WORKING TITLE OF A BOOK IN PROGRESS: HEBREWS’ PARADIGM FOR FAITH: THE STOIC PROCESS

OF THE ACQUISITION OF VIRTUE AS SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDG E

Ira J. Jolivet, Jr. Pepperdine University ijolivet@pepperdine.edu

Introduction

A consensus seems to have emerged around James Thompson’s seminal thesis regarding

the nature of faith in Hebrews: “For both Philo and Hebrews, pi/stij involves living as a

stranger on earth and ‘seeing’ a better reality. Thus both writers interpret pi/stij within the

assumptions of Platonic dualism. In fact, pi/stij in Philo and Hebrews is hardly distinguishable

from knowledge in the Platonic tradition.”1 In a very recent work Thompson indicates that his

position remains basically unchanged: “Both the author and Philo share with Middle Platonists a

focus on the ontological distinction between the transcendent and the phenomenal world. For

Middle Platonists, as for Hebrews, the individual ‘sees the invisible’ (Heb 11:1, 27; Philo,

Unchangeable 3; Posterity 15) but lives on earth as a stranger (Philo, Cherubim 120-21; Dreams

1.46). The individual searches for and finds stability only through access to the transcendent

world.”2

Harold Attridge perhaps reflects the degree of consensus that Thompson’s thesis has

achieved when in his significant commentary on Hebrews he writes: “Philo’s remarks on faith,

especially the faith of Abraham, display several significant affinities with Hebrews. For both,

faith is closely associated with hope and is a response to God’s promise. At the same time, faith

1 James W. Thompson, The Beginnings of Christian Philosophy: The Epistle to the Hebrews (Washington D. C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1982) ,13. 2 James W. Thompson, Hebrews (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 24.

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associates the believer with the unseen yet assuredly true realm of God.”3 Attridge implicitly

indicates that he concurs that faith in Hebrews is basically equivalent to knowledge in a Platonic

sense in his comments on Hebrews’ statement in 11:1 that “faith is the assurance of things hoped

for, the conviction of things unseen”: “The programmatic function of the second clause is even

more strongly marked, since the author continually highlights instances where individuals

perceived through faith a reality not apparent to the senses.”4 Elsewhere Attridge explicitly

references Thompson in acknowledging the “debt of Hebrews to contemporary middle

Platonism.”5

While scholarly agreement is in most cases a fairly good indication that some progress

has been made in resolving a difficult issue, equating faith in Hebrews with knowledge in a

Platonic sense has actually precluded rather than advanced an understanding of the role of faith

in the author’s argument and has obscured rather than illumined the finer nuances of that

argument. Ironically, Platonic dualism has also led to a serious underestimation of Hebrews’

philosophical expertise, an example of which may be seen in Attridge’s comments on Hebrews’

treatment of Melchizedek in chapter 7: “The chapter is a particularly clear case where the author,

despite his very Jewish exegetical techniques, deploys certain metaphysical categories, indicating

his at least superficial rhetorician’s acquaintance with contemporary philosophy.”6

Thompson likewise implicitly underestimates Hebrews’ philosophical expertise when he

states: “He is among many early Jewish and Christian writers who struggled to describe their

faith in the language of philosophy. His Christian confession that ‘God has spoken to us in these

last days’ through a crucified savior is irreconcilable with Platonism. Since his task is to be not a

3 Harold Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews (ed. Helmut Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 312. 4 Ibid., 308. 5 Ibid., 26. 6 Ibid.

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systematic theologian but a pastor encouraging his audience to hold fast to their confession, he

uses Platonic categories in his claim that, although believers do not ‘see’ the world in subjection,

faithful people see the invisible.”7 Platonic thought merely provides the language to describe the

Christian faith. More explicitly, Thompson goes on to state: “The Platonic distinction between

the transcendent/eternal and the earthly/mortal could be easily incorporated into the biblical faith

to provide the vocabulary for instructing believers that they should place their trust not in visible

realities but in that which is beyond their perception. Christians have access to this world, which

is invisible, unshakable, untouchable, and not of this creation.”8

The major premise of this analysis is that the nature of pi/stij and the coherence of its

role in the argument of Hebrews can only be properly understood in light of insights from the

Stoics’ conception of the process by which humans access e)pisth/mh, or, as the term is usually

rendered in English, scientific knowledge, which begins with sensory perception and ends with

virtue, the only te/loj that equates to happiness for humans as rational creatures. Eleven

observations support this premise. The first of these observations is not derived from the text and

is basically historical in nature; the other ten are essentially textual and philosophical, since they

arise from the detection of previously overlooked affinities between scientific knowledge and a

number of aspects of the argument involving faith in Hebrews.

The historical observation emerges as a contrast to the type of view expressed here by N.

T. Wright: “From the end of the fourth century BC the Middle east found itself more or less at

the centre of a vast area which spoke (or which did its best to speak) a single language, and

which was unprecedentedly culturally unified. The broad name for this unifying culture is of

course Hellenism, which denotes a pervading pattern, embracing different strands and streams of 7 Thompson, Hebrews, 25. 8 Ibid.

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thought and life, and tracing itself to the Greek culture which included Homer as a virtual holy

book and the philosophy of Plato as a guiding influence.”9

While Wright’s implicit assertion that Platonic thought was the guiding philosophical

influence that helped forge Hellenism into an “unprecedentedly unified culture” has perhaps

been accepted as an exegetical presupposition by most New Testament scholars, some classicists

and historians favor a reconstruction that takes into consideration further developments in

philosophical thought after Plato. Tarn and Griffith, for example, state very succinctly that “the

philosophy of the Hellenistic world was the Stoa: all else was secondary.”10 Hahm assesses the

situation in similar but much more specific terms:

For half a millennium Stoicism was very likely the most accepted world view in the Western world. Although there was, of course, never a single all-pervasive world view in antiquity, yet from the third century B. C. to the second century A. D. more people in the Mediterranean world seem to have held a more or less Stoic conception of the world than any other. The Peripatos had its following among a few intellectuals; Platonism was dormant while skepticism ruled in the Academy; and even if Epicureanism had a slightly larger following, it, too, was limited to a small coterie of ardent believers with a somewhat larger group of sympathizers, particularly among the Roman aristocrats. The Stoic world view, however, appealed to all classes, attracting slaves and laborers as well as kings and emperors. Its ideas infiltrated religion and science, medicine and theology, poetry and drama, law and government. Even when it had to yield to other world views, it left its mark on Christianity, Gnosticism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Neo-Platonism. For a variety of reasons the Stoic outlook, both physical and ethical, captivated a large number of people in the ancient world, more than we shall ever realize, and, in fact, in view of its pervasiveness, it may not be much of an exaggeration to say that the Stoic physical world view was the ancient counterpart to our current, popular, scientific world view.11

If Hahm has accurately described the pervasive influence of Stoicism on all cultural aspects of

the Hellenistic Period, then from a purely historical perspective Stoic thought in general would

be a logical source of insights into documents written during this period, especially those like

Hebrews that reflect some understanding of philosophical conceptions.

9 N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 152-53. 10 William Tarn and G. T. Griffith, Hellenistic Civilisation (London: Edward Arnold LTD, 1966), 325. 11 David Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1977), xiii.

