Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 22117-YEM

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-23730)

ONA

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24.1 MILLION *(US$ 32.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

FOR A LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION PROJECT

June 20, 2001

* after cancellation of SDR 3.7 million the total amount of the Credit was reduced to SDR 20.4 million

Rural Development, Water and Enviromment DepartmentMiddle East and North Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 2000)

Currency Unit = Yemeni Rial (YR)1000 YR = US$ 6.25

US$ 1 = 160

Official Rate Market RateMay 1992 US$ 1 =YR 12 US$ 1 =YR 29October 1994 US$ 1 = YR 50 US$ 1 = YR 103October 1995 US$ 1 =YR 90 US$ 1 = YR 112December 1996 US$ 1 = YR 100 US$ 1 = YR 126December 1997 US$ I = YR 131 US$ 1 = YR 131June 1998 US$ 1 = YR 135 US$ 1 = YR 135December 1999 US$ 1 = YR 155 US$ 1 = YR 155December 2000 US$ I = YR 160 US$ 1 = YR 160

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CACB Cooperative Agriculture and Credit BankCWMU Central Water Monitoring UnitGDI General Directorate of IrrigationFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationGDFDC General Directorate of Forestry and Desertification ControlGOY Government of YemenICR Implementation Completion ReportIDA International Development AssociationLWCP Land and Water Conservation ProjectM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMAI Ministry of Agriculture and IrrigationMOPD Ministry of Planning and DevelopmentNWRA National Water Resources AuthorityO&M Operation and MaintenancePIU Project Implementation UnitPMU Project Management UnitROY Republic of YemenSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSMS Subject Matter SpecialistTA Technical AssistanceTDA Tihama Development AuthorityUNCDF United Nations Capital Development FundUNV United Nations VolunteerWID Women in Development

Vice President: Jean-Louis SarbibCountry Manager/Director: Mahmood Ayub

Sector Manager Salah DarghouthTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Manuel Schiffler

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 14. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 35. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 76. Sustainability 87. Bank and Borrower Performance 108. Lessons Learned 129. Partner Comments 1410. Additional Information 16Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 17Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 24Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 26Annex 4. Bank Inputs 28Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 30Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 31Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 32

IBRD Map No.31316

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID: P005836 Project Name: LAND & WATER CONSERVTeam Leader: Manuel Schiffler TL Unit: MNSIFICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 25, 2001

1. Project Data

Name: LAND & WATER CONSERV L/C/TFNumber: IDA-23730Country/Department: YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF Region: Middle East and North

Africa RegionSector/subsector: Al - Irrigation & Drainage; AT - Forestry

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 10/31/1989 Effective: 05/14/1993Appraisal: 05/17/1991 MTR: 07/01/1995 07/07/1997Approval: 05/28/1992 Closing: 06/30/1999 12/31/2000

Borrower/lmplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF ROY/GDI/MAWROther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Caio Koch-WeserCountry Manager: Mahmood Ayub Ram K. ChopraSector Manager: M. Salah Darghouth Ngozi Okonjo-IwealaTeam Leader at ICR: Manuel Schiffler Rahul RaturiICR Primary Author: Manuel Schiffler

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactoxy, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:Background

Yemen is the poorest and most rural country in the MENA region. In 1998, 12.5 million people lived inrural areas, accounting for 76 percent of the population. From 1992 until 1998, the rural populationincreased by 16 percent, while value added in agriculture increased by 36 percent during the same period.

Nevertheless, according to a national household budget survey conducted in 1998, the incidence of ruralpoverty remained high at 25 percent.

Yemeni agriculture relies to a large extent on irrigation that has brought self-sufficiency in fruit andvegetables and an explosion in qat cultivation, while traditional cereals and the livestock economy weremarginalized, with consequent deterioration in watersheds and terraces. Recent sector work has shown thatthere is a substantial "yield gap" that Yemeni farmers could close and that there is good potential forincreasing returns to water in agriculture. Market prospects are better than for other sectors, with adomestic market expanding fast in size and quality of demand, and with new prospects for regional exports.However, natural resources are already fully utilized and in the case of groundwater, over-utilized in manyregions, with consequent effects on the prospects for sustainable growth.

The Government of Yemen requested the assistance of IDA in the agricultural sector through a series ofprojects, including the recently completed Agricultural Sector Management Support Project (ASMSP, Cr.22990) as well as the Land and Water Conservation Project (LWCP). The start-up of the Land and WaterConservation Project was slow, hampered by a lack of acceptance of the implementation arrangements bythe RDAs, initial conflicts between the PMU and the implementing agency, the Ministry of Agriculture andWater Resources (MAWR), slow progress in filling the positions for the PMU, procurement problems, andthe turmoil associated with the country's reunification, the repercussions of the Gulf War in 1990 and the1994 Civil War. Only with the restructuring of the project in August 1995, the appointment of a new PMUdirector, and the subsequent second restructuring at mid-term in January 1997 implementation began inearnest. Disbursement picked up quickly. In the subsequent five and a half years, and in particular duringthe last three years, the project achieved its major objectives.

Original Objective

To strengthen sustainable agriculture through: (i) institutional and technical developments in irrigation andforestry; (ii) initiating a program of water resource monitoring and regulation in the agriculture sector; (iii)improving water use efficiency in irrigated agriculture; (iv) conserving key indigenous forest areas,accelerating tree planting and extending soil and water conservation; and (v) establishing approaches forwatershed management and terrace stabilization.

3.2 Revised Objective:No revision made.

3.3 Original Components:1. Institutional Strengthening

1.1. Water Resources1.2. Forestry

2. Irrigation Development2.1. Spate Irrigation2.2. Groundwater Irrigation2.3. Agricultural Development2.4. Implementation Units

3. Forestry Development3.1. Land Conservation / Afforestation3.2. Watershed Management

3.4 Revised Components:

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No revision made. The restructuring in 1995 and the mid-term review in 1997 reduced the scope of thecomponents and simplified and clarified the implementation arrangements.

3.5 Quality at Ent,y:Quality at entry was satisfactory. Ownership of the project by the GOY was considerable: the project washighly relevant to the Borrower's development priorities, and was consistent with the Borrower's strategyfor developing the irrigated agriculture and forestry sectors. It also reinforced the overall goal - embracedby the Bank and the Government - to more effectively use the country's scarce water resources.

In retrospect, it may have been advisable not to include both forestry and irrigation components in the sameproject, given the lack of coordination in the detailed planning and the implementation between thedepartments of MAI (GDFDC and GDI) responsible for the implementation of the components.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective.The overall outcome of the project is rated partially satisfactory and the project's development objective hasbeen mostly achieved, albeit with some caveats. Physical targets were reached in most cases, and exceededin some. The project has achieved a high economic rate of return. It has had a beneficial environmentalimpact through water savings, afforestation, and soil conservation. Farmers have participated in manyproject activities by providing labor or through cash payments, creating the basis for the sustainability ofthese activities at the farm level. The capacity of most institutions involved has been strengthened.However, given the size of the technical assistance and training, the institutional development impactremained modest. PlUs supported under the project will be able to provide many services after the closureof the project until the funds generated through cost sharing arrangements under the project will bedepleted. After their depletion, and assuming no other donor-funded projects, the sustainability of the PIUs'services is not guaranteed. The project thus has introduced sustainable improvements for farmers. But sincecosts have intentionally only been partially recovered in order to spread new technologies, the servicesneeded to expand improved irrigation techniques to new areas cannot be provided on a sustainable basiswithout further external support.

Also, government's contribution to the project, both for investment and for recurrent expenditures, wasmuch lower than anticipated.

4.2 Outputs by components:Under the groundwater irrigation component, the targets in terms of area under improved conveyanceefficiency (10,600 ha compared to 8,500 ha) were exceeded. The reduction in water use due to irnprovedconveyance is estimated to be more than 20 percent. The nunber of pilot pressurized units remained belowthe target (66 compared to 165); the main reason was that farmers were skeptical about these systems priorto observation of the pilots. The experience with bubblers and sprinklers was encouraging, while the moresensitive drip systems have experienced some design and operational problems. However, despite thesedifficulties, farmers' demand was highest for bubbler and drip and lower for sprinkler. In terms of costsharing, every farmer had to deposit a cash contribution on the project's Bank account before receivingtechnical advice and equipment under the project. This generated USS2 million in beneficiary contributionsto cost sharing arrangements. These funds will be used to extend the area under improved irrigation afterthe project ends. This cost sharing by farmers is a clear departure from earlier practice of free provision ofequipment and may be considered a watershed event in this sector. The definition of upper limits on afarmer's area benefiting from the project helped to prevent windfall profits for larger farmers. Furthermore,the project used a higher quality of pipes than those sold by the private sector. Efficient procurement andlarge packages ensured very competitive rates, resulting from economies of scale, that were passed on to

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the beneficiaries. Project staff also designed and supervised the implementation of the works. Farmers whohad bought and installed low-quality pipes outside the project often had disappointing results. This had inturn discouraged other farmers from improving their irrigation techniques. The project succeeded inreversing this trend. The trust in piped and pressurized irrigation generated by the project is a crucialprerequisite for the replication of the irrigation component's success to larger areas. Bearing in mind thatthe project has covered less than 3 percent of the area irrigated by groundwater in Yemen, this could revealitself to be one of the project's most substantial benefits.

Under the spate schemes physical targets for construction have not been fully achieved (see Annex 1) andthe irrigated area has been less than anticipated (1,175 ha compared to 2,400 ha). The reason was that thenumber of structures had to be reduced after successive flooding led to an increase in width of wadisresulting in higher costs. Farmers have contributed their labor towards the building of smaller structures,which benefited communities in their immediate vicinity. In the case of larger structures, farnerscontributed by building canal outlets to their fields. Overall, farmer contribution was lower thananticipated. Economic rates of return are estimated to be much lower than for the groundwater component.Due to shortage of funds under LWCP, one spate diversion work and one spate breaker/recharge weir thatwere designed under LWCP were funded under the Emergency Flood Recovery Project (IDA Credit No.2932).

