully achieved and targets exceeded, while one outcome indicator target was substantially achieved. The key project achievements are summarized below (and detailed outputs by component are presented in Annex 2). 55. Adoption of improved soil management practices and agricultural production systems through technology demonstrations and access to technical services contributed to increasing average household incomes and reduced food insecurity for LRs: The project successfully allocated both residential and agricultural plots to 3,1488 eligible land recipients out of which 3,074 LRs received SLC agricultural plots. While there were challenges faced in moving to allocated plots, 57% of LRs (PDO -1: Target of 60% substantially achieved) that received agricultural plots, particularly in the older SLCs, had engaged in agricultural practices that involved inter/mixed cropping of cash crops with rubber, fruit trees and other permanent crops; introduction of permanent of permanent crops and improved management practices of water techniques through retention and drainage. A LASED Livelihood survey9 showed that the majority of interviewed land recipient households grew rice and cassava, and invested an average $176 for agricultural cultivation that earned them $394 as average net on-farm income. This represented a 55% increase in on-farm income when compared to $255 found by the baseline survey in 2010. Food insecurity had also significantly declined over a four year period according the 2014 annual GIZ Food Security Survey10 carried out in 4 LASED sites (Kratie Round 1: from

8Intermediate Indicator 4: Target of 3000 was exceeded.

9A small livelihood survey was conducted by an independent consultant, on behalf of the LASED project in September 2014 that aimed to review the use of agricultural and residential land as well as off-farm activities of land recipients in four Social Land Concession sites of LASED. Interviews were conducted and data collected from 267 randomly selected households from LASED sites and it found that the majority of interviewed land recipient households grew rice and cassava, and invested an average $176 for agricultural cultivation that earned them $394 as average net on-farm income. As most LRs started farming own land for the first time and with little or no prior farm management experience, many LRs continued to engage in off-farm activities to supplement their incomes. The survey showed that earnings from off-farm incomes were more significant (up to $1506) and combined for an average household income of $1901, which was 61% higher when compared to $1,176 found by the baseline survey in 2010. Further, an independent Food Security Survey, funded annually by GIZ as part of its technical assistance to the project, showed that in Kampong Cham SLC where the main crop was cassava, land recipient households earned a net income from $1250 - $1400 per Ha. In Kratie SLC, net earnings from cassava per household were between $997 -$1150 per Ha and $375 - $450 per Ha for rice. In both surveys, net incomes did vary across different SLCs based on the size of agricultural land use, quality of land preparation, soil quality and extent to which proper management techniques/technologies were adopted. 10With regard to food security, the 2014 GIZ-funded Food Security Survey carried out in four LASED sites showed that the percentage of household food security had improved dramatically due to among other factors, increased use of agricultural plots, less droughts and

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96% in 2010 to 36% in 2014; Kratie Round 2: from 95% in 2012 to 30% in 2014; Tbong Khmum (formerly part of Kampong Cham): from 100% in 2010 to 34% in 2014; and Kampong Thom: from 98% in 2012 to 32% in 2014) 56. The project built strong collaboration with various line departments that supported LRs on adaptation and adoption of technologies, especially agricultural technologies that aimed to improve soil fertility and increase income generation. Demonstration sites were set up in each commune to transfer relevant and appropriate techniques of improving soil management and agricultural production system. The project delivered 530 courses of agricultural management courses in livestock and crop production and demonstrated seven (7) technologies (PDO -4: Target of 1 was exceeded). A total of 18,936 participants (53% women) were trained in chicken raising, pig raising, compost making, rice production, fruit tree management, home gardening and vegetable production. Improved management methods and adoption of technologies. A livelihood survey undertaken on behalf of LASED in 2014, found that 80% of land recipients had adopted and implemented skills and techniques of modern agricultural and business techniques on their farm activities to improve soil fertility and agricultural production. 57. The selection process developed by the pilot was successful in effectively targeting landless and land poor eligible recipients to receive land and led to replication of procedures in other government programs for land allocation. The project was effective in utilizing transparent mechanisms and participatory selection processes that involved “ID Poor System” and worked with NGOs supported through JSDF funding to optimize the transparency process by collaborating in public information dissemination and providing oversight in the selection process. Critical attention was paid to awareness raising and explanation of process and criteria for land recipients to understand proper implementation of procedures and required actions. The selection process was so effective that all LRs (100%) selected for the SLC program met the eligibility criteria to receive land (PDO- Indicator 2: 90% target was exceeded). 58. The processes described in the Government guidelines were based on and adjusted following experiences in LASED communities. In addition to implementing the LASED project, the project team at the national level in the Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction were implementing Social Land Concession Projects for former armed forces where knowledge and experience gained from training and implementation of LASED project led to adoption of procedures in other SLC programs. The land identification process followed steps similar to LASED safeguard procedures of participatory land screening, preservation of protected areas and cut off of existing lands used by people. In the land planning process, the mapping process followed in LASED was

floods and supplementary food safety net through GIZ sponsored Rice Banks. The survey sampled a total of 655 randomly selected SLC households and 230 households randomly selected from control villages. The survey found that SLC households facing food shortages decreased dramatically in each of the surveyed sites. The survey also noted that around 30% of LASED SLC households still faced food shortages compared to 45% of households in the control groups. The agricultural production systems of most households, while improved, remained fragile and required more support to develop stability and resilience.

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used in the program including reservation of land for infrastructure services. In addition, distribution of land to land recipients used the lottery selection process as in the LASED project. This demonstrates the learning and shift in mindset that has taken place. The government has recognized the significant and potential contribution of SLCs to poverty reduction and is committed to scaling up the program. 59. Conflict resolution mechanism effectively addressed disputes related to selection criteria. The Complaint Handling Mechanisms established as part of project implementation was effective, particularly in addressing complaints received during the land recipient selection process. The project received 687 complaints during the land recipient selection process that were jointly reviewed by commune councils and NGOs. All 678 complaints were reviewed and screened against the selection criteria and scoring system. About 44% (297) of complaints were found to be from non-eligible households or unrelated to the process. Remaining 56% (381) of complaints were re-assessed and scores adjusted accordingly. About 207 of the aggrieved applicants increased their scores sufficiently to be successfully allocated land. Remaining applicants remained on the waitlist for the next consideration of plots. End results of the reassessment process were made public for further public discussion and acceptance. The process complied with guidelines and principles laid out in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM) and decisions taken were relayed to complainants in a timely manner. The involvement of NGOs in the review process enhanced trust between Commune Councils and communities and increased transparency in the procedures set up. All the complaints received (100%) were addressed and decisions reportedly accepted by complainants (PDO –Indicator 3: Target of 90% was exceeded) 60. Provision of infrastructure support services along with settling-in support for land recipients contributed to increased agricultural production as well as expenditure savings from improved road access. By project end, a total of about 215 km of road had been constructed that included 71km of clearing access tracks, approximately 123km of earth roads and 21km of laterite roads. LRs reported that the road investments had facilitated transport of their agricultural products to the markets and improved mobility and access to services, facilities and opportunities outside the SLC sites. The 2014 livelihood survey also interviewed 20 households randomly selected from land recipients in Tipo 1 SLC, Kampong Thom province where new roads had been constructed. Indications were that travel time reduced from 96 minutes to 39 minutes for travel outside the commune, which also resulted in transportation savings of about $3.27. The project also constructed 7 primary schools in the 7 communes where a total of 983 students have been enrolled with 30% attending from nearby villages. All three health posts planned under the project were constructed and were providing services to SLC members and surrounding communities. 61. At the time of ICR, a number of support packages and capacity building services had been provided to LRs that had settled in the SLC sites: (i) 1,225,944 kg of rice was distributed as part of the food for work program; (ii) 2,490 residential starter kits and 3,074 agricultural starter kits were distributed along with 2,226 housing construction materials, 2,687 latrine materials and other plating and livestock inputs such as seeds, seedlings, chickens and demarcation poles. All eligible households (100%) that settled in the SLC

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sites received support packages11. Based on the 2014 livelihood survey, a comparison between rice yields of households that used local rice variety and land recipients that used improved varieties distributed by the project found significant differences in harvest yields. Whereas the local variety provided 800-900kg of paddy rice yield, the improved variety yielded up to 1500kg of paddy rice per hectare of rice field.

3.3 Efficiency 62. Rating: Substantial 63. Methodology: Financial and Economic Analysis (FEA)12 for the ICR of the project was carried out for model households of the Land Recipients (LRs) and for the project as a whole. The analysis covered the without-project option13, the with-project option, and the project’s incremental effect. The incremental effect is the net effect the with-project option has over the without-project option, which assumes that investments would have been financed by the Government itself, as was done elsewhere in Cambodia. Data for the ICR’s FEA were based on the project’s records and gathered from field visits to five (5) project sites, and telephone interviews of beneficiary households’ representatives at two other sites. The discount rate used was 14 per cent14 and the period for analysis was 20 years. More details on the methodology and assumptions are provided in Annex 3. 64. Overall, the ICR’s FEA results were different from those of the PAD due to significant differences between (a) economic conditions at appraisal and during the project’s implementation stages relating to prices, wages, and market opportunities for Cambodia’s agricultural produce; and (b) the PAD’s assumptions and actual delivery and conditions of the project concerning the number of project sites, the number of model households15, the surface areas of agricultural land, the start-up year of agricultural land use, the trend and pattern of agricultural land use, start-up support costs for LRs, and income of off-farm labor and livestock. The PAD did not look at any qualitative benefits of the project. It did not present financial analyses. For economic analysis, it presented only the EIRR.

11Intermediate Indicator-6: Target of 100% fully achieved.

12 In the FEA, all three key measures, NPV, BCR and IRR, were analyzed, but only IRR are presented in this section for the sake of space and simplicity.

13 The without the project option (i.e., without the Bank’s investment) means that investment by Government would have been made too as evidenced by SLC projects carried out by the Government per se at other locations/sites. However, investments by the Government and by the Bank have some differences. The Government focused solely on hard infrastructure (land allocation) while the Bank’s focus was on both hardware and software (land allocation and associated services). The software aspects include, for example, processes, procedures, agricultural services, etc. Although the Government invested in hardware infrastructure at its SLC sites, the investment was very limited.

14 The 14 per cent discount rate was chosen to match with that used in the project appraisal.

15 The Project was actually implemented at eight (08) sites in three (03) provinces and had 24 model households receiving varied sizes of agricultural land, but PAD looked at only two (02) sample provinces, two sample sites and four model households with equal agricultural land size.

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65. Non-quantifiable benefits: Generally, the project generated qualitative benefits rather than costs. The non-quantifiable benefits produced by the project included (a) improved governance in land allocation and management, (b) community solidarity and mutual assistance, (c) sustainable land use practices, and (d) decrease/prevention of out/overseas migration for risky jobs. 66. FEA of model households: All financial measures for all types of model households fared better in the with-project case when compared to those in the without-project case. The incremental effect of the project was significant. In the with-project case, FIRR was 29.24-113.93 percent. The incremental FIRR was 34.35-139.77 percent. 67. Values of the with-project EIRR were far below the PAD’s for model households. This was because the start-up costs for LR households was much higher than the PAD’s estimate and LR households at most project sites received less than the 3 ha of agricultural land assumed in the PAD, regardless of household size. The EIRR for model households in the PAD was 16.30-21.10 percent. The EIRR for model households of the actual project was 7.03-13.79 percent. However, the incremental effect was much better with the incremental EIRR at 16.4-40.27 percent. 68. Economic analysis of whole Project model16: For the whole project model, land use trends and patterns at all sites were accounted for, which required that the analysis be done for two time-periods. The first was for a 20 year-period (2008-2027) beginning from the start of the project, and the second was for a 30-year period (2008-2037). The latter was to account for sites added at the later stages. The economic performance of the with-project option was better than that of the without-project option, and the incremental effect was substantial. The with-project EIRR was 13.66-16.96 percent, and the incremental EIRR was 32.3533.33 per cent.17

69. Sensitivity Analysis: Three key variables—produce prices, yields, and production costs (including wages)—were used to test the sensitivity of the results of the economic analysis to changes in assumptions. The FIRR in the with-project scenario was very sensitive to changes in prices and yields, while in the incremental analysis it was very sensitive to costs and yields. For example, when produce prices declined by 10 percent, the FIRR decreased by 15 percent. When costs rose by 10 percent, the incremental FIRR decreased by 15 percent. The EIRR of the project was very sensitive to changes in prices and yields, in that order. For example, when produce prices decreased by 10 percent, the EIRR declined by 20-30 percent. However, the order was reversed for the incremental EIRR, which was very sensitive to changes in yields and prices. For example, when yields were down by 10 percent, the incremental EIRR declined by 16-17 percent.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

16 PAD’s overall Project EIRR was estimated at 19.9 per cent for 20-year analytical period.

17 In the analyses two cost scenarios were covered: Scenario A and Scenario B. Scenario A included all project expenditures/costs (inclusive of project expenditures on administration, operation, processes). Scenario B included only expenditures/costs directly related to the beneficiaries. This was the start-up support cost for them. The presentations and discussions in this text only cover Scenario B.