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The first of the ten philosophical observations that arise from affinities between the Stoic

conception of scientific knowledge and Hebrews emerges in light of Dillon’s description of one

of the fundamental teachings of Middle Platonism: “The type of logos which apprehends the

intelligibles (ta noēta) Albinus terms epistēnomikos logos . . . and its product is scientific

knowledge, epistēmē. That which concerns itself with the sense-world (ta aisthēta) is doxastikos

logos . . . and its product is opinion, doxa. This distinction is, of course, perfectly Platonic (Rep.

v 476cff.), though the formalization of two types of logos is a subsequent scholastic

development.”12 Furthermore, “This distinction of a category of knowledge independent of

sense-perception, then, is a radical departure from Antiochus, but basic to Middle Platonism in

its developed form. The name for this activity of the mind is noēsis, intellection”.13

The Middle Platonists were, of course, restating a major doctrine of their philosophical

predecessor: “Plato’s use of the idea that souls are immortal and are endlessly reborn into

different bodies is a metaphorical expression of a deep body—soul dualism which also takes

other forms. He tends to draw sharp oppositions between active thinking and passive reliance on

sense-experience, and to think of the senses as giving us merely unreflected and unreliable

reports; the middle dialogues contain highly coloured disparagements of the world revealed to us

through the senses.”14 In generally describing those disparagements Arnold writes: “But just as

Plato holds that general conceptions are alone true and real, so he necessarily maintains that

objects perceivable by the senses are only half-real, and that the ordinary man lives in a world of

12 John Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 274. 13 Ibid. 14 Entry under Plato in the OCD, Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1192.

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illusions. Thus the thoughts of the philosopher are separated by an abyss from the world in which

men live and die.”15

As Arnold also explains, the Stoics did not acknowledge any such abyss:

The first five powers of the principate are those which are recognized in popular philosophy as the ‘five senses.’ To materialistic philosophers nothing is plainer than that these are functions of the body; is it not the eye which sees, and the ear which hears? This the Stoic denies. The eye does not see, but the soul sees through the eye as through an open door. The ear does not hear, but the soul hears through the ear. . . . The soul is actively engaged, and sends forth its powers as water from a fountain; the sense-organs are passively affected by the objects perceived. Subject to this general principle, sensation (ai)/sqhsij, sensus) may be variously defined. It is ‘a spirit which penetrates from the principate to the sensory processes’; it includes alike the mind-picture (fantasi/a, visum), that is, the first rough sketch which the mind shapes when stimulated by the sense-organ; the assent (sugkata/qesij, adsensus), which the mind gives or refuses to this sketch; and the final act of comprehension (kata/lhyij, comprehension) by which this assent is sealed or ratified.16

For the Stoics, then, sensory perception is the first significant step in the process that results in

assent to and comprehension of a certain kind of knowledge.

From the very beginning of his speech Hebrews emphasizes the significant role of

sensory perception in the acquisition of knowledge of God and of his will. In 1:1-2, for example,

he states: “Long ago God spoke to our ancestors in many and various ways by the prophets, but

in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son.” In 2:1-4 Hebrews emphasis on knowledge

acquired through sensory perception is even more pronounced:

Therefore we must pay greater attention to what we have heard so that we do not drift away from it. For if the message declared through angels was valid, and every transgression and or disobedience received a just penalty, how can we escape if we neglect so great a salvation? It was declared at first through the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard him, while God added his testimony by signs and wonders and various miracles, and by gifts of the Holy Spirit, distributed according to his will.

15 E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 57. 16 Ibid., 248-49.

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In this passage knowledge of the truth of God’s word is conveyed not only through further verbal

testimony, but also through the visual signs that confirm the spoken word.

These observations suggest that faith in Hebrews is a process that begins with sensory

perception as a way of knowing unseen realities.

The second philosophical observation emerges when we consider that the Middle

Platonists, like their namesake, did not adequately address the significant issue of how the

immaterial “world-soul” participates in matter. As Dillon observes: “The process by which the

Soul acts on Matter, the activity proper to Matter, and the identity of the triangles are not

problems to which one finds any satisfactory answer, or of which there is even much discussion,

in surviving Middle Platonist documents, although Xenocrates, as we shall see, wrestles with

them to some extent. Aristotle’s criticisms of the whole scheme in the Physics and in the De

Caelo were powerful, and could not really be answered.”17

Besides merely criticizing Plato’s system, Aristotle also attempted to answer questions

concerning the participation of the immaterial Form with matter:

The word development brings us to a new conception, that of “end,” which is universal in Aristotle’s philosophy, and is closely connected with the allied conception of “form.” The conception of end is applied by Aristotle to the whole of Nature. His view of the world is teleological; everywhere things are determined toward an end. . . . Form is an end towards which matter is determined; matter is the primary material necessary for the realisation of some end; and this primary material develops until the end is realised. There is thus a constant movement from matter to form, or from the ‘Potential,’ which is matter, to the ‘Actual,’ which is matter informed by form.18

Here Barker describes Aristotle’s teleological developmental process in which Form participates

in matter.

17 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 7-8. Plato postulated that the four elements, earth, air, fire, and water, are each composed of particles, which are themselves made up of different configurations of right triangles. The particles and triangles correspond respectively to molecules and atoms in the atomic theory of Democrates. 18 Ernst Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co., 1906), 219.

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As Hahm observes, Aristotle’s teleology had a greater influence on subsequent Stoic

cosmological conceptions than his perhaps more famous teacher’s theories: “If in cosmology

Stoicism’s debt to Plato was large, its debt to Aristotle was even larger. Aristotle’s metaphysical

analysis prepared the ground and provided seminal concepts from which the Stoics developed

the theory that all real things are corporeal. Aristotle initiated the quest for principles or archai,

and his concepts of matter and prime mover contributed something to the two Stoic principles.

Aristotle’s conception of the physical structure of the cosmos and his theory of natural

movements and places were taken over by the Stoics with only a few changes.”19

From Aristotle’s conception of the teleological development of matter activated by Form

from Potentiality to its te/loj of Actuality the Stoics derived one of their most fundamental

metaphysical principles:

‘Blend’ and ‘pervade’ were two terms connected with ‘breath’ in the preceding testi-monies: ‘breath’ is constituted by the ‘through-and-through’ blending of air and fire; ‘breath’ blends with the inert elements, earth and water; ‘breath’ pervades the whole universe. ‘Breath’ is the vehicle of god, the active principle or logos, and since only bodies can act upon bodies, its causal efficacy in the whole world was taken to require its presence throughout all substance or matter. Given such assumptions, the Stoics had to offer a physical theory which would explain the constant conjunction everywhere of ‘breath’ and matter. They found this in a species of mixture which they called ‘blending’.20

The most relevant insight here is that the Stoics taught that on a cosmic level the lo/goj as

pneu=ma is body which permeates and creatively participates in matter through the process that

they referred to as blending.

The Stoics also conceived of a microcosmic blending process that has explicit rather than

implicit affinities with Hebrews:

19 Hahm, Origins, 209. 20 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1: Translations of the Principle Sources, with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 292.

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Since an animal is a composite of body and soul, and both of these are tangible and impressible and of course subject to resistance, and also blended through and through (e)/t[i de\] di )o(/lwn ke/kratai), and one of them is a sensory faculty which itself undergoes movement in the way we have indicated, it is evident that an animal perceives itself continuously. For by stretching out and relaxing, the soul makes an impression on all the body’s parts, since it is blended with them all (e)[pe]idh\ kai\ ke/kratai pa=si), and in making an impression it receives an impression in response. (Hierocles; 1.5-33, 4.38-53; LS 314) 21

In this psychological process the Stoic technical term translated here as blended is the perfect

passive verb form of the verb kera/nnumi. A closely related compound verb sugkera/nnumi

figures significantly in the exegetically difficult text in Heb 4:1-2. For now let it suffice to

acknowledge the verbal connection between the microcosmic blending process and the argument

involving faith in Hebrews.