The project's impact on water resources has been beneficial overall, although with variations by regionand component. Given the increasing scarcity of water, this impact has to be given particular attention infuture projects. It was not possible to establish a clear link between water savings under the project and aslowdown in the decline of the groundwater table in a specific area. The main reason is that individualbeneficiary farmers were deliberately chosen from widely scattered locations in order to maximize thedemonstration effect of new technologies on other farmers. In some cases water saved through increasedirrigation efficiency has been used to extend the irrigated area; but this seems to have happened mainly inlow-hazard, shallow alluvial aquifers, primarily in the foothills of the coastal plains. In most cases theinvestments in groundwater irrigation efficiency have significantly reduced pumping, especially inhigh-hazard aquifers. One reason for this behavior is that farmers often already had to deepen their wellsseveral times at a substantial cost, while it is uncertain whether their wells will yield the same amount ofwater after the next deepening. Other concerns are higher pumping costs and an increase in salinity. Insome cases farmers were unable to increase their irrigated area because they did not have access toadditional land, either because of physical constraints or because they were unable to buy or lease landsfrom their neighbors. In one case observed by the mission in the Taiz area a farmer sold water he saved towater tankers supplying the city. The impact of spate structures has also been beneficial overall, especiallyfor downstream structures capturing flood flows that would otherwise have been lost to the sea. The projectalso improved the capacity for water resources monitoring through the drilling of 15 monitoring wells, thesupply of hydro-meteorological equipment, and related TA and training (see under institutionaldevelopment impact below). The record on groundwater monitoring is rather disappointing, since thenumber of wells monitored has actually declined during the project for lack of funding for recurrent costs.

Concerning the forestry and land conservation component (closed in 1999), nurseries that wererehabilitated or created under the project have produced almost one million seedlings, reaching its physicaltarget. Trees were planted either on private land to protect fields from wind or water erosion and to benefitcrops such as coffee (agro-forestry), or on public land such as along roads and in schools. The survival rateof seedlings was high, with a total of about 700,000 surviving trees. Public nurseries, however, facedoperational problems after closure of the component. Most of the seedlings are given away for free andeven transported to the farmers' fields. A smaller portion has recently been sold below cost. These limitedrevenues and current budget allocations are not sufficient to cover operating costs. In addition, attempts at

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cost recovery have slowed down demand for seedlings. As a result, most public nurseries operate at belowhalf their capacity. The much smaller community nurseries are apparently suffering less operationalproblems. Public nurseries may benefit from more budgetary autonomy, allowing them to keep locallygenerated revenues to cover their recurrent costs. The current trend towards decentralization could providea good basis for such reforms. Under the pilot activity on woodland management the concept of protectioncontracts signed by the local com-munity combined with the supply of an alternative fuel source (gas) hasproven to be successful. The concept is now being used under similar projects in other parts of Yemen.Sand dune stabilization by mechanical works and the planting of shrubs in coastal areas has slowed downdesertification. However, because the benefits from reduced sand deposit on fields are spread over largeagricultural areas, it was not possible to convince farmers to participate in these works. In watershedmanagement (small check dams, bank protection) and terrace rehabilitation, farmers participated bycontributing labor. These works were undertaken in poor communities with a high commitment to provideinputs, identified through a socio-economic survey. Under a small women in development activity ruralwomen were trained in natural resources management, leading to the establishment of home gardens and asmall nursery run by women.

A substantial number of cars and heavy equipment was procured under the project. It appears that most orall of these are operating, mainly at the field level, and continue to be used for the intended purposes.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:The Net Present Value of the project at an opportunity cost of capital of 12 percent is USS 2.0 million andthe economic rate of return is estimated at 15 percent, excluding the costs and benefits of forestry as well asTA and training that is not related directly to irrigation and watershed management. The investment costsincluded in the analysis (US$20.4 million) account for 68 percent of total investment costs (USS30.1million). If all project costs are included, as it was done for the SAR, the NPV falls to US$-2.0 million andthe ERR to 10 percent. The investment cost, ERRs and NPVs for selected components are as follows: (i)piped groundwater conveyance: ERR 30 percent, NPV US$ 8.2 m; (ii) spate irrigation: ERR 8 percent,NPV US$-0.15 m; and (iii) watershed management: ERR 10 percent, NPV USS-0.01 m.

In the SAR, the NPV at an opportunity cost of capital of 12 percent was estimated at US$11.1 million andthe economic rate of return was estimated at 19 percent, including all costs and benefits. The overallbenefits estimated in the SAR are higher than the benefits that actually materialized for the followingreasons: (i) there were substantial delays between the time the costs were incurred for TA, vehicles andequipment and the time the first benefits materialized; (ii) the SAR assumed that higher irrigation efficiencywould lead to an increase in the irrigated area, while the ICR assumes - based on empirical evidence - thathigher irrigation efficiency has mostly led to reduced pumping. Because the savings in pumping costs arelower than the incremental value added from increasing the irrigated area, this assumption had a slightnegative effect on the ERR; (iii) the SAR calculations were based on a larger project, while the ICRcalculations are based on the reduced scope of the project after it was restructured, thus leading to a lowerNPV. The SAR did not provide separate estimates for the NPV and ERR of project components.

4.4 Financial rate of retuirn:The estimated financial rates of return vary between 16 percent and 32 percent. The highest rates of returnare achieved in Highland areas where the water table is deep and pumping costs are high (up to 9 USCents/cubic meter), thus leading to higher savings in pumping costs. The financial rates of return in thecoastal plains (Tihama, Lahej and Dhamar) are lower (16-17 percent), despite the assumption that theirrigated area has been expanded in these areas. The payback for the investments ranges from 1. Ito 3.5years, with an average of about 2 years. In the case of the Highlands, this payback is based on the reducedpumping costs alone, not taking into account additional benefits from an increased lifetime of the aquifer, a

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lower pumping lift, and the avoided or delayed costs of deepening wells in those areas where the water tableis declining, or any benefits from the prevention of seawater intrusion in coastal aquifers. For most cropsand project areas, the return on labor has been decreasing, reflecting a stronger increase in labor input thanin total returns.

The SAR estimated rates of return estimated for various areas between 27 percent and 89 percent, anincrease in the income per family labor day of 15 percent and a payback period for the investment of 1.4 to3.6 years. The reason for the higher IRR and labor return estimates in the SAR is that the SAR values werebased on the assumption that the water savings per hectare would be used to increase the irrigated area.

4.5 Institutional development impact:Institutional Strengthening: The TA and training component has been large, its share amounting to 33percent of project costs. Both TA and training were crucial to achieve the project's objective. Without TAmost components of the project may never have been implemented. The main beneficiaries of TA were thePMU, CWMU, GDFDC and PIUs. Not all the TA and training has been of the highest quality. But in mostcases, TA and training were of high quality, as reflected in studies and reports as well as in the assessmentby counterpart staff and trained staff. But in the case of long-term TA, in some cases no concomitantcapacity was created in the counterpart institution, while in the case of short-term TA the counterpartinstitutions were sometimes unable to follow up on the recommendations made. The generally low salarylevel in the public sector is a serious constraint on performance, so that the institutional developmentimpact remains modest.

Under the water resources component, TA and training was mainly extended to staff of the Central WaterMonitoring Unit (CWMUJ) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, the PMU and PIUs. Some morelimited support was provided to the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) and to the GeneralDirectorate of Irrigation (GDI) in MAI. Assistance for the CWMU included local well inventories, thecategorization of 19 aquifers out of those covered under the project, the identification of the requirementsfor a national hydro-meteorological network, pilot studies on the use of non-conventional waters forirrigation, and capacity building for the design and installation of irrigation equipment as well as for themonitoring of water savings in irrigation. Long-term training also contributed to strengthen to a certainextent the capacity of CWMU and other entities, including the PMU of the Sanaa Basin project. Support toNWRA included mainly a public awareness campaign and support for the National Water Strategy thatwas approved by Cabinet. The support for irrigation agronomy, including the strengthening of field units,seems to have been the most successful activity. The impact of some activities has remained limited, partlydue to institutional problems (see above). Capacity for water monitoring at the field level in the project areais substantial in MAI through the CWMU and PIUs. However, the entity that has been legally entrustedwith water monitoring and water resources management -- NWRA --has field units only in Taiz and Aden.The record on cooperation and data exchange is mixed. Cooperation seems to be more developed at thefield level than at the central level. The sustainability of some of the activities supported is doubtful. Giventhe limited field capacity of NWRA, it is not clear who will operate the observation wells and thehydro-meteorological network once they are in place. Finally, it should be noted that, together with otherprojects, the project contributed to the preparation of the Water and Irrigation Law that is currently beforeParliament. Overall, the record of institutional strengthening under the water resources component has beenmixed.

Under the forestry component capacities TA and training were provided to the GDFDC and its localbranches. GDFDC had been created only shortly before the project. It had low capacity and was highlycentralized. Intemational experts worked together with forestry staff in teams and succeeded in transferringknowledge. This was enhanced by long-term training received mainly in other countries in the region with

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substantial experience with forestry management under similar climatic conditions. After the trainingpractically all staff returned to GDFDC, including many posted in the field, and were able to put theacquired knowledge to work. Moreover, a process of decentralization was begun under the project.Capacity of GDFDC has been somewhat strengthened, but some issues concerning the management ofGDFDC remain unresolved. The results of the institutional strengthening of the forestry component arethus mixed.