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70. Rating: Satisfactory 71. Given that the relevance of objectives, design and implementation are substantial; achievement of project development objectives is substantial and efficiency considerations are substantial, the overall outcome rating is assessed to be Satisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 72. Poverty Impacts: Land recipients in LASED SLC sites have taken important steps to improve their livelihoods. At the start of project activities, almost all families belonged to the group of poor households (classified as ID Poor 1 and 2) and where characterized by severe food shortages. The most recent LASED Food Security Survey shows that almost 70% of all households were classified as food secure and more than 80% of those were no longer part of the population group classified as ID Poor 1 and 2. However, even as LRs have shown an upward movement on the poverty ranking, they remain extremely vulnerable to falling back as more support is required for them to comfortably sustain gains made. 73. Gender Aspects: The project worked to ensure that women were given equal opportunities in land allocation and developing their livelihood skills. Gender equality was mainstreamed into the distribution of land and in livelihood development support. The gender analysis and gender segregated needs assessment conducted in all SLC sites played an important role in encouraging women to participate in project activities. Out of 3148 families that were allocated land in the SLC program, 34% of SLC land recipients were female headed households. Out of the total population of land recipients selected for the SLC program, 51% of project beneficiaries were female. Additionally, gender responsive training courses were also mainstreamed into training plans and women’s participation in all these activities stood at 53%. 74. Social Development: The Complaints Handling Mechanism was effective in addressing the challenges of the beneficiary selection process but much more was required to address the challenges of encroachers. The project made provisions in the guidelines not to exclude encroachers that chose to participate in the program and went further to allow unwilling participants to access public infrastructure facilities and services in the SLC sites. The project was very deliberate in providing sufficient time for potential land recipients to register their interest in the SLC program. The added support of NGOs for outreach and attention paid to record keeping and documenting processes enhanced legitimacy of the process. As the information about cut-off dates was widely disseminated and well understood by beneficiaries, it was widely accepted as a legitimate resolution mechanism whose decisions were acceptable to most potential land recipients. This was found to be effective in ensuring that no further encroachment on SLC land occurred. For the cases where encroachment had occurred after the cut-off date, cases were resolved through strong high-level local and provincial support. Other measures taken to minimize possible land

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conflicts included provisions for alternative lands within the SLCs as compensation in the event that an agreement could not be reached. More importantly for long term stability, the project agreed to a systematic land registration and titling process that would apply to all commune residents including encroachers. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 75. As documented under Section 2.2, the identification of potential lands that could be converted to SLC areas was found to be challenging and commune councils played the most critical role in this process. Commune Councils had little knowledge and experience in this field but were supported through technical assistance provided by District Working Groups and higher level provincial teams. Support was further reinforced by working with NGOs to identify eligible applicants and land recipients by using a systematic and transparent process. Working with the NGOs enabled Commune Councils to leverage constrained resources and minimize risks of complaints and conflicts as NGOs provided critical support in ensuring that knowledge about CHM was widely disseminated, and that land recipients were properly supported to file complaints. NGOs also provided close monitoring of the process to ensure that complaints were fully addressed. NGO support contributed to strengthening community ties and enhanced trust and credibility in the processes implemented by Commune Councils. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 76. Although the project development objective was process oriented, the project did have notable impacts on beneficiary households’ food situation, even though this was not formally part of the objective. According to the GIZ Food Security Survey Results of 2014, households facing food shortages declined dramatically in LASED sites sampled in four provinces: (Kratie Round 1: from 96% in 2010 to 36% in 2014; Kratie Round 2: from 95% in 2012 to 30% in 2014; Tbong Khmum (formerly part of Kampong Cham): from 100% in 2010 to 34% in 2014; and Kampong Thom: from 98% in 2012 to 32% in 2014). The survey also noted that around 30% of LASED SLC households still faced food shortages compared to 45% of households in the control groups.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 77. Rating: Significant 78. Much of the success of the SLC program is anchored in the Commune Council’s capacity to undertake a critical number of functions. Commune Councils are considered as the driving force for the program given that they are primarily responsible for the SLC identification process, beneficiary selection process and coordination of other stakeholders in development of the annual implementation plan. Effective execution of these functions requires development of adequate technical capacity complemented by the required financial resources to efficiently deliver results. Continued capacity weaknesses at the sub-national level could compromise the replicability of SLC identification process and integration into the overall Government framework; increase risk of elite capture in the

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beneficiary selection process and create delays in the provision of critical services that incentivize beneficiaries to invest their time and resources in land development and utilization. At the time of the ICR, around 57% of the 3,074 land recipients that had been allocated agricultural plots had settled on the plots and began cultivation activities. In addition, almost 80% of land recipients who were allocated residential plots had settled on their plots. Further settlements were expected and required concerted efforts from relevant staff at the sub-national level. The risk is significant. 79. The use of government systems was important for creating ownership and influencing the policy direction of land management and tenure. Various incentives were introduced during project implementation to increase service delivery performance of Government agencies combined with technical training. However, over-reliance on government systems could risk restricting opportunities for land recipients who require flexibility in a process that can easily lend itself to their evolving needs and circumstances, including the option for private sector support for related services. The Government has already demonstrated broadening its strategic approach by working closely with NGOs and therefore the risk is considered to be moderate. 80. Livelihood improvement for land recipients was an integral part of project implementation and addressing their immediate requirements as they moved to their new locations was crucial for their settlement and an important step towards earning a living. As the beneficiary selection process targeted the poorest and vulnerable groups most susceptible to shocks, inadequate interventions that do not provide quick and tangible benefits in terms of returns to labor and food security would only serve to further aggravate their vulnerability and poverty situation. It is now well recognized that appropriate support, taking into account the needs and labor availability in recipient households, is needed to help develop the SLC land as productive assets. The necessary flexibility in government agencies’ responses and support is increasing, however, it still needs further strengthening. The risk is moderate. 81. At the time of the ICR, Government had provided land titles to 250 households (roughly 22%) who had met the eligibility criteria (which includes 5 years of residence on the plot) that were supported under the LASED project. The title applications for the remaining households are currently going through the Government’s systematic land titling process. The land titles enable eligible recipients to derive benefits by way of tenure security, access to formal credit markets, and opportunities to increase investments and productivity. The issuance of titles for the first group of land recipients took longer than expected. Delays in the processing of land titles could risk affecting the realization of the full economic benefits to the land recipients. Going forward, this process should be expedited. The risk is moderate 82. Infrastructure services were provided by private contractors with supplemental support from the Department of Rural Development. However, sustainability for these investments is very much linked to the operations and maintenance capacity of SLC communities. Without sufficient systems in place to generate the required revenue for

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O&M, there is a risk of jeopardizing the long term maintenance of infrastructure and compromising access to other services and markets. The risk is significant.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 83. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 84. The project design tackled an issue that was relevant and consistent with the development agenda of the Government as well as the Bank’s CAS. The PDO was process oriented and aligned the project’s approach with the Government’s priorities in the sector. Indicators were simple and measurable. Recognizing the sensitivity of land issues, substantial effort went into incorporating relevant diagnostic work, understanding and incorporating lessons from relevant projects, domestic and international experiences, and developing frameworks that aimed to address the most critical risks identified. There was an adequate mix of skills in the preparation phase and sufficient budget allocated for the preparation process. There was strong collaboration with the Government, which had a deep interest in supporting the pilot. 85. However, given that the project financed pilot activities, the design could have been enhanced with inclusion of indicators to measure whether or not the pilot was successful in leading to a scaling up of the approach. Although the design recognized the importance of sequencing of activities to achieve project success and that infrastructure services had to be in place prior to land recipients moving into SLCs, the team did not adequately anticipate the length of time it would take to have services in place. An expedited process should have been facilitated such as advance preparation of procurement documentation at design which could have saved critical time for the project team to focus on other major issues that required attention. (b) Quality of Supervision 86. Rating: Satisfactory 87. The Bank team carried out regular implementation support and was responsive to the needs of the Borrower, maintaining a consistent team of local and international staff and consultants to provide fresh perspective and specific expertise as required. The task team was pro-active in responding to various issues in a timely and constructive manner. The project triggered 6 safeguards which were closely reviewed by the Bank safeguards team during each mission to ensure compliance with the frameworks that had been developed. The fiduciary team worked closely with the project team providing continuous guidance and technical support in light of challenges experienced with high fiduciary staff turnovers. Fiduciary and safeguard issues were adequately addressed. The team was very responsive to addressing key issues that arose during implementation through restructuring and adjusting expectations to reflect ground realities and ensured that the MTR was held

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on time. The project also greatly benefitted from having a TTL based in Phnom Penh alongside other key technical staff that were field based which enabled easy accessibility, quick decision making and timely provision of implementation guidance. A strong collaborative network was built with stakeholders and partners such as GIZ and NGOs. Joint implementation and technical support missions were carried out to ensure consistency in approach and alignment with expectations set. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 88. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 89. Given that quality at entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory and quality of supervision is rated as Satisfactory, the overall Bank performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance 90. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 91. The Royal Government of Cambodia was highly committed to the project and was closely involved in the preparation process and provided feedback to the Bank team. The Government had laid the legislative platform on which the project would build on and were flexible in adopting guidelines and measures that supported successful implementation. The Government was responsive to many of the issues that could not be resolved at project level by setting up various working groups to work with communities and address concerns. Even though, the Merit Based Performance Incentive scheme was discontinued, the Government made an extra effort to replace it with POC to ensure that the public delivery system continued to function as efficiently as possible in meeting the needs of the project. However, the Government was challenged in meeting its commitment of ensuring the availability of three sources of land for SLCs (land was sourced from degraded forest lands and recovered illegally occupied lands but none could be sourced from canceled economic land concessions as these could have also taken longer to secure given the potential legal obstacles). Meeting this commitment could have potentially provided additional options that could have contributed to accelerating the identification and registration process. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance 92. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 93. There was strong coordination between the two responsible ministries supported by clear distinction of roles and responsibilities. Systems, procedures and processes were new to the implementing agencies and the learning curve was steep as noted by the extraordinary effort made to deliver results while managing the different institutional layers

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that were part of the implementation process. The project team demonstrated strong commitment to the project and utilized much of the capacity support provided by GIZ to be effective in delivering results. The project complied with all legal covenants with the exception of undertaking an impact evaluation as explained in Section 2.3. The project team paid close attention to complying with safeguard measures that ensured fairness in the treatment of all stakeholders impacted by the SLC program (see Section 2.4). Data on indicators was collected regularly and the system updated however, it was not well integrated for more strategic decision making as discussed in Section 2.3. While the project team is commended for having met the objectives of the project through learning and doing, there were a number of shortcomings which, if properly addressed, could have produced even better results for the project. The Baseline Survey was initiated fairly late and only completed 2 and half years after project effectiveness. Given that the majority of procurement packages were to be procured by IPA and the IPA was engaged on time, the absence of technical expertise to provide inputs for procurement to be initiated from the start, was the critical issue that was not adequately addressed and led to implementation delays that affected transition of land recipients and contributed to the slow settling in process observed. Delays in the preparation and approval of the Annual Work Plan and Budget affected timely provision of IDA funding for settlement packages, which also had negative effects on the communities. These factors combined to further delay the consolidation process of livelihood activities for land recipients and resulted improved but lower than expected results. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 94. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 95. Given that Government performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory and Implementing Agency is rated as Moderately Satisfactory, the overall Borrower’s performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned 96. Important lessons have emerged from the pilot, some of which have been incorporated into LASED II design. They are outlined below: 97. SLC process can be effectively used to target poor landless and land-poor households for inclusion in the SLC program. There were nine key steps followed in the selection of land recipients and while procedures were considered laborious, they ensured credibility and maximized transparency in the process. This process ensured that the people targeted for the project intervention were the people who were selected and benefited. In addition, as staff became more familiar with the procedures and guidelines, efficiencies were gained in identifying processes that could run in parallel rather than sequentially, e.g. initiating SLC planning alongside land recipient selection process eliminated one step and helped to shorten the process without compromising credibility and transparency. Furthermore, involvement of NGOs not only contributed to enhancing the credibility of the selection process but also helped to improve working relations between the commune

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councils and beneficiaries. Their involvement in community mobilization and awareness raising expanded outreach to increase participation of potential beneficiaries and helped to leverage commune councils limited resources for similar activities. 98. Involving Key stakeholders at the beginning of the SLC identification process can accelerate critical decisions affecting SLC registration. The majority of land in SLC sites were sourced from degraded forests administered by the Forest Administration (FA). Initial delays were experienced in securing approval for land concessions with relevant authorities because they were not involved at the beginning stage of the process, rather, they were consulted only for approval at a later stage. Involving them at the earliest stage of the identification process can reduce delays in reaching consensus and help to streamline approval procedures. This along with improving capacity at sub-national level to undertake these activities would serve to further improve the process. 99. Complaints handling mechanism adequately addressed grievances arising from the selection process. Particular measures had been taken during the project’s implementation to minimize to the extent possible, conflicts and complaints. Allocation of specific plots to households could be a potential source of conflict because land quality varies across communes and within communes as well. By instituting a lottery process, the project was able to effectively minimize potential conflict as beneficiaries felt that the lucky draw system was more credible as it placed everyone on equal footing. The involvement of NGOs in providing oversight to the selection process ensured that complaints were received and adequately addressed. NGOs worked closely with beneficiaries in facilitating their rights to be heard by helping them fill out required paperwork and following up on complaints filed. This close collaboration with beneficiaries improved transparency and credibility perceptions of the process as well as overall relations between Commune Councils and SLCs. Many of the conflicts arising from this process were resolved at the sub-national level as a result of this improvement. 100. Settling-in support in the form of land clearance and preparation at the transition stage is critical to support beneficiary households most of who do not have assets and regular income. The support provided by GIZ in this regard proved to be an important coping mechanism for most households who were also heavily indebted. This allowed them to work on their agricultural lands without falling further into the debt trap as most common approach to land clearance was to borrow money from money lenders and repay once product was harvested. The returns from investments were used to address household needs and pay down debt. Early and comprehensive support for land preparation is crucial to quickly establishing sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods. This needs to be preceded by infrastructure services that help to accelerate settlement of land recipients. The sequencing of project activities in the SLC program is critical to have any meaningful impact. The identified and agreed advance actions should be in place before project effectiveness, otherwise, it would have significant effects on procurement start up. 101. Public-private partnership arrangements should be developed with specialized service providers and NGOs to complement Government efforts. The focus on livelihoods requires a more differentiated and flexible approach as the needs of beneficiaries are