The third philosophical observation is that the author’s argument shares several strong

affinities with the Stoic definition of e)pisth/mh:

[The Stoics say] Scientific knowledge (episte@me@) is a cognition (katale@psis) which is secure and unchangeable by reason. It is secondly a system of such episte@mai, like the rational cognition of particulars which exists in a virtuous man. It [scientific knowledge here=science] is thirdly a system of expert episte@mai, which has intrinsic stability (su/sthma e)c e)pisthmw=n texnikw=n e)c au(tou= e)/xon to\ be/baion), just as the virtues do. Fourthly, it is a tenor for the reception of impressions which is unchangeable by reason (a)/llhn de\ e(/cin fantasiw=n dektikh\n a)meta/ptwton u(po\ lo/gou), and consisting, they say, in tension and power (h(/n tina/ fasin e)n to/n% kai\ duna/mei kei=sqai). (Stobaeus 2.73, 16-74.3; LS 256)

Here Stobaeus gives four distinct definitions of the complex concept of scientific knowledge,

each of which shares affinities with Hebrews. A brief explanation of each of these definitions,

therefore, is in order at this point.

21 Translations of Stoic sources are from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1. For the convenience of the reader I have provided within the source references the page numbers in which they appear in Long and Sedley. The Greek interpolations within the cited sources are from A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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We begin with the first definition of scientific knowledge as “a cognition (katale@psis)

which is secure and unchangeable by reason.” This definition begins to make sense when we first

consider Arnold’s description of the entire process through which one acquires scientific

knowledge:

In the simplest case the senses present to the mind a ‘picture’ (fantasi/a, visum), carrying with it the suggestion of a statement (e.g. ‘that is a horse’). But it is for the man to consider well whether this suggestion is true, and only give his ‘assent’ (sugkata/qesij, adsensus) when he is so assured. Assent is an act of the will, and therefore in our power.

Of a picture to which he has given his assent the wise man should

retain a firm hold; it then becomes an item of ‘comprehension’ (fantasi/a katalhptikh/, comprehensio), and may be stored in the memory, thus preparing the way for future acquisitions of knowledge, which in the end combine in ‘scientific knowledge’ (e)pisth/mh, scientia).22

Here we see that one acquires scientific knowledge through a process that consists of several

discrete steps. The first of these steps is the formation of an impression (fantasi/a) that is

facilitated by sensory perception. Next, one must assent to this impression. This step must be

followed by a firm mental conviction or cognition of the impression. Finally, the accumulation of

many cognitive impressions culminates with the wise person’s acquisition of virtue as scientific

knowledge.

Arnold’s insights into the process of the acquisition of scientific knowledge shed light on

several key aspects of the argument involving faith in Hebrews. First, those insights regarding

the role of sensory perception in the initial step in the process explain the author’s references to

the formation of mental pictures through hearing God’s spoken promises. The exhortation of

2:8b-9, for example, is an implicit invitation to the recipients to form an impression in which

they see Jesus “crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death.” A somewhat

22 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 68.

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less implicit example is found in the author’s assertion that the patriarchs “saw and greeted

(au)ta\j i)do/ntej kai\ a)spasa/menoi)” God’s promise of a future city (11:13).

The insights regarding the act of assent in the acquisition of scientific knowledge help to

explain Hebrews’ mention of the point in time at which his audience had previously “been

enlightened (fwtisqe/ntej)” (10:32). Because in light of these insights we can see that he is

saying that they had already begun the process of becoming perfected by assenting to the spoken

word of God that they had received through sensory perception. Hebrews’ repeated admonitions

to the audience to “hold fast” to their first confidence and his exhortation to them to leave behind

the elementary teachings about Christ in order to “go on toward perfection (e)pi\ th\n

teleio/thta ferw/meqa)” are indications, however, that he is concerned that they have not yet

reached the important stage of firm cognition on their way to the virtuous state of eternal life.

According to Stobaeus’s second definition, scientific knowledge is “a system of such

episte@mai, like the rational cognition of particulars which exists in a virtuous man.” For help in

understanding this definition we turn to the following passage from Seneca:

What is the difference between the doctrines of philosophy and precepts other than the fact that the former are general precepts, the latter specific? Each of them prescribes things—the former quite generally, the latter in particular . . . Weaker characters need someone to lead the way: ‘This you will avoid, this you will do.’ If, moreover, someone waits for the time when he will know through himself what it is best to do, he will go astray in the interim and thus be prevented from reaching the point when he can be content with himself; therefore, he needs to be ruled while he is beginning to be able to rule himself. (Letters 94.2, 31, 50-1; LS 426)

Here we see that in Stoic thought a person attains virtue as scientific knowledge through learning

certain philosophical truths in the form of both general doctrines and more specific precepts.

The ultimate goal of these instructions is the development of the specific virtue of

fronh/sij, practical wisdom, through which the wise person knows instinctively the difference

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between those things that are good, those that are bad, and those that are indifferent. This Stoic

philosophical goal has strong affinities with Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s

attainment of the state of perfection before God:

So much for all this, but to these praises of the Sage, so many and so great, Moses adds this crowning saying, “that this man did the divine law and the divine commands.” He did them, not taught by written words, but unwritten nature gave him the zeal to follow where wholesome and untainted impulse led him. And when they have God’s promises before them what should men do but trust in them most firmly? Such was the life of the first, the founder of the nation, one who obeyed the law, some will say, but rather, as our discourse has shown, himself a law and an unwritten statute (no/moj au)to\j w)\n kai\ qesmo\j a)/grafoj). (Abr. 46.275-76)

In his rhetorical question Philo strongly implies that Abraham underwent a process in which he

initially accessed knowledge of God’s unwritten commands through spoken promises and

ultimately became the embodiment of God’s will.

For Hebrews, Jesus, not Abraham, is the one who, as a result of having been perfected by

submissively learning obedience (5:8) through the suffering that constitutes God’s discipline, has

become and “the source of salvation for all who obey him” (5:9), “the pioneer and perfecter of

the faith (to\n th=j pi/stewj a)rxhgo\n kai\ teleiwth\n 'Ihsou=n),” and the embodiment,

therefore, of the will of God that he had promised through his prophet Jeremiah to put into the

hearts and minds of his new covenant people (8:10-11). Hebrews holds Jesus up as the example

of one who embodies knowledge of God’s will to the members of his audience whose faculties

have not yet “been trained by practice to distinguish good from evil (5:14) and for whom,

therefore, perfection as eternal life still remains a future goal.

According to Stobaeus’s third definition, scientific knowledge is “a system of expert

episte@mai, which has intrinsic stability (su/sthma e)c e)pisthmw=n texnikw=n e)c au(tou=

e)/xon to\ be/baion), just as the virtues do.” The intrinsic stability of the systematic truths of

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scientific knowledge arises from their relationship to what is true and real. Diogenes Laertius

sheds light on the nature of this relationship: “Of impressions one kind is cognitive, the other

incognitive. The cognitive (katalhptikh\n), which they [the Stoics] say is the criterion of

things, is that which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance

with what is. The incognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that which

is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear or distinct” (7.46; LS 242).