Short-term training in Yemen under both components - water resources and forestry -- has proved to bemostly unsuccessful. The quality of the services was often very low. Furthermore, even when the qualitywas acceptable, the duration of the training often was too short to have an impact.

The TA was also crucial in supporting the PMU and the PIUs, and contributed significantly to theturnaround of the project after its slow startup. However, the weak services in the early phase of the projectmay have prevented the project from being turned around at an earlier time.

The capacity created in irrigation agronomy and forestry, including particularly at the field level,constitutes a good basis for follow-up activities in these sub-sectors with TA and training limited to specificneeds to fill remaining gaps, such as drip irrigation design and management. Concerning water resourcesmanagement, much more effort will be needed to resolve institutional problems and, in some cases, tostrengthen capacity at the field level.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:When the project was approved by the Board in 1992, the country was suffering from the aftermath of the1990/91 Gulf War and its repercussions on the Yemeni economy due to the return of Yemeni migrant laborfrom Saudi-Arabia, severe macro-economic imbalances and an extensive transition period following thereunification of Yemen in 1990, often paralyzing any effective government action. The project was furtheraffected by the Civil War in 1994. After the end of the war, periodic social unrest continued to hamperproject implementation in parts of the project area.

Heavy floods in parts of the project area widened some wadis to up to more than ten times there originalwidth. Thus the designs for spate structures along these wadis had to be modified, leading to a substantialcost increase and a concomitant reduction in the incremental irrigated area served within the given budgetfor this component.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:Counterpart Funding: During the entire project implementation period, GOY did not provide adequatecounterpart funding, despite the continued attempts of IDA supervision missions to resolve the issue. Thisshortfall was partially overcome by financing some limited recurrent costs through the FAO's Trust FundContracts.

Inflation, Overvaluation and Slow Procurement of Larger Contracts: During the period 1993-96, therewas a significant difference between the official and market exchange rates of Yemeni Rial and highinflation. This made procurement difficult, because contractors were unable to uphold their bids during thelong period between bid submission and contract award in the absence of price escalation clauses. Inflationalso increased the value of some large contracts denominated in local currency in such a way that theypassed the threshold for review by the High Tender Board, thus slowing down procurement and projectimplementation. Inflation also reduced the willingness of CACB to extend credits to farmers to meet their

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cost sharing part in the purchase of irrigation equipment.

Water Law: The passing of the water law, which has been discussed in several drafts since the early1990s, has been substantially delayed, thus encumbering the implementation of an effective water resourcesmanagement strategy.

Slow Effectiveness: Following Board approval in May 1992, the Credit became effective only in May1993. The delay was mainly due to the need to receive approval for the project from Parliament.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:Slow Procurement of Smaller Contracts: For smaller procurement items which were within thethresholds of the PMU, MAI initially interfered, thus causing delays.

Slow Start-Up: Reflecting the slow start-up of the project, about US$5.5 million from the IDA creditwere canceled in 1994 as part of a Country Portfolio Performance Review. As a result, the project had tobe restructured in August 1995 reducing its targets.

Implementation Arrangements: Initially, budgets were supposed to be allocated to the 7 PIUs through thePMU. This arrangement proved to be unworkable due to the resistance by RDAs and PIUs wereconsequently inactive. In 1996, MAM started allocating the budget directly to the PIUs and the relationshipbetween the PMU, PlUs and the RDAs/regional agricultural offices under which the PIUs were to workwas defined in a manner acceptable to all stakeholders. The PIU staff was entirely deployed only at the endof 1995. The cost recovery arrangements with CACB, an important pre-requisite for the sale of irrigationequipment, were also finalized only in late 1995.

5.4 Costs and financing:The project costs were US$30.1 million, or 63 percent of the US$47.6 estimated at appraisal. Thereduction of US$17.5 million is attributed to the reduction of the physical targets during the 1995restructuring and the 1997 Mid-Term Review as well as to efficient procurement in large packages leadingto cost reductions. The reduction in physical targets was mirrored by the cancellation of a portion of theIDA credit, the unavailability of UNCDF cofinancing and lower counterpart funding. Under the spateirrigation sub-component, increased costs due to floods were offset by a reduction in the scope of works.Also, a number of spate structures designed under the project were funded by other on-going IDA projects.Under the groundwater irrigation sub-component, prices received on some bids for pipes were lower thananticipated. Furthermore, the number of pilot projects for pressurized piped irrigation was reduced afterinitial uptake by farmers remained limited. The cost reduction due to these two factors allowed the projectto increase the area covered by piped irrigation conveyance beyond the targets of the mid-term review.

Ninety-nine percent of the reduced IDA credit were committed or disbursed at project completion.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:Sustainability is defined by the ICR guidelines as the "probability of (a project) maintaining theachievements generated or expected to be generated in relation to its objective over the economic life of theproject."

The sustainability of the project is likely. The on-farm investment in irrigation is undertaken on farmers'land based on a cost sharing arrangement, which includes a substantial contribution by farmers. These

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investments have achieved a high financial and economic rate of return. A high degree of beneficiaryownership and the existing financial incentives are expected to ensure that farmers will properly maintainthe irrigation equipment and replace it after the end of its economic life. As far as spate structures areconcerned, smaller structures that can be maintained by farmers are likely to be sustainable, while largerstructures that traditionally fall within the responsibility of the government are less likely to be properlymaintained. Investments in watershed management have been undertaken with substantial voluntarycommunity participation, suggesting that famners will continue to maintain the structures (bank protectionworks, terraces) built with their participation under the project. Afforestation has taken place to a largeextent on the land of farmers, protecting their land against wind and water erosion as well as protectingtheir crops (agro-forestry), thus giving them a stake in protecting these trees. The survival rate of trees hasbeen correspondingly high at 75-80 percent, including trees planted on public land.

The establishment of a revolving fund of about US$2 million through cost-sharing contributions by farmerswho have bought irrigation equipment will ensure that investments in improved irrigation conveyance willeven be extended to new areas after project closure without any external funding. However, given thatfarmers are not expected to pay the full cost of the equipment, this fund will ultimately be depleted. It was,however, never intended to fully recover the investments, since the groundwater component of the projectaimed at demonstrating unfamiliar technologies to farmers. In fact, the extent of the partial cost recovery isa considerable achievement in the context of Yemen. Together with the fact that beneficiaries will covertotal costs of O&M the successful cost sharing agreement is unprecedented in IDA-funded projects in theagricultural sector in Yemen.

On another positive note, the technical capabilities of the PIUs, of the Forestry Department and of theCWMU have been strengthened considerably, enabling PIUs to convince farmers to adopt water saving andland conservation technologies and provide technical support in their implementation. Furthermore, theproject has achieved its objective of familiarizing the beneficiaries with land and water conservationtechnologies concerning especially groundwater conveyance systems and pressurized irrigation systems.The beneficiaries are not only willing to actively participate in the activities supported under the project,but these activities are likely to be replicated in the future, if cost sharing agreements as devised under theproject can be maintained. The level of awareness created among the farmers in regard to the importance oftheir own contribution and participating in implementing similar works in the future has increased.

Without continued support, farmers are likely to operate and maintain most of the infrastructure installedunder the project. But public institutions are not likely to be able to promote such investments on new areaswithout being supported. PIUs and nurseries lack adequate recurrent budget allocations or revenuesnecessary to continue their operations at the same level as during the project. PIUs charge a levy of about 5percent of equipment supplied to cover the cost of the surveys/designs for irrigation networks, thusallowing them to recover a portion of their recurrent costs from beneficiaries. Under the forestrycomponent, some nurseries have begun charging small fees for fruit and ornamental trees, but seedlings forother tree species will continue to be provided for free on environmental grounds, thus limiting the scopefor cost recovery. In the absence of a follow-on project, it is expected that public institutions will have toslow down their efforts to further promote the activities supported under the project.

Another issue of concern is the usable life of aquifers on which groundwater irrigation supported under theproject depends. The project has achieved substantial water savings estimated at 15 million cubic metersper annum - mainly in high-hazard aquifers, defined as aquifers having experienced a long-term decline inwater tables of more than 3 meters per year - and has thus contributed to reduce overpumping. In somecases - mainly in low-hazard aquifers, defined as aquifers with stable water tables or an estimatedlong-term decline of less than 1 meter per year - farmers seem to have used the water savings per hectare to

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increase their irrigated area. Low-hazard aquifers, which are estimated to account for up to half the areacovered under the groundwater component. In high-hazard aquifers, the long-term sustainability of theagricultural activities improved under the project is not guaranteed, unless further reductions in abstractionare achieved. However, the project has brought water abstraction closer to the safe yield in thesehigh-hazard areas, which is a substantial achievement.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regurlar operations:There is no need for transition agreements at the farm level, as all operations and maintenance areundertaken by farmers themselves.

The staff of PIUs, who are part of the RDAs or of the regional agricultural offices, will remain in placeafter project closure. The proceeds from cost sharing arrangements deposited in a revolving fund will allowthe PIUs to continually fund investments in the higher efficiency of groundwater irrigation for an estimatedperiod of 18 months. However, the PMU and the PIUs will only be able to extend activities to new areasbeyond the lifetime of the revolving fund if financing from a follow-on project becomes available.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:Overall, the Bank's performance in lending was satisfactory. The activities to be implemented under theprojects were carefully selected. But implementation difficulties that could have been foreseen at the time ofproject preparation were not sufficiently taken into account in the projection of disbursement. Thesedifficulties include cumbersome procurement arrangements coupled with interference by variousgovernment entities in the procurement process, a high level of inflation, weak capacity within theimplementing agency, and resistance from the part of RDAs and regional agricultural offices to acceptadministrative control of the PMU over the PIUs. It should, however, be noted that the causes for thesedifficulties were largely beyond the influence of Bank preparation missions.