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constantly evolving. The linkages with line departments to provide critical extension services is very much welcome and needed because increasing production and productivity are essential for livelihoods development, however, they are not sufficient for increasing household incomes as this requires access to markets along with marketing services and inputs and responsiveness to changing market dynamics. These may not be readily available in the public delivery system. There is space for collaboration with private sector service providers and NGOs to support beneficiaries in taking advantage of market opportunities. 102. Coordination with line agencies needs to be strengthened to provide comprehensive support services to communities, this requires strong capacity at the secretariat level to coordinate these relationships. The pilot demonstrated ability to bring line agencies together for provision of services to land beneficiaries. It was also clear that more was required to address many of the critical factors necessary to support vulnerable groups such as the need for timely inputs, market information, access to new technologies and access to finance among others. Bringing together the kind of technical support that provides a full menu of important services required to improve and sustain livelihood activities requires timely provision of services from responsible line agencies sequenced to maximize impact. To effectively facilitate this kind of coordination, the responsible secretariats at the national level would need to be further capacitated with the required technical expertise and appropriate financial resources. This would also require that the M&E system become well integrated and institutionalized within all the structures of the project to allow for comprehensive and timely monitoring and decision making linked to actual needs. Additionally, it would improve resource allocation and efficiency of processes. 103. For sustainable scale up of the SLC program, Government will need to invest in developing institutional capacity at all levels of government structures involved in the process. The pilot program implemented activities mainly with support of national and international consultants and while this did help to demonstrate potential for scale up, it cannot be a substitute for having sufficiently capacitated and well enumerated staff to implement and scale up the program in a more sustainable manner. 104. Comprehensive and integrated livelihood approach and support is required to truly transform landless and land-poor land recipients into small holder farmers. The needs of this group are many and need to be addressed in a very integrated and holistic way if the expectation is to derive maximum benefits from land use and minimize/eliminate selling labor for wages. Needs include security for the land (land title); social safety nets/insurance (they are the most poor and most vulnerable to fall back into destitute in the event of a disaster); access to technologies that enhance production/productivity; access to market information and finance to invest in their lands. An integrated livelihood support package would place them firmly on a sustained path of poverty reduction.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

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105. The government prepared a Borrower’s Completion Report (February 2015), and provided direct input during the preparation of the ICR as well as written comments on the draft report. A summary of the comments is incorporated in the final ICR and a summary of Borrower’s Completion Report is in Annex 7. (b) Cofinanciers 106. N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders 107. The former GIZ-LASED and GIZ-contracted IP/GOPA, GIZ Land Rights Program (LRP), GIZ Improvement of Livelihoods and Food Security Project (ILF), KFW Economic Infrastructure Programme to Sustain Land Reform Implementation (IPLR) provided direct input during the meetings/wrap-up conducted for the preparation of the ICR mission in March 2-10, 2015 and May 4-20, 2015 as well as inputs to the draft report which were incorporated in the main report.

108. The NGOs Life With Dignity (LWD), Habitat for Humanity International-Cambodia (HfHI-C), and Wathnakpheap (WP), which were involved in implementation of separate complementary JSDF-financed activities, provided direct input during the meetings/wrap-up conducted for the preparation of the ICR mission in March 2-10, 2015 and May 4-20, 2015. The draft ICR report was shared with these NGOs for feedback but none had specific comments on the report.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions) Percentage of

Appraisal

Component A 1.50 0.22 14.67% Component B 5.70 5.22 91.58% Component C 4.00 3.20 80.00% Component D 1.80 2.09 116.11%

Total Baseline Cost 13.00 10.73 82.54%

Physical Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 13.00 10.73 82.54% 0.00 0.00 .00 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 13.00 10.73 82.54%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

GERMANY: BMZ 1.20 0.00 .00

Borrower Counterpart fund 0.30 0.014 4.67%

International Development Association (IDA) Credit 2.80 2.58 92.14%

IDA Grant Grant 8.70 8.14 93.56%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component A: Commune-Based Social Land Concessions Planning and Allocation: 1. A total seven communes SLC plans were submitted and approved by the respective PLUACs. And a total for eight SLC sites located in these seven communes in the three provinces were registered (Original target of 20 communes was revised through a restructuring because the sites were larger than originally planned in terms of land area covered as well as the number of land recipients. Therefore, the Government submitted a request for restructuring which included the decrease in the number of communes from 20 to 7 communes. 2. The SLC sites covered a total of 10,273 hectares (103% of the target achievement) and provided residential and/or agricultural lands to 3,148 land recipients (which 74 families have received residential land, 658 families received agriculture land and 2,416 families received both lands). The identification and registration of the SLCs involved extensive consultation and negotiation, surveys, screening, preparation of documentation, approval at different levels and legal registration. All sites were assessed for suitability and availability, and screened against a provincial “hotspots” map to make sure that the area would not trigger any safeguards issues (i.e. no conversion of remaining forest, not affecting indigenous peoples, etc.). Existing families on the sites were provided with three options: (1) give up their land and accept a SLC plot through the “lucky draw” process; (2) accept some adjustment of their existing plots to fit the SLC plan and become eligible for title and other SLC services; and (3) not join the SLC, in which case the existing land was excluded from the SLC. 3. The Project Implementation Manual defined steps and sub-steps required for participatory and transparent preparation and approval of the land use and full SLC plans. This included a number of land surveys, participatory assessment, land classification, mapping, agro-ecosystem analysis, infrastructure needs assessment, participatory land use and infrastructure planning, safeguards and legal compliance and preparation of the full SLC plan. The process included public information and consultation at several stages. The SLC plans were prepared and approved through this process for all 7 SLCs. Component B: Rural Development Services and Investments: 4. Plots for land recipients, community forests and other protected areas, and other community sites have been demarcated. The settling-in supports and capacity building have been also provided to all LRs in the SLC sites (100%). 5. The project provided various in-kind support to the beneficiaries to help them during the initial relocation and transition phase, which included: (i) rice assistance/food for work; (ii) residential starter kits; (iii) agricultural starter kits; (iv) construction materials for housing; (v) latrine materials; and (vi) other plating and livestock inputs such as seeds, seedlings, chickens, etc. The training and capacity building activities were also conducted through the various sub-national/provincial agencies. The project delivered 530 courses of

31

agricultural management courses in livestock and crop production and demonstrated seven (7) technologies. A total of 18,936 participants (53% women) were trained in chicken raising, pig raising, compost making, rice production, fruit tree management, home gardening and vegetable production. Improved management methods and adoption of technologies led to increased net income from on-farm activities and significant improvements in the security situation of most LRs. 6. The infrastructure works under the project were completed. Community infrastructure included construction of 7 primary schools, 3 health posts and 51 ponds for areas where wells failed and for irrigation. In addition, 312 open wells and 127 pump wells were constructed and erected. 501 kms of road comprising residential agricultural and feeder roads were constructed in the 7 SLCs. All have been completed and are operational. Infrastructure Repair and Maintenance Committees (IRMC) were established in each site. The IRMC committee facilitated the involvement of communities in repairing and maintaining roads and other infrastructures, although more is required for long term sustainability. Component C: Sustainable and Transparent SLC Program Development 7. This component supported the implementation of Components A and B through building institutional capacity at the national, provincial and district levels. Exchange and mutual learning between LASED and other SLC stakeholders at the provincial and national level were conducted. Important lessons learned were shared in formal and informal meetings and workshops. IEC materials were also produced and shared with relevant stakeholders through print and the NCDDS website. 8. Out of the 3 identified potential sources of land (cancelled economic land concessions, recovered illegally occupied lands and degraded forest lands), the project managed to obtain land for SLCs from 2 of the 3 sources: (a) degraded forest lands (94.5%); and (b) recovered illegally occupied lands (5.5%). While the target was not met, the sourced lands were sufficient to provide all the land required to meet the objective of the project. 9. Legal, technical and operational procedures and experiences on SLC implementation have been continuously improved and shared with various stakeholders. The knowledge sharing was done through annual project workshops, land governance training and NGO forum. IEC materials were also produced and shared through print medium and the NCDDS website. This allowed national and sub-national GRC institutions to meet implementation requirements and document and update improvements in the SLC process in the Project Implementation Manual. 10. Staff providing support to the project were closely monitored prior to release of MBPI and while this was later discontinued and its successor (POC) also ended in 2013 prior to project completion, all recipients were assessed to carry out their LASED responsibilities effectively.

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Component D: Project Administration 11. This component aimed to ensure sufficient capacity of LASED project implementation, focusing on procurement, financial management/audit and donor specific reporting. Planning, review and coordination of meetings among the LASED Team (GSSLC, NCDD and Sub-National) at all levels were held on a regular basis, including project management meetings with the project stakeholders (concerned agencies, NGO partners, Bank and GIZ) to discuss LASED operations issues and post-project sustainability. Procurement was implemented in line with Bank and Government guidelines. 100% of prior and post procurement reviews complied with the procurement guidelines of the Bank. All procurement packages, with the exception of 2 packages, were procured and delivered successfully. One package (earth road) could not be procured as the bids submitted exceeded the available budget and one contract (construction of a school) was terminated due to breach of contract. Financial audit reports were ‘unqualified’ throughout project implementation. Minor internal control weaknesses were identified and corrected. The project had an M&E system and a database had been established and regularly updated. The system was adequate to produce required reports but could have been better integrated for more strategic decision making. Capacity levels of staff required further strengthening in terms of analysis and clarity of reporting.

33

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. Project sites. The EFA at appraisal was based on the analysis of only two of eight project sites. The ICR analysis is based on project records, and data gathered from field visits to five (5) project sites (Thmey, Chambak, Dar, Sambok, and Choam Krovean), and telephone interviews of beneficiary household representatives of the Project in Changkrang and Tipo. 2. Farm sizes. The areas of agricultural land in hectares (ha) given to households of different sizes are different at different sites. At appraisal, it was assumed that each household, regardless of their sizes, would receive three hectares of land for farming. However, this varied by household size. Although the Project began in 2008, the first beneficiary households started their settlements in the very first communities (i.e., Sambok, Changkrang and Choam Krovean) in 2009 after certain basic arrangements were made. In the first year, the beneficiary households were not able to cultivate their given agricultural land and only initiated agricultural activities in the second year when they were able to clear enough land (on average 0.5 ha) using settling-in assistance and family labor and resources. The beneficiary households expanded the cultivation of their agricultural land on annual basis thereafter. 3. Crops. Agriculture remains largely subsistence in Cambodia. There is no exception for the farming of the Project beneficiary households. Their agriculture was highly weather-dependent, and thus yields were dictated mainly by rainfall. If they were to grow rice for rice/food security purpose they would need two (02) hectares or more of agricultural land if the land has below average soil fertility. Soil of agricultural land of all sites, except Choam Kroven, had low fertility. Most of the lands were in upland conditions, which are suitable generally for “chamcar” crops such as maize, soy bean, cassava, mung bean, sesame, water melon, husk melon, sweet potato, and upland rice. Enterprise budgets for the main crops that were commonly grown by the project’s beneficiary households on the given agricultural land were prepared. These crops include rice, field crops (cassava, mung bean, soy bean, sesame and maize) and a tree crop (cashew). For each site, average crop yields and representative cropping patterns and systems for relevant categories of the beneficiary households were used in the FEA. Actual rice yield was much lower than that assumed by the PAD. 4. Prices. When confronted with global financial and economic crises in 2008/2009, Cambodia experienced significant inflation in prices, especially of basic food items. The general level of prices rose, on average, 3.1 percent during the project’s implementation phase. Prices of inputs, labor, and produce were higher than at appraisal. Farm-gate prices of crops produced by the Project’s beneficiary households also significantly increased. These varying prices were applied in the FEA models, to the extent possible for the relevant locations. Average prices of inputs, labour and produce reported by different beneficiary households at each site were used. In particular, there was a significant difference in the wage rate assumed in the PAD, Rl 5,016/md, compared to that used for the ICR, Rl 20,000/md. Other agricultural inputs (including fertilizers, seeds, propagative materials, machinery) were readily available through local markets and were of reasonable quality.