Epictetus provides examples of the type of philosophical truth that gives rise to cognitive

impressions that are intrinsically “stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is”:

Now the philosophers say that the first thing we must learn is this: That there is a God, and that He provides for the universe, and that it is impossible for a man to conceal from him, not merely his actions, but even his purposes and his thoughts. Next we must learn what the gods are like; for whatever their character is discovered to be, the man who is going to please and obey them must endeavor as best he can to resemble them. If the deity is faithful, he also must be faithful; if free, he also must be free; if beneficent, he also must be beneficent; if high-minded, he also must be high-minded, and so forth; therefore, in everything he says and does, he must act as an imitator of God. (Dis. 2.14.11-13; LS )

Other examples of intrinsically stable philosophical truth are the knowledge that only virtue is

the true telos of humans as rational creatures and the specific natures of the specific virtues and

their opposites.

Hebrews indicates that for him the truth that has intrinsic stability is theological rather

than philosophical in nature. For in the exhortation of 6:9-10 he states: “We have this hope, a

sure and steadfast anchor of the soul (h(/n w(j a)/gkuran e)/xomen th=j yuxh=j a)sfalh= te

kai\ bebai/an), a hope that enters the inner shrine behind the curtain, where Jesus, a forerunner

on our behalf, has entered, having become a high priest forever according to the order of

Melchizedek.” For Hebrews, then, the hope that he describes here is an anchor because it is

grounded in the unchangeable character of God’s promise. 10:23: “for he who has promised is

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faithful (pisto\j ga\r o( e)paggeila/menoj).” The stability of the promise arises from “the

unchangeable character” of God’s purpose (6:17) and God’s truthful character (6:18).

The meaning of Stobaeus’s fourth definition of scientific knowledge as “a tenor for the

reception of impressions which is unchangeable by reason, and consisting, they say, in tension

and power” begins to become clear in light of Arnold’s discussion of the Stoic theory of tension:

Like fire, ‘spirit’ is to the Stoics a substance, stuff, or body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and elasticity; it is conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating it as the soul. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its ‘tension’ (to/noj, intentio), by means of which its creative power pushes forward from the centre to the circumference: as for instance in the human body walking is effected by ‘spirit exercising tension towards the feet.’ The theory of ‘tension’ has an immediate application to ethics. When the soul has sufficient tension to perform its proper work, it operates according to the virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness; but when the tension is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by the emotions.23

Here Arnold makes several important observations about the important Stoic conception of the

blending of pneu=ma with matter. First, pneu=ma participates in matter by its inherent quality of

elasticity or tension. Second, pneu=ma functions on two distinct levels. On the cosmic level it

gives shape and motion through the power of its tension to the multifarious entities in the

universe. On another level, however, in humans, who are essentially microcosms of the larger

universe, pneu=ma attains its highest form as reason. Third, the soul that has adequate tension has

the power to carry out its “proper work” which is to live virtuously in accordance with scientific

knowledge.

Arnold sheds helpful light on the role that tension plays on the microcosmic blending

process that is necessary for the attainment of scientific knowledge as virtue:

The mind-picture as such is not within a man’s control; but it rests with him to decide whether he will give it his ‘assent’ (sugkata/qesij, adsensio or adsensus). This assent is therefore an act of the soul, in its capacity as will; and can only be rightly exercised by

23 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 89.

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a soul properly strung, that is, possessed of due tension. Assent wrongfully given leads to ‘opinion’ (do/ca, opinio), and all wrong assent is error or ‘sin’ (a(marti/a, peccatum). This error may take place in two directions, either by a hasty movement of the will (propi/ptein), giving assent to a picture which is not really clear; or by feebleness of will, which leads to assent in a false direction (diayeu/desqai). Even haste however is a form of weakness, so that we may say that all opining is a weak form of assent.24

According to the Stoics, the tension of the soul’s pneu=ma is very similar to what we in this

culture might refer to in a physical sense as “muscle tone.”

But whereas muscle tone facilitates the accomplishment of great physical achievements

and athletic prowess, proper tension of the soul leads to the power to perform two important

mental activities. We may deduce the first of these activities from Philo’s description of the

initial stage in the formation of an impression: “An impression is formed by the approach of an

external object which strikes the mind through sensation. Impulse, the close relation of

impression, is formed by the tonic power of the mind (kata\ th\n tou= nou= tonikh\n

du/namin). By stretching this out through sensation, the mind grasps the object and goes towards

it, eager to seize and reach it” (Alleg. Interp. 1.30; LS 317). The soul, then, must have proper

tension in order to initiate the process of acquiring scientific knowledge by assenting correctly.

As Long and Sedley explain, the other steps in the process also require proper tension:

“The evidence does not suggest that the wise man must grasp more facts than other people. His

scientific expertise is rather a function of what he knows and how he knows what he knows—

systematically, completely securely, so rationally grounded that no reasons can be furnished

which could possibly subvert it. His ignorance of nothing does not imply literal omniscience, but

the absence of all doubt, uncertainty, falsehood and instability from his cognitive state.”25

24 Ibid., 132-33. 25 Long and Sedley, Translations, 259. Emphasis here is theirs.

16

Conversely, “‘weakness’ denotes the insecurity, instability and inconsistency of the

inferior man’s mental state, and seems to cover the following cases: (a) not assenting firmly to

cognitive impressions, (b) not going through with right decisions, (c) assenting precipitately to

incognitive impressions, (d) assenting to what is patently false.”26 This condition of the soul’s

improper tension was of primary concern to the Stoics because it ultimately and inevitably

resulted in the disease that Cicero describes here:

Viciousness is a tenor or character which is inconsistent in the whole of life and out of harmony with itself . . . It is the source of disturbances which . . . are disorderly and agitated movements of the mind, at variance with reason and utterly hostile to peace of mind and of life. For they cause troubling and severe ailments, oppressing the mind and weakening it with fear. They also inflame the mind with excessive longing . . . a mental powerlessness completely in conflict with temperance and moderation . . . So the only cure for vices is situated in virtue alone. (Tusc. 4.29, 34-35; LS 381)

As we shall see in a later chapter, while Hebrews’ view of sin is very similar to the Stoics’

teachings concerning viciousness, his prescribed remedy for this disease of the soul is the word

of God rather than the philosophical knowledge that leads to virtue.

For now, however, our immediate purpose is served by noticing that the Stoic theory of

the tension and power of the soul as the ability to assent firmly shares affinities with such

passages as 3:14 in which Hebrews warns his audience that “we have become partners of Christ,

if only we hold our first confidence firm to the end (e)a/nper th\n a)rxh\n th=j u(posta/sewj

me/xri te/louj bebai/an kata/sxwmen)” and with his exhortation to them in 10:23 to “hold

fast to the confession of our hope without wavering ((kate/xwmen th\n o(mologi/an th=j

e)lpi/doj a)klinh=).”

The fourth philosophical observation involves the Stoics’ conception of the relationship

between the object of perception and the agent who perceives it in the formation of impressions

26 Ibid., 258-59.

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and Hebrews’ assertions concerning the active nature of God’s word and the recipients’ response

to it. An understanding of this relationship begins with Arnold’s description of the Stoic

conception:

The Stoics fancifully derive the word ai)/sqhsij (‘sensation’) from ei)/sqhsij (‘storage’); it is therefore, strictly speaking, the process by which the mind is stored; but it is also, from an opposite point of view, the process by which the mind reaches out towards an external object. From the object (ai)sqhto/n) proceed waves which strike upon the sense-organ (ai)sqhth/rion); this impact is called a ‘sensation’ in a narrower sense. At the same time there proceeds from the mind (which is the ruling part or ‘principate’ of the soul), a ‘spirit’ or thrill which goes out to meet the impact; and this spirit and its operation are also called ‘sensation.’ As a result of the contact of these two waves, and simultaneously with it, there is produced in the soul an effect like the imprint of a seal, and this imprint is the fantasi/a or ‘mind picture.’27

Two insights here are relevant to our present analysis, the first of which is that a perceptible

object generates waves that “strike upon the sense-organ” in response to which the mind reaches

out to grasp the object of this sensory perception. The second insight is that the mutual active

participation of these two corporeal entities results in the formation of the fantasi/a, the

impression, which, as we have seen, plays a very significant role in the process of the acquisition

of scientific knowledge.