7.2 Supervision:Supervision of the project was satisfactory during the initial phase, and highly satisfactory during the finalphase of the project.

The project became effective during the period soon after unification in 1990 during which many of theinstitutions in the country had to go through an extended transition period and during which theconsequences of the Gulf War (1990/1991) were still very much felt on the economy in Yemen. This wasfollowed by the disruptions of the Civil War in 1994 which delayed activities and brought mostdevelopment projects to a stand still until the negative consequences of the hostilities could be overcome byGovernment. Implementation remained slow due to cumbersome government procurement procedures, highinflation affecting procurement, weak staff at the head of the PMU, and the absence of TA staff in the earlyyears of the project, again due to difficulties in procurement. In addition, RDAs and some regionalagricultural offices initially did not accept the implementation arrangements, which - in their view - gavetoo much authority to the PMU over the PIUs located within the regional authorities/offices. Supervisionmissions have been acutely aware of these issues, but they were either completely or largely outside IDA'scontrol.

In August 1995 only USS3 million (9 percent of the credit) had been disbursed, prompting a restructuringof the project. The restructuring did not change the project's objectives or components. It rather consisted of(i) a reduction in the physical targets due to the canceling of US$5.5 million of the IDA credit as a result ofa Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR), a lack of adequate counterpart funding and the

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unavailability of UNCDF cofinancing; and (ii) a repeated attempt at building consensus on implementationarrangements and somewhat streamlining them. After the restructuring the Bank began to increase itssupervision efforts, especially with the support of staff from the country office. Subsequently - and partlydue to a general improvement of the prevailing conditions in Yemen, the recruitment of TA and thestrengthening of PMU staff - procurement and disbursement picked up, so that US$14.8 m (54 percent ofthe credit) were disbursed at the time of the Mid-Term Review in July 1997. The Mid-Term Review furtherreduced the physical targets to bring them in line with limited counterpart funding. The Mid-Term Reviewfinally set realistic targets and confirmed working implementation arrangement, thus finally putting theproject on a level plane all the way to a successful completion during the following three years, up toclosure of the IDA Credit on December 31, 2000.

With hindsight, the cancellation of US$5.5 million was premature, since the project subsequently completedsurveys, designs and studies for spate irrigation structures estimated to cost about US$5 million, which hadto be transferred to other IDA-funded projects in the sector due to shortage of funding.

Overall, supervision missions have been effective in providing constructive suggestions to overcomeproblems confronting the implementation of the project. The credit agreement was modified twice tore-allocate funds among different categories and it was extended twice for a total period of 18 months toallow for the completion of the physical targets and to make up for the delays experienced initially. Bankstaff showed the degree of flexibility necessary to accommodate these changes.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:The overall Bank performance was satisfactory throughout the project cycle.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:The Borrower's performance during preparation was satisfactory, despite the political changes and tensionsoccurring throughout identification and preparation of the project in 1989-1992.

7.5 Government implementation performance:Government implementation performance was marginally satisfactory during the initial phase of theproject, when the country experienced macro-economic instability and substantial political tensions thatultimately erupted in a Civil War in 1994. Even after the situation calmed down, the lack of counterpartfunding and slow procurement procedures affected project implementation negatively.

7.6 Implementing Agency:The PMU within MAI initially lacked sufficient capacity in procurement and implementation ofIDA-funded projects to allow for a smooth implementation of the project. This situation was remediedsubsequently through the direct engagement of expatriate staff to assist the PMU. From then on theperformance of the PMU has been satisfactory. The expatriate directly engaged TA staff were importantin helping the PMU to carry out its activities, especially on expediting procurement, designs of spateirrigation structures, reporting, monitoring and evaluation.

The performance of the seven PIUs was also satisfactory since the project implementation at the local levelbegan. PIUs were substantially strengthened through the provision of training, vehicles, office buildings,storage facilities and equipment.

The CWMU and the regional offices of the GDFDC performed satisfactorily, although coordinationbetween GDFDC and the PMU remained unsatisfactory at the central level.

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Coordination with NWRA remained limited due to the fact that the project was originally intended toprovide support for the Water Sector within the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (later namedthe Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, MAI), while NWRA was placed under the direct authority of thePrime Minister upon its creation in 1995. The small assistance which was extended to NWRA didnevertheless provide satisfactory results such as the public awareness campaign. At the local level,cooperation between NWRA branches - where they exist - and the PIUs worked reasonably well,concerning mainly the exchange of groundwater monitoring data obtained by the latter. At the central level,it was difficult to reach satisfactory agreements concerning cooperation between NWVRA and the CWMJU,the details of which have not yet been resolved, thus delaying agreement on issues of coordination ofmonitoring of meteorological, hydrological and hydro-geological data collection and evaluation.

All legal covenants were complied with, except for those within the responsibility of NWRA, which wereonly partially complied. These are expected to be resolved through the Water Law which is expected to bere-submitted to Parliament, after reconciliation with the Draft Irrigation Law.

7. 7 Overall Borrower pertbrmance:Overall, the Borrower's performance was marginally satisfactory in terms of project preparation and earlyimplementation, becoming satisfactory during the later part of project implementation. The performance ofmost PIUs during the later phase of the project was highly satisfactory. The only area of deficiency hasbeen provision of counterpart funding in a timely manner, especially the recurrent budget required for theoperation of the PMU and its PIUs.

8. Lessons Learned

The Timing of Reforms in Water Resources Management Should Not Be Too Ambitious

The timing of reforms concerning water resources management was too ambitious. All legal covenantsunder the project were fulfilled, except those relating to water resources management, in particular thepassing of the Water Law, the licensing of drilling rigs, and the levying of fees on drilling rigs. Theleverage achievable under a single project of limited size to drive the policy agenda in such a crucial sectoras water policy should not be overestimated.

Project Design and Implementation Arrangements Should Be Kept Simple

The project involved a number of departnents and institutions, including RDAs, regional agriculturaloffices, CWMU, GDFDC, GDI and NWRA. At the time of project preparation all entities were under thesame Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. However, the RDAs operated andoperate under a semi-autonomous board and chairman. NWRA was created in 1995 as an independentgovernment authority under the Prime Minister.

The PMU, which was attached to MAWR (later transformed into MAI), was to be responsible for projectimplementation and management. However, as with PMUs for other projects, it had by itself only verylimited authority over the various departments and institutions involved. It could fulfilled its role only withstrong support from - and consensus within - the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee, however,met only rarely in the initial phase of the project. In later phases it did not succeed in achieving the level ofcoordination that would have been desirable. The PMU thus had to focus on implementation facilitation -including support to the Project's Steering Committee, requesting budgetary allocations for counterpartfunds from MOF and MOPD, procurement, and making disbursement requests - as well as monitoring and

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evaluation. Key decisions depended on agreement among stakeholders represented in the SteeringCommittee, including the Ministry of Finance for budgetary allocations, the Ministry of Planning and theabove-mentioned departments and institutions.

Despite coordination difficulties at the central level, the decentralized implementation mechanism of theproject, with a strong role being assumed by the various PlIJs and reasonably good coordination at the locallevel, has proven to be quite successful. Decentralized implementation should be further promoted duringthe follow-on project, with a strong reliance on RDAs, regional agricultural offices and regional branchesof NWRA. However, coordination among departments and institutions at the central level has been limited.It is probably not realistic in the Yemeni context to assume that a Steering Committee will gain consensusand exercise a strong authority over a nunber of various entities, especially if these entities are not underthe authority of one Minister. Therefore the number of departments and institutions involved should beminimized to the extent possible. If several of them are involved, clear and workable implementationarrangements have to be devised upfront, and active and sustained coordination among the concernedentities is crucial. Cooperation may be particularly promising at the local level and will be assisted by ahigher degree of autonomy for local branch offices of national agencies such as NWRA and Ministries.

A More Concerted Effort is Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding of Recurrent Costs

The Government was unable to meet its contribution towards the project costs, contributing to delays. Toensure smooth implementation, frequent and regular visits to PIUs by the experts and national staff arevery important. However, limited daily subsistence allowances and lack of fuel constrained the mobility ofexperts and national staff Low salaries also provide limited incentives to national staff to effectivelyperform their duties. Under the project, some of these problems were mitigated through the use of theIDA-funded FAO Trust Fund agreements. Supervision missions repeatedly raised the issue of insufficientcounterpart funding, but to no avail. However, as a matter of principle, recurrent costs should be fully andadequately funded by GOY. Adequate budgetary allocations to other sectoral Ministries apparently poseless of a problem than budgetary allocations to the MAI. Therefore, IDA should raise this issue in itsdialogue with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning in a concerted manner beyond the levelof individual projects.

Cost Sharing Targets and Upper Limits on Size of Farms Have to Be Realistic

The original project envisaged full cost recovery for irrigation equipment and prescribed a maximum sizeof benefiting farms. However, initially there were no takers with these two conditions. To promote thisactivity the farm size had to be modified and the farmer's contribution to cost-sharing had to be reduced.The rules applied during the last years of the project were pragmatic and allowed the project to beimplemented, without abandoning the principles of cost sharing and of spreading the benefits to a largenumber of farmers by setting an upper limit to the size of farm benefiting any one farmer under the project.