34

5. Start-up support cost. Start-up support cost was estimated at US$1,013/hh for Memot (Choam Krovean) and US$1,079/hh for Kratie, in the PAD. The actual start-up support cost per household was calculated to be US$1,657.9-1,689.2/hh. It was, therefore, relatively higher than that of the PAD’s estimate. The start-up support cost included the Project’s extension and technical support services to the beneficiary households. Unlike the PAD’s assumption, the services were not provided for the full five years. Therefore, limited improvement of yields and cropping system practices was realized. 6. Qualitative benefits. The FEA is quantitative in nature. It is, therefore, unable to capture the qualitative benefits generated by the project. Interactions with the Project’s beneficiary households and observations during field visits demonstrated that the Project brought about several important qualitative benefits for the project households and society at large. These benefits include: (a) good governance, (b) community solidarity and mutual assistance, and (c) more sustainable land use. 7. Opportunity cost of capital and period of analysis. The opportunity cost of capital was estimated to be approximately 14 percent (according to the National Bank of Cambodia). Although this is higher than the 12 percent rate often assumed for Bank operations, 14 percent is consistent with the PAD analysis. The period of the FEA is 20 years. 8. Household income. The analysis included both on-farm and off-farm income. 9. Economic analysis. The currency used in the financial analysis was. Unlike the financial analysis, where the Khmer Riel (Rl) was used, the currency used in the economic analysis was US$, at market exchange rates. Costs (e.g., family labor, cost of rice production) and benefits (e.g., benefit of rice production), which were not entered in the financial analysis, were incorporated in the economic analysis to reflect the costs and benefits to the economy. 10. In the economic analysis of the model households, only Project’s cost incurred directly to the Project’s beneficiary households were included. This was the start-up support cost. This cost was not entered into the financial analysis for the spending was not made by the Project’s beneficiary households. For the Project’s economic analysis, two scenarios were provided. One (Scenario A) covered all costs of the whole Project, while another (Scenario B) only took account of direct costs relating to the Project’s beneficiary households. FEA Results. Model households

11. Farm income. With the Project, most household types had negative farm income in the immediate/near term; but all would do better and much better, over the short, medium and long runs, than without the Project (Table A1 – Table A7, and Fig. A1a – Fig. A21c, Appendix A). At 14 percent discount rate, the beneficiary households would have a per capita daily income two times to six times higher than the cash poverty line calculated for

35

Cambodia’s rural areas by the World Bank, which was Rl 3,914/person/day. This was, however, the annual average estimate for the period of 20 years. In the near term, the situation was hard for many beneficiary households. 12. Return to family farm labor. Trend of return to farm labor in the with-Project and without-Project scenarios is similar. In the near term, return to family farm labor was negative; negative return to farm labor in the with-Project case was larger than in the without-Project case. Over the medium term, return to farm labor turned positive. Over the long term, such return was very large and became static. Return to farm labor under the with-Project condition was generally much larger than that under the without-Project condition. 13. Financial NPV, BCR and IRR. The PAD did not have any analyses of the three financial measures. All household types in the with-Project scenario were much better, on all three financial measures, if compared with those in the without-Project scenario. In the without-Project case FNPV ranged from Rl 6.12 million (small household in Tipo) to Rl 22.85 million (large household in Changkrang). FBCR ranged from 1.2 (small household in Tipo) to 3.4 (medium-sized and large household in Dar). FIRR was in the range 20.86 percent (small household in Tipo) – 185.6 percent (medium-sized and large household in Dar). 14. The incremental effect on the financial side due to the Project was significant. The incremental FNPV ranged from Rl 5.3 million (small household in Thmey) to Rl 20.6 million (large household in Choam Krovean). The incremental FBCR was 1.64 (small household in Choam Krovean) – 7.58 (medium-sized and large households in Dar). The incremental FIRR fell in the range of 34.35 percent (small household in Chambak) – 139.77 percent (large household in Choam Krovean). 15. Economic NPV, BCR and IRR.In addition to the economic costs concerning the households, Project costs that related directly to the households were incorporated. ENPV for all types of households at all sites were negative and EBCR were below 1.0 (Table 5). The EIRR was only 7.03 percent (all households in Dar) – 13.79 percent (medium-sized and large households in Changkrang). These results were far below the PAD’s. In the PAD’s models, the lower bound of EIRR was 16.3 percent (small household with 3.0 ha in Memot), and the upper bound was 21.1 percent (medium-sized household with 3.0 ha in Kratie). Size of agricultural land distributed by the Project to each household (be it small, medium-sized or large household) ranged from 1.0 ha to 3.0 ha. In most of the Project sites, each of the medium-sized and large households got less than 3.0 ha. 16. Although the with-Project scenario looked unpromising, the incremental effect was much better. The incremental ENPV ranged from Rl 553.34 (medium-sized and large households in Changkrang) to Rl 3,564.84 (large household in Tipo). The EBC value was 1.08 (medium-sized and large households in Changkrang) – 1.96 (large household in Tipo). The EIRR fell in the range from 16.4 percent (medium-sized and large households in Changkrang) to 40.27 percent (small household in Changkrang).

36

17. Whole Project model. For the whole Project model, all sites were included in the computation process. Trend in and pattern of land use were accounted for. Two time periods were considered (Table 1). The first was for 20 year-period beginning from the start of the Project (2008-2027). The second looked extended, 30-year period (2008-2037), but it only tried to take account of the late comer sites, when their final units of land were exhausted. The without- and with-Project situations were analyzed. Analysis of incremental effect was conducted as well. Table 1: Whole Project economic analysis

18. In the without-Project situation, ENPV were negative, BCR were less than 1.0, and EIRR was 4.0 percent (20 year-period) – 9.0 percent (30 year-period) for Scenario A, and 5.17 percent (20 year-period) – 10.13 percent (30 year period) for Scenario B. 19. In the with-Project situation, all the three economic measures were better. Nonetheless, ENPV was negative and BCR were below 1.0. EIRR was 10.26 percent (20

PeriodDiscount rate

Project A Project B Project A Project BPVB (US$) 16,444,951.63 16,444,951.63 19,728,202.56 19,728,202.56 PVC (US$) 21,768,798.51 20,572,264.15 23,526,744.86 22,330,210.50 BCR 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.88 NPV (US$) (5,323,846.87) (4,127,312.51) (3,798,542.30) (2,602,007.94)

IRR (%) 3.98% 5.17% 8.99% 10.13%

PeriodDiscount rate

Project A Project B Project A Project BPVB (US$) 26,780,498.39 26,780,498.39 31,983,669.38 31,983,669.38 PVC (US$) 30,021,777.29 27,011,340.55 32,130,562.46 29,120,125.72 BCR 0.89 0.99 1.00 1.10 NPV (US$) (3,241,278.90) (230,842.16) (146,893.08) 2,863,543.66

IRR (%) 10.26% 13.66% 13.88% 16.96%

PeriodDiscount rate

Project A Project B Project A Project BPVB (US$) 10,335,546.76 10,335,546.76 12,255,466.82 12,255,466.82 PVC (US$) 8,252,978.79 6,439,076.41 8,603,817.60 6,789,915.22 BCR 1.25 1.61 1.42 1.80 NPV (US$) 2,082,567.97 3,896,470.35 3,651,649.22 5,465,551.60

IRR (%) 20.30% 32.35% 22.24% 33.33%

NB:Project A represents scenario in which all LASED1's costs/expenditures were considered.Project B represents scenario in which only beneficiary-related/direct costs/expenditures were considered.

Year 2008-2027 Year 2008-2037

Without ProjectYear 2008-2027 Year 2008-2037

14.00%

With Project

14.00%

Incemental analysisYear 2008-2027 Year 2008-2037

14.00%

37

year-period) – 13.88 percent (30 year-period) for Scenario A, and 13.66 percent (20 year-period) – 16.96 percent (30 year-period) for Scenario B. 20. The incremental effect was remarkable. Incremental ENPV was US$2.1 million (20 year-period) – US$3.7 million (30 year-period) for Scenario A, and US$3.9 million (20 year-period) – US$5.5 million (30 year-period) for Scenario B. Incremental BCR was 1.25 (20 year-period) – 1.42 (30 year-period) for Scenario A, and 1.61 (20 year-period) – 1.80 (30 year period) for Scenario B. Incremental EIRR was 20.30 percent (20 year-period) – 22.24 percent (30 year-period) for Scenario A, and 32.35 percent (20 year-period) – 33.33 percent (30 year-period) for Scenario B. 21. Sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analyses of produce prices, yields, and production costs (including, labor cost) were carried out. Produce prices were allowed to decrease by 10 percent. Yields were set to decline by 10 percent. Costs were assumed to rise by 10 percent. 22. Off-farm income was not considered important in the current FEA, if compared with the PAD’s. Therefore, sensitivity analysis of the models as regards off-farm income was not conducted. Interviews with the Project’s beneficiary households showed that most households seemed to devote their family labour to cultivate agricultural land given to them by the Project 23. Whole Project model. The results of the sensitivity analysis for the whole Project model are summarized hereunder.

(a) Under the with-Project condition, extreme impact on EIRR, for both periods covered in the analysis and for both scenarios (Scenario A and Scenario B), was due to produce prices followed by yields. Costs had a relatively/least moderate impact on EIRR; when costs varied by one (01) percent, EIRR changed by less than one (01) percent. Impact of all three variables on EBCR ranged from relatively/least moderate to moderate/unitary. Produce prices had moderate impact on EBCR followed by yields and costs. Costs had least moderate impact on EBCR. On ENPV, produce prices had significant impact followed by yields and costs.

(b) For the incremental results, extreme impact on EIRR, for both analytical periods and scenarios, was due to yields tailed by produce prices. Costs had least moderate impact on EIRR. Yields also had most significant impact on EBCR. While produce prices had unitary/moderate impact on EBCR, costs had least moderate impact on it. Yields had extreme impact, as well, on ENPV followed by produce prices. Costs had least moderate impact on ENPV.

38

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending

Steven N. Schonberger Practice Manager GWADR Task Team Leader (2004-2008) and Lead Operations Officer, EASRE

Mudita Chamroeun Senior Rural Development Specialist GFADR Co-TTL (October 2008) and Rural

Development Operations Officer, EASRE Richard H. E. Chisholm Senior Agriculturist EASTS - HIS Senior Agriculturist, EASRE Weiguo Zhou Consultant GSU08 Operations Officer, EASRE

Asger Christensen Consultant GFADR Lead Social Development Specialist, SASDS

YasuoKonishi Consultant Consultant Economist/Marketing Specialist Qhobela Cyprian Selebalo Consultant EASRE Land Administration Specialist EASRE Glenn S. Morgan Adviser OPSOR Lead Environmental Specialist, LCSEN Jonathan Mills Lindsay Lead Counsel LEGEN Senior Counsel, LEGEN Danial Adler Consultant Consultant Legal Empowerment Specialist

Christopher Paul Jackson Lead Rural Development Specialist GFADR Economist, AFTAR

Vanna Nil Social Development Specialist EASTS Social Development Specialist, EASSO Kyoko Kusakabe Consultant Consultant Gender Specialist Caroline Hughs Consultant Consultant Political Scientist Jeffrey Himmel Consultant Consultant GIS and land Use Planning Specialist Claude Saint-Pierre Consultant Consultant Social Safeguard Specialist Julian Abrams Consultant-FAO Consultant Engineer Hans van Zoeggel Consultant Consultant Decentralization Specialist John Richardson Consultant Consultant Project Governance Specialist OithipMongkolsawat Senior Procurement Specialist EASRP-HIS Senior Procurement Specialist, EAPCO KannatheeDanaisawat Financial Management Specialist EAPCO Financial Management Specialist, EAPCO Roch Levesque Legal LEGEN Senior Counsel Edward Daoud Finance Officer LOAFC Finance Officer Cora Melania Shaw Senior Agriculture Economist ECSEN - HIS Senior Agriculture Economist

Wael Zakout Lead Land Administration Specialist GSURR LMAP TTL (till 2004)

Keith Clifford Bell Senior Land Policy Specialist GSURR LMAP TTL (2004-2007)

Malcolm D. Childress Sr Land Administration Specialist GSURR Peer Reviewer, Senior Land Administration Specialist, LCSAR

Andreas Groetschel Consultant GFADR PSIA Amara Khiev Operations/Executive Assistant EASCF Program Assistant Lars C. Lund Consultant EASDE - HIS Senior Social Safeguards Specialist, EASSO Evelyn Bautista Cowan Senior Executive Assistant CROVP Program Assistant Stephen D. Mink Lead Agriculture Economist Maria Theresa G. Quinones Senior Operations Officer GFADR Operations Officer Sambath Sak Program Assistant EACSF Program Assistant Christopher Paul Backhaus BunseangChea Consultant EASPR - HIS Program Assistant Nimol Ky Consultant EASRE - HIS Gender Specialist George Campos Ledec Ulrich K.H.M. Schmitt Program Leader SACSL John H. Dick Consultant GCCCF Forestry Specialist Bunlong Leng Environmental Specialist GENDR Environmental Specialist Saroeun Bou Communications Officer EAPEC Communications and IEC

39

Guzman P. Garcia-Rivero Consultant GFA02 Operations Adviser, EASRE MasudMozammel Senior Communications Officer ECRGP Communications Teri Nachazel Program Assistant MNCA4 Program Assistant Steven William Oliver Timothy T. Vickery II Consultant SEGOM - HIS Communication Consultant Rosa E. Muleta Finance Officer CTRLA Hoi-Chan Nguyen Senior Counsel LEGES Nipa Siribuddhamas Financial Management Specialist EASFM - HIS Cecilia B. Tan Program Assistant GEEDR Supervision/ICR Steven N. Schonberger Practice Manager GWADR Task Team Leader (up to December 2009)

Mudita Chamroeun Senior Rural Development Specialist GFADR Task Team Leader (December 2009 till