A theological application of the Stoics’ philosophical theory is found in Philo’s

allegorical interpretation of the statement in Gen 2:6 that before God caused it to rain upon the

earth, “a stream would rise from the earth, and water the whole face of the ground”:

See, then, how like links in a chain, the powers of the living creature hold on to each other; for mind and ‘sense-perception’ and object of sense being three, ‘sense-perception’ is in the middle, while mind and object of sense occupy each extreme. But neither has the mind power to work, that is, to put forth its energies by way of ‘sense-perception,’ unless God send the object of sense as rain upon it; nor is any benefit derived from the object of sense when so rained down, unless, like a spring, the mind, extending itself to reach the ‘sense-perception,’ stir it out of its repose to grasp the object presented to it. Thus the mind and the object of sense are always practising a reciprocity of giving (w(/ste

27 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 130-31.

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a)nti/dosin o( nou=j kai\ ai)sqhto\n ae)i\ meletw=si), the one lying ready for sense-perception as its material, the other, like a craftsman, moving sense-perception in the direction of the external object, to produce an impulse towards it. For the living creature excels the non-living in two respects, in the power of receiving impressions and in the active impulse towards the object producing them. The impression is produced by the drawing nigh of the external object, as it stamps the mind through sense-perception (h( me\n ouån fantasi/a suni/statai kata\ th\n tou= e)kto\j pro/sodon tupou=ntoj nou=n di ) ai)sqh/sewj); while the active impulse, close of kin to the power of the aforesaid (h( de\ o(rmh/, to\ a)delfo\n th=j fantasi/aj), comes about by way of the mind’s power of self-extension (kata\ th\n tou= nou= tonikh\n du/namin), and so comes into touch with the object presented to it, and goes toward it, striving to reach and seize it. (Alleg. Interp. 1.28-30)

Clearly, the process that Philo refers to here as the reciprocity of giving is in essence the Stoic

psychological process that involves the mutual active participation between the mind and the

object of sensory perception in the formation of impressions that results in the wise person’s

acquisition of scientific knowledge.

The Stoic theory of the reciprocity of giving emerges has affinities with several passages

in Hebrews. In 4:12, for example, the author proclaims that “the word of God is living and active

(Zw=n ga\r o( lo/goj tou= qeou= kai\ e)nergh\j).” Failure on the part of humans to reciprocate

with this word results in the sin of unbelief (3:16-19), the consequences of which the author

describes in 4:1-2: “Therefore, while the promise of entering his rest is still open, let us take care

that none of you should seem to have failed to reach it. For indeed the good news came to us just

as to them; but the message they heard did not benefit them, because they were not united by

faith with those who listened (a)ll¡ ou)k w)fe/lhsen o( lo/goj th=j a)koh=j e)kei/nouj mh\

sugkekrasme/nouj t$= pi/stei toi=j a)kou/sasin).”

The fifth philosophical observation involves the affinities between the Stoics’ view of the

role of propositions (a)ciw/mata) in the process of acquiring scientific knowledge and Hebrews’

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hermeneutical technique of allegorically interpreting Scripture.28 To begin with, “All Stoic

authors talk about assenting to impressions, and there is no doubt that this was an acceptable way

to describe what happens. But there are two texts that look as though they reflect more careful

discussions of the topic, and both tell us that what we assent to, strictly speaking, is not an

impression, but rather a proposition—something like a statement or sentence—connected with

the impression.”29 More specifically,

When an agent has an impression, there is, so to speak, a proposition built right into it; there is a unique claim that that picture is making, which is intrinsic to its being the impression that it is. This is not to take back what was said earlier; the impression and the proposition are still distinct things, and distinct kinds of things, in all the ways we mentioned. But the Stoic view is that each impression arrives bundled with one and only one proposition, and no impression—at least no impression in the mind of an adult human being—is a mere unlabeled picture. The impression is individuated both by its purely sensory content—the idealized photograph—and by its propositional content; any change in either makes for a distinct impression.30

With regard to the specific nature of propositions, Brennan states: “Impressions are very

different from propositions. According to the Stoics, an impression is just a piece of matter in a

certain configuration; it is my mind, altered in accordance with the thing that makes the

impression on it. And since my mind is just the hot breath in and around my heart, this means

that my impressions are each located somewhere in my rib-cage. The proposition, by contrast, is

immaterial and has no location—it is not dependent on me for its existence, much less for its

place of residence.”31

28 Contra Attridge’s (Hebrews, 29) observation that “Hebrews does not display the same elaborate allegorical exegetical techniques as Philo.” 29 Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 54. 30 Ibid., 57. 31 Ibid., 54-55.

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The Stoics’ conception of propositions was so pervasive and influential that it gave rise to

several Jewish and Christian techniques of interpreting Hebrew Scripture.32 Without consciously

being aware that he is doing so, Cohen implicitly identifies these techniques in Philo and in Paul:

Paul had very good reasons for substituting Letter and Spirit in place of r(hto\n kai\ dia/noia. First, he wished to win over the Jews to the new Dispensation, in which case an antithesis between letter and spirit would have had a more genuine and authentic ring. Secondly, Paul wished to bypass even the intent of the law and to abolish it by allegorical interpretation. It is true that in Philo dia/noia is applied to allegorical exegesis too. But Paul felt that it would be more effective if he appropriated the Biblical phrase pneu=ma kri/sewj because it is much more elastic and elusive than the rigid and limited dia/noia of the rhetoricians, and is susceptible of so many theological interpretations and allusions. Thus, the spirit reviveth, is a subtle reference to Ezekiel 37.5. Behold I will cause my spirit to enter into you, and you shall live.33

In support of my thesis that Hebrews reflects the Stoic concept of the role of propositions in the

process of acquiring scientific knowledge, I will argue that this important concept underlies both

Philo’s method of interpreting passages from the Septuagint allegorically and Paul’s use of an

argument from the letter and intent of the law as his primary argumentative strategy in Romans.34

I will also argue that the theory of propositions infiltrated the two major interpretive

methods of Rabbinic Judaism.35 An understanding of the first of these methods begins with

32 Contra Thompson’s assertion that Philo “maintained his Jewish identity by keeping the laws, but he sought a philosophical interpretation of Jewish ceremonies, interpreting the laws allegorically with the philosophical categories derived primarily from Middle Platonism.” (Hebrews, 25) 33 Boaz Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study, Vol. 1 (New York: Shulsinger Bros., 1966), 56-57. 34 In Ira J. Jolivet, Jr.: “An Argument from the Letter and Intent of the Law as the Primary Argumentative Strategy in Romans” (in The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture: Essays from the 1995 London Conference [eds. Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997], 309-35) and also in “Stoic Philosophy and Jewish Scripture in the Argument from the Letter and Intent of the Law in Romans” (in Society of Biblical Literature 1999 Seminar Papers [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999], 448-71) I argue, contra Cohen, that Paul does not entirely bypass the argument from the letter and intent in favor of an allegorical interpretation of Ezekiel. 35 In so doing I will basically be offering an alternative to the assertion of Ronald R. Cox (By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity [Berlin: DeGruyter, 2007], 34):

While we have some evidence that Hellenistic (Greek-speaking) Jews presented their religion in philosophical terms before the advent of Middle Platonism, the relationship must have been an uneasy one. Stoicism in particular likely presented a problem to those Jews interested in presenting their religion in Hellenistic terms. They could not fully appropriate Stoicism without diminishing a defining aspect of their ancestral religion, their transcendent God. While Stoicism reverenced a divine entity, it identified its god with the physical order. Though of different consistency, god and the world were of the same material.