Basin Planning Should be Piloted

Investments in water and soil conservation could provide higher benefits, if they were spatially planned andtargeted at the basin level. Basin planning in Yemen is still in its infancy and there is little spatial planningand targeting of investments in water and land conservation. Given the very limited capacity ofimplementing institutions, it is not realistic to expect that basin planning can be introduced for a project ofthe scale of the completed project. However, basin planning should be introduced on a pilot basis in an areawith favorable conditions, such as limited size of basin, adequate capacity of relevant local publicinstitutions, and a demonstrated ability of local users to engage in collective action to mitigate local

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environmental problems. In order to ensure a high level of participation in these pilot areas, farmers may beallowed to contribute a more limited share towards the cost of investments in exchange for an agreement toabide by certain resource management rules determined by local communities with the assistance of theproject. The preparation of groundwater management activities in these pilot basins should rely on theexperience gained during the Sana'a Basin project, which follows a similar approach and is currently underpreparation.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrowver/limplementing agency:

The Government of Yemen agrees, with the reasons cited in the ICR, for the slow start up of theimplementation of the project activities, especially the reasons which were beyond the Government control.As for the reasons within the Government control, especially the project organizational set up and therelationship between the RDAs and the PMU and the PIUs, it is worth to mention that the LWCP had beenthe second project in Yemen to be implemented under NADP.

The problems associated with the organizational set up and the relationship between the RDAs and thePMU and the PIUs are mainly due to the fact that the project had adopted a different implementationmodality compared to the previous RDAs and projects modalities. The Project Steering Conmmittee and theproject management had exerted immense efforts to overcome the sensitive management issues raised bythe RDAs and their reluctance to accept the project's new organizational set up and implementationmodality. The success of this modality had encouraged IDA and MAI to adopt the same organizational setup and implementation arrangement in the follow-on projects financed by IDA.

The Goveurnent of Yemen also agrees that the project success in implementing the cost-sharingarrangement in the form of farmer's cash contribution towards the cost of piped conveyance systems andthe pressurized irrigation systems.

The cost-sharing arrangement in the form of labor contribution towards the cost of implementation of thepilot watershed management activities, as well as small spate improvement works, was also successfullyadopted. The labor contribution represented 20% to 25% of the cost of these works.

The cost-sharing arrangement, in the form of cash contribution or kind participation, which is successfullyadopted and implemented by the project, represented a remarkable departure from the previous traditionalimplementation modality which relies on the Government doing every thing to farmers, and acknowledgedfarmers as partners in the development process rather than just recipient of the development efforts.

It is worth to mention that the funds generated from farmer's cash contribution towards the cost of pipedconveyance system and pressurized irrigation units are currently used for procurement of PVC/GIs andpressurized irrigation system to continue the installation of the piped conveyance systems and thepressurized irrigation systems in farmer's fields. The project has also succeeded in creating high level ofawareness among farmers with respect to the importance of improving the irrigation efficiency andultimately conserving irrigation water. This is clearly reflected in the huge demand among enlightenedfarmers for these types of water savings technologies. The amount of water savings resulting from theinstallation of the piped conveyance systems and the pressurized irrigation systems in the area coveredunder this project is quite remarkable (about 23 mcm), and these activities proved to be quite consistentwith the country agricultural strategy and represent a nucleus for the implementation of the National WaterStrategy which had recently been prepared and passed by the Cabinet of Ministers.

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The Government strongly believes that the success of the cost-sharing arrangement represents a keyelement for the sustainability of these activities and that the Government will capitalize on the positivelessons learnt from the project experience in this respect.

The Government agrees that the costs of Technical Assistance and Training under this project are too highcompared to the actual project costs, however the exact reasons for the high cost of Technical Assistanceand Training are not explicitly stated in the ICR report. The Government also believes that the costs ofTechnical Assistance and Training in future projects should not exceed 8% to 10% of any project totalcost.

It is quite true, as indicated in the ICR, that the short training program implemented by the InternationalCenter for Sciences and System Management (ICSMS), Sana'a had not been successful. We admit that thiswas basically due to poor formulation of this program. The main shortcomings of this program are the veryshort periods of almost all the courses (3 days to 14 days), in addition to the large number of participants ineach course (12 to 40 participants) for a total of 25,420 participants in the whole program. Against thisnumber, it is worth to mention that, the total project national professional staff (PMU, PIUs, CWMU andGDFDC ) are around 100 m. This means that most of the beneficiaries from the training program werenot project staff and subsequently didn't contribute directly towards the implementation of the projectactivities.

While the training programs implemented through AMIDEAST consisted of long term Diploma and M.Sc.(1 to 2 years), the courses periods organized through FAO ranged from short courses (2 weeks) to longterm courses (more than two years).

We believe that the training program organized through FAO has mixed successes as many of the traineesunder this program didn't contribute directly towards the implementation of the project activities.

In a nut shell, even though the training program implemented under this project has positive impact on thecapacity building of the national staff in MAI, RDAs, CWMI, GDFDC, GDI and Offices of Agriculturein some Govemorates, yet its direct impact on the implementation of the project activities and achievementsmay be considered as meager.

The Government strongly believes that the role of the national experts in the implementation andachievements of the forestry activities had been quite vital and significant. The Government will capitalizeon the LWCP experience related to recruitment and utilization of the expertise and experience of thequalified national staff in future projects.

However, for future projects, the recruitment of the International Technical Assistance will be limited toscarce specializations only and for short periods. The International Experts role will be confined, to theextent possible, to providing technical guidance to the national experts to formulate their technicalprograms and work plans. The International Experts should also follow up the pace of implementation andresolve technical problems, if any, during their periodic short term visits. This will not only reduce the costof Technical Assistance but also contribute to capacity building and upgrading the skills of the nationalexperts in the country.

It is worth to mention that, despite the remarkable achievements of the physical targets in the forestrycomponent, yet the level of coordination between PMU and GDFDC had been below our expectations. Thelevel of coordination between PMU and NWRA had been modest but the implementation of activities under

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the mandate of NWRA were negatively affected by this modest level of coordination. We hope to overcomethis multiplicity in decision making between different institutions involved in one project in the future

The Government also agrees that its contribution to the local budget is lower than its original commitmentand that had negatively affected the pace of implementation of project activities in many PIUs andespecially groundwater monitoring activities in all PIUs. The Government is determined to resolve thismatter which become evident in many projects.

Part of the provisions under the trust fund contracts with FAO had been used to cover the DSA of theproject's directly engaged expatriates experts and their counterparts, as well as the petrol expenses for thefield visits to the PIUs. The field visits of these experts had been quite vital and turned out to have apositive impact on monitoring the implementation of the field activities and solving a lot of the technicalproblems. However, due to the fact that frequent shortage and unavailability of local budget to cover theseexpenses can't be avoided sometimes, it would be quite important to make some provisions under theTechnical Assistance component to cater for the DSA of the Intemational Experts and the needed petrolexpenses for the field visits.

The Government strongly believes that activities imnplemented under this project are overwhelmingly ofenvironmental nature and accordingly most of the benefits generated are long term environmental benefits,which were not quantified and hence not included in the calculations of the NPV and the IRR. We alsoaccept the interpretations and justifications given in the ICR for the low NPV and IRR obtained under thisproject compared to NPV and IRR calculated for the project at appraisal.

(b) Cofinanciers:None

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):None

10. Additional Information

Financial Management and audits of the project have been satisfactory. The project had an adequatefinancial management system in place. The govermment auditors have submitted adequate audits, althoughin some cases with substantial delays.

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Key Monitoring Indicators Unit Appraisal Revised* Actual (up Remarks(as Per SAR 1992) Targets Targets As to (*The targets had to be reduced on

(up to per 31-12-200 account of reduction in project cost30-6-1999) Aug 95/Jul 0) from US$47.6 million to USS30.12

97 million)Missions

A: IRRIGATION

A.l: Institutional ProgressNo. 10 10 10 7 up to May 1996 and 3 in 1999.

(I) SMS (Irrigation Agronomy) appointed

(2) Training Completed

(i) Foreign (through FAO) No.) 20 7 6(a) MSc No.) (assumed) 10(b) One Year Diploma No. 14 160 100(c) Short term Training/Study Tours

(ii)ln-Country (through AMIDEAST &ICSMS(a)MSc No. 10 ) L.S.(b) One Year Diploma No. - ) provision of 19(c) Short term Training to Extension rn/m 400) money 273

and other staffA.2: Technical Assistance Rendered

(1) PMU(a) Expat. S/m 72 53 135 Direct(b) UNVs S/m) 48 42 -

(c) Local Contracts S/m) 36 58 Direct(d) Audit S/m - - 73 Direct(e) Secretarial S/m 63 Direct

(2) PIUs (Irrigation Engineers)(a) Expat. S/m - )- 131 Direct(b) UNVs S/m - ) 120 43 FAO(c) Local Contracts S/m - ) (4 mos) 31 Direct

(3) Start up activities and review ofOrganizational Structure

(a) Expat. Sm 12 12 FAO

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(4) G.D. of Irrigation(a) Expat. (Dams Engineer) S/m 12 33 Provided in MTR-Direct(b) LUNV/Local Contracts S/m 3 - -

(5) CWMU (WRS/Agr.)(a) CTA S/m 36 30 29 FAO(b) Expat. S/m 74 107 105 FAO 39, Direct 66(c) UNVs S/m 48 48 -(d) Local Contracts S/m - - 44 Direct(e) Other Short term S/m 6 14 Direct

(6) Pilot Activities relating to use ofSaline Water and re-use of WasteWater

(a) Expat. (2 nos.) S/m 16 10 2 FAO

(7) Studies (Re-organization of WRS, Nos. 3 3 3Water Strategy Study, Program forRegulating and Controlling activities ofDrilling Rigs) Completed

(8) Field Implementation Units Established Nos. 7 7 7

A.3: Physical Progress

(I) Monitoring Boreholes installed Nos. 25 25 15 The target of 25 boreholes wasreduced in consultation with NWRA.No boreholes could be drilled in Taizarea due to objection raised by thelocal farmers.