ICR) Richard H. E. Chisholm Sr Agriculturist EASTS - HIS Senior Infrastructure Officer Asger Christensen Consultant GSURR Lead Social Development Specialist OithipMongkolsawat Senior Procurement Specialist EASRP-HIS Senior Procurement Specialist Seida Heng Consultant GSURR Finance Management Specialist Sreng Sok Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement JosefoTuyor Senior Environmental Specialist OPSOR Environmental Safeguards

Jun Zeng Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Social Safeguards

Nina Bhatt Lead Social Development Specialist GSURR Senior Social Development Specialist

Bunlong Leng Environmental Specialist GENDR Environmental Safeguards Lars C. Lund Consultant EASDE - HIS Social Safeguards Weiguo Zhou Consultant GSU08 Operations Officer

Satoshi Ishihara Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Social Safeguards

Maria Theresa G. Quinones Senior Operations Officer GFADR Senior Operations Officer Julian Hilton Abrams Consultant-FAO EASVS - HIS Infrastructure Specialist Luc Christiaensen Lead Agriculture Economist GCJDR Daniel R. Gibson Consultant OPSPQ Senior Social Development Specialist Amara Khiev Operations/Executive Assistant EASCF Program Assistant

Sarin Khim Consultant GFADR Project Preparation, Stakeholders/NGO Coordination

Munichan Kung Rural Dev. Officer GSURR Rural Development Specialist MasudMozammel Senior Communications Officer ECRGP Communications Qhobela Cyprian Selebalo Consultant EASTS - HIS Land Specialist Timothy T. Vickery II Consultant SEGOM - HIS Communication Consultant Vanna Nil Social Development Specialist EASTS - HIS Social Safeguards Saroeun Bou Communications Officer EAPEC Communications

Angela NyawiraKhaminwa Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR

Jonathan Mills Lindsay Lead Counsel LEGEN Senior Counsel, LEGEN Bora Nuy Consultant Civic Engagement Specialist Veasna Bun Senior Infrastructure Officer EASTS Senior Infrastructure Officer Andreas Groetschel Consultant GFADR Economist and Agriculture Specialist Samnang Hir Consultant GSURR Infrastructure Bernardita Ledesma Operations Analyst GFADR SamsenNeak Poverty Economist GPVDR Poverty and Economics NaryaOu Program Assistant EACSF Administrative and Logistical Support Vanna Pol Program Assistant Program Assistant, Procurement RathaSann Infrastructure Specialist EASTS Infrastructure Makathy Tep Consultant GSURR Environmental Safeguards

40

Patrick Labaste ARD Sector Leader (retired) GFADR Agricultural Policy, Extension and Livelihoods

Anis Wan Operations Officer GENDR M&E Reaksmey Keo Sok Consultant GGODR Financial Management Darachan Heng Program Assistant EACSF Program Assistant

Sitaramachandra Machiraju Sr. Water and Sanitation Specialist GWASP Peer Reviewer

Pushina Kunda Ng andwe Senior Rural Development Specialist GFADR ICR Team Leader

Dzung Huy Nguyen Disaster Risk Management Specialist GWADR Irrigation and Water Management

Harideep Singh Lead operations Officer GFADR Peer Reviewer Louise F. Scura Program Leader EACTF (b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY04 4.09 29.65 FY05 31.83 166.26 FY06 41.20 219.77 FY07 32.63 156.55 FY08 28.56 1467.39 FY09 0.00 1.39

Total: 138.31 720.01 Supervision/ICR

FY09 17.32 139.67 FY10 24.92 66.41 FY11 33.23 67.81 FY12 34.34 84.51 FY13 25.61 92.12 FY14 22.45 96.04 FY15 27.06 110.09 FY16 0.00 1.41

Total: 187.93 656.65

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results 1. No beneficiary survey was carried out as part of the ICR preparation, however, the

project used information from the LASED’s Limited Beneficiary Assessment (BA) Report undertaken in July 2014.

2. The LASED implementation had carried out an own Beneficiary Assessment. While

the initiative was commendable, design and implementation suffered from significant methodological issues. The 4-pages design proposal already lacked crucial information that should have guided the BA. Sampling techniques were unclear; contents of the questionnaires was confusing and did not undergo appropriate testing; survey administration, including the training of involved interviewers and data entry staff was not done properly.

3. Coding and data base design did prevent a comprehensive and meaningful analysis

of the many questionnaires that were collected from the field. Translations back and forth between Khmer and English did not help eliminating inconsistencies. Numerous duplications were discovered during re-evaluation of questionnaires.

4. Despite all the shortcomings, the collected information formed the basis for a few

case studies and the derivation of general conclusions about the socio-economic status of sites and beneficiary families.

5. The methodological issues with the BA were acknowledged by the design team and

lessons have been documented. Future survey activities (as envisaged in LASED II) will benefit from the experience and are expected to be implemented more effectively and efficiently.

6. Based on the available information and a thorough reexamination and analysis with

the support of a specialized consultant, below observations could be confirmed and documented:

(a) The BA data collected was wide ranging and clearly structured with 1441 beneficiary households in the three provinces. More than half of them were selected from Kratie. An overwhelming majority of them identified themselves as Khmer. Nearly 82 percent of them received residential land, and 97.5 percent received agricultural land. (b) Data showed that 96 percent of the agricultural land recipients cultivated the agricultural land. Many were able to put their land or additional land units into production because of GIZ's land clearing support scheme. On average, the beneficiary households cultivated 1.11 ha of the given agricultural land.

(c) Family food security of the beneficiary households improved only slightly during the project life. The situation could not be better because Cambodia at large was negatively affected by many critical events (such as global economic meltdown,

42

natural disasters) that occurred during 2008-2012. These events were completely beyond project control.

(d) The beneficiary households expressed many views about improving their living conditions and thus the project result. However, two are worth for consideration: (i) additional services (including, agricultural land clearing and preparation, agricultural extension, water and sanitation, education, and health care); and (ii) local infrastructure improvement.

(e) The detailed Beneficiary Assessment Report and the cleaned data sets of a limited number of survey questions are available.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results 1. Although this WB document is not an intense “learning ICR”, the implementation completion and results missions in March and May 2015 conducted intensive discussions, meetings and field visits to meet with the beneficiaries, villagers and affected people to learn and document their experiences and perceptions. Wrap-up meetings were held at MLMUPC on March 10 and May 20, 2015, to discuss the main project outcomes with broad participation from Government agencies as well as other donors and diverse stakeholders. 2. During project implementation already, annual lessons-learned workshops were conducted among LASED and JSDF implementing agencies (LWD, HfHI-C, Wathnakpheap), including the participation of project beneficiaries and all other relevant stakeholders such as GIZ the World Bank. Results and documented lessons-learned were incorporated into the subsequent AWPBs, as well as in the Recipient PCR and in this ICR document.

3. The Recipient project completion report has been compiled by an external international consultant. The process included 6 detailed discussions and 2 mains stakeholder workshops in December 2014 and February 2015.The workshops reports/results/comments have been incorporated under “final recipient project completion report” and the report has been submitted to the World Bank in February 28, 2015.

4. The ICR mission in March 2-10, and May 4-20, 2015 included broad participation from stakeholders at all levels. Below table list of attendees and persons met in Cambodia at the missions and wrap-up in March and May, 2015:

No. Name

Position Institution

1 H.E. SakSetha Secretary of State MoI 2 H.E. Pen Sophal Secretary of State MLMUPC 3 H.E. Dr. DuchWontito Under Secretary of State MLMUPC 4 H.E. Dr. Sareth Boramy LASED Project Director/ Deputy General

Director of the General Department of Land Management and Urban Planning

MLMUPC

5 H.E. Cheam Pe A LASED Project Coordinator LASED/NCDDS 6 Mr. Sin Sokhon Chief of Training and Communication Unit LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 7 Mr. Sen Song Chief of Land Management Unit LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 8 Ms. Heng Rangsey Chief of Administration unit LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 9 Ms. Sok Senphirom Chief of Target Land Recipient unit LASED/NCDDS 10 Ms. Noun Mountha Chief of Development unit LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 11 Mr. RuosRaksa Director of Internal Auditing Office LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 12 Mr. So Naro Chief of Cadastral Office LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 13 Mr. Heak Sopharith Chief of Finance Unit LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 14 Mr. VongKongkea National Operation Advisor LASED/GSSLC, MLMUPC 15 Mr. Ma Onn Ma On Nath Deputy Director of PMSD, and LASED

Project Procurement LASED/NCDDS

16 Mr. Soung Thon M&E Officer LASED/NCDDS 17 Mr. Hong Samnang Contract and Administration Unit Advisor LASED/NCDDS 18 Mr. Man Buntharith Chief of Finance LASED/NCDDS 19 Mr. Sameng Seomonine Deputy Director, GDA GDA/MAFF

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20 Mr. Tauch Chan Kresna, Deputy Director, Department of Cooperation and debt Management, General Department of Budget

MEF

21 Ms. Ngoun Socheat Project Monitoring Officer MEF 22 Mr. Ly Kim Peav LASED Project Manager/ Secretary General

of the Provincial Hall Kampong Thom

23 Mr. Sun Ratha Procurement Officer Kampong Thom 24 Mr. HomSianghoeurn Community Officer, LASED Kampong Thom 25 Mr. Chhay You Commune Chief, Tipo Kampong Thom 26 Mr. KengSovann Commune Member, Tipo Kampong Thom 27 Mr. Peng To Commune Clerk Assistant, Tipo Kampong Thom 28 Mr. Chek Chon Chief of Village, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 29 Mr. Son Vanna Community Leader, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 30 Ms. Sam Oeun Group Leader, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 31 Mr. Son Sanh Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 32 Ms. OeungOuk Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 33 Ms. Chhim Soklorn Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 34 Ms. Phal Chhon Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 35 Ms. Yin Ven Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 36 Ms. Yim Vet Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth I Kampong Thom 37 Mr. Ry Nov Chief of Village, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 38 Ms. Oun Sokhun Community Leader, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 39 Ms. Khiev Tot Group Leader, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 40 Mr. San Rat Group Leader, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 41 Ms. Hem Rim Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 42 Ms. Yee Sorphear Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 43 Ms. Van Nak Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 44 Ms. Chan Khon Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 45 Mr. KhotSorn Villager, Phom Sen Aphivoth II Kampong Thom 46 Mr. Soung Yoeun Vice Chief of Village, Or Thom Village Kampong Thom 47 Mr. ThounChetha Deputy LASED Project Manager/Director of

the Provincial Department of LMUPC and Cadastre, Land Management Officer

TbongKhmum

48 Mr. HingSitha Chief of District Land Management TbongKhmum 49 Mr. LonhNean District Land Management TbongKhmum 50 Mr. HingVicheth District Land Management TbongKhmum 51 Mr. Chon Minea Villager TbongKhmum 52 Mr. KhutOeurn Villager TbongKhmum 53 Mr. Sou Yun Villager TbongKhmum 54 Mr. Oun Chay Villager TbongKhmum 55 Mr. Hy Ny Villager TbongKhmum 56 Ms. Kuy Thoeun Villager TbongKhmum 57 Mr. ChhonNgak Villager TbongKhmum 58 Mr. Kol Veasna Villager TbongKhmum 59 Mr. Orn Yan Villager TbongKhmum 60 Mr. Soy Sopheap Villager TbongKhmum 61 Mr. ThekSar Villager TbongKhmum 62 Mr. Khorn Khim Villager TbongKhmum 63 Mr. Soun Run Villager TbongKhmum 64 Ms. Sou Yan Villager TbongKhmum 65 Mr. Mon Sokran Villager TbongKhmum 66 Ms. ImYat Villager TbongKhmum 67 Ms. Sok Sophorn Villager TbongKhmum 68 Mr. KhannChamnan LASED Provincial Project Manager Kratie 69 Mr. SuonNhak Deputy LASED Project Manager, Chet Borey

District Kratie

70 Mr. PhokSothearith Deputy Director, Provincial Department of Agriculture

Kratie

71 Ms. Sam Ath Manin Official, Kratie Provincial Hall Kratie 72 Mr. Hout Yam Deputy Governor of Chet Borei District Kratie

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73 Mr. Mom Kham Commune Chief, Thmey Commune Kratie 74 Mr. Mong Sreang 2nd Commune Council, Thmey Commune 75 Mr. Seng Heng Commune Chief, Dar Commune Kratie 76 Mr. Hun Channoeun Commune Clerk Assistant , Dar Commune Kratie 77 Ms. KoeNhor Land Community, Dar Commune Kratie 78 Mr. Kim Sam Land Community, Dar Commune Kratie 79 Mr. Rin Dara Land Community, Dar Commune Kratie 80 Mr. TavPengLay Commune Chief, Chambok Commune Kratie 81 Ms. NgamNeng Commune Council Member, Chambok

Commune Kratie

82 Mr. VongThlong Vice Chair of Community Kratie 83 Mr. ChoeunRamarch Official, PrekProsab District Kratie 84 Mr. Thorn Sary Official, PrekProsab District Kratie 85 Mr. Kong Limho Official, PrekProsab District Kratie 86 45 Villagers Thmey Commune Kratie 87 57 Villagers Dar Commune Kratie 88 92 Villagers Chambok Commune Kratie 89 Ms. CheaKanha Provincial Admin Assistant Kratie 90 Mr. Eang Phal Kun Deputy Director of Provincial Department of