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Neusner’s observation about two of the most authoritative writings of Rabbinc Judaism: “Both

Talmuds explain the Mishnah, and the Mishnah is the first, and the most important, document of

the oral Torah.”36 Neusner goes on to state: “This Mishnah, this code of laws that embodies in

rules for petty details of life some rather profound philosophical conceptions, stands at the head

of a long line of writings, which all together comprise the oral Torah.”37 The general nature of

the oral Torah and the significant role that it played in Rabbinic Judaism emerges in light of

Neusner’s further statements:

Judaism has always maintained that God revealed a dual Torah to Moses at Sinai: One Torah was to be transmitted to the people of Israel through the medium of writing; the other was to be handed down orally, memorized by successive sages. These words of God were specifically formulated to be memorized, and the formula was repeated to Moses. Moses repeated the formula to Joshua, Joshua handed it on to his disciples, and so on through the ages. The written Torah and the oral Torah together constitute a single whole Torah—the full and exhaustive statement of God’s will for Israel.38

I am proposing, and will argue later, that the development of the concept of the oral Torah as the

compliment to the written Torah reflects the Stoic theory of an immaterial proposition that is

embedded within a material object of sensory perception.

I will also argue that this theory also underlies a second interpretive technique of

Rabbinic Judaism. Neusner implicitly identifies this technique as well: “The idea of history, with

its rigid distinction between past and present and its careful sifting of connections from the one

to the other, came quite late onto the scene of intellectual life. Both Judaism and Christianity for

most of their histories have read the Hebrew Scriptures in an other-than-historical framework.

They found in Scripture’s words paradigms—patterns, models—of an enduring present, by

Therefore, while aspects of Stoicism were appropriated, Stoic materialism made it an ultimately unacceptable system for explaining Judaism.

36 Jacob Neusner, The Oral Torah: The Sacred Books of Judaism: An Introduction (San Francisco: Harper & Row: 1986), 183. 37 Ibid., 1-2. 38 Ibid., vii.

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which all things must take their measure; they possessed no conception whatsoever of the

pastness of the past.”39

Neusner goes on to describe the general content of the Rabbis’ interpretive technique that

he refers to as paradigmatic thinking: “Galilean sages wrote about a fantasy of a Jerusalem

rebuilt and a dream of a Temple restored. They knew neither and made it up in their minds, just a

Plato did in his Republic.”40 I will propose later that the sages of Rabbinic Judaism did not have

to make up the paradigm concerning a future restored Jerusalem, because the immaterial

proposition concerning this paradigm was embedded within the spoken promises that God had

made to Israel in the oracles of that the either the prophet Ezekiel himself or his priestly disciples

reproduced in written form.41

Hebrews gives several indications that he, like his Hellenistic Jewish counterparts, is

engaged in allegorically and paradigmatically interpreting Scripture. In 11:8-10, for example, he

strongly implies that God’s spoken promise to Abraham that his descendants would inherit the

land upon which he wandered also entailed the vision of a divinely-constructed city “whose

architect and builder is God” (11:10). Since no reference to such a city appears anywhere in

Genesis, Hebrews is obviously deriving an allegorical interpretation from the written Torah.

Furthermore, his ability to project the vision of this city into the future (12:22-24; 13:12-14)

indicates that he is also using the type of thinking in which “the paradigm obliterates distinctions

between past, present, and future, between here and now and then and there.”42 I will also argue

39 Jacob Neusner, Judaism When Christianity Began: A Survey of Belief and Practice (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 16. 40 Neusner, The Oral Torah, 3. 41 Walther Zimmerli (Ezekiel 1: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, Chapters 1-24 [trans. Ronald E. Clemens; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979], 75) supports the view that Ezekiel’s story of Israel’s exile and reconciliation figured significantly in the hopes of future forms of Judaism: “The book of Ezekiel was of great importance for apocalyptic, as is to be seen in the Old Testament in the book of Daniel. Jewish and Christian apocalypses draw from the imagery and material of Ezekiel.” 42 Neusner, Judaism When Christianity Began, 16.

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that Hebrews derived the vision of this city with its heavenly temple where God abides forever

(9:11-14, 23-28; 10:19-22), where Jesus functions simultaneously as high priest (2:17; 4:15;

chs.8-10; 13:10-14), as “the mediator of a new covenant” (8:6; 9:15; 12:24), and as “the great

shepherd of the sheep” (13:20), and where the population consists in part of “the spirits of the

righteous made perfect” (12:23) from the immaterial proposition that he found embedded in

God’s promises of reconciliation in the written oracles of Ezekiel.43

The sixth philosophical observation consists of the strong affinities between the discreet

stages in the process of the acquisition of scientific knowledge and different aspects of the nature

and role of faith in Hebrews. These affinities are conceptual rather than verbal and begin to

emerge in light of several insights, beginning with Brennan’s observation that “a belief on the

Stoic view is an event, . . . If it is not playing an active role in my thoughts, then it is not a belief,

on the Stoic view. And instead of talking about ‘dispositional beliefs’, as though they were

another kind of the same thing, they talk about having a ‘disposition to believe’, that is, a feature

of your psychology which is not a belief, but makes you the sort of person who will have a belief

when the occasion arises.”44 This disposition of the soul, then, equates to the proper tension that

facilitates a person’s ability to assent correctly, and therefore to attain the state of virtue as

scientific knowledge.

According to Brennan, belief also equates to assent: “The sequence of events goes

something like that: first one gets an impression, and then an assent either follows or does not,

43 Leslie C. Allen (Ezekiel 20-48 [WBC 29; Dallas: Word Books, 1990], 215) also senses a connection between Ezekiel’s description of the restored city and land and Hebrews’ vision of the future city: “It may be that, just as the book of Revelation gives up its treasures to a persecuted church, these chapters along with the other oracles of salvation speak loudest to those in a state of disorientation, who can catch their note of pastoral concern and reassurance. Land and temple become symbols of solid hope for the renewal of social identity, for full fellowship with God and for ‘a kingdom that cannot be shaken’ (Heb 12:22-24).” 44 Brennan, The Stoic Life, 64.

24

and if it does then the assent is a belief.45 Simply put, then, “a belief is an assent to an

impression.”46 Furthermore, “The act of believing, of assenting to the impression, is a kind of

endorsement of the impression, saying ‘yes!’ to it, agreeing that it gets things right, that the

world really is as the impression depicts it to be (and as the correlated proposition describes it to

be). When we assent to an impression, we swing the whole weight of our actions and beliefs

behind it, like jumping to grab a rope that will rescue us from a balcony. From there out, unless

we reconsider it, we will act as though that impression is solid and reliable, and will make plans

based on it.”47

Brennan also explains that belief equates to cognition, the next step in the process of

acquiring scientific knowledge: “There are two criteria here; the assent must be strong, and the

impression must be kataleptic. If either fails, then the assent does not constitute (a bit of)

knowledge, but rather what the Stoics called ‘opinion’ (doxa in Greek). . . . Whenever we assent

to a kataleptic impression, we not only have a belief (inasmuch as it is an assent to an

impression), we also have a true belief (since all kataleptic impressions are true). We

furthermore have what the Stoics called a katalepsis, that is, an assent to a kataleptic impression.