(2) Monitoring Stations established:(a) Weather Nos. Not defined Not defined 68 Senior Hydrology Expert

recommended 13 Meteorologicaland 55 Rainfall Monitoring Station.s

(b) Spate Nos. Not defined Not defined 41 Senior Hydrology Expertrecommended 33 automatic wadiflow, 5 manual and 3 cable-waystations.

(c) Ground Water Nos. 220 220 239 (60*) The 239 nos. exclude the wellsmonitored by NWRA in Taiz andAbyan Govemorates and by TDA inTihama. These 239 wells areselected for quarterly monitoring.* Salinity also measured at 60 wells

(3) Piped Conveyance System Installed Ha 14,350 8,500 10,600

(4) Pilot Irrigation Systems Nos. 220 165 66 As revised during MTR to 66 nos.(Pressurized Irrigation Systems) (I ha each)

Installed(5) Spate Improvement works:

(a) Spate Diversion works (SDWs) Nos. 15 15 7* *In the SAR 1992, small size SDWswere envisaged to be constructed.However, as a result of widening ofwadis due to successive floods, large

(b) Bank Protection Works (BPWs) size SDWs had to be taken up.(c) Canal Control Structures (CCSs) Nos. 165 165 277

Nos. 43 43 26 10 large size structures in Shabwahad to be in place of the largernumber of small size envisaged in

(d) Spate Breaker Re-charge Weir the SAR 1992.(SBRW) Nos. 2 2

(e) Bana Hssan diversion ChannelNos. I II

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(6) Pilot Studies:(a) Use of Saline Water for Nos. 1 1 I Equipment for 68 sites ( 13

Irrigation meteorological and 55 rainfallgauging sites) procured. These areproposed to be transferred toNWRA for monitoring afterinstallation of equipment.

(b) Re-use of Waste Water Nos. I I Nil Equipment for 33 Automatic, 5manual and 3 cable ways procuredand monitoring of observations is tostart now after installation ofequipment.

A.4: Operating Performance

(I) Sites Monitored(a) Weather Nos. Not defined Not defined 68

(b) Spate Nos. Not defrned Not defined 33

(2) Observations Collected:(a) Weather Nos. Not defined Not defined Nil Procurement of equipment and their

installation (which has recently beencompleted) was delayed

(b) Spate Nos. Not defined Not defined Nil All existing wadi flow sites mostlydamaged during 1994 civil strife.Procurement of equipment and theirinstallation (which has recently beencompleted) was delayed2230 up toJune 1998 and 239 afterwards,

(c) Groundwater Nos. Not defined Not defined 2230 up 2230 wells (owned by farmers) wereto June monitored up to June 1998 and their1998 and monitored data is computerized,239 after- After June 1998, the number ofwards wells to be monitored was reduced

to 239due to constraint of localbudget.

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(3) Categorization of Aquifers Nos. Not defined Not defined 19 Includes 4 alluvial aquifers,

(4) Basin Plans Initiated Nos. Not defined Not defined Nil Activity transferred to NWRA.

(5) Trenching Private Sector Ha Not defined Not defined 8,000

(6) Share of Private Trenching in total % Not defined Not defined 75(7) Piped Conveyance System:

(a) Pre-project Irrigated Area ha 12,500 Not defined 9,200(estimated)

(bh Area Irrigated after installation ha 14,350 8,500 10,600 This is on account of reduction inthe target area from 14,350 ha asper SAR 1992 to 10,600 haactually achieved.

(S) Pilot Systems Operating Nos. 220 165 66 As revised during MTR.

(9) Incremental Spate Cropping Hla 2,400 2,400 1,175 This excludes incremental spate areaunder Ali Salim SDW (Shabwa) andSBRW on wadi Dowmarine designedand supervised by LWCP butimplemented under EFRP(Cr. 2932).

(10) Saving of water due to PipedConveyance System and its economic cost: From wells irrigating 10,600 ha.

(a) Groundwater pumped annuallv Mm3 Not defined Not defined 113from the target area

(b) Annual net saving of water due to Mm3 Not defined Not defined 15piped conveyance system

B. FORESTRY

B.A: Institutional progress

(I) Agricultural Graduates Appointed Nos. 18 Not defined 18

(2) Training Completed

(i) Foreign (through FAO)(a) MSc Nos. 15 Not defined 9(b) One Year Diploma Nos. 9 Not defined 4(c) Two Year Diploma (Latakia) Nos. 15 Not defined 15(d) Short-term Training/Study tours Nos. 4 (WID) Not defined 59

(ii) In-Country (Through AMIDEAST/ICSMS) Nos. 6 L.S. provision 5(a) MSc Nos. - of amount Nil(b) One Year Diploma m/m 447 300(c) Short-term Training to Extensionand other Staff

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B.2: Technical assistance Rendered

(i) Forestry Advisor S/m 48(ii) Woodland Management

- Expat. S/m 36 30 36 FAO-UNVlLocal S/m 36 30 34 FAO

(iii) Watershed Management-Expat. S/m 29 36 46 FAO-UNV/Local S/m 48 30 24 FAO

(iv) Terrace Stabilization-Expat. S/m 3 - -(v) Sand Fixation -Expat. S/m 6 - -

-UNV/Local S/m - 4 44 Direct (National Consultants)(vi) M & E -UN V/Local S/m 60 -(vii) Wild Life Expert -Expat. S/m 4 - -(viii) WID -Expat. S/m 4 4 3 FAO 2 and IDA I

-UNV/Local S/m - 30 14 FAO(ix) Soil Conservation -UNV/Local S/m 120 144 FAO (National Consultants)(x) Survey -UNV/Local S/m - 30 -

B.3: Physical progress(1) Fore-dune Constructed (4 nos.) M 800 800 3,600 2,600 m in Abyan and 1,000 m in

Shabwa.

(2) Shelterbelts constructed along Ha 35 35 146 kms Lahej, Abyan, Shabwa and Taiz.WadiKabir

(3) Trees Planted Kms of 10 10 57 57 krns. In Lahej, Abyan androads Shabwa. In addition, 4,800 seedlings

distributed in Shabwa and 7,500 inAbyan.

(4) Stone Dams and Afforestation Ha 200 200 20 Check dams to protect/reclaim 20ha in Al-Dhala'a constructed. In

_ addition, I 0,000 seedlings planted.

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(5) New Nurseries Established Nos. 2 2 2 At-Masara (Hajja) and MadinaAl-Shark (Dhamar) each with acapacity of 125,000 seedlings peryear established.

(6) Inland and Coastal Sand Dune Fixation Ha 40 40 37 32 ha in Abyan and 5 ha in Lahej.

(7) Canal bank and Flood Protection Kms. 20 20 12.6 Lahej, Abyan and Shabwa.

(8) Aerial Photography completed for Km2 Not defined Not defined Nil Only ground survey was done.Terrace Rehabilitation

(9) Area of Woodland Ma ed Km2 Not defined Not defined Nil Existing maps analyzed.

B.4: Operating Performance

(I) Seedlings Produced Million 1.06 1.06 0.5 (1999) A capacity of 0.80 million seedlings0.23 (1998) per year was created by strengthening0.18 (1997) 21 existing nurseries (capacity0.10 (1996) 507,450 seedlings annually),

rehabilitating 4 nurseries in Lahej,Abyan, Shabwa and Al-Dhala'a(capacity 35,000 seedlings) andestablishing 2 new nurseries inAl-Masara (Hajja) and MadinatAl-Shark (Dhamar) with a totalcapacity of 250,000 seedlings peryear.

(2) Seedlings Planted Million Not defined Not defined 0.95 (up to1999)

(3) Seedlings Destroyed Million Not defined Not defuned 0.05 About 5%.

(4) Planted Trees Surviving Nos. Not defined Not defined 700,000 75-89%.

(5) Cost pet Seedling YR Not defined Not defined 25-35 In Sana'a, the cost is around YR 25per seedling, while in Abyan it is YR35 per seedling.

(6) Reduction in Sand Movement % Not defined Not defined 60-70% Abyan Site.

(7) Management Plans

(a) Woodland Management Plans Nos. Not defined Not defined 2 (i) to set up a National Park in JebelBura'a; and (ii) to protect andrehabilitate Jebel Iraf Woodland.

(b) Watershed Management Plans Nos. 2 2 2 An integrated participatory approachto watershed management withinWadi Shares and upper catchment ofWadi Rima was developed andrepresentative sites selected forimplementation on a pilot basiscovering activities like vetiver hedgeson steep eroded slopes, afforestation,gully protection, river bankprotection, water harvesting, terracerehabilitation and agro-forestry.

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(c) Terrace Rehabilitation Plans Nos. Not deinfed Not defined I (25Ha) 9 pilot sites were selected inAl-Mahaweet- Shibam (2 sites),Al-Tawila (2 sites), Roujoum(2 sites) for restoration of terraceand repair of terrace walls, erosioncontrol and soil protection withfarmers' participation.

(9) Pilot Sites Implemented:(a) Woodland Management Nos. Not defined Not defined I Priority was accorded to Jebel Iraf

(Al-Hissen 56 ha) where a villagenursery was established, approachroad to Jebel Iraf was improved,reservoir constructed, provision ofirrigation equipment made in 1.0 ha,plantation done in 3 ha with fodderspecies, fruit trees and multi-purposeplantation, 150 gas cylinders weredistributed against use of wood forcooking. In Taiz and Ibb area theproject planted, in more tha 12 ha,trees for agro-forestry, shelter-belts,and public tree planting with averagesurvival rate of over 75%.

(b) Watershed Management Nos. Not defined Not defined 43 27 sites on Wadi Shares and 16 sitedon Wadi Rima were implementedwith farmers' participation. WadiBank Protection works wereundertaken, and retaining walls andspurs constructed for 2,300 mbenefiting 176 families andpreventing wadi banks erosion offertile coffee plantation andreclaimed new arable lands. 182loose-stone check dams wereconstructed resulting in sedimentdeposit behind these reclaiming newarable lands. A pilot water harvestingstructure benefiting 100 families wasconstructed in Wadi Rima catchment.