Water Resource and Meteorology Kratie

91 Mr. Prom Chhoeuk Commune Clerk Assistant, Sambok Commune Kratie 92 Mr. San Nhor Commune Chief, Changkrang Commune Kratie 93 Mr. Phann Sophea Commune Clerk Assistant, Changkrang

Commune Kratie

94 Mr. ImSrung Commune Chief, Sambok Commune Kratie 95 Mr. Ouk Saroeun Chief of Village, Takok Kratie 96 Mr. KhannBuntha Chief of Village, Kampi Kratie 97 Mr. Yi Meng Villager Kratie 98 Ms. KoeRoeun Villager Kratie 99 Ms. ChoupSary Villager Kratie

100 Mr. Ith Try Villager Kratie 101 Mr. So Ratana Villager Kratie 102 Mr. KorlKeng Villager Kratie 103 Ms. Heng Saroeun Villager Kratie 104 Ms. ChhinYoy Villager Kratie 105 Ms. Chin Sam Ath Villager Kratie 106 Mr. Leng Chhou Villager Kratie 107 Ms. Oun Hor Villager Kratie 108 Mr. Chan Vorn Villager Kratie 109 Mr. DukNgim Villager Kratie 110 Mr. Chea Sam Oun 1st Commune Member, RaksmeySamaki Kampong Speu 111 Mr. Houn Hay Villager, Prey Thom Village Kampong Speu 112 Mr. Bo Boeun Chief of Block D, Prey Thom Village,

RaksmeySamaki Commune Kampong Speu

113 Mr. Chhim Bunthoeun Chief of Block F, Prey Thom Village, RaksmeySamaki Commune

Kampong Speu

114 Mr. Eam Heng Vice Chief of Block F, Prey Thom Village, RaksmeySamaki Commune

Kampong Speu

115 Ms. Or Mouy Lang Vice Chief of Village, Prey Thom Kampong Speu 116 Ms. NeangChhoeun Prey Thom Kampong Speu 117 Mr. YimYoeum Villager, Prey Thom Kampong Speu 118 Mr. Kif Ngo Yen National Director HFHC 119 Mr. IvBonnakar Southeast Program Coordinator HFHC 120 Mr. Men Sor Executive Director LWD 121 Mr. Tuy Someth Social Land Concession Coordinator LWD 122 Mr. PechChinda Community Empowerment Facilitator (CEF) -

SLC LWD, Kampong Speu

123 Mr. Soun Samnang Community Empowerment Facilitator (CEF) LWD, Kampong Speu 124 Mr. Seng Vork Civic Engagement Program Coordinator Wathnakpheap 125 Dr. Franz Volker Mueller Team Leader, Land Rights Programme GIZ

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126 Mr. Guenter Wessel Team Leader GIZ-ILF 127 Mr. Florian Rock Interim Program Manager GIZ-LRP 128 Mr. Phat Phalit Technical Advisor GIZ 129 Mr. Nop Sopheak Technical Advisor GIZ 130 Mr. KhannKanha Technical Advisor GIZ 131 Ms. Uch Sophas Technical Advisor GIZ 132 Mr. Lom Sereikot Technical Advisor GIZ 133 Mr. PholChanthon Technical Advisor GIZ 134 Mr. Alassane Sow Country Manager WB 135 Ms. Mudita Chamroeum TTL of LASED WB 136 Ms. Pushina Kunda

Ng'andwe Senior Rural Development Specialist WB

137 Mr. Andreas Groetschel Mission Coordinator, Consultant WB Consultant 138 Mr. Jun Zeng Senior Social development Specialist WB 139 Mr. Sreng Sok Procurement Specialist WB 140 Mr. Koe Sok Reaksmey Financial Management Specialist WB 141 Mr. Samnang Hir Infrastructure Specialist WB Consultant 142 Mr. Sarin Khim Implementation Support Specialist WB Consultant 143 Mr. Srey Chanthy Agriculture and Livelihood Specialist WB-FAO 144 Ms. NaryaOu Program Assistant WB

5. A presentation was made on preliminary findings of the ICR mission. In general, there was agreement on the analysis and the ratings. Specific points were raised and finalized and documented in the Aide Memoire of the Implementation Completion and Results Mission report, as well as in the management letter dated April 1, 2015 and June 18, 2016 to the government counterparts, which also form as a basis for this final write up of the ICR. In addition, the mission team also received a copy of the final recipient’s project completion report (PCR) on February 28, 2015. The Recipient’s PCR Executive Summary submitted to the Bank for inclusion in the ICR report on June 30, 2015.

6. The main results and recommendations derived are summarized as below:

(a) The project has been successful and, as demonstrated by the high level of achievement of the PDO and intermediate results indicators, the Implementing Agencies have done an excellent job of project implementation. The Bank team would nevertheless like to highlight key points for further consideration by the government and the international community.

(b) Although the project has been completed, a number of actions are recommended for further activities to consolidate gains from the project. The below provides a summary of the actions recommended throughout this document:

• LASED is demonstrating that the provision of land to the poor, even with

relatively limited additional support, can be an effective mechanism for poverty reduction through economic growth as land recipients work hard to quickly convert their land into productive farms which can move them relatively rapidly to food security and beyond to income generation which contributes to agricultural sector growth and diversification. However, the willingness of land recipients to continue to invest in their land is

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dependent on demonstrating that their tenure security is well protected from any continuing encroachments on the SLC areas.

• LASED has demonstrated that RGC can utilize formal, transparent, consensus-based approach for identifying and transferring state land to SLCs. However, the ability to scale-up this experience is unclear given the continuing challenges in reaching consensus on the allocation of state land from current claims and management to SLCs, particularly at the national level.

• LASED has demonstrated that clear operational processes, based on RGC

legal framework, combined with effective communication and transparency can bring national and local level authorities, communities, NGOs and development partners into a common, collaborative Government-led effort to support poverty reduction with better results for the target group – even in the traditionally conflictive domain of land management. It is also helpful in review the experience of LASED and that of other national and locally-initiated SLCs to identify opportunities to streamline and simplify procedures while maintaining the high level of transparency and participation of stakeholders.

7. Overall Poverty Reduction Context: At project appraisal, it was estimated that approximately 200,000 rural households were landless, and employment opportunities through rural to urban migration are insufficient, with most rural employment based on seasonal labor, resulting in significant underemployment. Accordingly, SLCs were viewed as a means to put unused land into production so as to increase rural labor productivity resulting in improved food security and poverty reduction with economic growth.

8. The SLC approach appears to remain highly relevant. While agriculture’s share of GDP declined from 42% to 28.7% from 1998 to 2014, agriculture’s share of employment declined significantly from 77.5% to 48.7% over the same period. The growth of employment generation in the manufacturing and services sectors remains relatively low, unlike growing overseas migration, indicating that unless productivity in agriculture is improved, there will be continuing growing disparity between urban and rural incomes. As increasing the returns to agricultural labor requires more land or technology, SLCs are well placed to address this priority issue in Cambodia, and in fact, experience in the field confirms this approach as SLC recipients have been able to increase their incomes from typically Riel 2 million to Riel 3million per year from occasional agricultural and non-agricultural labor, to Riel 3 million to Riel 5 million in the first year and Riel 6 million to Riel 10 million per year (well above the food poverty line) in subsequent years where previously uncultivated land was put into production. Further, SLC sites are already resulting in broader economic activity through shops, local agricultural marketing arrangements and other mechanisms for linking the communities growing incomes to broader economic growth in the SLC communes and districts. Accordingly, the ICRR finds

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that LASED remains highly relevant given the overall poverty reduction and economic growth context. 9. Land Availability: At project appraisal, 70 to 80% of land in Cambodia was named as state land with limited and sometimes contradictory mapping regarding assigned use and oversight agency responsibility. It was also noted that there were often conflicting claims to state land and significant, un-regularized occupation, sometimes conflicting agendas of state agencies in terms of land use priorities, and reluctance on the part of most state agencies at the national to release land from their direct management. As in the case of other countries in South-East Asia (c.f. Thailand, Indonesia) essentially all land in Cambodia not formally recognized for other uses was considered as forest lands, often regardless of actual land use characteristics. This was anticipated as the primary source of unoccupied land but with a focus on identifying degraded forest areas, which were in the process of being occupied through illegal, sporadic settlement. At the same time, it was proposed to seek land released from cancelled economic land concessions (ELCs) as well as resulting from the recovery of large-scale illegal land occupations, though there was no prior experience with pursuing land for SLCs prior to LASED. Given this situation, the willingness of RGC to support the reallocation of land between current classifications so that land could be assigned to SLCs was seen as a key project risk.

10. In order to facilitate a more transparent and technically effective approach to the allocation of state lands, RGC established the legal framework to support the process of land use planning, land allocation, state land registration and, in the case of SLCs, transfer to private ownership for land recipients as a pre-requisite to proceeding with LASED. LASED was intended as an instrument to drive practical application of these legal instruments – in particular the Provincial Land Use and Allocation Committees (PLUACs) and the state land registration process. Given that these mechanisms were largely to be tested, the willingness and ability of government institutions to implement these multi-stakeholder processes was viewed as still continue a significant project risk. 11. The current context continues to reflect many of the challenges identified at appraisal, and these have slowed, but not stopped the project from progressing with the identification and registration of state lands for SLCs. LASED has supported the first-ever implementation of the State Land management procedures, and confirmed that these have generally worked well at the sub-national level. The provincial and local-level agencies with LASED support have generally demonstrated the institutional capacity to implement the new procedures and processes with appropriate participation and transparency. However, national level support for assignment of land to SLCs has been more problematic with the rejection of a number of provincial proposals of SLC areas in both degraded forest and cancelled ELC areas. Difficulties in coordinating land use priorities are not limited to ELCs but are also currently seen in the internal RGC conflicts regarding the granting of agricultural and mining concessions in protected areas and protected forests without any consideration of the application of the state land management legal framework. It is noteworthy that despite the continuing challenges associated with the overall state land use context, LASED has been able to support the effective implementation of the state land management processes in the project area provinces and with the result that appropriate

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land areas have been registered as State Private Lands for SLCs in full compliance with the law. Accordingly, the impact of the context risks identified at appraisal regarding high-level political will for assignment of state land to SLCs and willingness to implement the legal framework and processes, has delayed and reduced but not prevented LASED from progressing towards its development objectives through the transparent and participatory identification, screening, consensus building and registration of state lands for SLCs. 12. LASED has confirmed the interest of communes and the support of provinces for commune-initiated SLCs. In Kratie and Kampong Thom, where provinces were asked to submit requests for SLCs to the provincial authorities, most communes have provided proposals based on Commune Land Use Planning or less formal mechanisms for identifying proposed land areas. However, it was noted that commune level uncertainty regarding ability to seek subsequent SLCs, and the length and technical requirements of the state land processes naturally encourage a focus on larger SLC areas in order to economize on technical staff time relative to the land to be made available, as well as on fixed infrastructure costs such as access tracks, schools and health clinics. RGC is considering some streamlining of SLC procedures for nationally-initiated SLCs. Accordingly, for commune-initiated SLCs to be scaled-up, it is necessary to continue review the experience under LASED and other SLC programs, and to streamline the procedures while conserving transparency and participatory aspects which ensure the credibility of the SLC process with possibility that schools and health clinics can be at least partially streamlined supported through the Commune/Sangkat investment funds. 13. LASED anticipated that communes would utilize the commune land use planning (CLUP) to identify potential SLC sites in the context of other land use priorities. This has proven to be very useful in Kratie as the basis for systematic proposals from communes which were better screened than the sketch map proposals from other provinces which did not utilize CLUP. However, given the technical challenges of the CLUP approach and the absence of information at the commune level on national and provincial claims on state lands, the CLUP has not been continued as a mainstream land use planning instrument for communes in Cambodia, with the focus now moving to provincial land use planning. Accordingly, it has been simplified local land use planning tool which utilize information from the national and provincial levels and facilitate better screening and accuracy of commune driven SLC proposals. 14. At appraisal, UXO was identified as a potential risk where financing of livelihood support was conditioned on certified clearance of SLC area prior to settlement. Specific procedures for clearance were initially not anticipated. During implementation, significant UXO contamination was identified in the Kampong Cham SLC site. Given pressure to settle the area to avoid wide-spread encroachment, RGC worked with its partners and the on-going USAID and CMAC program to clear and certify the area relatively rapidly. LASED procedures have to anticipate situations of UXO contamination and the procedures to follow to address the problem so as to minimize delays in provision of uncontaminated land to SLC recipients.

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15. Transparent Selection of Land Recipients: At appraisal, provision of SLCs to unqualified recipients was considered a major risk which LASED attempted to address through utilizing transparent and participatory selection processes. This was achieved by using the “ID Poor System” and by working with NGOs to assist with public information dissemination and observation of the selection process, as well as implementation of a complaints handling mechanism which again involved NGOs. These measures have been considered by all stakeholders to be highly effective with priority having been given to the poorest households and with well over the target 90% of recipients fully meeting the SLC recipient criteria. The main issue which stakeholders raised regarding recipient selection was whether some criteria of capacity to farm the land received should be used to screen applicants. Accordingly, the land recipient selection processes under LASED are considered highly effective and the collaboration of RGC with NGOs exemplary. It is recommended that this approach will be expanded to other SLC programs.