But a katalepsis is still an opinion, not (a bit of) knowledge, if the assent is weak instead of

strong—that was the second criterion.”48 Stated in other terms, “What does ‘to know something’

signify more than to believe with absolute conviction that something is the case? . . . If we

‘know’ something, we mean that we believe it to be the case, and it is the case. The Stoics

expressed this feeling by saying that certain percepts strike our senses accompanied by a certain

45 Ibid., 65. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 59. 48 Ibid., 70-71.

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distinctive mark, a mark of ‘clarity’ (enargeia), which makes it impossible for us to disbelieve

them, and which guarantees their truth.”49

As another of Brennan’s perceptive insights demonstrates, the degree to which a belief is

true bears a direct relationship with the nature of its embedded proposition:

There are different kinds of belief, on the Stoic view. The most important kinds follow from the fact that there are different kinds of assents, and different kinds of impressions to assent to. To begin with impressions, the most important difference is between those that are true and those that are false. . . . Many texts say that impressions are true and false, but the more precise view seems to be that what is primarily true or false are propositions, and that impressions are true or false only in virtue of the truth or falsehood of the proposition they are correlated with. A belief, in turn, is true or false depending on whether the impression (or rather proposition) to which it is an assent is true or false.”50

Belief as assent and cognition to true propositions, therefore, constitues the crucial steps in

acquiring virtue as scientific knowledge, the only sure cure for vice. On the other hand, “The

greatest impediment to our progress is our false beliefs about what is really good and bad. We

must come to learn that nothing but virtue is good, nothing but vice is bad. The rest are all said to

be indifferent; it makes no difference towards one’s happiness or unhappiness whether one has

wealth or poverty, health or disease.”51

Hebrews makes several statements that indicate that for him pi/stij functions in the

same ways in the teleological process of acquiring salvation as eternal life as do the mental

activities of assent and cognition as belief in the acquisition of e)pisth/mh in Stoic thought. In

10:32-36, for example, he writes:

But recall those early days when, after you had been enlightened (e)n aiâj fwtijqe/n-tej), you endured a hard struggle with sufferings, sometimes being publicly exposed to abuse and persecution, and sometimes being partners with those so treated. For you had compassion for those who were in prison, and you cheerfully accepted the plundering of your possessions, knowing that you yourselves possessed something better and more

49 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 65. 50 Ibid., 66. 51 Ibid., 37-38.

26

lasting. Do not, therefore, abandon that confidence of yours, it brings a great reward. For you need endurance, so that when you have done the will of God, you may receive what was promised

Here the author reminds his audience of the point in time when they had previously assented to

God’s promises by believing in the message that was conveyed to them by those who had

received it directly from Jesus himself. The author implies that they had made the decisive leap

of faith and had thrown the whole weight of their beliefs and actions behind the proposition that

they had endorsed by recounting the sufferings they had endured when they had first “been

enlightened.” Furthermore, his admonition to continue to hold fast to their confidence by

continuing to patiently endure hardships indicates, however, that they, like those persons who

according to the Stoics are progressing toward scientific knowledge, are not immune to losing

out on the rewards of virtue by reconsidering their initial faith commitment.

The seventh philosophical observation has to do with affinities between the Stoics’ views

concerning sin and salvation and those of Hebrews. We begin with the Stoics’ broader view of

sin:

Men in the mass are both foolish and wicked; they defy God’s will and thwart his purpose. The world is full of sin, and all sins (to use the Socratic paradox) are equal. What then is sin? It is a missing of the mark at which virtue aims (a(ma/rthma); it is a stumbling on the road (peccatum); it is a transgressing of the boundary line. It is the child of ignorance, the outward expression of ill health of the soul. Everywhere and in everything it weakens, hampers, and delays the work of virtue. . . . If we understand what sin is, we shall see its repulsiveness; if we learn how it spreads, we shall seek protection against its infecting poison; if we attack it in detail, in individual men and in their daily acts, we shall in the end lay it low. Philosophy then proceeds to arm itself for the task.52

Here we see that, according to the Stoics, the greatest danger that humans face is not physical

disease, or enslavement, or natural disaster, or war, or even loss of life. It is, rather, the

52 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 330.

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devastating and deadly disease of the mind and soul, sin (a(marti/a), the only remedy for which

lies in the acquisition of the philosophical truth.

Among the most important of these truths is knowledge of the more specific nature of

sin:

Sin is ignorance; more accurately, it is that which appears to be knowledge, but is not knowledge; it is false judgment. If we follow the process by which knowledge is attained, we find that there is no error in the mind-picture (visum), whether it is sensory or partly sensory and partly rational; this is an adumbration automatically presented to the mind. But ‘assent is in our power’; it is both an intellectual and a moral act. A too hasty assent to that which appears to be but is not is both an error and an offence; and most particularly so when it lies in the application of the general conceptions (prolh/yeij) of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ to particular cases.53

Long and Sedley explain how false judgment with regard to what is good or evil leads one to the

condition of sin as ignorance:

The impulses which launch his behaviour are determined by the moral propositions to which he assents. Because he has securely grasped the fact that goodness is confined to moral excellence and badness to the opposite of this, he never assents to the goodness or badness of anything else; consequently he is quite immune to the passionate impulses characteristic of the unenlightened majority, which derive from misdescribing and falsely assessing the value of things. To help him progress towards this end, he receives training in moral rules based upon the doctrines of the system.54

Although they use different terminology, both Stoicism and Hebrews are concerned about

salvation from sin in a general sense. In the admonition of 3:12-13, for example, the author

writes: “Take care, brothers and sisters, that none of you may have an evil, unbelieving heart

(kardi/a ponhra\ a)pisti/aj) that turns away from the living God. But exhort one another

every day, as long as it is called ‘today,’ so that none of you may be hardened by the deceit-

fulness of sin (i(/na mh\ sklhrunq$= tij e)c u(mw=n a)pa/t$ th=j a(marti/aj).” Here Hebrews

53 Ibid., 331. 54 Long and Sedley, Translations, 345.

28

describes sin, as do the Stoics, as a deceptive and insidious force that threatens the spiritual well-

being of humans.

Hebrews’ argument also involves sin in the more specific Stoic sense. In 5:11-14, for

example, he writes:

About this we have much to say that is hard to explain, since you have become dull in understanding. For though by this time you ought to be teachers, you need someone to teach you again the basic elements of the oracles of God. You need milk, not solid food; for everyone who lives on milk, being still an infant, is unskilled in the word of righteousness. But solid food is for the mature, for those whose faculties have been trained by practice to distinguish good from evil (tw=n dia\ th\n e(/cin ta\ ai)sqhth/ria gegumnasme/na e)xo/ntwn pro\j dia/krisin kalou= te kai\ kakou=).

Here the author indicates that his audience needs further instructions in the basic oracles of God

because they have not yet arrived at that level of maturity where they can distinguish good from

evil. In other words, they are still susceptible to the sin that arises from falsely taking an apparent

good for the highest good and an apparent evil for the greatest evil.

The eighth philosophical observation involves affinities between the Stoics’ conception

of the specific virtue of courage and its opposite vice of fear and similar aspects of Hebrews.