(c) Terrace Rehabilitation Nos. Not defined Not defined 9 (25 ha) Pilot Terrace Rehabilitation workswere implemented by farmers, onself-help operation basis withproject support in terms of materialand machinery on 9 sites benefiting50 families. The activities includeconstruction of 4 reservoirs(120 m3), restoration ofterracewalls, construction of check damsand diversion canals to protectcultivated terraces, improvementof access roads, and planting of3,500 forest trees and 500 fruit trees-on degraded terraces.

(d) Sand Dune Stabilization ha Not defined Not defined 37 Inland and coastal sand dunescovering 32 ha in Abyan and 5 ha inLahej were fixed using biologicalfixation and mechanical fixation withmicro-wind breaks of palm fronds anddry plant material.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Pro ect Cost by Component (in US$ million e uivalent)

Institutional Strengthening: Water Resources 5.61 8.36 149Institutional Strengthening: Forestry 4.12 3.59 87Spate Irrigation 6.01 3.75 62Groundwater Irrigation 18.81 7.41 39Agricultural Development 1.53 1.63 107Implementation Units 4.52 2.23 49Land Conservation / Afforestation 4.21 1.74 41Watershed Management 2.83 1.41 50

Total Baseline Cost 47.64 30.12

Total Project Costs 47.64 30.12

Total Financing Required 47.64 30.12

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

1. Works 0.00 3.72 6.27 0.00 9.99(0.00) (2.37) (0.00) (0.00) (2.37)

2. Goods 24.77 0.00 1.10 0.00 25.87(20.40) (0.00) (1.01) (0.00) (21.41)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 9.27 0.00 9.27(0.00) (0.00) (9.02) (0.00) (9.02)

4. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 2.50(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 24.77 3.72 16.64 2.50 47.63(20.40) (2.37) (10.03) (0.00) (32.80)

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICa Nr N.S.F Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 3.18 0.61 0.00 3.79(0.00) (2.96) (0.54) (0.00) (3.50)

2. Goods 8.41 7.40 0.87 0.00 16.68(8.41) (7.33) (0.84) (0.00) (16.58)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 9.14 0.00 9.14(0.00) (0.00) (8.68) (0.00) (8.68)

4. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 8.41 10.58 11.12 0.00 30.11(8.41) (10.29) (10.06) (0.00) (28.76)

" Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.

I Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contractedstaff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to(i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

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Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits

Overview of Assumptions

Economic Analysis

The economic analysis was calculated in Yemeni Rials in 1997 prices, with current prices deflated to 1997prices using the Consumer Price Index as a proxy for the GDP deflator. No shadow pricing for foreignexchange was performed, since the official exchange rate broadly reflected the equilibrium exchange rateduring the period of analysis. Labor was shadow priced at 50% of the market wage rate, reflecting theopportunity cost of labor since unemployment is widespread in rural areas. Shadow prices for agriculturalinputs and outputs were applied using the values provided in the World Bank's 1997 Agricultural SectorReview.

The analysis includes only the costs and benefits that can be attributed to groundwater irrigationdevelopment, spate irrigation, and watershed management, including overhead costs for equipment, vehiclesand some technical assistance provided specifically for the support of on-farm activities. The costs andbenefits of forestry, technical assistance for the PMIU, training and support for water resourcesmanagement are excluded, because (i) the benefits of the forestry component are mainly of anenvironmental nature and should not be quantified only in economic terms, and (ii) technical assistance,training and support for water resources management are part of institutional strengthening and have abroader, non-quantifiable impact beyond the farrm-level activities supported under the project. Theinvestment costs included in the analysis (US$ 20.4 million) account for 68 % of total investment costs(US$ 30.1 million). If all project costs are included, as it was done for the SAR, the NPV falls to US$ -2.0million and the ERR to 10 %.

The benefits from watershed management do not include externalities, but only benefits that accrue to thelandowners themselves. These benefits have been assessed through the estimated increase in land value.Any future benefits from improved production are already included in the increased land values and arethus not shown during later years, when these benefits are shown as zero.

Cost-Benefit Stream for LWCP (excluding forestry as well as some TA and training)

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Costs | Benefits | NetInvestment Incremental Total from Piped from Spate from Total Benefits

Year Operating Conveyance Works and WatershedSystem Bank Protection Management

YR mill. YR mill. YR mill. YR mill. YR mill. YR mill. YR mill. YR mill.1993 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01994 14.6 15.4 30.0 0.0 -1.6 0.0 -1.6 -31. 61995 183.9 7.3 191.3 0.0 14.7 0.0 14.7 -176:51996 769.1 32.2 801.3 0.1 -6.4 0.0 -6.3 -807.61997 152.6 65.7 218.3 16.2 -14.5 61.1 62.9 -155.41998 424.2 40.2 464.4 100.8 -55.2 56.0 101.7 -362.71999 379.0 31.7 410.6 347.1 -117.2 32.6 262.5 -148.12000 375.2 41.3 416.5 423.4 -27.5 14.2 410.1 -6.42001 35.8 10.0 45.8 528.7 26.1 0.0 554.9 509.12002 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 77.1 0.0 606.3 606.32003 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42004 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42005 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42006 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42007 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42008 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42009 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42010 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42011 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 20.2 0.0 549.4 549.42012 0.0 0.0 0.0 529.2 78.3 0.0 607.6 607.6

NPV YR m 378.7NPV US$ m 3.2ERR 16.3%

Financial Analysis

In accordance with ecological variations across project areas, seven farm models are used for the financialanalysis of the groundwater component, representing the areas covered by each PIU: Northern Highlands,Tihama, Dhamar (Central Highlands), Taiz, Lahej, Abyan, and Shabwa. The without project scenarioreflects current practice on farms not supported under the project. The with project scenario is based onon-site monitoring in the seven PIUs. In the Highlands (PIUs Northern, Dhamar, Taiz and Shabwa) itassumes a reduction in groundwater pumping, while in the Coastal Plains (PIUs Tihama, Lahej and Abyan)it assumes an increase in the irrigated area. In all areas, the model assumes a slight change in the croppingpattern towards higher-value crops, slightly higher yields, a somewhat higher cropping intensity, a shiftfrom manure to mineral fertilizer for some crops, and a higher labor input. Many of these changes are dueto increased efforts by the farmers to increase the value of their production in order to recoup theinvestment costs for the irrigation equipment as quickly as possible.

A more detailed overview of assumptions and the spreadsheets have been filed electronically in theMNSRE document library.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implemcntation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation10/89 5 Irrigation Engineer, Ag.

Economists (2), ForestrySpecialists, Agronomist

06/89 1 Forestry Specialist01/90 4 Ag. Economist, Agronomist,

Irrigation Engineer, FinancialAnalyst

10/90 1 Sr. Irrigation Engineer06/90 4 Ag. Economist, Irrigation

Engineer, Agronomist, FinancialAnalyst

Appraisal/Negotiation05/91 6 Irrigation Engineers (2), Ag.

Economist, ForestrySpecialist, Agronomist,Economist

08/91 1 Water Resource Specialist09/91 2 Ag. Economist, Irrigation

Engineer10/91 1 Forestry Specialist03/92 1 Ag. Economist

Supervision07/92 2 Irrigation Engineer, Sr. Ag. HS HS

Economist02/93 1 Sr. Ag. Economist S S10/93 3 Sr. Agronomist, Sr. Irrigation S S

Engineer, Sr. Ag. Economist04/94 2 Prin. Irrigation Engineer, Sr. Ag. S S

Economist10/94 3 Sr. Agriculturist, Sr. Irrigation S S

Engineer, Sr. Ag. Economist08/95 1 Prin. Irrigation Engineer U S04/96 2 Prin. Irrigation Engineer, Sr. S S

Irrigation Engineer10/96 3 Sr. Agriculturist, Sr. Irrigation S S

Engineer, Agriculturist07/97 4 Sr. Agriculturist, Sr. Economist, S S

Sr. Irrigation Engineer,Agriculturist

02/98 4 Sr. Agriculturist, Sr. Economist, S SSr. Agriculturist, Agriculturist

10/98 5 Prin. Irrigation Engineers (2), Sr. S SOperations Officer, Sr.Economist, Ag. Economist

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03/99 2 Prin. Irrigation Engineer, Sr. S SOperations Officer

08/99 4 Prin. Irrigation Engineer, S SNatural Resource Specialist,Projects Specialist

04/2000 2 Prin. Irrigation Engineer, Sr. S SOperations Officer

10/2000 2 Lead Irrigation Engineer, Sr. S SOperations Officer

ICR2/2001 4 Irrigation Engineer, Sr. S S

Operations Officer,Economist, Sr. IrrigationEngineer

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/;Latest Estimate

No. Staff weeks USS ('000)Identification/Preparation 87.20 237.40Appraisal/Negotiation 52.70 165.10Supervision 150.33 443.96ICR 14.73 64.07Total 304.96 910.53

- 29 -

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

El Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NAEl Sector Policies O H *SUOM O N O NAEl Physical O H * SU OM O N O NAO Financial O H *SUOM O N O NA3 Institutional Development 0 H O SU* M 0 N 0 NAEl Environmental O H *SUOM ON O NA

SocialO Poverty Reduction O H OSU*M O N O NAEl Gender O H OSUOM * N O NAEl Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA

El Private sector development 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NAEl Public sector management 0 H O SU* M 0 N 0 NAEl Other (Please specify) 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

El Lending OHS*S OU OtfruEl Supervision OHS OS OU OHUOf Overall OHS *S Q U O HU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating

LI Preparation OHS *s O U Q HULi Government implementation performance 0 HS O S * U 0 HUEl Implementation agency performance OHS OS 0 U O HUEl Overall OHS *S 0 U Q HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

The documents in each section are listed in chronological order. Selected key documents are available in anelectronic form in the MNSRE electronic document library - a Lotus Notes database - and are marked withan asterisk (*).