16. In order to support the confidence in the SLC process and ensure that any problems are identified and addressed, a complaints handling mechanism was included as part of the LASED procedures. The complaints handling mechanism used the Commune/Sangkat suggestion boxes and a PLUAC review group which includes NGOs, systematically reviewing and addressing complaints, most of which were associated with those who did not bother to enroll in the program but decided ex post to try to receive land. The system was generally found to be effective as complaints were addressed systematically and transparently. Nonetheless, experience indicates that the process could be improved through earlier village meetings, use of check boxes to shorten complaint forms and more frequent collection and recording of complaints. Accordingly, the complaints process has proven effective and has been well implemented but can be further improved to permit more rapid review and resolution of complaints. 17. Livelihood Development: At project appraisal, the willingness and ability of SLC recipients to meet basic food security needs and eventually earn sufficient income to escape poverty was questioned by those expecting land recipients to either abandon or illegally sell their land to return to full-time wage labor. At the same time, the need for SLC recipients to be able to complement initial farming production with wage labor during initial years of SLC establishment was a critical assumption for the viability of livelihoods. In order to mitigate this risk, SLC title eligibility requirements established minimum levels of farming required on land received. Food for work was planned for distribution during first growing season prior to harvest, and extensive information campaigns were planned with provincial and district authorities and NGOs to remind SLC recipients of their responsibilities. There are no confirmed reports of abandonment or illegal sales of SLC plots. SLC plots are being developed for agriculture with food or cash for work assistance, and recipients are able to find sufficient, complementary wage labor to meet basic needs. However, all stakeholder emphasized need to provide some initial land clearing to “jump start” production in the first year – normally a half hectare which they were expected to complement with an additional half hectare on their own. Analysis of the actual farm models indicates that households are most likely to meet their basic expenditure needs, including probable medical expenditures, and to sustain this income by beginning with one hectare of cleared land dedicated to a short-term cash crop, such as cassava, in combination

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with investments in medium and long maturity crops such as cashew, rubber, mango and pepper which raise income and provide some diversification against price risks with cassava. Accordingly, it is suggested that LASED consider systematically ensuring a minimum area of cleared land (0.5 to 1 ha) for each SLC agricultural plot to accelerate own-livelihood development, while maintaining food or cash for work support in first year, and to promote diversification of cash crop production. 18. At appraisal, it was assumed that SLCs would need a broad package of both public and household support services as minimum requirements. Public and private assistance packages included access tracks, roads, pump wells, latrines, schools, health posts, household kits, building materials, agricultural materials and a number of training services related to agriculture and health. Land recipients and other stakeholders indicated that the priorities for SLC support beyond land are as follows (in order): (a) Improved road access to site; (b) Access tracks to fields; (c) Initial land preparation/clearing; (d) Food /cash for work; (e) Pump wells (but issues of water quality); (f) Schools; (g) Basic housing materials; (h) Revolving funds; and (i) Facilitation of community building/problem solving. Accordingly, it is suggested to consider prioritizing the provision of these services in LASED and other SLC programs, with other services provided as funding permits. 19. LASED anticipated a focus on food self-sufficiency amongst SLC recipients based on food crop production. In practice, emphasis has been on cash crops which raise concerns regarding nutritional balance, particularly for young children. Household gardens have proven popular as residential plots generally provide sufficient space for vegetables and some fruit trees. Accordingly, agricultural support to SLC recipients should include a household gardening and nutrition component. 20. Institutional context: At appraisal, Cambodia’s decentralization and de-concentration process was advancing based on a focus on commune level governance through elected councils with technical support from district and provincial level staff of RGC line agencies. In order to ensure sustainability of institutional arrangements, LASED implementation was based on a commune led approach which would utilize the existing systems for channeling investment support for implementation at the commune level, with technical support provided through provincial line agencies with back-stopping from national departments of line ministries. This approach has ensured mainstreaming of implementation into line departments, but given normal delays in adopting new procedures and gaining familiarity with the processes under the pilot program, there have been significant implementation delays, particularly in terms of procurement. This has resulted in additional dependence on the GIZ-funded consulting team to go beyond technical cooperation to more direct implementation support. Accordingly, for future pilot programs which introduce challenging procedures and new institutional partnerships, the use of decentralized project implementation units should be considered to work directly with local authorities and support technical processes and coordination of different implementation partners as line agencies gain familiarity with the new approaches. 21. Given the challenges of land issues in Cambodia, and the introduction of new procedures and partnership approaches, the insufficiency of RGC staff incentives was

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highlighted at appraisal as a risk to effective implementation. Consistent with the general approach agreed between RGC and donors, a Merit-Based Pay Initiative (MBPI) was adopted for GSSLC and NCDD staff implementing LASED. However, the MBPI was discontinued by Government in January 2010. A new, interim approach – the Priority Operating Costs (POC) was introduced in mid-2010. The absence of incentives during the early part of 2010 had a noticeable impact on staff performance, particularly at national levels. Accordingly, particularly in the case of innovative and challenging pilot programs, appropriate staff incentives are required to encourage staff to overcome inevitable implementation challenges and take risks accordingly.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR (a) Summary of Borrower’s ICR:

1. The Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development (LASED) Project was initiated in mid-2008 to develop and pilot test the systems, procedures, tools and capacities for pro-poor land distribution through the government’s Commune-Based Social Land Concessions (SLC) Program, and through practical implementation, allocated/awarded some 10,000 hectares to around 3,000 landless or land-poor households. This aimed to operationalize the Sub Decree No. 19 of 2003 on SLCs through a technically and administratively robust system based on transparency and the rule of law. The total project financing of US$13 m. was provided through contributions from the World Bank (IDA credit of US$2.8 m. and IDA grant of US$8.7 m.), GIZ (US$1.2 m. grant through its “LASED” Project) and the Royal Government of Cambodia counterpart (US$0.3 m.). The project was initially planned for 6 years but was extended by 1 ¾ years to the end of March 2015. The project worked in 7 communes in the three provinces of Kratie, Tbong Khmum (formerly part of Kampong Cham) and Kampong Thom. 2. The project built on previous work carried out since 2004 by the World Bank, GIZ (formerly GTZ) and RGC to develop strategies, systems and tools for SLC implementation. The project also built on and combined with the GIZ LASED Project, initiated in 2007. 3. The project helped to develop and implement a ten-step SLC process and involved: (1) supporting communes to identify and register suitable SLC land, identify and select eligible beneficiaries, and prepare detailed land use and development plans for each SLC site, and then (2) providing site preparation, settling-in support for land recipients (LR) and basic community infrastructure and services to implement these plans. 4. The project was implemented through government structures from national to provincial, district and commune levels, and also the various structures needed to implement commune-based SLCs as set out in Sub Decree No. 19. Commune Councils are responsible for initiation, planning and implementation of SLCs with approval, technical support and supervision through District Working Groups (DWG), Provincial Land Use and Allocation Committees (PLUAC) under the Provincial Governor, and the General Secretariat for SLC (GSSLC) under the MLMUPC. The project provided technical support, capacity building and M&E through the GSSLC / MLMUPC, provincial line departments and DWGs. Operational support, procurement, financial management and reporting were provided by the NCDDS. These included managing contracts and the flow of funds to the provinces and communes. Supporting project teams were established in the provinces, under the GSSLC and the NCDDS. This rather complex institutional framework required strong multidisciplinary and multilevel collaboration and coordination, annual work plans and budgets, contracts with provincial line departments, and regular LASED team meetings linked with provincial meetings. 5. The project aimed also to develop and implement robust processes based on transparency, the rule of law and the avoidance of social or environmental harm. The

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project triggered six WB safeguard policies (included environmental assessment, natural habitats, forests, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and physical cultural resources) and it is classified as Environmental Category B. The project developed and implemented a number of safeguards instruments (EA-EMP, RPF, IPPF, CHPF and PIM) to address the requirements of these safeguard policies by using safeguard instrument such as SLC planning, monitoring and implementation processes to avoid or mitigate and minimize potential impacts. This required building strong participation of local communities, public consultation and a transparent grievance resolution mechanism into the SLC and project implementation processes. This included developing and implementing resettlement policy, indigenous people and cultural heritage frameworks and environmental management plans so that risks could be avoided or reduced to acceptable levels. 6. The project used almost all of the US$13 million provided and delivered almost all of the planned inputs. Inputs included a total of 44 full time government staff, around 30 line department focal persons with technical inputs from many more line department staff, and 22 employed national TA and commune support staff. Around 66 government staff received salary incentive through the government’s Merit Based Performance Incentive (MBPI) and the Priority Operating Costs (POC) schemes when these were in operation and this was judged to have worked satisfactorily. All except one of the 190 procurement packages were successfully procured, and all except one of these were implemented satisfactorily. Procurement, financial management and fiduciary compliance and safeguards compliance were assessed by the joint WB GIZ implementation support missions on a regular basis and were all judged to have been satisfactory. The overall performance of government, and the GIZ TA support were both judged to have been satisfactory. 7. The World Bank and GIZ provided supervision and implementation support through monitoring, review and “No Objection Letter” (NOL) procedures, as well as regular (every 7 months on average) joint implementation support missions with significant multidisciplinary teams reviewing different aspects of the project in some detail. These processes were very useful to keep the project on track although at times, rather demanding and time consuming. The overall performance of the World Bank was judged to have been satisfactory. 8. The project encountered and largely overcame a number of significant challenges during implementation. The difficulty of mastering the demanding procurement procedures and slow recruitment of the full-time TA delayed implementation at the start of the project. World Bank support on procurement helped to resolve many issues. Many challenges stemmed from difficulty of implementing the many steps and sub steps of the SLC process, many of which were new or involved new ways of working. These included the identification and legal registration of SLC sites, beneficiary selection through transparent processes, dealing with encroachment in SLC sites after identification, preparing and approving SLC plans, and procurement and coordination of the implementation of the many contracts needed for SLC site preparation, settling-in support, and community

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infrastructure and services. The strong support of the SLC process by senior decision makers at all levels of government was instrumental in resolving many of these issues. 9. The project successfully achieved almost all its planned outputs and intermediate results indicators. Under the Commune-Based SLC Planning and Land Allocation” Component A, all the target intermediate results indicators were fully achieved. Specifically, a total of seven SLCs (target is 7) covering 10,273 ha (target is 10,000), were identified, surveyed, screened, mapped and registered as public state land for SLC. These were in seven communes in the three target provinces. Full SLC plans were prepared and approved for all seven SLCs (target is 7). A total of 3,148 eligible landless or land-poor households (target is 3,000) of whom 34% were female-headed, were selected and allocated SLC plots (either agricultural, residential or both) through a transparent process with participation, public disclosure and a satisfactory grievance redress mechanism (678 eligible complaints were received and resolved). In addition, the experiences gained through practical implementation allowed a number of improvements to be made to the SLC procedures, documentation, tools and capacities. Also, the project has surpassed the World Bank’s land administration and management core sector indicators on: (1) target land area with use or ownership rights recorded as a result of the project (10,273 hectares vs. target of 10,000); and (2) target population with use or ownership rights recorded as a result of the project (15,226 vs. target of 12,690). 10. The target intermediate results indicators under the Rural Development Services and Investments Component B, were also substantially achieved. All land recipients (target is 100%) at the seven SLCs received the planned settling-in support, and around 98% (target is 80%) of the planned public infrastructure and services were provided. Settling-in support included provision of residential starter kits for 2,490 households (HHs), agricultural starter kits for 3,074 HHs, 1,313,365 kg of milled rice as “food for work” to support land preparation, shelter materials for 2,226 HHs, solar panels for 2,499 HHs and latrine materials for 2,019 HHs. Agricultural households were supported to prepare and plough the first half hectare of their land. The site preparation and community infrastructure provided included demarcation of all residential, agricultural, community, forestry, etc. plots, and construction of 186 km of residential roads, 270 km of agricultural roads, 45 km of connecting roads, 127 pump wells, 51 ponds, eight schools and three health posts. A total of 1,090 training courses in agriculture, gender mainstreaming, public health, education, water use and hygiene, environment, forestry and land law courses were provided to a total of 47,569 participants of whom 53% were female (target is 60%). The agricultural training was a key component in helping the LRs to make the transition to an agriculture-based livelihood and introduced a number improved technologies and good practice. All schools and health posts have been taken over by the ministries of Education and Health, respectively, and are staffed and in operation. The wells and roads have been taken over by the communities and Commune Councils, respectively, with monitoring and support from the Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD). 11. The Sustainable and Transparent SLC Program Development Component C was concerned with building the institutional capacity for implementation of the SLC process at national and sub-national levels. The target intermediate results indicators under