These affinities begin to emerge when we consider the Stoics’ definition of the virtue of courage:

Courage is the quality by which one undertakes dangerous tasks and endures hardships. Its parts are highmindedness, confidence, patience, perseverance. Highmindedness consists in the contemplation and execution of great and sublime projects with a certain grandeur and magnificence of imagination. Confidence is the quality by which in important and honourable undertakings the spirit has placed great trust in itself with a resolute hope of success. Patience is a willing and sustained endurance of difficult and arduous tasks for a noble and useful end. Perseverance is a firm and abiding persistence in a well-considered plan of action. (Cicero, Inv. 2.54.163-64)

Through both exhortations and examples Hebrews exhorts his audience to highminded-

ness, confidence, patience, and perseverance. In 6:9-12, for example, he writes: “Even though we

speak in this way, beloved, we are confident of better things in your case, things that belong to

salvation. For God is not unjust; he will not overlook your work and the love that you showed for

29

his sake in serving the saints, as you still do. And we want each one of you to show the same

diligence so as to realize the full assurance of hope to the very end, so that you may not become

sluggish, but imitators of these who through faith and patience inherit the promises.” Here the

author exhorts his audience to continue to patiently persist in the performance of great works for

the noble end of salvation.

And in 12:1-2 he offers this example of one who has done the same: “Therefore, since we

are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight of sin that clings so

closely, and let us run with perseverance the race that is set before us, looking to Jesus the

pioneer and perfecter of our faith, who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross,

disregarding its shame (o(/j a)nti\ th=j prokeime/nhj au)t%= xara=j u(pe/meinen stauro\n

ai)sxu/nhj), and has taken his seat at the right hand of the throne of God.” For Hebrews, Jesus is

the perfect model of one who received the ultimate reward of eternal life because he embodied

every aspect of the virtue of courage.

Even more verbal and conceptual affinities between courage and Hebrews begin to

emerge in light of Philo’s insights regarding the antithesis of the virtue: “Holy too, and

praiseworthy is the hopeful man, just as on the contrary the despondent is unholy and

blameworthy, since in all things he takes fear for his evil counsellor; for no two things are more

at enmity with each other, men say, than fear and hope, and surely that is natural, for each is an

expectation, hope of good, fear on the other hand of evil, and their natures are irreconcilable and

incapable of agreement” (Abr. 1.14). Here Philo’s description of the fearful person as “unholy”

reflects the Stoic view that all vice is sin. Also, by explicitly describing the antithetical

relationship between fear and hope, Philo is also implicitly equating hope with the virtue of

courage.

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These insights shed a great deal of light on such passages as Heb 2:14-15 in which the

author states: “Since, therefore, the children share flesh and blood, he himself likewise shared the

same things, so that through death he might destroy the one who has the power of death, that is,

the devil, and free those who all their lives were held in slavery by the fear of death (o(/soi fo/b%

qana/tou dia\ panto\j tou= zh=n e)/noxoi hÅsan doulei/aj).” Jesus’ courageous act of

sacrificing his own life in order to destroy death gives courage in the form of hope to those who

previously lived in fear of dying. By assenting to this proposition, the believers to whom

Hebrews writes are no longer “among those who shrink back and so are lost, but among those

who have faith and so are saved” (10:39).

The ninth philosophical observation has to do with affinities between aspects of scientific

knowledge and the purpose of Hebrews. In light of these affinities, nuances emerge about the

situation that compelled the author to craft his elaborate “word of exhortation” that were

previously undetected. In order to gain a full appreciation of these nuances we must first

acknowledge that scholars have indeed correctly identified the general purpose of the document.

Peterson, for example, is correct when he states that “Hebrews was seeking to deal with a

problem of spiritual lethargy on the part of his readers, involving loss of zeal, lack of confidence

and faltering hope.”55 Thompson also correctly assesses the purpose when he writes: “Although

the author employs philosophical language to define faith, he is more a pastor than a philosopher,

for his purpose is to address the crisis in a community living in the uncertainty caused by the fact

that they do ‘not see all things in subjection’ to the Son (2:8). Since all they see is alienation and

disappointment, they are in danger of falling away (3:12) or shrinking back (10:38-39). By

55 David Peterson, Hebrews and Perfection: An Examination of the Concept of Perfection in the ‘Epistle to the Hebrews’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 186.

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directing them to things not seen (11:1c), the author reassures the community that it can take its

firm stand on the invisible reality.”56

The nuances about the author’s purpose that Peterson and Thompson fail to see begin to

emerge in light of a passage from Philo that serves as a summation of the insights from the Stoic

conception of the process of the acquisition of scientific knowledge: “‘Presentation’

(fantasi/a) is an imprint made on the soul. For, like a ring or seal, it stamps on the soul the

image corresponding to everything which each of the senses has introduced. And the mind like

wax receives the impress and retains it vividly, until forgetfulness the opponent of memory

levels out the imprint, and makes it indistinct, or entirely effaces it” (Deus 9.44). Hebrews’

audience had received the word of God through sensory perception. They had assented to the

impression formed by that word and had thrown the whole weight of their beliefs and actions

behind its proposition. “Forgetfulness,” however, was beginning to set in and some of them were

in danger of reconsidering their previous commitment. In other words, they had not yet reached

the stage of firm cognition which was necessary to attain the ultimate goal of perfection as

eternal life.

The tenth and final philosophical observation has to do with affinities between the

contributions of the Stoic philosophers in the development of Greco-Roman rhetorical theory and

practice and the rhetoric of Hebrews. The entry under the name of the Stoic rhetorician

Hermagoras of Temnos (fl. ca. 150 B.C.E.) in the OCD is indicative of the significance of the

Stoics’ contributions: “By discussing not only themes involving particular situations

(u(poqe/seij), but also general theses . . . he helped to extend the scope of rhetorical education to

cover moral and philosophical subjects. His complex and subtle classification of ‘types of issue’

56 Thompson, Hebrews, 231.

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(sta/seij, status) was decisive for later theory, and it is this for which he is chiefly

remembered.”57 Primarily because of the contributions of the Stoics, then, Hellenistic rhetoric

presupposes philosophy.

As we have seen, Hebrews is concerned primarily with the virtue of courage as it relates

to faith and hope and with the vice of fear because it gives rise to the sin of unbelief. Following

Stoic stasis theory, Cicero places the topic of courage in the category of honor under the heading

of deliberative rhetoric:

We shall call honourable anything that is sought wholly or partly for its own sake. Now, since it has two divisions one simple and the other complex, let us consider the simple one first. Everything in this class is embraced in one meaning and under one name, virtue. Virtue may be defined as a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature. Therefore when we have become acquainted with all its parts we shall have considered the full scope of honour, pure and simple. It has four parts: wisdom, justice, courage, temperance. (Inv. 2.53.159)

We have already seen how philosophical insights from the Stoic theory of scientific knowledge

regarding virtue and courage have shed some light on the argument of Hebrews. At appropriate

places in later chapters of this book we will use rhetorical insights to gain further insights into

that argument.

The tentative outline of the book is as follows:

Chapter 1 - 'Episth/mh in Stoic Thought

Chapter 2 - 'Episth/mh in Philo

Chapter 3 - 'Episth/mh in Rabbinic Judaism

Chapter 4 - 'Episth/mh in the Writings of Paul

Chapter 5 - 'Episth/mh as Pi/stij in Hebrews

57 OCD, 689.

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Chapter 6 – Assent in Hebrews

Chapter 7 – Cognition in Hebrews

Chapter 8 – Scientific Knowledge as Perfection in Hebrews

Chapter 9 – The Proposition in Hebrews and the Promises of Land, Temple, Prince/Priest, and

New Heart and Spirit in Ezekiel