WATER RESOURCES AND IRRIGATION

1. "Appraisal of Groundwater Resources in the Amran Region, Sana'a Govemorate". M.T. Jones,Geohydrology Consultant, July 1996. TR No. 1.

2. "Appraisal of Groundwater Resources in the Sa'adah Plain, Sa'adah Govemorate." M.T. Jones,Geohydrology Consultant, July 96. TR No. 2.

3. "Technical Assistance to the LWCP, Water Resources/Irrigation Component Preparatory Phase -Project Findings and Recommendations." Terninal Report. TR No. 3.

4. Hydrometeorological Network of Yemen: Evaluation and Proposal for Optimized Network." TinMaung, Hydrology Consultant, September 1996. TR No. 4.

5. "Cost Recovery for Investment in Groundwater Improved Irrigation Conveyance System." NagibAbdul Lateef, Legal Consultant, October 1996.

6. "Public Awareness Campaign." Mahmoud Saleh Agamia, Communication Consultant, December1996. TR No. 5.

7.* "Assistance to the CWMU in Groundwater Monitoring and Aquifer Simulation Modeling." PaoloRomano, Geohydrology Consultant, January 1997. TR No. 6. (covers the Abyan Delta, the Sana'aBasin, the Axmran region, and the Sa'adah region).

8. "Pilot Studies on the Use of Saline Groundwater." Ghulam Haider, Salinity Consultant, March1997. TR No. 7.

9. "Development of Groundwater Reclamation and Reuse Practices for Urban Areas of Yemen. PartA." Andreas N. Angelakis, Wastewater Reuse Consultant, July 1997. TR No. 8.

10. * "Assistance to the CWMU in Groundwater Monitoring and Aquifer Simulation Modeling." PaoloRomano, Geohydrology Consultant, August 1997. TR No. 9. (covers the Sa'adah plain, the Dhamargovemorate, and the Tuban Delta).

11. Development of Wastewater Reclamation and Reuse Practices for Urban Areas of Yemen. Part B."A. N. Angelakis, Wastewater Reuse Consultant. TR No. 10.

12.* "Assistance to the CWMU in Groundwater Monitoring and Aquifer Simulation Modeling." P.Romano, Geohydrology Consultant, December 1997. TR No. 11. (covers the Shabwa Govemorate).

13. "Public Awareness Campaign." M. Uvais Ahmed, Public Awareness Consultant, December 1997.

14. "Pilot Studies on the Use of Saline Water." B.K. Garg, Salinity Consultant, April 1998. TRNo.

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15. Research Trial on Effect of Irrigation Frequency and Leaching Fraction on Salinity Control.Season 98-99. Mekki A. Omar et al.

16. Report on Study of Saline Water Use in Irrigation and Achieved Results in Tihama Plain. AdelAl-Khirbash, National Consultant.

17. Proceedings of the Workshop on Water Resources Management in Yemen with emphasis on:Wastewater Treatment, Reclamation and Reuse. 16-18 December 1997. A.N. Angelakis and S.Thirugnanasambanthar (editors.) September 1998.

18. "Inception Report." M. Bazza, Irrigation Agronomist. January 1999.

19.* Yemen hydro-meteorological network: Selection of hydro-meteorological stations site. M. Tayaa,Hydrology Consultant. October 1999.

20. "Field Mission Reports." M. Bazza, Irrigation Agronomist. Fifteen reports.

21. * Technical and Economic aspects of water savings. M. Bazza, Irrigation Agronomist. April 2000.Revised June 2000 and August 2000.

22. Water Savings Data. M. Bazza, Irrigation Agronomist. September 2000.

23.* Project Terminal Report. M. Bazza. October 2000.

Papers Prepared by the Project for the Workshop on 'Waste Water'

1. Scope of the Workshop2. Potential for Wastewater Reclamation and Reuse in Yemen3. Water Resources Degradation and the Risk of Extensive Desertification in Yemen4. Groundwater Over-Exploitation and Monitoring5. Natural Treatment Systems of Municipal Wastewaters: Design and Operation Principles6. Wastewater Reclamation and Reuse in the Mediterranean Basin7. Decentralized Systems for Wastewater Management with Emphasis to Aquatic Treatment Systems8. Groundwater Recharge with Reclaimed Wastewater Effluents

Papers Prepared by the Project for the Workshop on 'Water Savings'

1. Working Document for the Workshop on the Assessment of Water Savings resulting from theIrrigation Technology introduced by the LWCP.

2. Report of the Workshop on the Assessment of Water Savings resulting from the IrrigationTechnology introduced by the LWCP.

3. Questionnaires to be used by PIUs for assessing the Water Savings. In Arabic.

4. Recommendations of the Workshop on the Assessment of Water Savings resulting from theIrrigation Technology introduced by the LWCP. In Arabic.

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Papers Prepared by the Project for the Workshop on 'Achievements of the L WCP'

1. General about the Project2. Water Monitoring3. Agro- and Hydro-Meteorological Stations4. Irrigation Technology5. Private Sector in Irrigation6. Institutional Development and Capacity Building7. Experience and Viewpoint of the PIUs8. Achievements in Forestry

FORESTRY

1. * FAO: Technical Assistance to Land and Water Conservation Project (Forestry Component), Yemen,Terminal Report, Rome 2000.2. Methodology of Participatory Watershed Management. H. Hadi. (In English).3. Methodology and Sites Selection for Woodland Management. M. Houmymid.4. Vegetation Survey of Wadi Shares Watershed. A. Al Khuleidi. (In English).5. Vegetation Survey of Wadi Rima'a Watershed. A. Al-Khuleidi. (In English).6. Socio-Economic Study of the Selected Sites for Terrace Rehabilitation in Al Mahweet Area. A. AlHaimi. (In English).7. Socio-Economic Study of Wadi Shares Watershed. A. Al Hakimi. (In English and Arabic).8. Socio-Economic Study of Wadi Rima'a Watershed. H. Al Oudi. (In English and Arabic).9. Socio-Economic Study of the Woodland of Jebel Iraf A. Al Hakimi. (In English and Arabic).10. Socio-Economic Study of the Zaida Acacia Woodland. A. Al Hakimi. (In English and Arabic).11. Program of Work of Sand Dune Stabilization in Abyan, Lahej and Shabwa. M. Bazar'a. (In English).12. Work Plan of the Terrace Rehabilitation in Al Mahweet Area. M. Houmymid. (In English).13. Methodology for Study of Zyziphus Spina Christii as an Agroforestry Tree.14. Woodland Management Plan for Jabel Iraf. M. Hourmymid. (In English).15. Woodland Management Plan for Jebel Bura'a. M. Houmymid. (In English and Arabic).16. Watershed Management Plan for Wadi Shares. H. Hadri. (In English).17. Strategy of Desertification Controlling the Near East. (In English and Arabic).18. A Contribution to the Formulation of the Natural Resources Management Strategy. H. Hadri. (InEnglish).19. A Draft Report on the Assessment of the Household Energy Strategy. H. Hadri et al. (In English).20. Torrent Control in Wadi Shares and Wadi Rima'a. I.G. Harmond. (In English).21. A Strategy for Introducing Gender Concems into the Forestry Component. S. Saidi. (In English andArabic).22. Understanding of Desertification in the Republic of Yemen: Its Causes and Socio-Economic Aspect.M. Houmymid. (In English and Arabic).23. Ecology, Utilization and Silviculture of Zyziphus Spina Christii. (In Arabic).24. Technical Note of Tages Minuta Sp. (In Arabic).25. Technical Note of Adansonia Digitata. (In Arabic).26. Technical Paper on Energy Strategy of the GDFDC. (In English and Arabic).27. Several Reports (Inception report, progress reports, mid-term review reports, field visit reports, annualand monthly work plans and end-of-assignment reports).28. Several Data Collection forms (terrace rehabilitation, forest inventory, agroforestry study, study formfor livestock, study form for wildlife, study form for bee-keeping, study form for water harvesting, study

- 34 -

form for tree planting, etc.)29. Three Cooperation Agreement Types: Establishment of Village Nurseries, Forest Protection andManagement, Terrace rehabilitation.30. Regeneration and Seed Germination of Juniperus Procera, with Reference to Jebel Iraf Forest.31. Causes of the Die Back Phenomena of the Juniperus Procera.32. Brief courses on woodland management, nursery techniques, tree planting, forestation's, sand dunestabilization, watershed management, aerial photograph interpretation and Rapid Rural Appraisal.33. Drawing of Structure and Specification for Wadi Rima'a. Khaled Al Attas. (In English).34. Drawing of Structure and Specification for Wadi Shares. Khaled Al Attas. (In English).35. Watershed Management Plan of Wadi Rima'a. A. Al Khuleidi. (In English).36. End-of Assignment Report. Arachilalage Baminiwate. (In English).37. Consultative meeting with the rural leaders on terrace degradation in Al Mahweet area. (In English andArabic).38. Assessment of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification. Ahmed Hayel et al. (In English andArabic).39. Booklet of the Land and Water Conservation Project (Forestry Component). H. Hadri. (In English).40. Guidelines of Forestation Techniques for Women. Raja Al Aghbari. (In English).41. Draft of the Study of Forest Nursery Seedling Costs. Abdelassalam Hayel. (In Arabic).42. Scenario and Scientific Material of Two Television Films on Desertification and WatershedManagement. Abdul Salam Hayel. (In Arabic.)

- 35 -

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