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this component were also substantially achieved. These include the: (1) sourcing of SLC sites from pre-determined sources, including the testing and documentation of the processes and experiences; and (2) sharing of SLC knowledge and experiences among various stakeholders; and (3) POC recipients effectively carrying out LASED responsibilities. SLC land was successfully sourced from two of the three planned sources. Mostly was from degraded forest (94.5%) with some (5.5% from recovered illegally occupied land. No land was sourced from economic concessions. A total of 26 training courses and 15 workshops were carried out or attended by number of different staff and stakeholders (around 18% female). A range of SLC manuals, tools and information, education and communication (IEC) material was produced and distributed including the Project Implementation Manual (PIM) which contains the forms and tools needed for the SLC process), the sub-decree on SLC, social and environmental safeguards documents, draft M&E manual and preliminary database, The training and supporting materials, combined with the wealth of practical experience and learning by implementation of the SLC process has led to continued improvement in knowledge and capability for all main stakeholders. The successful implementation of the whole SLC process (Components A and B), provides the main evidence that the SLC related institutions have developed sufficient SLC capacity. Continued adoption and use will depend on the resources being made available as well as government policy. 12. The Project Administration Component D aimed to ensure sufficient capacity for LASED project implementation, focusing on procurement, financial management and audit, as well as donor-specific reporting. Compliance with fiduciary procedures and regulations and reporting requirements indicates that the intermediate results indicators were substantially achieved. 13. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was substantially achieved. The PDO had three linked outcome indicators. The first relates to the adoption of improved soil management and agricultural production systems by at least 60% of LR. Around 57% of the 3,074 LR that had been allocated agricultural plots had settled on and started to cultivate their plots. They have adopted at least one of the improved agricultural production systems and practices promoted through the agricultural extension training. In addition, around 80% of those allocated residential lots had settled on their plots. Further settlement is expected, particularly in the newer SLCs, and so the 60% target was almost completely achieved. 14. The second and third PDO outcome indicators concern the development of a replicable SLC “mechanism” on land recipient selection and dispute handling, based on transparency and the rule of law. The ten-step SLC process developed and improved through the project worked successfully and was fully documented. This included SLC land acquisition and planning, land recipient selection and plot allocation through a transparent process, site preparation, and provision of settling-in support and community infrastructure and services. The targets relating to land recipient selection and transparent dispute resolution were fully achieved. Some elements of the process have already been adopted by other projects. Further streamlining and greater involvement of the private sector are areas identified for further improvement. In addition, the project has also surpassed the World Bank’s agriculture core sector indicator on “technologies

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demonstrated in project areas. The project has demonstrated and trained in 7 improved agricultural technologies (target was one) covering chicken raising, pig raising Compost, rice production, fruit trees, home gardening and vegetable production and marketing. 15. The project has already achieved a significant beneficial impact on the livelihoods and lives of the majority of land recipients that settled on the SLCs. The majority of these households have improved their incomes, some considerably. The 2014 beneficiary survey carried out by the project found an average household (agricultural and off-farm) income of US$1,901 compared to US$1,176 found by the baseline survey in 2010. The annual food security surveys found also that food security had improved remarkably, with almost all households facing food shortages at the start compared to around 33% by 2014 (compared to around 45% in 2014 for control groups). Anecdotal evidence from discussions with the SLC households confirms these findings and indicates further that almost all households are very satisfied with their transformation from poor landless or land-poor farm laborers to proud farm owners who manage their own farms and are more in control of their own lives. Although there are differences between SLCs, genuine human communities are beginning to develop with an active life around schools, local shops and other community facilities. Several of the SLCs have been registered as official new villages within the commune. 16. Although lives have improved for almost all land recipients that settled on the SLCs, agriculture has not sufficiently taken root, and a majority of households remain relatively poor, with some food insecure. In addition, the gains for some (e.g. female-headed or poorer) households are vulnerable to community level or broader shocks. 17. If there are no major shocks, the growing confidence and capacities of the majority of households and the communities as a whole are likely to sustain and support further improvement. Shocks however are part of the agricultural and rural development experience, and there is a risk that sustainability could be undermined. A relatively small amount of additional support would consolidate, protect and spread the gains for a majority of households, and speed up and spread the natural growth and development processes that the project has contributed to. 18. The overall conclusion is that the LASED Project was very successful and has been rated as “satisfactory”. This was not an easy undertaking with many aspects of implementation that were new to Cambodia. After a slow start, the project managed to achieve, exceed or almost achieve all its main objectives and targets. A total of 3,148 households were allocated land in eight SLC sites located in seven communes, covering 10,273 hectares. The majority of these households have substantially improved their livelihoods and general well-being, although much remains to be done. The SLC “mechanism” developed with detailed procedures, documentation, tools and capacity, will support technically competent, transparent and well-managed implementing of other commune-based SLC projects. The learning gained will support further improvements to SLC-related policies and the development of the SLC program in Cambodia.

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19. The project was implemented through a strong team-based collaborative approach involving much exchange of ideas and learning. Key lessons learned have been compiled and are summarized in this report. These concern the following.

(a) Implementation of SLCs needs strong management with close access to key decision makers:

(b) Strong, competent and balanced project teams should be established at an early stage:

(c) Develop public – private partnership arrangements whereby specialised private sector service providers and NGOs can be used to complement the work of government agencies in the implementation of SLCs:

(d) Further strengthen the capacity of Commune Councils to prepare and enable them to perform decentralised functions and decision making responsibilities for more responsive and locally appropriate implementation.

(e) Develop more comprehensive, coherent but flexible and participatory approaches to community and agricultural / livelihood development before the land recipients move to the SLC site:

(f) SLC projects need a systematic and coordinated M&E system which includes a well-focussed and coherent programme of evaluation and learning to support project improvement and policy discussions:

20. Considering the positive experiences and learning from the project and that it was designed at least in part, as a pilot project to test and improve the commune-based SLC process, two main recommendations are made for follow up actions. These relate to: (1) strong support for the implementation of the proposed LASED II, and (2) a structured, in-depth and evaluative study to generate the learning from LASED that can guide broad pro-poor land policy development in Cambodia. (b) Comments on draft ICR:

21. Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF): Actually, our technical team provided comments on the LASED’s Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) since 09 March 2015 as per requested by Dr. Boramy, Director of LASED. We rechecked again on the final draft ICR that your provided attachment and so from our technical side doesn’t have any more comments (received via email on September 10, 2015 and September 15, 2015, respectively).

22. General Secretariat for Social Land Concession (GSSLC), Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), and National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development (NCDD), Ministry of Interior (MoI): Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development (LASED) Project is the part of the Royal Government of Cambodia Social Land Concession Program. It was implemented by teams of national and sub-national level with fully cooperation financial support from the World Bank (WB) and technical assistant from Government of Germany through GIZ and also implemented with cooperation of 3 Non Government Organization (NGOs) are Life with Dignity (LWD), Wattanakpheap (WP) and Habitat for Humanity in

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Cambodia (HBHC), which received funding from Japan, administered by the WB through Japan Social Development Fund.

23. The detail activities and the achievement of the project are descripted in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) as well as result framework analysis, rating of the project performance, assessments, lessons learns, and comments, which are covered overall the project gold and as the project Director I accepted this full report.

24. LASED is the piloting Project on social land concession and since we started to prepare a concept note in 2005 and continuing to implementation stage and then now we reach the goal of the project, we had seen that at the beginning we as implementers faced many challenges such as many procedures and capacity. But with willingness and commitment we overcome those challenges and we see the great result that poor and hopeless peoples got benefit from project activities.

25. We had learned a lot on working as a team contains of multi-institutions at national and sub-national and also with development partners and NGOs and the main activities were discussions, facilitations, cooperation, conversation, brainstorming and participation with fully respect each other of the team members.

26. We had seen that we reach some result of the project, but we are still concerning of the sustainable of the livelihood for those families, who received land from the project and we should keep take care them for a lite bit more time toward their better in life and till they can stand by themselves.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders 1. The draft ICR report was sent to GIZ Land Right Program, GIZ livelihood program, Habitat for Humanity international-Cambodia, Life with Dignity and Wathnakpheap for feedback and comments with responses received as follows: 2. GIZ Land Right Program: No comments on the draft report shared. 3. GIZ Livelihood Program: Minor revisions were provided and incorporated into the draft final report. 4. HfHI-C: No comments on the draft report shared.

5. LWD: No comments on the draft report shared. 6. Wathnakpheap: No comments on the draft report shared.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 1. Financing Agreement Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development

Project (IDA Credit H3860-KH and IDA Grant 44410-KH) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association, June 13, 2008

2. Financing Agreement Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development

Project (IDA Credit H3860-KH and IDA Grant 44410-KH) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association. Proposed approaches to address the legal implications of the cancellation of MBPI, PMG and other salary supplements, January 8, 2010


Project (IDA Credit H3860-KH and IDA Grant 44410-KH) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association, Amendment to the Financing Agreement, October 10, 2012


Project (IDA Credit H3860-KH and IDA Grant 44410-KH) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association, Amendment to the Financing Agreement, April 26, 2013


Project (IDA Credit H3860-KH and IDA Grant 44410-KH) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association, Amendment to the Financing Agreement, May 22, 2014

6. Grant Agreement Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Community

Empowerment Through Access to Land Project (Grant No. TF091839) between Lutheran World Federation – Cambodia Program, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, June 13, 2008


Empowerment Through Access to Land Project (Grant No. TF091839) between Lutheran World Federation – Cambodia Program, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, January 30, 2012


Empowerment Through Access to Land Project (Grant No. TF091839) between Lutheran World Federation – Cambodia Program, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, May 18, 2012

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9. Grant Agreement Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Strengthening Civil Society-Government Partnership to Deliver Land Tenure Security Project (Grant No. TF091836) between Habitat for Humanity International – Cambodia, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, June 13, 2008

10. Grant Agreement Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Strengthening Civil

Society-Government Partnership to Deliver Land Tenure Security Project (Grant No. TF091836) between Habitat for Humanity International – Cambodia, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, May 18, 2012

11. Grant Agreement Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Strengthening Good

Governance in Land Distribution Project (Grant No. TF091833) between Wathnakpheap, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, June 13, 2008

12. Grant Agreement Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Strengthening Good

Governance in Land Distribution Project (Grant No. TF091833) between Wathnakpheap, International Development Association, and Kingdom of Cambodia, May 18, 2012

PROJECT PLANNING DOCUMENTS

13. Grant Proposal Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Community

Empowerment Through Access to Land Project (Grant No. TF091839, LWD), FY07 round 23 (Grant approval date March 24, 2008)

14. Grant Proposal Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Strengthening Civil

Society-Government Partnership to Deliver Land Tenure Security Project (Grant No. TF091836, HfHI-C), FY07 round 23 (Grant approval date March 24, 2008)

15. Grant Proposal Cambodia Japan Social Development Fund for Strengthening Good

Governance in Land Distribution Project (Grant No. TF091833, Wathnakpheap) round 23 (Grant approval date March 24, 2008)

16. LASED – Project Appraisal Document – Report No. 42931-KH, April 23, 2008

17. LASED Civic Engagement Framework, November 2007

18. LASED Project Implementation Manual, 2008 and Simplify LASED PIM, June 25, 2012

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EVALUATIONS, ASSESSMENTS, AND LESSONS-LEARNED

19. Assessment Report on LASED Rural Infrastructure and Livelihood Support by Julian Abrams (FAO) and Sarin Khim (World Bank), May 2011

20. Assessment of the LASED Agricultural Development Component by Global Development Solutions, LLC, December 11, 2013

21. LASED Mid-Term Review, Conducted by E. Gen Consultants in association with Green Field Consulting and Development Co., Ltd, May 2011

22. Food Security in the LASED Project, GIZ, May 2014

23. LASED Lessons Learned from 5 years of Implementation Experience, GIZ, August

2014

24. Impact Evaluation Design and Baseline Survey for LASED – Consia Consultants, January 11, 2011

25. Implementation Completion Memorandum (ICM) of Cambodia Japan Social

Development Fund for Community Empowerment Through Access to Land Project (Grant No. TF091839, LWD), by Cyprian Qhobela - Consultant, September 30, 2013


Development Fund Strengthening Civil Society-Government Partnership to Deliver Land Tenure Security Project (Grant No. TF091836, HfHI-C), by Cyprian Qhobela - Consultant, October 2, 2013


Development Fund Strengthening Good Governance in Land Distribution Project (Grant No. TF091836, Wathnakpheap), by Cyprian Qhobela - Consultant, August 27, 2013

28. LASED Review of M&E System, Recommendations for Improvement, Discussion paper, Nuno Santos and Maria Dodson, FAO/TCI, May 2011

29. Monitoring and Evaluation and Assessment of Livelihood Support activities,

Prepared by Japan Development Institute (JDI) in Collaboration with Global Development Solutions, LLC (GDS), October 13, 2011

30. LASED Monitoring and Evaluation Database and updated M&E Reports, April 6,

2012

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31. LASED Monitoring and Evaluation Operations Manual, by ADA Consultants, Volume 1, December 2012, and Volume 2, January 2013

32. LASED Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) Seq. No 1-9, and

Management Letter and Aide Memoires, World Bank.

33. LASED Recipient’s Project Completion Report (PCR), by Mr. Steve Gossage - Consultant, February 2015

34. LASED Limited Beneficiary Assessment Report, Mr. Srey Chanthy, July 2014

35. LASED Limited Beneficiary Assessment – Supplementary Appendix, Mr Srey Chanthy, July 2014

36. LASED Survey on the Livelihoods of Land Recipients in SLC Sites by Mr. Hong Samnang, 2014

37. LASED Procedure and Achievement, March, 02, 2015

38. Lesson Learned from LASED Implementation, LASED MTR, October 2011

39. LASED Annual Lesson Learnt Workshop, December 2011

40. LASED Lesson Learnt & Experiences Workshop, November 2012

41. LASED Gender Mainstreaming on Land Policy Workshop, by LASED Team in Collaboration with MLMUPC’s Gender Group, October 2012 (in Khmer)

42. LASED Sustainable Strategy Workshop, GIZ, September 2012 (in Khmer)

43. LASED Work Plan Support Workshop, GIZ IP-GOPA, January 2013

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Annex 10: LASED Institutional Framework

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